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The years of falling prices, meagreness of profit, and
flooded markets began with 1873 and, with two short periods
of recovery (1879-82 and 1886-90)? continued until I096.
These years are often referred to as the "Great Depression",
but it Is not altogether a satisfactory term. Industrial
output Increased, although uneasily and more slowly than in
1
the "good years The wages of certain workers fell and
2
there was unemployment, but the fall in prices over the
period as a whole was greater than the fall In wages. Thus
3
on the average the peoples' lot improved. But it was a
moderate improvement only. Charles Booth after his
investigation in London (1887-93) estimated that a little
over thirty per cent of the population was more or less
b
poverty stricken, and T.H.Escott considered that Manchester
5
and Liverpool had even more poverty than London.
1 H.L.Beales, "The 'Great Depression' in industry and trade",
£gSQ2ala Hevisyf,, v (193^35), 65-75.
p
W,W.Rostow, "Investment and the 'Great Depression'", ibid..
VIII (1937-38/, 136-156; and M. Dessauer-Meinhardt,
"Monthly unemployment records, 18yb-1892", icononica. New
series, VII (19^-0), 322-6.
3 A.L.Bowley, Wag^ ia K&ngqom
1860. nassims and G.H.Wood, "Real Wages and the standard of
comfort since 185'0" J&wml 2L j^tigtlgol Sppjefry,
LXKII fl909), 91-103.
k
C.Booth, Life lom&L* £ov£r£y Series, II. 21.
(Revised ed. 19u£JV
5 T.R.S.Escott, MiOaM? 8D,
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In one sphere the term "great depression" was fully
applicable, and that was in agriculture. The impoverishment
of the land owners led to a decline in their political
influence, and the Conservatives, as Mr. Ensor has pointed
out, were "enabled, indeed compelled ... to become a town
1
party In Ireland the ill equipped small tenant farmers
were forced into a hard, and not always successful struggle,
to make a living from their holdings. From their poverty
came the revolution in Irish land tenure, and for Irish
nationalism a driving force such as it had never had before.
These lean years did much to weaken confidence in
economic liberalism as the one and only road to the greatest
well-being both of the individual and of the community, and
stimulated the growth of collectivisfcic trends. The
collectivistic trends had little of the doctrinaire. The
democratic spirit was abroad among the electors as never
before, and xms linked with an expansion of the humanitarian
movement unparaHelled in the nineteenth century.
Collectivistic programmes were first adopted in the municipal
politics of the cities. The health, comfort, and prosperity
of the citizens were vastly improved and confidence engendered
in the suitability of collectivistic remedies for national
ills.
R.C.K,Ensor, "Some political and economic Interactions in
later Victorian England" TjrangagUfflS QL ifel Historical
Society. Vth series. XXXI (l9'+9). 22.
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Imperialism was an Increasingly Important factor in the
eighties and nineties, and one which sapped much, strength from
the home rule cause. It developed slowly from about I87O
until the fall of Khartoum, and then for the remainder of the
century expanded with increasing impetus. The feeling that
Britain was being outclassed by foreign rivals in the economic
and military fields, the industrial and agricultural
depression, and the new value placed on colonies by other
powers were a few of the complex factors in which it was
rooted.
# & & #
The Irish home rule movement as distinct from the
repeal movement may be considered to have commenced with
the formation in I870 of the Home Government Association
of Ireland. Isaac Butt was its chairman and members Included
Liberals and Conservatives, Roman Catholics and Protestants.
Two years later the Ballot Act freed voters from intimidation,
ah event of special Importance in Ireland. In the general
election of I87U home rulers gained fifty-nine seats. (Half of
1
them were landowners and presumably landlords). In Parliament
Butt pleaded in a correct and eloquent manner for a provincial
Irish parliament but failed to have the matter taken seriously.
The result was that a number of Butt's followers broke with
his methods and adopted deliberate obstruction of parliamentary
business as a policy. Butt resigned the leadership in 1878
1 Sir J. O'Connor, iflgtary Ireland,. 1798 - 12^f, II. 36.
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and his place was taken by Parnel1. In June of the previous
year the parliamentary home rule movement and the Irish-
agrarian movement had been formally linked by the creation
of the National Land League. Parnell had accepted the
presidentship and four Fenians had been appointed secretaries
and treasurers.
The ministry which Gladstone formed in April i860
planned to govern Ireland by the ordinary law, but increasing
lawlessness caused it to abandon that intention. In 1881
it passed a bill which suspended the Habeas Corpus Act and
conferred on the Irish executive the power of arbitrary and
preventive arrest, Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Bright
consented to the measure with especial reluctance. In the
same year Gladstone passed a land reform bill which gave
the tenants the long demanded "three F*s". (Fair rent, fixture
of tenure, and free sale of the holding by the tenant). The
act surprised contemporaries by its comprehensiveness and
proved of much value to the tenants. Nevertheless, the
Parnellites ruthlessly attacked it and urged the tenants not
to use the provisions for the judicial revision of rents. The
Government replied by imprisoning Parnell in Kllmainham Gaol
and suppressing the National Land League. Their action was
followed by a further increase in crime and disorder in
Ireland. Parnell who had welcomed imprisonment for private
reasons wished for release a few months later. Negotiations
were undertaken by Chamberlain and Gladstone with Parnell, a
Queen's speech, 20 May i860, x'he Times. 21 May 1880, p. 6.
ix
Captain 0'Shea being the intermediary. An understanding was
reached by which the Government was to pass a bill to relieve
Irish tenants weighed down by rent arrears and in return
Parnell was to use his influence to maintain law and order.
The release of Parnell resulted in the resignation of W.E.
Forster, the Irish chief secretary, Gladstone replaced him
by Lord Frederick Cavendish, Lord Frederick arrived in
Dublin on 6 May and that evening he and the Irish under¬
secretary, T,Ii,Burke were assassinated. Great Britain and
most of Ireland were horrified. The Government replied by
the severe coercion act of 1883. It gave wide powers of
arrest, the power to suppress newspapers and to proclaim
meetings, and under certain circumstances allowed the right
of trial by jury to be restricted, the use of special jurors,
and change of venue. The arrears act promised to Parnell
was also passed in 1883, but its terms were not sufficiently
liberal to allow many tenants to use it.
In October 130b Chamberlain contacted the Irish Nationalists
with the object of bringing about a rapprochement between
the Nationalist and the Liberal party on the basis of
devolution for Ireland. (' 'Shea who was again the
intermediary sowed distrust between Chamberlain and Parnell
by suppressing certain Information). Gladstone gave his
support to the proposal and Cardinal banning secured the
provisional assent of the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy.
The outcome was that a scheme for an Irish "central board"
with both legislative and administrative functions was laid
before the Cabinet on 9 May 1883. The scheme was rejected.
X
All the peers except Granville opposed it and all the commoners
1
except Hartington supported it. Four days later Dilke
resigned on a matter which had arisen out of the defeat of
the "central board" scheme and chamberlain resigned in
support of him. The resignations were temporarily suspended,
but were still not withdrawn, when on 8 June the Government
was defeated by the combined vote of Conservatives and
Nationalists.
Salisbury's ministry decided to attempt to rule Ireland
b ' the ordinary law. (The I883 coercion act expired in
August 1885). Placed in power by the Irish Nationalists
and with no over-all majority in the Commons, it could
scarcely have passed a coercive measure had it wished to do
so. The Conservative reversal of Irish policy and the pains
which they took to do nothing which might offend the Irish
Nationalists made a deep impression. Very many began to
wonder whether there was any demand which would not be
conceded under the British party system to a determined group
2
in return for a temporary parliamentary support. The
attitude of the Government, continued support of it by the
Irish Nationalists, and remarks which Salisbury made in two
3
speeches even led some to suspect that the Conservative
1
Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 132? Morloy, III. 19*+; and
Chamberlain, 1^-9.
p
See below pp. /gy-72..




leaders were not unfriendly to home rule. On 1 August the
2
Irish viceroy, Carnarvon, with Salisbury's consent, had a
secret interview with Prnell at which Parnell's views
3
were asked for and discussed. The Irish tenants were
given a very real boon in the Ashbourne Land Purchase Act
of this administration.
£ :Js :<5
Gladstone's adoption of home rule caused six of his
lieutenants to oppose him, They were Hartington and
Chamberlain - the two most influential Liberals in the
country apart from Gladstone - Goschen, James, Trevelyan, and
Courtney.
Partington was widely regarded as the embodiment of
honesty and sound judgment and as the man who always placed
If
the national Interest first. The Conservative Sir Richard
Temple noted that he ted seen few politicians so widely and
5
deeply respected. Margot Asquith considered that Martington
1
dee below p. j<?o.
2 dir A, Hardinge, T^e life of . . . fourth bar! of Carnarvon.
1821-1800, III. 17b; and Lady Eurghclere [daughter of
Carnarvon) to The Times. 2b i;ov. 193- •
0 Memorandum drawn up by Carnarvon for Salisbury, 1 Aug.
13dy, Sir A. Carnarvon, on. ext.. III. 173-81.
hr
One observer in December 108y wrote thus of the attitude
of the people of Lancashire, the Rossendale Division of which
Hartington represented* "He may be summat back'ard, but we
know he means what he says, and performs more than he promises.
His character for downright honesty tells.(C.S.Roundell to
Spencer, 9 Lec. 1885, Miscellaneous, Aithorp).
'J Sir R,Temple, nettjqrs a^d g'^trqg^r sgoyghes iTo^
>:JgttSfc of cq,:iiiqna, 66.
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had the figure and appearance of an artisan, the brevity of a
peasant, the courtesy of a king, and the noisy sense of humour
1
of a Falstaff. The Gladstonian Stuart Handel described him
as emotionless, master of himself in every circumstance, and
without a spark of poetry or chivalry - a man who never went
out of his way for anyone, and seemingly was without the
2
desire to please. The Conservative, A.A.Baumann, considered
him a very shy, proud man with whom one was either on very
3
easy terns or no terms at all. The parliamentary journalist,
Sir Henry Lucy, summed up Partington as a hard working,
conscientious, stolid man, somewhat surly in manner, much
Impressed with the ; ulf between a marquess and a man to the
despite of the latter, and without humour, imagination, or
h
gracefulness of diction.
Hartington gave the impression of indifference and deep
5
boredom. When he was not sprawling on a bench or in an
6
armchair he was leaning agains t a pillar or a mantlepiece.
7
It was not uncommon for him, especially when in opposition,
1
Countess of Oxford anu Asquith, Autobiography of harlot
2 Lord Rendel, Pgr3,9raj pqpqre,
MMSj-iOhh, 35.
3 A.A.Eaumann, P^rgo,^ anu pgUvto, 83.
L.
sir H.w.Lucy, la W.
y Lord Rendel, loc. clt.
^
L.T.Raymond [pseud, of E.u.Thompson], Portraits 01 the
hlaeUos, 86.'
^ Sir A. Mackintosh, hchoo.a of 1 ir Pen, Ih.
to be asleep In his place in the Commons during tedious
speeches. He was a man of few words and spoke with a
1
slight drawl. He seeras to have had few or no intimate
friends and until his marriage, it appears, he entertained
2
little. He rarely wore a greatcoat or gloves and his hands
3
were disfigured by close bitten nails. His speeches were
without oratorical distinction and were delivered with his
V
customary air of boredom - a fact which gave life to the
5
myth that he habitually yawned when making them. His voice
6 7
was unmusical, he hesitated as though deep in thought,
and the final words of his sentences could be caught only
B
with difficulty. He barely succeeded in holding the
1 Lord Rendel, loc. cit.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
^ Sir H.W.Lucy, A ^jqry g£ 3alUgbOT parliament, b-79*
+ Once when Hartington was introducing an Indian budget he
had given a huge yawn and had muttered, "This is damned dull"
to A.M.Porter, the Irish Attorney General. (Sir A.Mackintosh
op. cit.. lh). This Incident was probably the origin of the
myth that Hartington habitually yawned during hi3 speeches.
The myth in its turn has been the parent of the following
anecdote which is still currents Lord Hartington once
dreamed that he was making a most important speech in the
House of Commons and on waking up discovered that that was
exactly what he was doing.
6
Sir H.W.Lucy, loc. cit.
7 H.Hutchinson, P2£fc£&Ua °£ eighties. 22.
a Ibid.
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attention of the Commons when making momentous official
1
statements. Gut of office he had to address largely empty
2
benches.
Iiartington was a slow thinker and had a lethargic
3
temperament. He was noted for his unpunctuality and was
sometimes very forgetful. On one occasion he forgot to
h-
deliver an important message entrusted to him by the Queen.
Many contemporaries credited the report that he was deeply
interested only in horse racing and that he took part in
politics with reluctance and purely from a strong sense of
duty. Viscount Esher, who had been his private secretary
(1373-35), reported a different story. He. considered that
Iiartington had no real interest apart from politics and that
if cut off from them he would have been as bored as he
5
appeared, to be by them. Esher had never known anyone- who
6
pondered longer over state problems and he discovered that
liar ting ton insisted upon "accuracy in detail, at first hand.
7
and from original sources Iiartington was not without
chivalry, f'sher reported that he rarely allowed any ra£disance
1
Jir K.W.Lucy, Hcrj. na^^£ ill 199.
2
ibid.
3 Holland, II. 2Vj-1; J.S.otrachey, ^ adenture of livjrx£,
397-3; H.Brett to W.l.utead, 22 April 1336. Journals and
l&y&ES. 3L Reginald V^coui^ I sfr -ff, I. 125.
^
Holland, II. 2*fG.





of a political or personal foe to pass unchallenged and
1
without some exculpatory or qualifying phrase.
Hartington*s over-close friendship with the Duchess of
Manchester was a well known, hut tolerated scandal. It had
2
begun in the early sixties and lasted until the death of
the Duke of Manchester permitted carriage in 1892. The
Duchess was strongly Conservative and Ilartington was believed
3
to he influenced by her views. Gladstone frequently
complained to his family that she influenced Kartington in
b
a Conservative and jingo direction.
5
Chamberlain was resolved on securing the premiership
and had Gladstone not taken up home rule he i/oulu almost
certainly have secured it. He was ambitious, resolute,
tenacious, and abounded in drive and self-confidence. Lady
Asquith considered that he owed his position to his contagious
6
belief in himself and his compelling individuality. He was,
7





3 Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, £17; and Sir P. Magnus, Gladstones
& biography. 3S+8•
k
Sir P. Magnus, loc. cit.
5
Minute of Sir H.W.Lucy on conversation with Chamberlain,
29 April 19c J, Sir K.W.Lucy, sixty years In the wilderness. 2
and The i£ll2y£i£n pqr^a^at, 190.
6 Sir A.West, Prjyat^ diari,e^, 100.
7 Countess of Oxford and Asquith, Autobiography of liargot
A aqui tlx. 1?HS.
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popularity among the Liberal masses was surpassed only by that
1
of Gladstone. He was especially popular with the Free
Churchmen. Hot only was he the leading advocate of their views
on education and disestablishment, but he was a Unitarian and
2
prided himself on being descended from one of the clergy who
had suffered ejection from his living rather than comply with
the 1662 Act of Uniformity. In Birmingham audiences greeted
him with a greater enthusiasm than they did the veteran John
3
Bright. But whigs had no love for the man who had expounded
the "Unauthorized Programme" and had referred to liarting ton
h 5
as Hip van Winkle and Goschen as the skeleton at the feast.
To Conservatives he was an anathema, Lucy has written that
Gladstone they distrusted and detested, but Chamberlain they
loathed and feared. Had he not suggested that the wealthy
7
should pay "ransom" for the security of their property and
e.£. The British quarterly review. 1 April 1686 ( p. h-l1*-),
noted! "In the country his [Chamberlain's] influence Is second
only to that of Mr# Gladstone himself ". In certain areas he
was much more popular than Gladstone. During the 1885 election
campaign Hev. Tuckwell found at many of the Liberal meetings
that "if audiences cheered Gladstone's name for two minutes,
they cheered Chamberlain's for five." (Reminiscences of -p
Hadleal parson. 59).
2 Chamberlain's speech at Deribifrh. 20 Oct. 188h. The Times,
21 Oct. l&d1' , p. 10. —
3 Sir A, Mackintosh, I chocs of - In Bon, l*f.
?i"
Speech at Warrington, 3 Sept, 1886, - ho Times. 9 dept. 1885,
p. 6.
** Speech at Towbridge, Wiltshire, 1J+ Oct. 1885, 'The Timesf
lj Oct. 1885, P« 6,
° Sir II.W.Lucy, urns. M 1°5.
^ Speech at Birmingham, 5 Jan. 1885, The Times. 6 Jan. 1885,
P. 7.
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referred to Salisbury as the spokesman of the class who "toil
1
not neither do they spin"? Did his "caucus" not make a
travesty of British democracy ?
Gladstone was the greater orator, but in debating ability
2
Chamberlain stood supreme, Lucy noted that Chamberlain had
a lightning-like acuteness and a consummate gift of lucid
3
expression. He described his speeches as in the main business
talk, pellucid, persuasive, arousing enthusiasm on his own
b
side and lashing his opponents with whips of scorpions.
Chamberlain had a vigorous, straightforward phraseology; a
5 6
clear, musical voice ; and a faultless enunciation. The
fiercer the attack upon him, the more noisy the interruption,
7
the brighter and cooler he became. Those who interrupted
him often received cause to regret their action. Lady Asqulth,
Speech at Birmingham, 30 March 1383, the Times, 31 March
1803, p. 10,
2
ja.jg. "To the end Gladstone remained what he was, even when
compared with Mr* Bright in his prime - the finest orator in
the House of Commons. In sheer debating power, in the quick
give and take of Committee work, he was excelled by Mr,*
Chamberlain , . (Sir H.W.Lucy, negpfips o£ parli^u;ienta, 23).
3 Sir H.W.Lucy, A aiqg.V sL J&S Parl,iaTjsat>
k
Sir H.W.Lucy, HqaqflPff M£HkiMiAS? 190.
tj
£.£• Ikid.i and Lord Frederick Hamilton, &LYS J2S£2£S.
yesterday. 211.
^ Sir II.W.Lucy, Memories of eir ht parliaments. 190; and T.P.
O'Connor, Skc-tcfreff In j&e Hoqse, §+pfT
7 Sir II.VI.Lucy, A &WX Mm Oallsiiiry 1^7?
and Lord Frederick Hamilton, loc. ext.
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who heard him many tines, has written that self-mastery was
particularly noticeable in Chamberlain's speaking, and that
he used such an economy of gesture, movement, and colour
that Ids opponents were snowed under by his accumulated
1
moderation. He hit hard and sometimes with a ruthlessness
which, makes one wonder whether he fully realized how much
his words must have injured. I.'e himself could be very
sensitive to other men's phrases. The Pr.ll ifoH. it seems,
once remarked of him that he was "as touchy as a schoolgirl
2
auu as implacable as Juno
Chamberlain had wide Interests, was an excellent
3
conversationalist, and had a good sense of humour. lie
was steadfast in his friendships. Ilorley has recorded that
to Chamberlain a friend was not merely a comrade in a
if
campaign, but an innermost element in his existence. In
conversation he was "startingly candid and direct Garvin
referred to the ardonlc recklessness of his conversation and
explained that to Chamberlain private talk was all relief and
play and no guide to his full meaning and much less to his
2
Countess of Oxford and Asquith, Aiitobiorranhv of farpot
Agqnitfr, llf6.
2
Salisbury to Balfour, 29 Inarch 1886, I .E.C.Ducdale,
Adite fes 79.
3
Viscount Korley, collect.' o is. I. Lk. II, chap, i, nassim.
itii., i. iou
5 W, d.Churchill, treat coato: luorerios. 73.
1
intended method. Chamberlain was thoroughly loyal to his
supporters and drew from them devoted service. Cue who knew
him well has described him as a natural chieftain? "He
expected obedience and loyalty . . ., but he felt in every
corner of his being that it was the duty of the chieftain to
2
succour, to help, and to advance those who stood by him".
Coschen was the most prominent of the more extreme right
wing Liberals. He had been Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster In Russell's second ministry, and President of the
Poor law Board and later I'irst Lord of the Admiralty in
Gladstone's second ministry. His refusal to reduce the
Admiralty estimates had been largely responsible for the
dissolution of the government in lb7K. He had represented
the interests of the British bondholders in I876 in an
3
investigation of the Egyptian finances. In lbdO he had
successfully undertaken a special embassy to the Sultan of
Turkey to induce him to carry out certain provisions of the
h-
Treaty of Berlin. He had strongly opposed the equalization
of the borough and county franchise and on that account, could
$
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the Viceroyship of India in 1300 and the Secretaryship for
2
War two years later.
Goschen was the son of a prosperous banker and was of
3
German descent. He had been a member of his father's firm
if
and a director of the bank of England. He was a recognized
financial authority and had written a book of some importance
The U-ieory of the foreign exchanges. Asquith considered that
o
he had a complex, but not a subtle mind. T.P.t'Conr.or
described him as acute, subtle, a dialectician to the finger
6
tins, and perhaps the most destructive critic in the Commons
3
Men trusted Goschen, but felt no affection for him. He was
distant in conversation and sometimes seemed pompous and
9 10





J Ibid., chap, i, passim.
k
IM&Ur chap, ii, ji^aiij.
J Sir A.West, 1-rivaue diaries. 20.
6 T.P.C Connor, .mcetqhoq, ill £h& Hyp??, IP2.
7 Ibid.. 191.
u
A.A.Baumann, last Victorians. 103-h, and lib.
9 Ibid.. 113.
10 Gladstone to Sir A.West in conversation, 10 Jan. 1391,
Sir A.West, .. -ivae. claries. l>i and Lady Asquith to Sir A.
West in conversation, 26 Lee. 1392, ibid.. 101.
shore blame or distribute praise, and was sensitive to public
1
and private opinion. His speeches were good in substance
and form but were marred by the delivery. They were either
2
a torrent or a tempest. His voice was raucous and hoarse,
3
his speaking disjointed, and his manner ungainly, When he
consulted notes he held them close to his face because of
b
short sight. He was excitable and easily disconcerted by
5
interjections, but sometimes his retort was crushing,
6
Janes, the youngest son of a Hereford surgeon, was
another right wing liberal, but a less militant one than
Goschen, lie had been made Solicitor-General in September 1873
and two months later Attomey-G-oneral. He had been again
Attorney-General in Gladstone's second ministry. He had




Lady Asquith to Sir A, West in conversation, 26 bee. 1892.
P
A.A.Bauiiiann, ext. ? lly.
3 Kate Courtney's journal, 13 April 1886, Courtney XX; Sir
A. West, Private •.juries, 171, and 352; Sir b. Lucy, :, :\i and
£ Mk Parliament;, 80, and A d,i^ry ^ the parliament.
103, and m-IC; A.A.Laumann, ££. cit.. and Sir A.
Mackenzie, _eho^ of LXlL 27.
b
cir A .Mackenzie, loc. cit.: and R.Farquharson, Iij and out
o£ Parliament. 282.
y A .A .Laumann, or;, cit.. ll>.
6
Lord Askwith, Lord James o£ Hereford, l*f.
7 JM&.> chap, ix, pfigjjp.
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James was a person:.1 friend of Gladstone and had been
givui a knighthood by him in 1373 - facts which made him
1
especially reluctant to oppose GI -dstone on home rule. lie
2
was a rood advocate, but not a profound lawyer. His speeches
were straightforward, clear, and, as a rule, lengthy. He
3
spoke rapidly in a low voice. Sir diehard Temple described
Janes1 speaking as majestic and of a classical excellence,
but admitted that sometimes his voice dropped too much for
a noisy, restless assembly such as the mouse of Commons.
Lucy, on tho other hand, considered that Jar.es was nowhere
5
near the front rank of parliamentary debaters or orators.
James was staunchly loyal to his party, once when ill he
had been unable "to pair" and had insisted on being taken to
the house of Commons and laid on a sofa so that he might vote
6 7
in an important division. He was exceptionally generous.
Speech by James, 13 hay 1886, Hansard. CCCV, cols. 912-13.
2w
Sir C.I.Lucas, "Sir Henry James", flctionarv of national
Btorraobv- ...cot .y"—1 mont. l°oi-1011. I. t<C.
3 Sir tf.U. Luc;/, A dlarv of tho SnllsLv-rv parlla^ont. 252;
anu ■0^:1 a nd manner""in Parliament, 18*67""
k
Sir R. Temple, a^u ffkqfrche.a tto
House of Commons. 73.
CC
J Sir H.W.Lucy, A fjnry of tdo Xalifrfoafy ,PSr,U?</■<■.<IP, 376.
° Sir A. West, "Lord James of Hereford", Cornhill Harazine.
XXXII (1912), 22.
/
BM'9 23i and J, McCarthy, cya, II.
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When still a young and comparatively poor man h© had made over
the whole of his saving's to the widow of a school friend, who
1
had boon left with no means of support. He himself was
unmarried,
Trevelyan was the only son of the Sir Charles Trevelyan
who had done much for the reform of the civil services in
India and Britain, He was a nephew of Lord Macaulay and was
2
much influenced by Haeaulay's views. He had written two books
of note (fife and letters of ;.ord facaulav and harly history
of Charles dames fox) and was to write others. He had
entered Parliament in 1865 at the age of twenty-seven. He
had been a lord of the Admiralty, 1869-7°? Parliamentary
Secretary to the Admiralty, 1S8C-2; Chief Secretary for
Ireland, 1382-1*; and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
18GV-5* He had accepted the Chief Secretaryship for Ireland
following the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and
his period of office had been one of unusual difficulty,
3
Trevelyan was a shy man, seems to have lacked self-
confidence, and apparently worried easily. One person who
was much in his company for two days during his Irish Chief
Secretaryship concluded that he was a pleasant companion of
much literary ability and wide reading, but was too excitable,
Sir . , host, cit., 23.
G,II,Trevelyan, fir decree Otto frevelvan. 151.
-J Lord Knutsford to G. .Trevelyan, quoted without date,
G.H.Trevelyan, op,, cit.. 1*4-8.
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too nervous, and too easily influenced by outward appearance
1
to be a good legislator or administrator. The same person
recorded that during a visit to Belfast Trevelyan received
telegrams several tines in the day informing him that his
2
children, whom he had left in Dublin, were safe. He had a
strong voice and was a clear and forcible sneaker, but with
3
awkward ma nnerisms.
Courtney was the eldest son of a bank manager in
Penzance. be had left school at thirteen years of age to
.5
become a clerk in his father's bank. After almost six
years as a clerk he had won a sizarshlp to St. John's
College, Cambridge where he had had a distinguished
6
undergraduate career. He had been called to the bar in
18£8, but was drawn into journalism and in 1865 had been
7
appointed a leader writer to The xirnes. In 1872 he had
been given the chair of political economy at University
College, London, but had resigned the appointment throe years
d
later in order to visit India. His first election to
•i
Lady Cowan ( ife of Sir 3'.,P.Cowan, Lord Mayor of Belfast,
1801-2) to x. Hacknight, quoted without date, 1• Macknight,
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Parliament was in 1872. Ke had been Under-Secretary for the
Home Department, 1880-15 Under-Secretary for the Colonies,
1881-2; end Financial Secretary to the Treasury, loci2-U.
He had resigned from the administration in lotP+ because of
the Cabinet's refusal to include proportional representation
1
in the franchise reform bill of that year.
Courtney had married Kate Potter, a sister of the
Beatrice Potter who was to become famous as Beatrice Webb.
lie was a Radical and a friend of I'orley, Gladstone once
unfairly described him as "a confined faddist and lover of
paradox, the advocate of womens' franchise, minority votes,
bimettalism and the rest He was a good parliamentary
speaker, vigorous and logical, but did not have the voice
3
and delivery necessary for first rate oratory. lie was a
V
little too didactic In his speeches. Lucy referred to his
Koses-on-the-mountain. attitude and stated that the Commons
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CHAPTER I
THE LIBERAL LEADERS DIVIDE
In the weeks following the rejection of the Central Board
Scheme (9 May 1885) Gladstone's mind developed towards the
idea of self-government as advanced by the Irish Nationalists.
One can do no more than speculate on which were the factors
that consciously or unconsciously influenced hira or how far
any one factor was responsible. Iiis conversion seems to have
1
been completed by early August although he was still far from
2
formulating a concrete plan. He broached the matter first
to Granville and Spencer. Granville admitted that "the
Chamberlain Manning Parnell scheme" combined all disadvantages
if
and that he favoured a stronger measure. Spencer's reaction
is not recorded. On 7 August Gladstone uncovered the trend of
5
his thoughts to Hartington. Hartington was much alarmed,
■®"
Hartington to Granville, 8 Aug.1885, P.R.Q., 3°«29«22A (q.w.o,,
B.Holland, The life of Spencer Cornuton. eighth Duke of Devonshire
II. 77-785 5 and Sir T.Dyke Acland to GiRussell, n.d., q.w.o.,
F.W.IIirst, Earlv life and letters of John Morlev. 263. (Tho
conversation described took place in August and must have
been prior to Gladstone's departure for Norway on the 8th).
2 Gladstone to Granville, 6 Aug. 1385, P.R.O., 30.29.22A
(J.Morley, The Jj£e of Wil^ia- • MkZS Gladstone?, 111.216).
3 Granville to Spencer, 1^ Aug. 1885, Granville vol.,A1thorp.
^ Hiii-
' Hartington to Granville, 8 Aug. 1885.
2
hut assumed that Gladstone would retire from politics rather
than destroy party unity by the advocacy of a separate Irish
P
legislature. Uext day Gladstone began a three week cruise in
llorwegian waters. On his return he said that he was still
•3
uncertain whether or not to remain in the leadership. Two
factors attracted him to remain and in a short time they
prevailed. The immediate one was to prevent the Moderate
Liberal-Radical feud fro;:, smashing the party and the other
k
was to settle the Irish problem.
As the weeks passed the latter task dominated his
imagination more and more. On 11 September he assured.
Iiartington, "Nothing can be more unlikely according to present
appearances than any effective or great legislative action for
5
Ireland." A fortnight later he hinted in a letter to
Chamberlain that, if Parnell were to be returned with eighty
or ninety followers and were to produce a scheme with adequate




Gladstone to Iiartington (draft), 3 dept. 1835, Add.Mss.
W+l*+o f. lli+ (Holland, II. 78-80); and Gladstone to
Chamberlain (draft), 9 dept. 1885, Add.Mss.Mi-126, f.93
(J.Chamberlain, A political memoir. 121-2; and q.w.o.,
J.L.Garvin, Life of Jog&ph c toiler ial^, II. 92-93).
1+
Gladstone to Granville (draft), 5 °ct. 18o>, Ado., ss.
M+178, f. 229; and Gladstone to Granville, 13 Jan.1836, P.R.O.,
Chats. 3lf0. 1909 (Holland, II. 112-13 and Ilorley, 111.282-3).
Gladstone to Iiartington (draft), 11 dept. 188y, Add.liss.
M+li+3, f. 136 (Holland, II. 86-80).
3
1
new Liberal government would be to accept and to promote it.
On 22 October he reported to Granville that he was trying to
familiarise his mind with the Irish problem, but, if one can
.judge from his remark that he believed there was "great
advantage in a constructive measure which would be subject to
repeal or recall compared with the repeal of the Union," had
2
not advanced far. Nevertheless barely eight weeks later
his ideas had crystallized sufficiently to make possible the
indiscretion of his son which came to be known as the Hawarden
"Mite".
The antagonism between Moderates and Radicals, which had
done so much to bring about the collapse of the previous
Liberal administration, was now intensified by the determination
of the Radicals to make the most of the new franchise.^
This antagonism in itself might have ensured Gladstone's
continuance in the leadership for it was clear that only
under him could sufficient unity be retained to give the party
a reasonable chance of success in the general election.
Hartington himself admitted that he did not believe his
1
Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 26 Sept. loby, Add.fas.
M+126, f. 107 (q.w.o. Garvin, II. 97-96).
2 Gladstone to Granville, 22 Oct. 1385, P.R.O., 30.29.22A
(Holland, II. 89-90).
3
The following remarks which Chamberlain penned during the
general election give an indication of the strength of feeling
between Radicals and Moderates: "Foljambe is out for which I
am devoutly thankful. There goes another Moderate Liberal and
Hartington's speech did not help him. I hope E.Cavendish
LHartington's brotherl will go too. He is not safe."
(Chamberlain to Labouchere, 7 Lec. 1885, A Thorold, The life
of Henry Labouchere. 2b6).
if
leadership to he possible and added that he had no wish to
attempt it. ^This indispensabllity of Gladstone both
enhanced his influence within the party and reduced the pressure
which colleagues could bring to bear upon him, "If we chose
to go into direct opposition," Chamberlain remarked to Dilke,
"we might smash him, but the game is not worth the candle, I
2
think•"
In order to strengthen the unity of the party, and perhaps
also his own position, Gladstone endeavoured to obtain
statements from his three lieutenants, Hartington, Chamberlain,
and Granville, that they wished him to continue in the
3
leadership, Granville alone gave a spontaneous assent.
Hartington refused to commit himself. He admitted that if
party unity could be secured, it could be done only under
if
Gladstone. "Whether I desire that such unity should be
secured," he bluntly Informed Gladstone, "must depend on
what the party is likely to do, if in a majority after the
5
election." He urged Gladstone to call a meeting of the party
leaders to ascertain whether the different sections could
1
Hartington to Gladstone, 10 Sept. 1885, Add.Mss.Mfli+8,
f. 131 (Holland, II. 83-85).
2 Chamberlain to Dilke, 20 Sept. 1885, Add.Mss.i+3876, f.127.
3 Granville to Gladstone, 9 dept. 1885, Add.Mss.M+178, f.187.
U-
Hartington to Gladstone, 6 Sept. 1885, Add.Hss.)iJ,lJ+8,
f. 1;0 (Holland, II. 80-81).
^
Hartington to Gladstone, 10 Sept. 1885, ibid.. f. 131
(Holland, II. 83-85).
5
acquiesce in whatever policy, and especially in w^hatever Irish
1
policy, he proposed to adopt. Gladstone, however, had little
wish to be caught where he would be expected to give definite
2
commitments and resolutely refused such a meeting. Chamberlain,
who did not yet know the trend of Gladstone's ideas on Ireland,
3trove to induce him to commit the party to certain objects.
These were, the principle of "free education", the extension
of the local government proposals to include parish councils,
and local authorities to have power to compel the sale of land
for the creation of small holdings, and to have control of
a
local charities and educational endowments.
Parnell, encouraged by his interview of 1 August with
Carnarvon, the Irish Viceroy, as well as by the obvious anxiety
of the Conservative Government to do nothing which might
antagonise him, appears to have assumed that the Conservatives
wero well on the road to the acceptance of home rule. At any
rate he acted as though on that assumption and by his cynical
contempt for the opinion of Great Britain did his cause
irreparable harm during the remainder of the year. This was
especially true of his two Dublin speeches of 2k and 25 August
in which he declared that home rule would be granted no matter
1
Ilartlngton to Gladstone, 6 and 10 Sept. 1885.
2
Gladstone to Hartington (draft), 11 Sept. 1885, Add.Mss.
(Holland, II. 86-88).
^ Chamberlain to Gladstone, 10 and 12 Sept. 1885, Add.Mss.
M+126, ff, 95 artG 102 (Chamberlain, 122-3 a^d 126-7, and
q.w.o. Garvin, II. 93-9*0.
6
whether the government should be Whig or Tory and that it was
now "only a question of how much self-government they will be
1
able to cheat us out of." Nothing less would satisfy, he said
on that occasion, than an independent legislature, preferably
unencumbered by a house of lords, with full power over lands,
2
rents, and education, and with the right to protect industries.
Five days after the Dublin speeches Hartington at Waterfoot
stated his unqualified opposition and warned Parnell that in
the long run his programme would cause the other parties to
3
unite against him. On b September Chamberlain, speaking at
Warrington, disclosed that, although willing to concede "the
greatest measure of local government", he was no less opposed
than Hartington to home rule as Parnell had defined it.
During the months when Gladstone was becoming more and
more engrossed in home rule he did not conceal from Chamberlain
that Ireland was a major interest with him, but he in no way
1
The Times. 25j and 26 Aug, 1385.
2 Ibid.
^ Ibid.. 31 Aug. 1885, P* 8.
l'
9 Sept. 1885, p. 6.
1
took him into his confidence although it was from the champion
of the Central Board Scheme that he could most reasonably expect
sympathy for his own ideas. In addition Chamberlain was, after
himself, the most popular Liberal in the country and had great
influence within the party machine. The main explanation
perhaps lay in the strained relations caused by Chamberlain's
determination to gain the greatest possible recognition for
radicalism. It is understandable that Gladstone should have
had an antipathy to the hard bargaining plebeian, who so often
treated him more as an ally than as a leader and for whom the
welfare of the party as a whole was secondary to the welfare
of the Radicals, Besides, Gladstone still harboured the old
suspicion that Chamberlain had been responsible for certain
cabinet leakages in the previous Liberal ministry and feared
2
to trust him with confidential information. Then, too,
Gladstone to Chamberlain (drafts)* 8 dept. 1885, Add.Mss.
44126, f. 93 (q.w.o. Garvin, II, 92-93)5 26 Sept. 1685 ibid.,
f. 107 (Chamberlain, 161; and q.w.o. Garvin, II. 97-98), 25
Oct. 1885, ibid., f. 114 (Chamberlain, 131-2; and Garvin, II.
113); 6 Hov. 1885, lbld.r f. 118 (q.w.o. Chamberlain, 134).
Gladstone to Chamberlain, 22 Sept. 1885, Chamberlain, 130-1 (also
Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 185-6)• chamberlain to Dilke, 7 Oct.
1885, Add.Mss.^3876, f. 140 (q.w.o, Garvin, II, IO7-8); and
9 Oct, 1885, ibid.. f. 142 (Garvin. II. 106). Gladstone to
Granville, (letter no. 1), 8 Oct. 1885, B.R.O.3O.29.29A (Morley,
III. 224-5). Chamberlain to Labouchere, 20 Oct. 1885, A.Thorold,
The Life of Henry LabouchereT 239-40. Chamberlain's memoir,
Chamberlain, 167,
2
Gladstone to Hartington, 2 Jan, 1886, Chats. 34C.1883
(Holland, II, 108-9); and J.L.Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish
nation, 483 (Hammond bases his statement on notes by Gladstone
in the Gladstone papers. The present writer has been unable to
locate these notes and so possibly they are among the reserved
memoranda of Gladstone's third Cabinet).
8
1
Gladstone, from at least 7 October onwards, believed that
Chamberlain and he were in agreement on the essentials of the
home rule question and possibly Gladstone assumed that, should
he produce a scheme, Chamberlain could be relied on to support
it. What Gladstone does not seem to have taken into account
was the possibility that Chamberlain and he might hold
conflicting views on what would, and what would not, endanger
the integrity of the Empire.
Gladstone's failure to take Chamberlain into his
confidence was a tactical error. It was made doubly so by
another circumstance. From early in October Herbert Gladstone
£
had been corresponding through Labouchere with the Irish
Nationalist Mealy. He could scarcely have chosen a less
suitable intermediary, Labouchere delighted in intrigue and
3
was quite unscrupulous. He was at that time an enthusiastic
supporter of Chamberlain and on his own initiative kept
Chamberlain informed of the correspondence even to the extent
of providing him with copies of some of the more important
1
Gladstone to Granville, 8 Oct. 1885, P.K.0.30»29«29A
(Morley, III. 22^5).
2
iiadical M.P, for Northampton, and owner and editor of Iruth.
3 "Beware of Labby (baboucherJ", Karcourt warned Chamberlain
some weeks later, "lie talks to everybody, writes to everybody
and betrays everybody" (Harcourt to Chamberlain, h Jan. 1886,
Chamberlain, 175-6), and Morley once remarked of him, "His
powers of amplification and ornamentation are so prodigious
that it is hardly safe to let him have two words to build upon".
(Morley to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1887, Add.Mss.lPf255, f. 171) •
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1
letters. Chamberlain, of course, intensely resented what he
2
considered were negotiations conducted behind his bach.
The interview with Carnarvon appears to have cade Parnell
eager to ascertain the extent to which Gladstone would be willing
to meet Nationalist aspirations. A few days later Mrs. 0'Shea
wrote to Gladstone offering to send him a paper on Ireland
drafted by Parnell. Gladstone replied that he would look
upon such a paper as ,!one of very great public interest" but
cade clear that he would not enter into any form of
3
counter-bidding for Parnell's support. Gladstone heard
nothing more of the paper until 23 October when Mrs. O'Shea
wrote asking for a Liberal seat in Ulster for her husband
and added that she had Psmell1 s paper should he wish to see
b
it. Gladstone replied that he did and received a rough plan
whereby Ireland was to be governed by an elected chamber with
powers of legislation in all domestic affairs, but with no
power to interfere in imperial matters. "The representation
of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament might bo retained or
1 Laboucher© - Chamberlain correspondence, Oct.-Dec. 18o5,
A.Thorold, The Life of Henry Labouchere. Chap. XI,
2 Lord Harcourt's journal, 9 Dec. I88y, quoted in A.G.
Gardiner, Life of Sir William warcourt. Brett to
liar ting ton, lj Dec. 138>, Journals and letters of Reginald
Viscount I sher. I, 110; and Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain,
iT^TlS? and 170.
^ Gladstone to Mrs. O'Shea (draft), 8 Aug. lodp, Add.Mss.
Mf269, f. 225.
**
Mrs, O'Shea to Gladstone, 23 Oct. 138^, ibid.. f. 226.
10
might be given up", the document naively stated. Again
Gladstone would in no way com it himself. The subject of the
paper, he remarked, could be considered only by the Government
of the day, but that all information in regard to it was of
great interest to him.
However this is not the whole story of Gladstone's contact
with the Nationalists at this period. There still remains the
correspondence (conducted through Labouchere) between his son
Herbert and T,M,Healy. Herbert Gladstone in his -'titer thirty
year3 stated that,
Both in letters and in private talks he [Gladstone]
had told me that there was no reason why I should not
state my own views of his position. ... It was a
definite authorisation, and I took it to mean that he
wished his position to be known by those whom it
directly concerned, I had accordingly written or spoken
freely to Labouchere, Eryce, and many others. . . . 2 * 3
Herbert Gladstone was perfectly aware that Labouchere was
little more than the intermediary through which he was
communicating with Healy. Thus it seems clear that he believed
his father wished his views to be made known to Ilealy and
1
Lord Richard Grosvenor to Mrs, O'Shea (draft in Gladstone's
handwriting), £3 ?3 Nov. 1885, ibid.r f. 236. (Gladstone
drafted two replies to Mrs. G'Shea; one from himself (f.23k)
■which was not sent and this one).
2
Viscount Gladstone, After thirty years. 309-IO.
3 Labouchere informed Chamberlain that Herbert Gladstone asked
him just before the end of the session to endeavour to arrange
some form of modus vlvendi with the Nationalists (Labouchere
to Chamberlain, 18 Oct. 1885, A.Thorold, Vh-.. life of henry
Labouchere. 297-8) - but then a statement of Labouchere, unless
supported by other evidence, has to be treated with great
caution.
11
presumably to the other Irish leaders. Why Gladstone should
have done so is a matter on which one can only speculate, but
that he did so wish makes him, in a sense, at least part-
responsible for the correspondence. However, the question of
how far Gladstone was responsible for the contents of any one
of Herbert's letters is a different matter. Herbert has stated
that he was in daily conversation with Gladstone during that
autumn, "Hmt nevertheless it is possible that he wrote at
least a number of the letters without in any way consulting his
father just as later in December he did not consult him before
2
giving the press interview which resulted in the Hawarden "Kite".
On 7 October Healy in a reply to Labouchere suggested
that the nationalists be told what Gladstone was willing to
grant so that a compromise could be arranged and pointed out
that without an understanding the two parties would "run
3
amuck" with one another in the election. Labouchere passed
the letter to Herbert Clodstone remarking that some general
basis was required and suggested the Canadian internal
constitution. "A few words saying 'my father says' sent
privately to Healy would, I am sure, work wonders", he added.
1 Viscount Gladstone, liter thirty years, 306.
2
Ibid., 311.
^ T.M.IIealy to Labouchere ( copy), 7 Oct. 1335, Add.Mss.
*<•6019, f. 2m-.
** Labouchere to II,Gladstone, 10 Oct. 1885, Ac d.MssA6019,
f. 23.
Herbert took the hint and on the 12th forwarded Labouchere a
letter which under the phrase "my own impressions as to my
Father's view" indicated Gladstone's attitude more fully than
Gladstone had done to any but his more intimate colleagues.
He felt sure, ran the letter, that, provided the integrity
of the Empire was in no way infringed, there was no limit to
the powers which his father was willing to see granted to
Ireland for the management of Irish affairs. Further he thought
that his father in no way disapproved of the efforts of the
Nationalists to have the Conservative party take up their
question as that, if it could be done, might be the shortest
way to a settlement. "I have however", he stated, "heard him
say that unless they wish permanently and unconditionally to
sink or swim with the Tories, they had better bring the matter
to a speedy upshot". Two other points made were that he doubted
if his father would consider the gratuitous launching of a
plan - supposing he could see his way to one - the best means
of forwarding it at that stage and that he had heard his fattier
say that the protection of the minority v/ould be a difficult
1
problem. Healy replied that he had been speaking with Parnell
and that Parnell was confident home rule would be granted no
matter which party should win the election. He explained that
Parnell's idea was to abolish the Lord Lieutenancy, to fix an
imperial contribution based on a ten year average of Irish
H.Gladstone to Labouchere (draft), 12 Oct. 1865-. Add.Mss.
if6ci9, f. 26.
13
contributions minus the cost of ruling Ireland, and to retain the
Irish members at Westminster. Healy gave as his own view that
the nationalists would gain most from a conservative government
dependent upon Nationalist support because the Conservatives
i
controlled the House of Lords.
Three days later Herbert Gladstone replied in a long,
confused letter. The Nationalists, he urged, ought to come
to an agreement - that is if they could - with the Conservatives
before the general election as otherwise the Conservatives
night be able to refuse, or to avoid, a settlement of home
rule and might even be kept in power by a secession of anti-
Irish Liberals. Whether a plan could be devised which would
meet his father's two fundamental conditions was still unknown,
he wrote, but he believed that his father considered the great
obstacle to such a plan was not the protection of the
Protestants but of the landlords. The reminder of the letter,
and perhaps the most significant part, consisted of seven
reasons why the Nationalists would be advised to throw in their
1 I.M.Healy to Labouchere, 15 Oct. 1835, Add.Mss. MS019,
f. 33 (q.w.o., A.Thorold, Life qi henry Lsujonohere, 235-7).
No indication is given by Thoroid that several omissions have
been made in printing the text of this letter. The same is
true of a number of other letters in the book - a fact which
reduces the value of the ones for which originals are not
available for comparison. Also Mr. Howard, who had access to
the Chamberlain papers, informs us that for the Labouchere to
Chamberlain letters Thoroid had to rely on inaccurate copies
made by Chamberlain's secretary in I913. (Chamberlain,
footnote, 166).
2 H.Gladstone to Labouchere (draft), 13 Oct. 1885, Add.Mss.
V6019, f. 36,
lb
lot with the Liberals in the elections,
Healy seems not to have written again until 10 or 11
November when, if one can rely on Labouchere's transcript,
he stated that as far as he could gather from Parnell it was
not certain that the Nationalists would go against the
Liberals "bald headed, if at all". The request that the
Nationalists define their demands seemed to be, he complained,
a device for their discomfort and added that should the
Liberals gain a majority they would not find the Nationalists
1
unreasonable.
In a speech at Liverpool on 10 November Parnell made a
further attempt to induce Gladstone to reveal his intentions
2
by inviting him to draw up a constitution for Ireland, To
that Gladstone, when speaking a week later, retorted that he
was not a minister and had not the right to assume the
3
functions of a minister. However, possibly this may not
have been the whole of Gladstone's answer. On the previous
day Herbert had written to the intermediary Labouchere and,
one feels, had gone as far as was possible to meet Parnell's
impracticable invitation. In the letter the fundamental
conditions for the creation of an Irish legislature were
* Labouchere to Chamberlain, 12 Kov, lob?, a,Thorold, Life
Of lieary i..-.;bouch&.ro, 2^1-5•
2 ilie Tirana, 11 Kov, 1Gb?, p, 6.
^ lbio.. 18 i.ov. 1835, p. 10.
15
1
clearly set out? a conference between Liberals and Nationalists
suggested, thus emphasising that the wishes of the Nationalists
would be a prime consideration; and finally an assurance given
2
that on home rule Gladstone truly meant business.
Herbert's letter fell on barren ground. Far.sell,
believing that home rule was certain no matter whom the
elections should bring to power, held that his Immediate task
was to place his party in the position which would best eoable
him to extort the maximum amount of home rule when the time for
actual legislation should have come. Hence he decided to
endeavour at all costs to ensure that in the new Parliament
the Nationalists would continue to hold the balance and thus
be able to make or mar governments at will. The danger, he
recognised,was lest the Liberals, whose prospects were good,
should gain a majority over Conservatives and Nationalists
combined. To prevent such an outcome he finally decreed that
all possible assistance should be given >t the polls to the
Conservatives and on 21 November a violent manifesto was issued
ordering Irish Nationalists to vote Conservative and not for
1 The3g were : 1. the maintenance of the unity and integrity
of the Empire, 2. an Irish chamber for Irish affairs, 3. Irish
representatives to sit at Westminster for Imperial affairs,
b. the equitable division of Imperial charges by fixed
proportions, 5. protection of the minority in Ireland,
6. suspension of the Imperial authority for all civil purposes
in Ireland.
2 II.Gladstone to Labouchere (draft), 16 Nov. 1885, Add.IIss.
My-19, f. * 2.
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"the men who coerced Ireland, deluged Egypt with blood, menace
1
religious liberty in the school, the freedom of speech in
Parliament, and promise to the country generally a repetition
2
of the crimes and follies of the last Liberal administration",
one cannot doubt that in this Parnell made a grave error. Hot
only did the embittered struggle between Liberals and
Nationalists which followed make their co-operation more
difficult in the following year, but it increased the number
of Liberals publicly committed against a separate Irish
legislature.
The election of that autumn was fought in the main on
British domestic issues. The campaign of Chamberlain and the
Radicals for the programme of reforms which came to be known
3
as the "Unauthorised Programme" held the centre of the stage.
Few candidates treated home rule as the urgent question of the
moment, nevertheless, Ireland was not ignored. An examination
of the candidates* manifestos and speeches reveals that well
over half of the liberals had something to say on Irish affairs
and that about one fifth of the i made statements which can be
taken as indications that they were willing to contemplate at
1 For the Influence of the Schools Question in transferring
Roman Catholic votes to Conservative candidates see Mr. C.H.D.
Howard, "Parnell manifesto of 21 November 1385 and the schools
question", "indlioh historical ReviewT LXII. k-2,
2 The fines. 23 Nov. 186y, p. 11.
3 The sobriquet "Unauthorised Programme" was coined by Goschen
in a speech at Glasgow, 1*+ Oct. 1885. (The Tines. 1, Oct. 1885)•
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least some form of subordinate Irish legislature. Among the
latter were Korley and Childers. Chamberlain went forth with
energy pent up since the time of ids "ransom." speeches of the
early part of the year and in a tour which took him to Inverness
and back again he everywhere drew Immense crowds and was
greeted with wild enthusiasm. Hi3 campaign was a triumphal
progress which Gladstone himself could scarcely have equalled.
On 17 September Gladstone Issued his manifesto for the
election. His ain was, he explained to Granville, to provide
a statement which would hold through the election, and which
would avoid conflict with either IIw rting ton* s or Chamberlain's
followers. "*"In the manifesto he emphasised the importance of
an early withdrawal from Egypt and maintained that it would
result in Britain being restored to "that admirable position
in Europe of perfect independence and salutary influence," In
home affairs he put forward local government, the reform of
parliamentary procedure and of land transfer, the simplification
of registration for voters, and recognised to a certain extent
the Radical ideas on taxation. lie considered that reform of
the 'louse of Lords was not a question of the immediate future,
but he referred to it with approval. The House of Lords, he
complained, had been predominantly Tory ever since 1832 and
was likely to become progressively more so. He did not refer
adversely to the disestablishment of the Church of England, but
classed it as a question belonging to the dim and distant future.
1 Gladstone to Granville, 9 Sept, 1885, Pf-.O, 3u.29.29A.
13
On "free education" he wrote that he wished to reserve his final
judgment, but his remarks upon it were on the whole hostile.
Re dealt with Ireland at considerable length but in
generalisations which gave only the vaguest indication of his
views, \'he result was that very few Liberals saw in them any
suggestion that Gladstone was considering a separate Irish
parliament.
In spite of the statements on local government and taxation
Gladstone1s election manifesto fell short of what the Radicals
had hoped for and Chamberlain at once vrote informing his that
neither he nor Dilke could join an administration formed on the
2
basis of the programme which he had presented, Gladstone
protested that his aim was for the election only and that he
3
was not laying; down the policy for a new government.
Nevertheless, Chamberlain in speeches at the "Old Vic" and
5
at Bradford restated his intention of remaining aloof should
1 The important paragraph wasJ "In my opinion, not now for the
first time delivered, the limit is clear, within which any desires
of Ireland- constitutionally ascertained, may, and beyond which
they cannot, receive the assent of Parliament, To maintain the
supremacy of the Crown, the unity of the Empire, and all the
authority of Parliament necessary for the conservation of that
unity, is the first duty of every representative of the people.
Subject to this governing principle, every grant to portions of
the country of enlarged powers for the management of their own
affairs is, in my view, not a source of danger, but a means of
averting it, and is in the nature of a new guarantee for increased
cohesion, happiness, and strength," (The Times, 19 Sept.1335,p.d.).
2 Chamberlain to Gladstone (copy). £ Sept. 1835, Add.Mss.
1*3376, f. 127 (chamberlain, 129-38).
Gladstone to Chamberlain (no draft in Add,Mss,l+)+l26), 22
Sept, . 1835, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 135-6, and Chamberlain, I30-I.
h
iliS Ite5> 25 Sept. 1385, p. 6.
5
Ibid.. 2 Oct. 1885, P. 7.
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the election result in a Liberal government. However, the
issue was not fought to a finish for as Chamberlain wrote to
Dllke it was better to "work to get a majority and then make
1
our terms if we join the Government." Accordingly he finally
reduced his ultimatum for practical purposes to an acceptance
of the principle of powers for municipal authorities enabling
2
them to purchase land corapulsorily.
The Moderate Liberals, although in some ways less militant
than the Radicals, by no means left the field. Hartington,
Goschen, and others preached Moderate Liberalism on the
platforms, and, behind the scenes, Hartington as well as
Chamberla in endeavoured to put pressure upon Gladstone. On
8 November he wrote warring Gladstone that the only possibility
of keening the moderate men in the party lay in his taking a
3
strong and decided line against the Radicals.
The general election resulted in the return of 333
-T
Liberals, 2>X Conservatives, and 86 Parnellites. Fair trade,
the fear of disestablishment, the Nationalist vote, the memory
of Gordon and to a lesser extent of Majuba and Kaiwand, and the
revulsion of a number of Liberals from the party as a result of
1
Chamberlain to Dilke, 2- Sept. 1885, Auu.Mss.*1-3076, f. 127.
2
Chamberlain to Gladstone, 26 Sept. 1885, Add.-ss.M+126,
f. 117 (q.w.o., Garvin, II. 11L-15).
3 liar tington to Gladstone, 8 Nov. 1885, Add.Mss. M-lhS
(Holland, II. 90-9D.
if
Including T.P.u'Connor, Scotland Div., Liverpool.
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1
the activity of the Radicals enabled the Conservatives to carry
the boroughs, but the newly enfranchised farm workers, responding
to the "Unauthorised Programme", saved the day for Liberalism.
However, the Liberals did not gain the clear majority which
2
Gladstone had greatly desired and which most other men would
have regarded as a necessity for any attempt at a major
solution of the Irish problem. In Ireland the new franchise
and the Nationalist policy of supporting the Conservatives in
the constituencies which they did not themselves contest
resulted in the defeat of every Liberal candidate. In the
previous election Ulster had returned nine Liberals and the
rest of Ireland five. It was no ted with apprehension that
twenty-two of the Rationalists returned had already been in
prison.
Chamberlain reckoned that he had 100 sympathizers in
3
the new house and this figure is supported by the calculation
made for Gladstone by his chief whip, Lord Richard Crosvenor.
(Lord Richard's figures were s 232 moderate Liberals and 101
radicals). A feature of the election, and one which was to be
Grosvenor wrote to Chamberlain on 30 October, "I toll you
frankly that you have frightened over shoals of what I call the
'floating* balance, the men who turn an election." (quoted from
Chamberlain papers by ilr. C.II.D.Howard in 'Joseph Chamberlain
and the 'Unauthorised irograinme' ", rnrlish ■1stor leal Review.
Lav. hoo).
2
Speech at Edinburgh, 9 Nov. 1335, I'q .times. 10 wov. 1835.
3
Labouchere to Herbert Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1835, A.id, Mss.
h-6019, f. 123.
f Lord a. Crosvenor to Gladstone, 12 Dec. 188y. Add. Mss.
^316, f, Ibo.
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of considerable importance, was the number of members who were
returned for the first time, Herbert Gladstone on. learning
that Churchill reckoned that 2Jo Hartingtonians and 60
Chamberlainites had been returned commented that probably
not a score of members had as yet decided to follow either
1
man, Herbert Gladstone's comment, although an exaggeration,
contained a truth, Very many Liberal members and especially
the newcomers were in no way attached to any particular group,
but tended to look almost entirely to Gladstone for leadership.
This was even true of many Radicals. The Scotsman (perhaps
over optimistically) doubted if more than thirty would answer
2
a whip from Chamberlain,
The prospect of the early overthrow of the Government, to
which the election result pointed, caused strong misgivings
among the ) iberal leaders. Hartington wrote to Goschcn on
6 December that if Gladstone were to adopt a policy of strong
hostility to the Government a coalition would be impossible,
but he was "not at all sure whether some promise of independent
support to the Government, if it discards the tarnellite alliance,
3
would be out of the question". Also few Radicals looked
forward to a precarious Liberal administration as that would
1 II.Glads tone to Labouehere (draft), 7 Dec. I8u6, Add. Kss.
3+6019, f. 51.
2
Scotsman, 10 Lec. 1885, p. h.
3 Iiartington to Goschen, 6 Dec. 1885, Holland, II. ?6.
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force them to shelve their struggle for supremacy in order to
keep the administration in existence - or rather to avoid being
held responsiile for its collapse. Dilko in speeches on 9 and
V- December publicly advocated, that the Conservatives should
1
be allowed to continue in office. "It would be monstrous for
us to bring in a Palmerstonian Government leaning on lory
support", wrote Chamberlain to Ilor ley. "Better far a lory
2
Government dependent on our good will". bevertheless, radical
opinion on this question was much less important- than might
appear. At bottom it rested on wishful thinking for as
Chamberlain pointed out to I'ilke, "if the Government ask for
3
a vote of confidence wc must vote against them".
The second week of December saw a revival of the Herbert
b
Gladstone - Labouchere - Healy communications. Healy pressed
for a more detailed statement of Gladstone*s home rule
5
proposals but Herbert replied that that was not possible as
Pamoll might use the information as a lever on the Government
and the Government once it should know Gladstone's hand would
1 The Times., 10 Dec. 130i, p. 3, and 15 Dec. 1339', P. 6.
c"
Chamberlain to Morley, 15 Dec. 1335, Garvin, II. 13'+.
3 Chamberlain to Lilke, 15 Dec. 1335, Add.Bsc. h-3376, f. 169.
** A sidelight on the Nationalist reaction to the communications
is provided by Justin McCarthy's statement at an interview with
Carnarvon that Gladstone was making overtures and was most
anxious to deal with home rule. McCarthy added that he
distrusted Gladstone's sincerity. (Memorandum by Carnarvon,
13 Dec. 1335, P.M.3., 3-.6.67).




play its own cards accordingly. Suddenly it was decided that
Labouchere should contact Darnell himself. Herbert Gladstone
provided him with a letter for Pamelas ear in which he restated
the six basic conditions for the creation of an Irish
legislature enumerated in his letter of 16 November and added
that he believed his father was "anxious to proceed on the
2
first opportunity on the lines Indicated by these conditions".
Kosebery, who had just been to llawarden for consultation, was
urgently asked to meet Labouchere for a discussion. At the
meeting Rosobery insisted on the inexpediency of any attempt
3
at negotiation, at that tiro. Later he explained to Gladstone
that he believed certain Irresistible natural forces would
compel Parne.ll to side with the Liberals and that negotiations
L
might be fatal to who cause end the party. he also expressed
the fear that Labouchere might use the letter supplied to him
by Herbert as an authorised statement of Gladstone1 s plan. "1
quite adult", was Rosebery's revealing remark, "that there is
a certain guarded wording as regards the source, but the veil
5
is too thin to disguise the inspiration."
1 H.Gladstone to Labouchere (draft), 9 bee. 1885, ibid., f.60.
H.Gladstone to Labouchere (draft), 10 Lee. 1685, ibid.,
f. 63? and Laboucher-e to H.Gladstone, 10 Dec. 1385, ibid. ,
f. 65.
3 Rosebery to Gladstone, 1< Dec. 1385, Add.Has. M+260, f. 279.
^ Ibid., and Rosebery to Gladstone, 2- Dec. 1335, Aod.IIss.
Mf23o, f. 235.
f
" Rosebery to GladsI^re, 20 Dec. 1385.
As it happened there was no danger of a Labouchere -
Parnell meeting for Parnell did not acknowledge Labouchere's
approach until the 19th and then simply remarked that he would
inform him of his return to London, ^However, on 10 December
Gladstone had a letter from Mrs. 0* Ghea in which she complained
that she had not yet received his views on Parnell1 s proposed
Irish constitution and added that Parnell was to see "Lord C."
2
in a day of two, Gladstone replied that he van glad that
Farnell was to see Carnarvon as he was convinced that if
possible arnell should come to an arrangement with the
Government - the only source from which a specific plan could
3
properly proceed. Further correspondence ensued with Mrs.
O'dhea but Gladstone in letters written on 16, 19 and 2k
December declined to alter his attitude.
On l'j December Gladstone, without any previous
5
consultation with his colleagues, made in conversation with
Balfour his famous offer to Salisbury of Liberal support should
he attempt a settlement of the Irish question. (He committed
6
the offer to writing in a letter to Balfour on 20 December ).
1 Labouchere to Chamberlain, 19 Dec, lbop, A.Thorold, Life of
Henry LnDoucherc. 250-2.
^ Mrs, 0'Shea to Gladstone, 10 Dec. 188p, Add.Kss.Mf269, f# 237
3 Gladstone to Mrs. 0'Shea (draft), It Dee, 1885, ibid., f, 2bl
** Gladstone to Mrs. 0'Shea (drafts), 16, 19 and 2k Dec. 1689,
Ibid., ff. 2D-9, 256, and 266.




In doing so Gladstone undoubtedly acted in an exceptionally
high handed manner towards his colleagues. He afterwards informed
1 2 3 h
Granville, Hartlngton, S eucer, and Hosebery of what he had
done, but that did not compensate for the original omission.
Gladstone acted under an Illusion, He believed that the
Conservative leaders were genuinely in favour of some form of
home ml . His approach would have- had little chance of
success under the most favourable of conditions, As it was,
the Conservatives ted rejected on the previous clay a not very
dissimilar proposal laid before them by Carnarvon and had
resolved that the Conservative party could not tamper in any
5
manner with home rule. Carnarvon's proposal was that a joint
committee of both houses should, be appointed with the task of
examining home rule within the limits of unimpaired authority
of the Crown and the maintenance of the rights of minorities
and property. Further that if possible it should be ascertained
by private negotiation whether any, or all, of the leaders of
6
the opposition would support the Conservatives In this course.
1 Granville to Gladstone, 27 bee, ldop, ^dd»I-lss,Mfl7t>, f, *fl.
2 Gladstone to Hartingtoa, 20 Dec. 1035, chats. OhC.lOjo
(Holland, il. 102-3).
3 Hammond, 'nodstone ate the Irish nation, h2o.
h Ibid.
^ Salisbury to Queen, 1!+ Dec. loop, Letters of Queen Victoria.
2nd Dorics, III, 7U,
r
° Memorandum by Carnarvon, 7 Dec. loop (printed for use of




The Cabinet put the worst construction on Gladstone's offer.
Lad- Gwendolen. Cecil informs us that Salisbury thought it an
attempt to draw the veil of disinterested patriotism over a
1
contemplated surrender to the Parnellite vote. Churchill
considered it as tantamount to an enquiry as to what would be
the policy of the Government on home rule. Cranbrook referred
3
to it as Gladstonian, insidious, ambiguous. "'The result was
that the Cabinet, when the matter was brought before it at the
meeting on 2 January, decided to reject the approach and to
give Gladstone no information.
Towards the end of the second week in December Herbert
Gladstone became convinced that Chamberlain and Dilke were
taking steps with the purpose of compelling Gladstone to
5
shelve home rule - an event which he believed must result in
6
the retirement of his father from politics, Sir Lyon Playfair
(M.P., S.Leeds) wrote to him that he had been told by Dilke
7
that such was their object, Herbert decided to counter
1
Cecil, III, 260-1.
2 Churchill to Carnarvon, 2 Jan. 1886, P.R.O., 30.6.55, Ms,57.
J Cranbrook to Carnarvon, 2 Jan, 1886, P.R.O., 3°.6.55» Ms,55.
**
Harrowby to Carnarvon, 3 Jan, 1886, P.R.O,, 30,6.55» Ms,60:
Churchill to Carnarvon, 2 Jan. 1886; and Cranbrook to Carnarvon,
2 Jan, 1886.
^ Viscount Gladstone, After thirty years. 308, and 309.
5
Ibid.. 308.
' Ibid.: and heuohrs and correspondence of Lyon .''layfair. 3^2.
27
Chamberlain and Dilke by inspiring the independent papers in
a home rule direction and on Tj December he had a lengthy
interview with the manager and an editor of the TJ-tional Press
r
Association. fcNext day the Standard and the evening papers
announced that Gladstone had d-finitely adopted the policy of
an Irish legislature and that he contemplated a scheme of
which important features would be protection of the minority
(perhaps through a system of proportional representation),
safeguards for the landlords, Irish representation in
Westminster for Imperial affairs and a veto exercised by the
Crown on the advice of the Irish ministry. Gladstone, of
course, was unable to contradict the announcement flatly. He
telegraphed that the statement was not an accurate representation
of his views, but. was, he presumed, a speculation upon them
and was published without his knowledge or authority. On
the whole that merely confirmed the impression that the
statement was either true or substantially true and that
Gladstone, craving for power, had directly inspired it. Aa a
result of that impression the incident came to be known as
the liawarden "kite11.
fhe ..in- s wrote that Gladstone was going to bid for
Nationalist support with the offer of an Irish parliament with
complete control of Irish affairs. It warned that if such a
1
Viscount Gladstone, Iftor uhirtv years. 308-11.
& !iM., 312.
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parliament -were conceded the House of Commons must lose all
control over Ireland and would have no hope of ever recovering
it except by a sanguinary war. "'"The standard declared that
apparently no price was too high for Gladstone in his passion
for office and that anyone who understood his character could
have foreseen such an outcome. The Irish question, it
continued, hod now reached a stage when party predilections
must give way before the threat to the integrity of trie
r-
Empire. ^The daily dews wrote that nothing less than a
legislature with jurisdiction over all purely Irish affairs
would be worth establishing. It emphasised the importance of
a veto, especially to prevent the imposition of Irish tariffs
011 English goods, and thought that a royal veto exercised
on the advice of a minister responsible to the Imperial
Parliament would be best. It raised, but did not answer, the
question of Irish representation in Westminster auu pointed
out L' at if the police were to be in Irish hands some form of
security to prevent them from being used against law and
order would have to be devised. 3 ^'he iu.nch.ester Guardian
agreed that the Irish people should have the settlement of
all purely Irish matters but hold that that did not make
necessary a separate legislative body as it could be fully
attained by forming the Irish members into a Grand Committee
J' The Times. 18 Dec. 1885, P. 9.
2
standard. 17 Dec. 1885, p. h.
Doilv hews. Id &ec. 1885, p. *+•
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which would consider all Irish bills before their introduction
into the House of Commons. The role of the House of Commons
would then be United to accepting or rejecting Irish bills
which had received the approval of the Grand Committee.
The rirninnhan Dally Post wrote that the idea of Darnell giving
guarantees for the protection of the landlords and the minority
was much too ludicrous for serious discussion and hinted that
even Gladstone might fail to carry the Liberal ]arty in any
2
project of the magnitude indicated in the press announcement.
The dcotsman remarked that there could be no settlement of
the Irish question which did not include a large measure of
home rule una that it believed this was recognised by both
a
Liberals and Conservatives. The forthern ' die refused to
believe that Gladstone could contemplate the home rule proposal
L.
attributed to him. It expressed confidence that such a
proposal world be hopelessly impracticable and most dangerously
revolutionary and anarchical. Ulster would not, and ought not,
submit to it, it stated.J Hot until 25 beeember did its
confidence in the essential falsity of the Press Association
~ Manchester Guardian, 19 Dec. 103p, p. 7.
c
hlrninphrr. Solly . o 1-. 10 Dec. 1385, P» ! •
o
Scotsman. 18 Dec. loop, p. h.
U-
'
orther i v'hig. 17 Dec. 1885, P. U-, and 18 Dec. 1805, P* 5*
5 Ibid., 18 Doc. 1885, P. 5.
6 Ibid., 17 Dec. 1335, y. b.
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statement evaporate.1 The Irish limes considered that Gladstone
had betrayed the interests of the loyalists as far as he could
and that there was not a day to be lost in declaring obstinate
2
resistance to the betrayal. The iree Church Christian horid
stated that an Irish parliament was impossible, but that it
was willing to see home rule given in any form short of a
3
parliament. The method is t -timet? er.iphasis.-u tliat Ireland would
have to retain its full representation in the Imperial
Parliament, a division being made between Imperial and British
legislation. The relaxation of the Imperial grip, it held,
would be a signal for the proclamation of a republic and,
if
in audition, Great Britain haa a duty to the loyalist minority.
The tartist freeman in an article, which, however, may have
been written before the press announcement, advocated that
Ireland be given the same privileges (including county
?
councils) as England, Wales, and Scotland, but no more. The
English soman Catholic Tablet considered that Ireland might be
given any scheme which had proper safeguards, provided that
6
the Irish members were retained in Westminster. It held that
home rule ought to be dealt with in the same manner as that
X
Ibid., 2'j Eec. 1335, p. >.
2 Irish Times, 19 bee. loop, p. ?.
^ Christian. . or Id. 2h fee. 133?, p. 931.
hothoCist rimes. 2h Dec. 133?, p. 3V>.
5 Ere email. 13 Dec. 188?, p. 8V/.
6
Tablet. 19 Dec. 133?, p. 95o.
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1
which had. been used to settle redistribution.
2
The Queen had been distressed by the election results
and had taken steps to see if a coalition of Conservatives
3
and Moderate Liberals was possible. The Hawarden "Mite"
thoroughly alarmed her, but left her as determined as ever
b-
on a coalition. However, realising that she could not have
one immediately, she decided that Salisbury must be retained
5
in power with the assistance of the Moderate Liberals. On
the 20th she wrote to Goschon appealing to him to gather
around him all the Moderate Liberals so that Gladstone might
be prevented from overthrowing the Government without being
able to form one which would stand or which she could
6
accept. She also communicated a similar appeal through
7
the Marchioness oi Ilv to W.E.Morster, Letters from Goschen,
8
Hartington and Morster largely reassured her, although
without diminishing her determination to have an alliance of
9
"all moderate men" against Gladstone.
1 Xbio.. 26 tec. 1385, P. 997.
o
Queon t:> Salisbury, 3 Dec. 1685, Letters of Queen Victoria T
2nd Series, vol. Ill, 206.




Queen to Goschen, 20 Dec. 1885, Letters of Queen Victoria,
2nd Series, III. 712-lb; Marchioness of Ely to . , .lorster,
22 Lee. 1885, ibid.. 7l6; and Queen to sir Il.Ponsonby, 19 Dec.
1335, A.Ponsonby, henry . onsofby. 201.
^
Queen to Goschen, 20 Dec. 1885.
^ Marchioness of Ely to w.E.Forster, 22 Dec. 1885.
® Queen to Goschen, 29 Dec. 1885, Letters of Queen Victoria.




The Queen had an exceptionally high opinion of Goschen
and although he had but a small handfvl of followers and a
lit-J.ted influence, she assumed that he could accomplish much.
At this time she gave him advice which no one can say that
he did not act upon curing the following months. "You must
keep Lord Eartington up to the mark," she wrote, "and not
let him slide back (as so often before) into following Mr.
1
Gladstone and trying to keep the party together".
Prior to the Eawarden !,...ito" Har ting ton. knew, not from
Gladstone, but from Granville, Spencer, and IJorthbrook that
Gladstone was still much occupied with self-government for
2
Ireland. On 15 December Gladstone wrote to him that "the
urgency and bigness of the Irish question was opening to
men's minds from day to day" and enclosed a letter from
Jenkinson, the head of the Irish Criminal Investigation
3
Department, advocating the cause of self-government.
Eartington was uneasy and next day asked Gladstone for his
"views and intentions on the Irish question as developed by
the general election" and referred to rumours tir t Gladstone
was preparing plans and was in communication with Parnell -
rumours which "are so numerous and persistent that it is
1 Ibid.
2 Partington to Gladstone, 16 Lee. 1835, Add. Mas. kklhu,
f, 163 fq.v.o., Holland, II. 97-8) 5 and Horthbrook to Spencer,
16 Dec. 1885, Hiscollaneous, A!thorp.
^ Gladstone to darting ton, 15 Dec. 1335, Chats. 3'+0* 1850.
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difficult to believe that they are entirely without
1
foundation". On the following morning the Hawarden "Kite"
2
appeared. liarting ton was alarmed and feared that Gladstone
3
would utterly smash up the party. That same day Gladstone
answered the request for his "views and intentions".
The truth is, he wrote. 1 have more or less of
opinions and ideas, but no intentions or negotiations . . .
I consider that Ireland has now spoken? and that
an effort ought to be made £& the Government without
delay to meet her demands for the management by an Irish
legislative body of Irish, as distinct from Imperial
affairs. ...
There is first a postulate - that the state of
Ireland shall be such as to warrant it.
The conditions of an admissible plan, 1 think
are:~
1. Union of the Krnpire and due supremacy of
Parliament.
2. Protection for the minority - a difficult
matter . . .
3. Fair allocation of Imperial charges. . . .
1. As to intentions, I an determined to have none
at present - to leave space to the Government - I should
wish to encourage them if X properly could - above all
on no account to say or do anything which would enable
the Nationalists to establish rival bidding between us « . •
*1
Hartington to Gladstone, 16 bee. 1885.
2 Hartington to Gladstone, Id Dec. 1885, Ada. Mss. hh-lh-U,
f. 177 'Holland, II. 103-2).
3 Hartington to Granville, 17 bee. loop, P.R.O., 3O.29.22A.
(Holland, II. 98-9 [in Holland the word "only" has been
aceidently omitted in the sentence- "The latter [llarcourtj is
in the depths of despair; not only -"bout Ireland, but about
the prospects of the party"]).
3lf
My earnest recommendation to everybody Is not bo
commit himself. Upon this rule, under whatever pressure,
I shall act as long as I can .... x
llartington replied that since Gladstone's views ui the Irish
question had become Luiovn it was difficult for those unable
to share those views to take his advice not to commit
d
themselves,
Goschen, when he saw the National nross Agency statement,
wrote to llartington suggesting that they m<_et and discuss
3
the situation. Ilartington, although he did. not suppose
that they could take any action, readily acceded arid went •
5
to London on the 19th. Vith Goschen's assistance he there
wrote a letter to the chairman of his electoral co miittee
in which he stated that the views he had expressed on Irish
self-government during the election remained unaltered.
6
Granville tried to dissuade Ilartington from publishing it,
but without success and the letter appeared in the press two
days later. 1t was the first important move in public to
counter Gladstone and led Chamberlain to doubt if Gladstone
7
would go further with his Irish ideas.
* G1 ids tone to I-Iartington, 17 Dec. 1835, Chats. V+ . 1353
(Holland, II. 99-101).
p




J Goschen to Sir li.lorier, 10 Pet. 1336, A.b.Elliot, Idle of
Lor... Coschee. II. ana Hartirg ton to Granville, 19 Dec.
1335, P.a.O. 30.2S.22A.
6 Granville to Gladstone, hi Dec. 1385, Add.Mss.M+173, f.251;
and Granville to Spencer, 20 Dec. 1335, Granville vol., A1thorp.
7 Chamberlain to Dilke, 21 Dec. 1335, Add.Mss.^3876, f.180.
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Chamberlain had no difficulty in believing the National
1
Press Association statement and he was much perturbed. The
scheme which it outlined he declared to be "death and
2 3
damnation" - unworkable and worse than separation. He
admitted that many Liberals - perhaps even a majority -
might be induced to accept it, but held that there was little
likelihood that the country would do so. He believed that if
the Conservatives were to dissolve upon the issue the Liberals
4
would almost certainly "be beaten into a cocked hat". He
concluded that he and his friends must try to stop Gladstone,
but that their immediate plan must be to "lie low" and let
the situation shape itself before deciding, for should they
openly commit themselves they would be left in the arms of
5
their "greatest enemies" the Whigs.
On the evening following the National Press Association
announcement Chamberlain spolce at a banquet of the Birmingham
Reform Club. He said that he considered it still premature
for Liberals to attempt to settle the Irish question, but that
1
Chamberlain to Dilke, 16 Dec. 1885, Add.Mas.43876, f. 171.
("The statement in the Standard is true, of course, and Mr. G*s
action is awfully compromising.")j and Labouchere to H.Gladstone,
17 Dec. 1885, Add.Mss.46019, f.70.
2
Chamberlain to Dilke, 17 Dec. 1885, Add.Mas.43876, f.174.
Labouchere to Herbert Gladstone, 17 Dec. 1885, Add.Mss.
46019, f.70.
4 Chamberlain to Dilke, 18 Dec. 1885, Add.Mas.43876, f. 177.
^ Chamberlain to Dilke, 17, 18 and 26 Dec. 1885, Add.Mss.43876,
ff. 174, 177 and 183; Chamberlain to Morley, 24 Dec. 1885,
q.w.o., Garvin, II. 147-8; and Chamberlain to Labouchere,
24 Dec. 1885, A.Thorold, Life of Henry Labouchere, 262.
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he "believed he would he alio to support Gladstone should he ever
embody in a scheme his numerous statements that he was willing
to grant Ireland the largest measure of local government
compatible with the integrity of the impire. He declared that
Radicals were no less determined than Whigs to maintain the
unity of the Empire and that Englishmen would be as resolute
in preserving the Union of the United Kingdom as the Jorthern
States had been in preserving the American Union. Kext day
Gladstone remarked in a letter to him that "reading [the speech]
. . . hastily I think we are very much in accord." It is
understandable that he should have made this mistake since
Chamberlain had not defined what he meant by "local government"
and Gladstone seems at all times to have been serenely
confident that the self-government which he contemplated
3
would in no way endanger the integrity of the empire.
Chamberlain in his reply unfortunately ignored the opportunity
to correct Gladstone's misapprehension. He confined himself to
only one argument against a home rule policy, but it was an
argument which he may have assumed would carry more weight
1
£teg, 18 Dec. 1835, P. 7.
?
Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 13 Dec. 1885, Add. Mss.
Mtl26, f. 125 (Garvin, II. lh-2, and Chamberlain, 170).
•a
~ Gladstone must have been strengthened in his confidence
by his belief that the Irish people would be opposed to complete
separation from Great Eritain. In a memorandum which he drew
up on 23 Dec. he noted. "It is much debated whether the Irish
people are in favour of separation. I lean to the opinion
that they are not. After all we must not presume them to be
political madmen". (Add. Mss. M+312, f. 227).
37
than all the others s
. . . If there vera to be a dissolution on this question
and the Liberal party or its leader were thought to be
pledged to a separate parliament in Dublin, it is my
belief that we should sustain a tremendous defeat. The
Fnflish working classes, for various reasons, are
distinctly hostile to "ore Pule carried to this extent,
and I do not think it would be possible to convert them
before a General .. lection . . . ~
During this period of exasperating uncertainty Hartington
seems to have been 'v.cng the voce optimistic of the anti-home
rule Liberals. After a discussion with chamberlain, Harcourt
and Mike on iiew fear's .ay he noted that Chamberlain and
Harcourt were more impressed than he by the hopelessness
either of resisting Gladstone or of governing Ireland by
2
repression. Lansdcwne, at that time Governor General of
Canada, had sent him a scheme of Irish land purchase and
I-Iartington1s reply is very helpful to an understanding of his
position. He wrote °
. . . Hut I do not feel so sure as you that we are
approaching any very considerable extension of local
self-government in Ireland. Although Mr• Gladstone's
opinions are an Important element in the case, I doubt
whether public o-inion will support any government in
doing more than giving a County Government scheme on
lines similar to those which may be settleo for England.
This will have to be offered not because anybody thinks
it will be a good thing in itself, but in deference to
the principles of equality of treatment, but it will be
refused by tho Parnellitos and will probably not pass
to the great regret of nobody. We may therefore have to
struggle on for some tine longer on tho present system.
I think that even in this case it would be very desirable
that an effort should be made to settle the land question
1 Chamberlain to Gladstone, 19 Dec. 18op, Add. Mss. *+*4-126,
f. 12s ''Garvin, II, lbc-3, and Chamberlain, 171-2).
2
Hartington to Granville, 2 Jan. Ibb6, i.h.O., 30.29*22A
(Holland, II. 109-10).
33
by buying out the landlords; but as I understand your
scheme as Indeed any scheme that has been proposed, its
practicability even in theory, would depend on the
creation of some Irish Local Body, which would be
(nominally) responsible for the payment of the annuity
of the sum due to the British Government.
For the interest of landlords, therefore, I think
that the best solution might probably be a Home Rule
scheme combined with a fair Land Purchase measure. But
when the political results of any form of Home Rule are
fully understood, I doubt its acceptance by the English
constituencies, and I am afraid that the landlords may for
some time longer have to bear the chief brunt of the fight
for the maintenance of the Union ....
Chamberlain believed that Gladstone's home rule would
include an independent Irish parliament and that all guarantees
or securities whether for the protection of minorities or for
2
the security of the Union would be completely illusory.
Westminster would not even be rid of Irish obstruction and
3
interference. He held that such an arrangement was but a step
4
to separation and that separation was to be preferred to it.
5
"National councils", he now admitted, were no longer practical
politics. It was useless, he stated, to impose them on the
1
Hartington to Lansdowne, 4 Jan. 1886, Chats. 340, 1884.
^
Chamberlain to Mike, 26 Dec. 1885, Add. Mas. 43876, f. 183




In his speech at Warrington on 8 Sept. 1885 (The Times,
9 Sept. 1885) and in another at Glasgow a week laterTfHe Times,
16 Sept. 1885) Chamberlain had suggested that the whole of the
United Kingdom, or such parts as should wish it, should be given
"national councils" with administrative functions and, perhaps
al30 after a probationary period, powers of preparing legislation.
Also, an article which Chamberlain had inspired in the July 1885
issue of the Fortnightly Review had advocated "national councils"
with administrative functions and such legislative functions as
are normally dealt with by private bills.
1
Nationalists when they repudiated them. At the sane time
Chamberlain despaired of being able to stop Gladstone from
2
laying his home rule proposals before the country. The
outcome was that he turned to what he believed were the two
remaining workable possibilities - abolition of the Lritish
3
constitution, and complete separation. On boxing Day he wrote
to Labouchere and to Dilko sketching a revolutionary scheme
whereby the Dritish constitution would be swept away and
replaced by one modelled on that of the United Otates. Under
this plan legislatures with powers similar to those of the
American state legislatures were to be set up in England,
Scotland, and Wales, and possibly in both Southern Ireland
and Ulster. He wrote to Labouchere, one feels certain, in
5
the expectation that, as happened, the letter would be forwarded
to Herbert Gladstone. Light days later Chamberlain again
wrote to 1 abouchere suggesting a different but equally
6
startling scheme. This time Ireland was to be given
independence except that like Canada and Australia she was to
1 Ibid.
c"
Hartington to Granville. 2 Jan, 1006, P.U.O., 3O.2k.29A,
(Holland, II. 10J-9).
^ Chamberlaiu tc Dilke, 21 Dec. 13U>, Add.Mss.^3876, f.ldO,
lr Chamberlain to Labouchere, 26 Dec. ISop, A.lhorold, Life of
Henry Labouchere, 272; and Chamberla in to Lilxe, 26 nec. 18o>,
Ado. I Is s7^3 3767T.I03.
^ Labouchcre to K.Gladstone, 23 Dec. 188>, and. b Jan. 1336,
Adtl.Kss.UoGIS, ff. 12? and 136.
^ Chamberlain to Labouchcre, 3 Jan. I006, A.lhorold, Life of
ilcnry Labaucfaore. 270-79.
ko
be allowed no control over foreign relations. She was to be
called a protected state and England's responsibility confined
to protecting her against foreign aggression. She was, moreover,
to pay a fixed annual sum to cover her share of the I*:- tioual
Debt, to establish a fund for extinguishing it, and to pay
the cost of a military garrison in Ireland. ,fne was to have a
commons, a senate, and a governor who was to have the power to
dissolve parliament, but no veto, finally r. commercial treaty
was to be concluded which would pledge Ireland not to impose
duties on manufacturers of Great Britain.
It is unlikely that Chamberlain had any real expectation
that either of those schemes would be adopted, he nr.de no
effort to ndvaij.ee either of them a ad possibly woulu have been
surprised if anyone else ted done so. "As a Radical', he
wrote to hi lie,, "all these changes hove- no terrors for ne,
but is it conceivable that such a clean sweep of existing
institutions could be made in order to justify the Irish demand
1
for Home Rule?" The first, or federal scheme,Chamberlain
singled out in an article in the lebruary number of the
I ortni; urly Review as the only plan which was likely to work
2
without friction and to preserve the real unity of the Empire.
Chamberlain to Dilke, 26 Dec, 133y, Add. -ss.bn376, f.133.
p
The article was signed "A Radical" but the authorship
was a thinly disguised secret. Chamberla in adults the
authorship in his memoir (Chamberlain, 1£A).
The second» or separation scheme he outlined at the meeting of
1
Hartlngton, Harcourt, Dilke, and himself on New Year's Day.
But on both occasions Chamberlain appears to have put forward
his scheme as one which he could consent to and not as one which
2
he advocated. These extreme proposals are an indication not
only of Chamberlain's despair, but of his ruthless consistency.
The one thing which he would not do was to support a scheme
which he believed certain to result in embittered Anglo-Irish
relations and finally in a separate, hostile Ireland. And, of
course. Chamberlain with his wide experience of politics knew
that such consistency would mean disaster both for his own
political career and for the radical reforms which he




Lord Harcourt's diary, quoted, Gardiner, I. 557.
2 In the |ortnirhtlv Review article Chamberlain stated that he
considered no home rule scheme satisfactory to Parnell would
be accepted by Parliament at that time and that it was the
duty of statesmen to dispel the wild expectations which had been
raised. He maintained that the settlement of the Irish land
question would deprive home rule of all vitality and urged that
the Liberal party should make the settlement of the land question
its immediate policy. He also stated that the condition of
Ireland did not justify a further coercion act, but that
criminal outrage, were it to break out, would have to be
dealt with, and that large scale Parliamentary obstruction
could not be allowed even should the Speaker have to be given
additional powers or the Irish members be excluded temporarily.
3 Labouchere to 13.Gladstone, 3° Lec. 1885, Add. Mss. U-6019,
f. 128.
The Ilawarden "Kite" was an unraistaxable danger signal
to all anti-home rule Liberals and almost at once they began
to draw closer together. On the following day Derby wrote to
liartington s "It seems to me that those who think as we do
ought to take council, and see at least that we are not placed
in a position where we must either accept what we object to
1
or split oil from the party." Two days later ilarcourt, on
behalf of himself and Chamberlain, wrote to llrrtington
advocating that he press Gladstone to call a meeting of the
2
ex-Cabinet. Partington, because at such a meeting he would
be opposed to Gladstone, declined and forwarded harcourt1 s
3
letter to Cranville wno could not have the same objection.
Gra.iville also declined and gave as his reasons : "Two members
of the late Cabinet are out of the Louse of Commons. The
first consultations with Gladstone ought hardly to be in a
meeting of sixteen people - with the probable result, as
Ilarcourt justly says, of Gladstone resigning the leadership."
Granville reported the request to Gladstone who thanked hira
for having stopped it and added that he thought "no one in his
3u ises could covenant to call tho- late cabinet together ...
1 Derby co Darting ton, lo Dec. lobp, Chats. 3*fu. 1855#
^ Harcourt to Iiartington, 20 Dec. loop, Chats. 3*4-0, Id59.
3 Hartington to Granville, 25 Dec. 1885, R.R.Q., 30.29.22A
(q.w.o. Holland, II, 10b-p),
** Granville to Hartington, 27 Dec. 150p, E.Fitzmaurice, Life
of lorn Granville. II. *4-72.
even if there were something on which it was ready to take
1
council."
When Chamberlain learned that the attempt to have a meeting
of the ex-Cabinet had failed, he suggested to Ilarcourt that
2
they, together with Hart lag ton and Lilke, should meet. lie
further suggested, that should the four of them be absolutely
agreed they should meet Gladstone "and call on him to stand
and deliver his plans" and then, if he insisted on going on
without the , should lay their differences before a special
meeting of the party. Chamberlain's "stand and deliver"
idea was most unrealistic and he quickly dropped it, it
sprang from his well founded dread that if they remained
quiet much longer Gladstone would have "the game in his
hands." It was, as he said, the bold course and "might
prevent men from committing themselves or from being drawn
5
over the precipice."
Harcourt met Partington next day and they agreed that
6
the meeting should be held. Harting, ton wished to make it as
1 Gladstone to Granville, 28 bee. loop. P.R.O., 3e.29.22A
Oiorley, III. 269).
2





Partington to Granville, 28 bee. 1809, P.R. -., 30.29.22A
(Holland ? II, 10:;).
representative of the party as possible and ashed Granville
1
and Rosebery to Join, but both declined.
The meeting took place at 1 evonshirc House on I'ew Year's
£
Day and was very amicable. iio one wa ■ able to suggest a
scheme of action and the only decision of importance was that
Partington shoulc write to Gladstone passing 1 in to Inform
the leaders as soon as possible and subsequently the party
itself of his views and intentions on Ireland one. the course to
3
be canen on the meeting of Parliament. Chmlxrlain, Harcourt,
and bilke differed from Dartington in having little hope of
^4-
governing Ireland by repression. Chamberlain br.cL lost the
pugnacity of five days earlier and said that he could support
Ireland being made a protected state and suggested practically
tilt* same scheme which, as has been noted, he outlined in his
■J
letter to Labouchere two days later. liar ting ten alone said
that he conic not Join a government which promoted a legislative
Hartington to Granville, 2d Dec, 1889; Marquess of Crewe,
Ford hosebery. I. 2plK Hartington to Dilke, 29 Dec. 1885,
Add. Mss. ^3696, f. lb9 (Gwynn and Tuc'cwcll, II. 20f) 5 and
Granville to Spencer, 29 Dec. 1885, Granville vol., A1thorp.
2 Kartington to Granville, 2 Jan. 1886, P.H.O., 3 .29.22A
(h o 1 laxid, i 1. 1Jlb).
^ hartington to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1386, Add. Mcs.
fHolland, II. 106-G).
b
Hartington to Granville, 2 Jan. 18865 and Hartington to
Spencex4, 3 Jan. I006, Miscellaneous, A1thorp.
r
J Lord ilarcourt'3 diary, quo ted, Gardiner, 3 . 587.
i
body for Ireland. Dilke did. not see his way clearly and
2
said little. Four days earlier he had written to Chamberlain
that he believed Gladstone would be unable to form a government
to promote an Irish legislature, but had added that he saw
total separation looming ahead as less dangerous than
3
separate parliaments.
That evening Hartington wrote urging Gladstone on the
lines agreed upon, Gladstone replied that he had not a
word to add to his letter of 17 December. He ted done nothing
and would do nothing, he stated, to convert his ideas, which
were "floating ideas only", into intentions as he lacked
sufficient information and wished to gain "whatever lights
intervening time may possibly afford". There would be, he
thought, ample time to discuss procedure when they should meet
in London and as for a meeting of the party, that was a
5
serious matter but might be found requisite. Perhaps it is
hardly surprising that on the day Hartington received this
6
letter Granville found, him extremely bitter against Gladstone.
Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 2O3; and
Hartington to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1886. (Gwynn and Tuckwell
have printed Dilke's memoir accurately and in full and
references in this thesis will be to the printed version).
2 Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 2O3,
^ Dilke to Chamberlain (copy), 28 Dec. 1885, Add. Mss,
>+3953, f. 76.
L|.
Hartington to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1886.
Gladstone to liarting ton, 2 Jan. 1886, Chats. 3V0, 1883
(Holland, II. 108-9).
^ Granville to Spencer, b Jan, 1886, Granville vol., Althorp.
1+6
The last remark in Gladstone's letter was not merely a
phrase intended to placate Hartington and his three fellow
malcontents. A week earlier Gladstone had proposed in the
event of his being asked to fori: a government to call a
party meeting and to inform it that he vonId accept office
only if assured of its general support for a plan of safe-
1
guarded home rule. Incidentally, Gladstone showed this
2
memorandum to Granville and Spencer, but not to Itertington.
He feared, he said, to challenge liarting ton before personal
3
communications could be established. However, he did discuss
the subject of the memorandum with Grosvenor and asked him to
h-
discuss it with Hartington.
Hartington, Chamberlain, Dilke, and Trevelyan corresponded
on whether they should meet Gladstone in London as a noose
5
costiitatus or separately. Without exception they favoured
meeting him in a body. liarting ton wrote that should they be
forced to meet him singly they could urge further collective
6
consultation. However, Gladstone forestalled any attempt at
Memorandum by Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1835, P.R.O., 3t.29.22A
(Korley. III. 270-2).
o
Granville to Spencer, 29 Doc. 1885, Granville vol., Althorp;
and Spencer to Gladstone copy), 29 Dec. 1885, P.R.O.,30.29.22A.
3 IMd.
'+
Gladstone to Granville, 26 Dec. 1835, forley III, 270.
5
Hartington to Granville. 10 Jan, 1836, P.U.O., 30.29.22A
(Holland, II. Ill); Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwcll.
II. 2Oh-; Gardiner, I. 553? and Garvin, II. 163.
6
Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 20m-,
collective pressure by inviting them to Interviews at different
times. "It is evident that he proposes to nobble us in detail"
1
was chamberlain's bitter comment.
At the- interviews Gladstone held to the sane position as
he bad done in his letter to liar ting ton. Fe still had.
"opinions" but no "plan" for discussion and hoped that even
2
yet one night be produced by the Government. On the day
Parliament assembled (lb January) a meeting of the former
3
cabinet was held at noon, and the question of immediate
policy was hotly discussed but one more Gladstone refused
*+
to com li t himself on Ireland.
Three days later Ilartington wrote to him and included
the warning : "But I can scarcely doubt that in some form
or other an Irish debate will arise on the Address, which
will make it impossible for those who are in favour of
maintaining the legislative union as it exists to abstain
5
from reasserting their opinions". Gladstone was thoroughly
6
alarmed and wrote asking Granville to use his influence with
1 Chamberlain to Harcourt, 8 Jan. 1886, q.w.o., Garvin,
II. 163.
2
Dilke's memoir. Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 20V; Gardiner,
I. and Garvin, II. 163.
3 Marquess of Crewe, Lord Itoscbor.v, I. 257.
**
Gardiner, I. 559#
* Ilartington to Gladstone, 1>' Jan. 1886, Act . llss. M+1V8,
f. 203 (Holland, II. 111-12).
0
Granville to Spencer, 16 Jan. 1886, Granville vol.,
Althorp; and Granville to Hartington (draft), T*n.d.~\ Jan. 1886
P.R.O., 3'.I,;.22A.
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Hartington. "It seems to me that if a gratuitous declaration
of this kind is made", his letter stated, "it must produce an
explosion; and that in a week's time Hartington will have to
co isider whether he will lead the Liberal party himself or
leave it to chaos. He will make my position impossible . . .
If he still meditates it ought not the party to be previously
1 2
informed?" Granville gave the letter to Hartington but
Hartington refused to be influenced.
The speech from the throne was vague on Ireland, but
contained a declaration in favour of the Union and a hint
that special powers would be asked for. In the debate
Gladstone stated the attitude which he had been expressing
for some time, but disclosed nothing of his intention: he
thought that there was sympathy between Salisbury and himself
on Ireland; he had done and would do nothing which would
arouse prejudice or prevent the question from being judged
on its merits; there could be no greater calamity than that
it should be brought within the lines of party conflict; and
the Government were the only people who could act in the
3
matter.
Eleven years later Gladstone described how he spent the
night in extreme anxiety lest a declaration in favour of the
1
Gladstone to Granville, l<i Jan. 1886, Ghats. 3^0.1909
O lorley, III. 2d2-3 and Holland, II. 112-13).
2 Granville to Hartington (draft), Qn.d.J Jan. 1886.
Hansard. CCCII, cols. 100-20.
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Union should be brought forward, lie felt pretty certain that
such an event "would in its moral effect shut the doors of
the existing parliament against home rule" for he doubted if
•
1
two hundred would oppose it. In an effort to forestall such
2
a declaration he had in his speech said that he would keep
his own counsel and reserve his freedom of action and "as
3
an old parliamentary hand" recommended others to do the same,
Kartington had already threatened the dreaded course and Goschen.
s+
was pressing him to act. On the first evening of the debate,
Albert Grey, a friend of Goschen, asserted that if Gladstone's
closed hand were forced open a parliament on College Green
would be found in it. He appealed to Liberal leaders,
especially Eartington and Chamberlain, to announce their
5
determination to uphold the Union, text day the debate
continued with no' move against heme rule until late in. the
evening A,R,b.Elliot# another supporter of Gt schen,
6
endeavoured to goad the anti-home rule Liberals into action,
7
Goschen had planned a strong speech but thought that his
1 Reminiscence written by Gladstone in 1397, 1'orley, 111,233-5#
1
Ibid.
3 Hansard, CCCII, col. 112.
L,
Goschen to his wife, 19 Jan, 1386, q.w.o., Illiot, II. 8.
Eansart. Cecil, cols. lb2-*+,
6 Ibid, cols. 256-60,
? Goschen to 3ir R, Eerier, 10 leb. 1366, q.w.o., Elliot,
II. 13-16.
best tactic was to wait until after Ilartington should have
spoken as that would emphasise Karting ton* s leadership a .d
1
give him "the whole weight of having stood firm"• However,
Elliot's speech caused Goschen to abandon his intention of
speaking as he felt that to have done so "would have been
pointedly and publicly to have taken the lead out of
Hartington*s hand" and would have appeared as though he had .
"put Elliot up . . . but did not know that he would take the
2
line he aid".
The silence of Hartington, Chamberlain and the other
.leaders considerably demoralised the ordinary anti-home
rule Liberal members. One of them wrote to Hartington :
fear the opportunity has been lost now for you to rally
your supporters; . . . should the government be turned out
... I very much fear the temptation of office will prevent
many making any stand, more especially as after the silence
of yourself and others they will feel that the party are
.3
drifting towards it". Albert Grey, seeing that his
intervention in the debate had achieved little, tried to have
k
a memorial got up. Goschen and Grosvenor were sympathetic
but the idea did not materialize. Perhaps as Heneage pointed
1 Goschen to his wife, 2- Jan. 1836, q.w.o., Elliot, II. 9.
^ Goschen to Jir R, Korier, 10 Feb. 1886.
3 F. Heneage (Gt. Grimsby) to Hartington, 22 Jan, 1886,
Chats. 3*f0. 1912.
K
A.Grey to Partington, 22 Jan. 1886, Chats. 3"+e • 191V.
1
out to Hartington the wording was a difficulty and that
with so many new members in the House it would be impossible
to obtain many signatures before everyone knew about it.
Chamberlain, although he took no part in the debate,
made/on the 22nd a futile, behind-the-scenes effort to hand
off home rule. Probably encouraged by a report from
Labouchere that it was still uncertain whether Gladstone and
2
the .Nationalists would come to terms, he drafted out a
3
memorandum which he gave to habouchere to read to Parnell
if
to whom he also sent a copy through G'Ghea. In it Chamberlain
advocated that for the present the Conservatives should be
allowed, to remain in office, but if that were impossible
they should be overthrown on some now-Irish issue. He then
cane to his main purpose ;
... If Mr. Gladstone were to come in and immediately
propose a scheme of Home Rule it is almost certain that
in the present state of opinion he would be defeated,
and an appeal, to the country would in all probability
result in a lory majority . . .
The question is would Mr. Parnell co-operate with
a Radical or Liberal Government in an endeavour to make
a final arrangement by means of some large operation of
land purchase, without pressing for the i.mediate
consideration of Home Rule proposalsV
1
E. Ileneage to Hartington, 22 Jan. 1386,
O
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 176.




In any case these proposals -would have to come in
the first instance from the Irish party. Is Mr# Parnell
prepared with a definite scheme? And in this case would
he be satisfied to submit it to a large and representative
committee? 1
Parnell replied at once through Labouchere. Ignoring the
key suggestions that the land problem be dealt with first and
that home rule be given a non-party examination, he bluntly
stated that, admitting Mr, Gladstone could give no pledges,
he must know two things j
... 1. That Mr. Gladstone if called upon by the Queen
to form a government, will form one, i.e. if Gosehen,
Ilartington, etc. decline to join, that he will not throw
up the sponge . . .
2. ... that if Mr. Gladstone comes in he will act
on his speech, and at once bring in his scheme for the
Government of Ireland. *
On the third day of the debate the member for Forfarshire
moved an amendment to extend the "Three F's" of the Irish
Land Act of 1831 to Great Britain. Few thought the
amendment of much importance, but Kartington, without any
warning to his supporters, voted against it with the
Conservatives. His action was a tactical blunder and tended
to detract from him as a possible alternative to Gladstone.
On the following afternoon. (26 January) Hicks-beach
announced that the Government planned to introduce a coercion
1 Chamberlain*s memorandum, 22 Jan# 1886, Garvin, II# 166-7,
and Chamberlain, 177-8.
Labouchere to Chamberlain, 22 Jan# 1886, A. Thorold,
Life of iWarv Labouchcrc. 286-7.
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bill in two days time. On this news Gladstone determined to
2
bring down the Government at once. For the purpose he had
at hand an amendment which had been agreed to at the meeting
of most of the ex-Cabinet on the moraine of the Queen's speech.
Dilke, who was present, informs us that they net apparently
wi.hout any policy and that when Chamberlain produced the
amendment they accepted it without discussion as a way out of
3
their differences and difficulties. It was la tor known as
Colling's amendment and expressed regret that the Queen's
speech haa contained no promise of a measure to enable farm
workers and other country dwellers to obtain allotments and
small holdings. Ordinarily such an amendment would have had
few but Radical supporters and Goschen considered that "the
sending out of a whip in its favour was a fearful blow at the
h * 5
Moderate Party"• Low it went forward with the blessing
of Gladstone, All knew, of course, that the immediate issue
The proposed bill suppressed the National league and dealt
with intimidation, public order and the protection of life arid
property.
2 Reminiscence written by Gladstone in 1697, Morley, 111,267-8.
^ bilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 20%
L.
Goschen to Sir R, Morior, 10 Feb. 1836, q.w.o,, Elliot,
II. 13-16.
'.X
J Goschen was not alone in deploring official support for the
amendment, c.£. the l rata too wrote: "The great majority of
the Liberal Party, headed by Mr. Gladstone, bound itself by
that vote to a new policy, which is in principle that the state
may employ the general wealth of the- community, and may even
expropriate property, in order to reduce the poverty of certain
sections of the people. That principle, however moderately or
carefully applied at first, is the very essence of socialism
• • •" ■dueetator. 30 Jan, 1836, p. 136),
5*f
at stake had little to do with agrarian policy.
The debate was a comparatively short one and the division
war taken around one o'clock in the morning of the 27th, The
Government was beaten by seventy-nine votes. The Nationalists
voted with Gladstone, but of equal or greater significance was
that seventy-six Liberals, including John bright, abstained
from voting and that eighteen voted with the Conservatives.
Among the eighteen were Ilartlngton, Goschen, James, and
1
Courtney.
The resignation of Salisbury was delayed by the
2
disinclination of the Queen to allow Gladstone into office.
3
She even suggested a dissolution and not until both Salisbury
and Goschen had advised that she send for Gladstone did she
M-
accept the inevitability of his premiership, Ponsonby
/
delivered the queen* s invitation after midnight on the 29th
5
and next morning Gladstone set about forming his new cabinet.
John Morley, with reason, has suggested that not since
Canning formed his cabinet in 1827 had anyone been faced with
-I
The others were : A.Barnes, J.Corbett, Sir S.Crossley,
D.Davies, D.Davles, Lord Ebrlngton, Admiral Egerton, A,H.Elliot,
A.H.Grey, Sir J.Lubbock, Sir John St.Aubyn, C.Seeley, J.Westlake
and L.R.Jodehouse.
2 Queen*s correspondence, 27-30 Jan. 1886, Letters of Queen
btctorx;
, 3rd Series, I. Chap, i; and Queen to Sir P..Ponsonby,
27, and 29 Jan. 1886, A. onsonby, Henry k onsohbv. 206-8.
3 Cecil, III. 290.
l'r
Queen's correspondence, 27-3 - Jan. 1886; and Queen to
Sir K.Ponsonby, 27, and 29 Jan. 1686.
* Note by Ponsonby. 30 Jan. 1666, A.Ponsonby, .gu. cit.. 207;
and Ilorley, III. 29O.
1 * 2
such difficulties as now confronted Gladstone. Of the
twenty-one men who had served in the previous Liberal cabinet
3
eleven were to become liberal Unionists. At the tew Year's
Day meeting in Devonshire House Dilke had prophesied that
they would be asked to join, not a government to promote homo
H.
rule, but one to consider it. This was the course which
Gladstone adopted. lie prepared the well known memorandum
which he showed to those whom he asked to take office. It
ran»
I propose to examine whether it is or is not practical
t'_ comply with the desire widely prevalent in Ireland,
and testified by the return of eighty-five out of one
hundred and three representatives, for the establishment
by Statute of a Legislative body, to sit in Dublin, and
to deal with Irish as distinguished from Imperial affairs;
in such a manner as would be just to each of the three




Hero is an indication of how hard-pressed Gladstone was to
find suitable men for at least certain posts. Sir tyon Playfalr,
who had been I ost Faster General in 1873-''-> but had not been in
Gladstone's previous ministry, thip described how he came to
accept officios "... I was offer'it [Vice-Presirency of the
Privy Council) yesterday but declined it. I met : r. Gladstone
at dinner at Uurlborough House, and he told mc how deeply he
was grieved, and entreated me to reconsider my .refusal. "Lord
Granville and Lord Gpencer prossec me also very strongly. Today
1 . . . was received first by Hrs. Gladstone, the told me that
he was very poorly, end that I was bhe cause, for he was quite
upset by ray refusal. The 0.0.6. then expressed Ms disappointment.
Fa said that he knew I was in sympathy with him, and could not
understand iry reasons for refusing to join him; that as I had
taken little interest in party politics ho coulo not put me in
the Cabinet, tut that anyone who stood by him in his emergency
hod a .ri: ht to that soon. ... I made the condition that I
srould. have a fr ,e hand in debate." (Playfair to o.H.Mussell,
b I'eb. 1366, :.onoirs and cor* "os ondc ;co of Lyon Fla.vfoir, 3525.
^ The eleven were: liarting ton, Char.ibor.la in, bright, Lerbv,
Northbrook, Gelbourne, Carlingford, Argyll, Trevelyan, Hodson,
and Forster (died y April, 1666).
I.
Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 203.
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people of Ireland, conducive to the social order and
harmony of that country, and calculated to support and
consolidate the unity of the Empire on the combined basis
of Imperial Authority and mutual attachment.
It is easy to assume that Gladstone, with far-sighted
cunning, was endeavouring to manoeuvre those colleagues who
did not go the whole way with him on Irish self-government
into a position from which they could escape only with great
difficulty when later they should discover his real intention.
to give plausibility to this assumption are the facts that
once the government had been formed he acted as though the
sole purpose of its existence was, not to examine the
practicability of, but to grant a Dublin legislature, and that '
in little more than two months he had drafted, the first home
rule bill (with the aid of P:>mell through Morley) and had
laid it before Parilament. However, throughout his long career
Gladstone had been one of the most conscientious and scrupulous
of politicians and it seems unlikely that in his old age he
should deliberately stoop to a deceit of that hind.
What then is the explanation of" the memorandum? The first
which springs to one's mind is that perhaps Gladstone, like so
many of his contemporaries, had doubts on whether a workable
and reasonably permanent legislative body could be devised which
would yot have the features that he had determined upon. But
it appears incredible that he should have taken so important a
step as to propose the formation of a government to examine the
practicability of granting something which he recognized might,
after all, prove to be of the same nature as squaring the circle.
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It seems more likely that what Gladstone wished to examine
was not the abstract problems of Irish home rale, but certain
down to earth factors of which he was still uncertain. Would
1
a sufficient number of the rank and file support him? Was
Ireland in a sufficiently peaceful condition to merit the
2
exj>eriment? - a fact which he claimed could be known only by
3
the government in r>ower. Would the Nationalists as a party
consent to home rule with the limitations that he had determined
4
upon?
An account of this period which Gladstone wrote in the autumn
of 1897 illustrates how uncertain he was of the support to be
expected from his party. "When we came to the debate on the
Address I had to face a night of extreme anxiety.. . . What I
dreaded was lest some one should have gone back to the precedent
of 1833, when the Address in reply to the speech was virtually
made the vehicle of a solemn declaration in favour of the Act
of Union. ... I . . . strongly advised the party to keep its
own counsel, and await for a little the development of events.
Happily this counsel was taken; had it been otherwise, the early
formation of a government favourable to home rule would in all
likelihood have become an impossibility. For although our home
rule bill was eventually supported by more than 300 members, I
doubt whether, if the question had been px-ematurely raised on the
night of the Address, as many as 200 would have been disposed to
act in that sense". (Quoted, Morley, III, 284-5).
2
Gladstone stated on several occasions that home rule could be
taken up only if an adequate state of law and order prevailed
in Ireland. (Gladstone to Hartington (draft), 17 Dec. 1885,
Add. Mas, 44148, f. 167; Gladstone to Hartington, 2 Jan. 1886,
Chats. 340,1883; Gladstone to Granville, 18 Jan. 1886, Chats.
340.1909; and Spencer to Granville, 29 Dec. 1885, P.H.O.,
30.29.22A).
^ Spencer to Granville, 29 Dec. 1885.
^ On 18 Nov. Gladstone had written to Hartington,"The main
questions are, does Irish Nationalism contemplate a fair
division of Imjjerial burdens, and will it agree to just
provisions for the protection of the landlords", (draft,
Add. Mss. 44148 (Holland, II. 94-95).
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The memorandum, one suspects, sprang from a dilemma:
Gladstone did not wish to commit himself fully until he should
1
know the answers to these key questions and at the same time
he wished to be certain of a cabinet willing to concede his
Irish aim should conditions be favourable. T* c fatal flaw
was his assumption that those who could agree with him on the
desirability of his home rule aim would also agree with him on
its feasibility. But for it there would not be the impression
tiiat he was practising a calculated deceit.
Gladston,- sent for Harting ton, but it could have been
with little expectation that he would join bis government.
The interview was short and friendly and Hartington promised
to write a letter, which could be shown to the Queen, stating
2
his reasons for refusing office. In the letter he wrote that
his objections to an Irish legislature, whether subordinate
or independent, were as strong as ever. He was unable to
attach great importance to a distinction b-.twee.ri examination
and the actual conception and a mounceraent of n plan because
"the Government which had undertaken to enter into such an
examination can scarcely stop short of proposing a policy founded
1
In a memorandum which Gladstone drew up on 26 Bee. 1685
he wrote "it is impossible to justify the contention that
a condition vrvh,;.; to asserting"the right and duty of a
Parliamentary majority, the party or the leaders should commit
themselves on a measure, about which they can form no final
juegment until by becoming the Government they can held all the
necessary communications". <copy, P.U.O., 30.29.22*0.
2
liarting ton to Duke of Devonshire, 30 Jan. 13*;' • q.u.o.,
Holla net, II. "id 25 and James' memoir, Lord Askwith, ord
01; dercfor^.. 16k.
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upon it". In addition he had, he stated, so deeply pledged
himself against an Irish legislature that it would be
dishonourable if ho were now to assist in creating one. He
felt that such a step w.. uld be disastrous for his political
influence as he would bring with him none of lis followers
and they under another leader would probably bo more hostile
to the Government than under himself. Then comes the most
interesting part s
I am now of the opinion, he wrote, that these declarations
having been made, it is necessary that they should assume
a practical shape. The country must now understand what
concession of legislative independence is considered safe
and practical by any responsible party, anc it must now
be proved whether it is, or is not possible to reconcile
the demands of the Irish Home Rule party with the
deliberate opinion of the majority of Lnglishncn and
Scotchmen.
hhile therefore I reserve full liberty to form the
best judgment I can on your proposals when they may
assume a definite shape, and can in no way commit myself
co their support, I hope and believe that it nay be possible
for me, as a private member, to do something to prevent
obstacles being placed In the way of a fair trial being
given to the policy of the now Government.
I am fully convinced that the alternative policy of
governing Ireland without large concessions to the national
sentiment, presents difficulties of a tremendous character
which, in my opinion, could now only be faced by the
support of a nation united by the consciousness that the
fullest opportunity had been given for the production and
consideration of a conciliatory policy.1
This is not quite the kind of letter which one would expect
from a convinced upholder of the Union. The explanation is
simple. The tone of the loiter sprang from Kartington1s deep
1 Farting ton to Gladstone, 30 Jan. I006, Act', ilss. M*lMJ,
f. 212 'Holland, II. 1
00
rooted regard for his old loader and the substance from his
fear that an early over throw of Cladstone would in the long
run prove a worse blow at the Lnion than if Lie were allowed to
lay a scheme of home rule before the country and then be
defeated. As Ilartington explained to Janes almost immediately
after the interview - "I do not like Home Rule, and never shall,
but as things now are, if I oppose Mr. Gladstone and am called
upon for an alternative policy, I have not got one, except the
bayonet, and I do not think the Liberal party will stand that".
This waiting policy which Hartlogton adopted was the soundest
one for his future influence. As the .■acta tor noted six weeks
later, had he prejudged Gladstone's proposals and allied himself
with the Conservatives he would have been followed by only a
handful of liberals and would then have lost ail influence with
2 d 3
the Liberal rank and file.
Chamberlain's position was ono of extreme difficulty and
very different from what he had envisaged in the autumn.
1
Janes' Memoir, Lord Askwith, Lore: J amos of hi reford. 16k,
2 Spectator. 13 March 1886, p. 33fG.
3 L.Heneage later wrote in a letter to upeneer (17 March 13o6.
Miscellaneous, Aithorp) that on being offered the Chancellorship
of the Duchy of Lancaster: "I demurred and proposed to go to
see Lord J lorting ton a-id Primrose [Gladstone's private- secretary]
left the room and on coning back said ih-.i he had seen Grosvenor
and he wished him to tell me that Rartington had advised all his
friends to join the Government." Possibly Partington did do so,
but one would like; further evirence before accepting Henoage* s
statements as absolutely accurate. Lot only had it been relayed
through more than one mouth, but ITcneage when he wrote it had
lust resigned his office and was endeavouring to uefend his
action in joining, the Government in the first place.
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During the election Morley had called for a bold policy of
Irish self-government and at the end of December he and
Chamber la in had parted, as far as po itics -went, after a
1
misunderstanding, Dilke had been cited as a co-respondent
In a divorce suit and was helpless to influence events one nay
or another. nyway, he too was soon to declare for home rule.
Shaw-Lefevre had been defeated in the election and was out of
Parliament until May when he came back pledged to a separate
legislature, but against the Irish land :urchase bill,
ilarcourt was as opposed to an Irish legislature as most but
held that the only alternative was coercion and blood in
Inland - a hopeless proposition, he believed, as the American
Irish would keep up a perpetual supply of arms, dynamite and
assassins while in Britain a large party, armed with the taunt
"if you had followed the advice of Ilr. G. this would not have
2
happened", would make the position of the Government impossible.
From the moment the Tories sold the pass to larnell for office
in June resistance to home rule had been a lost cause,
3
Larcourt had written to Chamberlain on Christmas Bay. In a
further letter on the eve of the new Year's Day meeting he had
stated that he foresaw that they might have to let Gladstone
'
Chamberlain-Korley correspondence, 2k Dec. 1885 - 1 Jan, 1886;
Viscount Morley, n. collections. I. 205-9; and Garvin, II. IV7-51.
2 Harcourt to Hartington, 20 Dec,, Chats. 3^0,1880; 22 Dec.,
q.w.o., Gardiner, I. 552-3j ano 24 Dec. 1885, Gardiner,
I, 5o3-5; and liarcourt to Chamberlain [2o-81 Dec. 1885. n.d.
given in Gardiner], q.w.o., Gardiner, I. 55b.
3 C-ardiner, I. 555.
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try his hand so that no one -would be able to say that all
1
methods had not been exhausted.
Chamberlain if he refused office would seriously weaken
the Government and his action would bo fully 'understood by
few - especially in the constituencies. This was particularly
so as very many were unable to see that one who had advocated
"national councils" could be opposed on principle to a
separate Irish legislature, And then there was the factor of
the unknown. Perhaps after all Gladstone would be forced
either by circumstances or by his colleagues to adopt a scheme
which would be little more than one- of "national councils".
To refuse office when faced with a definite plan for an Irish
legislature was one thing, but to refuse because one had been
asked to examine the question was a very different matter,
Gladstone offered Chamberlain the Admiralty, an uncongenial
and cramping post for anyone bent on having the "Unauthorised
Programme" translated into legislation# In addition Chamberlain
was reluctant to throw upon his young and comparatively
inexperienced daughter responsibility for the large amount of
2
entertaining expected of the lirst lord. However, ho did not
3
press his objections at the initial interview, but concentrated
^ liarcourt to Chamberlain, 26-31 hoc. loop .
2
Note by Sir Austen Chamberlain, 7 tec. 1932, quoted by
editor, Chamberlain, lop.
3 The description of this interview is based on Chamberlain's
memoir, Chamberlain, lo.„-6 and 19-'.
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Oil the more fundamental question of Gladstone's intentions for
Ireland. He must know about that first, he told Gladstone, for
if a separate parliament was to u, established In lublin he
could not accept office. Gladstone explained that as yet he
had not made up his mind to any plan or proposal and that no
one would be pledged to any conclusion which mi? ht arise out of
the proposed enquiry. He then produced the memorandum.
Chamberlain, having read it, stated his own views. He said
that he was opposed to an Irish parliament and that he thought
negotiations should be resumed with the nationalists on the
basis of the "national councils" proposal. He pointed out that
agreement might be reached on the questions of land, education,
and municipal government and that these would occupy much time
before they could even consider Irish government. Gladstone
ashed Chamberlain if he : re,judged the enquiry or did he think
he could consider impartially its results. Chamberlain answered
that he was not committed to a final judgment but felt it only
fair that he should state his views. Gladstone thereupon said
that he saw in what Chamberlain had told him no impediment to
his joining the Government. Chamberlain asked and was granted a
few hours in which to make up his mind, he decided on office
and wrote a letter of acceptance which he took back with him
to Gladstone. The letter can have brought Gladstone little
consolation for he must have seen in it a clearing of the decks
rather than anything else.
, . . Cut I have already thought it due to ycu, wrote
Chamberlain, to say that according to ny present judgment
it will not be found possible to conciliate these conditions
6>+
with the establishment of a National Legislative body
sitting in Dublin: and I have explained my own preference
for an attempt to come to terms with the Irish members on
the basis of a more limited scheme of local government
corpied witi. proposals for the settlement of the land, and
perhaps also the Education questions.
Ion have boon hind enougl , after hearing these
opinions to repeat your request that 1 should join your
Government and yor have explained that in this case I shall
retain ■ "iHilinited liberty of judgment and rejection" on any
scheme that may ultimately be proposed and that the full
consideration of such minor proposals as I have referred to,
as an alternative to any larger arrangement, will not be
excluded by yon. , , A
On the following day Chamberlain wrote to Gladstone referring
to his reluctance to accept the Admiralty and asked for a further
✓n
C-
interview. Gladstone granted the interview later on the same
3 k
day. lie ashed Chamberlain which office he would prefer.
Chamberlain replied that he would like the Colonial Office
whereupon, according to Dilke, Gladstone made the unfortunate
6
remark, "Oh! A Secretary of State". Gladstone wished to hold
the Colonial Office for his old friend Granville, who, it was
generally recognized, was no longer fitted for the foreign Office,
1
Chamberlain to Gladstone, 3. Jan. 1686, Mi. Iss.hh.l26, f.132
(Chamberlain, Id?--•- and q.w.o, Garvin, II. 172). Chamberlain
added the following sentence on Gladstone's suggestion, "on the
other hand I have no difficulty in assuring you of my readiness
to give an unprejudiced examination to any more extensive proposals
that may be made with an anxious ccsire that the result may be
more favourable then I am at present able to anticipate"
(Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 167).
^ Chamberlain to Gladstone, 31 Jan. 1686, Add. lss.';'(-126, f.136.
3 Dilke' -3 memoir, Gv/yun and i'ucliwi.l"1 , 206.
Ibid.: and Chamberlain's memoir, chamberlain, 138.
^ Ibid.
^ LiHo '3 memoir, loc. clt.
As a result he did not take up Chamberlain's reply but instead
asked him if he would accept his former post of President of the
1
Board of Trade, Chamberlain answered that he would, if
2
Gladstone desired it, but that ho would prefer a change,
text day Chamberlain mentioned to liarcourt that he would be
willing to take the Local Government Board as it would enable
hira to prepare the local government bill, which he assumed
3
would be the first work of the Ministry.^ liarcourt informed
Gladstone, who agreed to the suggestion, and so Chamberlain
entered the Cabinet as President of the Local Government
Board. "As to 3.Poland", he wrote to Bright a day or two later,
"I have very little hope - not much in agreeing with my
colleagues in proposing anything - and still less of finding
5
that what we propose is a solution."
Spencer accepted the Lord Presidency. His support of
Gladstone was of great importance at this crisis and in the
following months. Morley in after years considered that,
without it, the attempt to give hone rule would have been
6
useless from the first. Spencer had been Viceroy of Ireland
1 Chamberlain's memoir, loc. cit.
2
ibid.
3 Ibid., and Dilke's memoir, loc. cit.
** Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 2 Feb. 1886, Add. Mss.
Mil, 6, f. 139.
^ Chamberlain to Bright, 5 Feb, 1886, Add. Has. U3387, f. 22.
^
Viscount Morley, hocolloctfons. I. 219.
in Gladstone's first ministry and again following the murder
0
of Lord Fredrick Cavendish in 1332 and was credited with a
A
greater knowledge of that country and had undoubtedly a greater
experience of the coercive maintenance of law and order, and
of its limitations, than any other man. his advocacy of an
Irish legislature required great moral courage for not only
had the policy of his previous viceroyalty been based to all
outward appearances on the refusal to recognise the nationalist
demand for a separate parliament, but ho had been the victim of
1
much brutal and unfair nationalist vituperation. He now
acquiesced in the policy of a separate legislature because he
believed that the only alternative was coercion of the most
rigid type and that all policies involving coercion would
sooner or later be sold by someone in return for the parliamentary
support of the nationalists and, moreover, would not be
cL
tolerated for long by the English people. As iiorthbrook wrote
On 31 Ice. Spencer confessed to Campbell-Iannerman "if I
remain, of the opinion which you heard and i hove to express it,
1 shall do that which surpasses anything I have ever done before
as to horror" (Spencer to Campbell-Eannerman, Add.Mss.*fl223,
f. 305) and on the previous day ho had written to Kosebery
". . . how odious (and maybe wicked) it is to think that Pamell
and his crew are to govern Ireland" (Spencer to Rosebery (draft),
Miscellaneous, Althorp.).
2 wolverton to Glads bone, 13 Doc. 1385, Add. Ms3,^3^9, f, 18U-;
Spencer to Granville, 25 fee. 1385, P.K.O., 30.29.22A; Northbrook
to Spencer. 7 Jan. 1836, Miscellaneous, Althorp; Spencer to
Lansdowne (copy), 2 Feb. 1386. Miscellaneous, Althorp; Spencer
to Sir Rowland Elennorhasset (copy), 7 Feb. 1886, Miscellaneous,
Althorp; Spencer to Lord Longford (copy), 31 Mai-oh 1886,
Miscellaneous, Althorp; Spencer's speech on second home rule
bill, .-.ns-u-u (I693), XVII, cols. 11-12; Viscount Forley,
■ ■•v?collcctv'Uiij. I. 219; and Gardiner, I. 556-7.
to him, "You do not look upon Home Pule a,3 a good thing in
1
itself, but only as the least bad of two bad alternatives."
Spencer's sine nua noa for a home rule measure was that it must
be one which made impossible the exploitation of the landlords
or separation from C-reat Britain.
Trevelyan, Chamberlain*s fellow Radical, consented to
take the Secretaryship for Scotland. lie had been Irish Chief
Secretary under the previous Liberal administration and this
fact now increased the influence of his views. Unlike some he
believed that a separate Irish legislature was by no means
inevitable and that a sustained policy of coercion could, if
3
necessary, be maintained. He especially objected (perhaps
as a result of his experiences as Chief Secretary during the
police strike of 1682) to the relinquishing of any control of
li.
law and order to an Irish body. He strongly denounced the
suggestion that Ireland should have her own parliament and in
5
addition be represented in Westminster on imperial matters.
Such an arrangement, he declared, would make the Irish masters
2.
Ilorthbrook to Spencer, 7 Jan. 1886.
2
Ibid.: and Ilorthbrook to Spencer, 16 Dec. 1885,
Miscellaneous, A1thorp.
■3
Campbell-; annerman to Spencer, 8 Jan. 1086, Miscellaneous,
Althorp; and Northbrook to Spencer, 7 Jan. 1886, Miscellaneous,
Althorp,
If
Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 8 Jan. 1886; and Trevelyan's
speech at onitterford, Warwickshire, 30 Dec. 1888? 1'ije limes.
31 Dec. 1885.
lA
Trevelyan's speech, 36 Dec. 1885.
Co
1
of both the Dublin and the Imperial Parliament. His own
proposal was that responsibility for education, roads, bridges,
asylums, and poor rates and poor relief should be given to
freely elected Irish bodies which would be entrusted with the
expenditure of the money allotted by the Treasury to these
objects plus such additional sums as they themselves should
2
decide to raise by additional Irish internal taxes.
Trevelyan's family had long been connected with India and with
him an important reason against an Irish parliament waj lest
3
it should sex a precedent for India.
Goschen was invited to accept office although Gladstone
could have had little hope that he would. The interview was
b
short and courteous, but the result was negative.
Sir Henry James, who had pledged himself against home
5 6
rule during the election, refused both the Lord Chancellorship
and the Home Office. Gladstone and Mrs. Gladstone begged him
7 '





Conversation between Trevelyan and editor of ..or tfnern dhir.
f.Macknirht, Ulster, as it is, II. lbO.
: lor ley, III. 29b.
£
y In one speech James had told his constituents, "Mr. Gladstone
has been more than aleader to me - he has b en a father. But,
even if he were to go down on his knees, and beg me to vote for
Home Mule, I should be constrained by conscience to say him Hay".
(G.W.E.Russell, i o^iticg and personalities, bi).
^ Mr. Ensor remarks (England, lb70-191b. 97), "Sir IT,James . . .
refused the lord chancellorship - said to have been never before
refused in modern times". It was however refused at least once -
in 1868 by Selborne, who again refused it on this occasion,
^ James* memoir, Lord Askwlth, Lord Janes of Hereford,, 160-b.
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promised to return for a further interview, but instead he wrote
to Herbert Gladstone asking to be excused it 03 his views
remained unaltered and he wished to be spared "that pain which
the personal expression of a refusal to comply with any request
3.
which Mr. Gladstone may make" would cause him. He concluded
his letter with an assurance that he would endeavour to give
"an assidious support to the Hew Government" (James is probably
not quite fair to himself in this letter as it suggests that
the main reason for his refusal was the intervention of the
chairman of his election committee).
Another excellent example of the domination which Gladstone,
through his personality, had over friends and colleagues is
provided by John Bright, who in spite of his age was still
one of the great political forces in the country. Bright was
2
opposed to the granting of an Irish legislature, but because
3
of his regard for Gladstone steadily refused to take part in
the controversy either in or out of Parliament, Gladstone
later described Bright10 refusal to support him at this time
as a grievous loss and declared that he would rather have had
V
Bright with him than all the other unionist Liberals.
"
James to Herbert Gladstone, .31 Jan. 1366, Add.MssA603&, f • 19.
c" lh& diaries of John .. ri lit (edited by P.Bright), Chapter
XVIII; G.Il.Trevelyan, i'ho life of John Bright. Chapter XXI;
and H.B.O'Lrien, I he life of Charles Stewart Parneli. II. IV5-.52.
3 Bright to Gladstone, 13 May 1836, Add.Mss, VV113, f. 22V
Qiorley, III. 327-9).
if.
Conversation with Gladstone, 31 Dec. 1838, Lord Hendel,
Personal Papers. conversations with -n. Gladstone, 1668-98. P. 5°>
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Gladstone had the impression in early August that, like
1
Granville, Derby was inclining towards Irish self-government.
2
He was quite mistaken: Derby both then and afterwards was
stoutly opposed to it. Gladstone had learned how mistaken he
had been from a letter which Derby had written Granville in
3
mid-December and in addition he had had an. interview with
b
him in mid-January and could now have had little hope of his
accepting office. On the appearance of the national Press
Agency statement Derby had written to Ilartington setting out
his views:
... I do not believe any parliament meeting in Dublin
can long go on without a quarrel with the imperial
parliament at Westminster. Retain a veto on its acts
and you have exactly the state of affairs which was found
intolerable 10.) years ago. Limit its functions, and
every question taken out of its power . . . will be the
beginning of a grievance, Its first act will probably be
to declare itself the only body entitled to make laws
for Ireland. . . Then what possible security can you
give to the landlords? And how can you reconcile lister?
... I had rather give the Irish at once what must
follow from it - separate administration with only the
Crown for a co meeting link.5
T'.orthbrook was offered the Lord Lieutenancy or the Privy
Seal. He was by no means diametrically opposed to all forms
1 Hartington to Granville, 8 Aug. 1885, P.R.Q., 31 .29.22A
(Holland, II. 77).
2
Granville to Spencer, lb Aug. 1885, Lord E.Fitzmaurice,
The Life of Lord Granville. II. **59.
3 Derby to Granville, 15 Dec. 1885> Add.Mss.Vrlf-2, f, l!-o;
and Granville to Gladstone, 17 Lee. 1887, AdG.Mss.M+178, f,277#
Derby to Spencer, 15 Jan. I086, ItLsce''laneous, A1 thorp.
' Derby to Ilartington, 18 Dec. 1885, Ghats. 3^ .1885.
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of home rule, hut refused to consider either post mainly
because of the treatment which ho had received in connection
1
with his mission to r:gypt in l8o!+. in early February he wrote
to a friend:
, . . The position which Mr. Gladstone has taken upon
the Irish question, coupled with the weakness shown by
the late Government, has produced a state of
circumstances under which it seems to be inevitable that
we should see if any tolerable terms can be made with
the Hone Toilers; and I an not going into opposition to
any such proposals. I shall wait and see what they are;
but I era not sanguine that Mr. Gladstone will succeed.
I feel sure he has a plan in his head.2
Courtney declined to take part in the new administration.
lie believed that home rule would injure Britain, but would well
3
nigh ruin Ireland. If he could nave had his way he would have
exerted all the authority of the Lmpire to ensure the rule of
law in Ireland; have curbed the nationalists' power for mischief
in Westminster; have established free county government; have
felt the way to provincial conferences? and have allowed Irish
I.?*
grand committees at Westminster. But such a programme, he knew
would have to be steadily maintained and as that did not seem
possible he was drawn to the conclusion that Ireland was "doomed
1 Northbrook1s diary, 3 Feb. 1886, B.Mallet, i'horns C'eorro.
Pari eg ■Torthbrook. 228? and Korthbrook to li.Greufell, n.d.,
ibid.". ' 22b.
2
dorthbrook to II.Grenfell Ln.d, in Mallet, but was in answer
to a letter dated f *eb. 1836J, ibid. 229.
^ Courtney to Gladstone, 19 Dec. 1885, Add. Mss. W+93, f. 186;
f.nu Courtney to Li s rod (draft), 30 bee. 1685, Courtney, XIX, p
^
Courtney to Gladstone, 19 Dec. 1835* and Courtney to .diss
Tod, 30 Dec. 1835.
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1
to go through the furnace of Home Rule." Under such circumstances
he had decided that his policy mu3t be simply to resist home
2
rule as lone; as possible.
John Horley, who had never before held office, accepted
the Irish Chief Secretaryship with a seat in the Cabinet. The
appointment caused much comment and most people interpreted it
as an earnest that Gladstone was determined on the production
of a substantial home rule measure for, as Harcourt wrote to
Gladstone, it would be "obviously impossible for Itr. Morley to
deal with Ilr. Parnell on any other footing than that of the
3
opinions he has himself proclaimed".
Granville, Gladstone's chief confidant in Irish as in
other political matters, wished for an Irish legislature
containing efficient safeguards for the landlords and the
antl-hationalist minority. The great bribe for him, he
stated, and he believed for the majority of the people of
Great Fritaln, would be the exclusion of the Irish L.I s from
5
Westminster. Granville's management of foreign affairs in the
previous Liberal ministry has led his chief colleagues and also
1
Courtney to Gladstone, 19 bee. loop.
Courtney to Hiss Tod, 3C Dec. 1385.
3 Earcourt to Gladstone, 31 Jan. 1886, Add. Ess. Hh-fCC, f. lp
(Cardiner, 1. pol-h).
If
Granville to dpenc^r, 20 Doc. lodp, Granville vol., A1thorp;
and Granville to Gladstone, 28 Dec. 18o5, Add. has. VkL78, f. 287.
^ Ibid., and Granville to Spencer, Granville vol., A1thorp.
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the Queen to fear that his powers were no longer equal to the
1
task, and so Gladstone now gave him the Colonial Office. The
Foreign Office he gave to the young and able Rosebery. Rosebery
held that powers of local self-government should not be withheld
from Ireland when they had already been given to British
colonies and would unhesitatingly be given to her if she were
2
a thousand miles distant. He further believed that the
Liberal party had no alternative but to take up home rule as
the Irish, now that they had discovered Gladstone's views from
the Ilawarden "Kite", would never consent to anything else and
3
would otherwise have to be ruled, by the sword.
Ilarcourt accepted the Chancellorship of the Lxchtquer, but
first he wrote to Gladstone setting out his views and the
conditions under which he consented so office. The letter is
of especial Interest because of the contribution which it makes
to an understanding of the key part which Ilarcourt took in the
- Lord Crewe, Lord doseberv. I, 259-60; and P. Guedella,
.sissa sM kk. 11 • 65.
p
Rosebery to Spencer, 31 Dec. 18b5, Miscellaneous, A1thorp.
3 Ibid*
1
reunion negotiations of the following winter. He wrote :
... I have not either from any reflection of my own or
from the slight indications I have received of your views
on th-. subject been able to arrive at the co -.elusion that
there is any probability of devising a scheno of "Home Rule" -
by which I mean a plan involving a legislative ry-cy sitting
in Irclone' - which could fulfil the conditions laid down by
you in the paper ... If therefore your Government was
about to be formed on the basis of the adoption of a
separate legislative body in In.-laad I could not
conscientiously join it. but I understand from you that
this is a question to be examined by the Cabinet with
perfect freedom to every member of it to arrive at his own
conclusions ... I have from the first felt that your
great influence and authority make your opinions and
views on this subject so potent an element in dealing with
the Irish problem that before having recourse to any other
alternative every effort should be made to bring them forward
for a fair trial.. . . I understand that nothing is to be
done which should fetter the freedom of the Cabinet to
accept or reject ... a solution.. .
Campbell-kannermon accepted the bar Office. He regarded
3
home rule as a dangerous and damaging pis aHer, but feared that
1~ On the same day as he wrote this letter Karcourt remarked to
•James "It will be best to let the scheme be brought forward, it
will then be condemned and so got out of the way. «.e shall all
cone together then" (Janes* memoir, lord Askwith, Lord Jar.us of
['creford. 16;;). And Garvin records (II. h%.) that barcourt in
the following years often wondered whether he would have done
better to have resigned with Chamberlain in ilarch lub6. In a
letter to his son, written when the 0* Shea divorce suit appeared
to have mortally stricken home rule, Harcourt remarked, "Like
Grattan we can say, *ue sat by its cradle and we fallow its
hoarse'. And I at least suffered as much from the pangs of its
birth as I ever can from the agony of its decease" (Gardiner,
II. 91).
harcourt to Gladstone, 31 Jan, ldb6, Add. has. 'i-h-SGO, f. 15
(G.i rdiner, I. yo3-:' ).




there was no alternative to it. He considered a separate
parliament much less objectionable than the Irish Central Board
2
proposed in the previous Liberal ministry, but nevertheless
admitted that it might ruin Ireland by driving out all capital
3
and destroying her credit. He had more reason to be
embarrassed than most by the anti-home rule utterances which he
had made curing the general election.
Ripon, who had favoured mild home rule as early as the
5
preceding duly, became First I.ord of the Admiralty and Childers,
6
who had declared for an Irish legislature in the general election,
became Home Secretary. do indications are at present available
of the private views on the Irish legislature question of the
three remaining appointments to the- Cabinet. They were, Kimberley
to the India Office, Sir F.IIerschell (created first Baron
Ilerschell in 1606) to the Lord Chancellorship, and A.J.Mundella
to the Board of Trade.
Campbell-Bamerman to Horthbrook, 26 Dec. 1665, J.A.Spender,
The life of -the ri;;; .1 hon. Sir Ikpiry l-jl; .1-: a uwrnap1.92-95.
2 Ibid.
^ Ibid.: and Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 27 Dec. 1865,
Miscellaneous, A1thorp.
But it is only fair to record that Campbell-Lannerman had
noted in a memorandum on the Central Board Scheme of the previous
April, "I am personally not afraid of going great lengths - the
length of something like a 'Grattarfe Parliament', although there
would be awkward difficulties of detail". (J.A.Spender, The life
of Jir Henry Ca: 'obeli-■ amerman. I. 6k) .
* Lucinn I olf, hjf- of the.First Marquess of Rinoru II. 175-9.
^
Childers' speech, lc Oct, 1865, The Times. 13 0- t. 18655
Childers to Gladstone, 27 and 28 Sept. looy, Ado. Mss. Mfl32,
ff. 183 and 186; and Lieut-Col, Spencer Childers, Life and




On© of the first acts of the new cabinet was to commission
Chamberlain to prepare a local government bill. lie was given
1 2
no instructions about details and, with assistance from Dilke,
he developed a scheme very much to his heart's desire, bounty
councils, district councils, and parish councils were planned
with powers to regulate licensing, to purchase land, for allotments,
3
and to administer local charities. However, because of
Chamberlain* s subsequent resignation the measure was fated
riot even to reach the cabinet table.
On 8 February Gladstone- ashed Chamberlain for a discussion
on Ireland. The meeting took place at Downing Street five
5
days later and must have resulted chic-fly in demonstrating to
Gladstone how futile would be any attempt to reconcile
Chamberlain1s views with his own. Chamberlain once more urged
the same plan as he had done when, a fortnight earlier, he bod
been asked to take office t "deal first with the Irish land
■j* Chamberlain* s memoir, Chamberlain, 193.
2
Dilke* 3 memoir, Gwynn and Tuc.-.well, II. 2lc.
3 Chamberlain* s memoir, Chamberlain, 193-
4
Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 6 Feb, 1386, Add. Mss,
Mi 126, f, lh6,
^ Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 189.
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question, and then with education and municipal and county
government, leaving anything more entirely lor future
consideration". One wonders what Gladstone said in reply for,
strange to say, Chantorlain loft with the impression that he
had moved closer to him. Two days later he wrote to laboucheres
• * • As regards our future r-olicy I can say nothing at
present, but I think: that a closer Inspection of the
difficulties in the way has brought Mr. Gladstone nearer
to me t an he was when ho first came tc bonder*. If
Parnell is Impracticable my hope is that we may .all agree
to give way to the Tories and let them do the coercion
which will be necessary.2
Gladstone, understandably enough, made no further attempt
to discuss Irish policy with Chamberlain, but with the
3
co-o; oration of :>araell through horley went forward with the
development of two vast schemes - one for the creation of an
Irish Parliament ana the other for the buying out of Irish
landlords. Gladstone feared and distrusted Chamberlain. He
asked liarcourt to discover, if possible, Chamberlain1 s .real
intentions and even had a meeting of forley, Spencer and
Granville to consider how far it would bo wise to reveal the
i+
schemes to him. The realisation that he was to have no part
in the "inquiry" probably hardened and clarified Chamberlain* s
1 Ibid.. 1%.
Chamberlain to Labouchere, 15 Feb. 1886, A.L.Thorold, The
111© of Hr^ryry Labouchcrc. 286-9.
3 fiorley, III.3OV1 Viscount Morloy, accojl,.ct-oee. II. £21;
Horley-Glad..-.tone correspondence, Aud.Mss7W25;>; and Gladstone* 3
memorandum, 18 March 1886, Add.1133.^+772, f.h.
J.L.Hammond, ^ ^p<:. r^io^, «k3.
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resolution* On 8 March he wrote to his brother Arthur t
... As regards Ireland I have quite made up my mind -
indeed I have never felt the slightest hesitation. If
Mr. Gladstone's scheme goes too far as I expect it will
I stall leave him. The immediate result will bo
considerable unpopularity and temporary estrangement
from the Radical party . • . 1 shall be left almost alone
for a time, I cannot, of course, work with the Tories,
and Fartington is quite as much hostile to ry Radical
views as to Mr# Gladstone's Irish plans, . . ,x
The Conservatives, freed from all prospect of Israeliite
support, began straight-forward campaigning against home rule.
On 22 February Churchill crossed to Ulster and received an
enthusiastic welcome. In lelfast he was given a march past
2
by, it was estimated, 70,000 people. In a militant speech, to
a packed audience he said that, should the home rule storm not
blow over, the struggle was not likely to be restricted to
constitutional action - the history of the United States taught
a different lesson - and urged the Ulstermen to stand firm,
assuring them that men of influence and position in England
3
would throw in their lot with them.
The episode helped to draw attention to the strength of
unionist feeling in lister, a factor which was very imperfectly
appreciated in Great Britain, and the riots which followed on
his visit, while being no credit to Belfast unionism, gave a
* Chamberlain to A.Chamberlam, 8 March 1386, q.w.o., Garvin,
II. loy.
£ Churchill, II, 61.
3 Times. 23 Feb, 1886.
hint of the civil strife which would be launched by the passing
of a home rule measure.
Of all the people in the British isles the Irish Liberals
had been the most persistent in refusing to believe that
1
Gladstone could contemplate home rule, hot until the
appointment of Morley to the Chief Secretaryship and the
refusal of office by so many Liberal leaders did their faith
in the unionism of Gladstone Login to falter. By the time
of Churchill's visit it was v-.-ry shaky indeed, A direct
outcome of that event was that the lister Liberal leaders
decided that, be Gladstone's intention as it racy, the time had
2
come for a statement of their attitude to home rule and at a
meeting in the Belfast deform Club on 2b February they
3
decided to call a convention of the province for that purpose,
The convention met on Vj I larch, Gome seven hundred
representatives were present, a number of whom were Roman
Catholic Liberals, The main business was a resolution which
passed with an overwhelming majority. The resolution, after
expressing confidence in the patriotism and statesmanship of
Gladstone and gratitude for his past services to Ireland, urged
Irish land legislation, the grant of local govemrxnit to Ireland,
abolition of the Viceroyalty, appointment of an Irish secretary,
1
Th« H3ML Liberal T^or&si A £&&& of its Ma£2£Z
Ivo, „ 13-1^5 T»i'laclmight, Ms tor as it is. IX, 122; end
Eichard Patterson, "Mercantile Ireland verses home rule", national
novicu. Jan, 1888,
The ;.lsijc:r L4b£££l Tnionist Association. . . . IhGi-lMb-. lb-.
3 IMd.
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reform of the Irish administration and a greater share in it
for Irishmen# On home rule it stated t
• # • we declare our determined opposition to the
establishment of a separate Irish Parliament as certain
to result in disastrous collision between sections of
people holding conflicting views upon social, economic,
and religious subjects, and likely to create such a feeling ,
as would jeopardise industrial and commercial pursuits • . ♦
A counter resolution expressing complete confidence in
£
Gladstone was heavily defeated# It was supported mainly by
3
Roman Catholic Liberals# Finally a committee was appointed
with the task of pressing the^views of the convention where
they would be most effective# The chief action of the committee
was to send to London a deputation which interviewed Hartington,
Chamberlain, Goachen, irevelyaa, Smith, the Duke of Abercorn
5
and other influential persons# This convention and committee
was the first step by unionist liberals anywhere towards
organised resistance to home rule and was the seed which was to
develop into the influential Lister Liberal Unionist Association#
As can be seen from the resolution passed at the conference,




3 SM &§& hl&asal Association.. # • 16
^ Northern whir# 16 March 1886#
5 Hie tester Literal IMsalHt M32&U&S2. . . • 16#
They had their main support among the Protestant, and especially
the Presbyterian, tenant farmers, and among the middle, and the
Protestant artisan classes of the towns. The farm workers and
the working classes of the towns were as a rule either Nationalist
or Conservative.
The Conservatives were not slow to see the value of an
alliance with the unionist Liberals and soon they were throwing
out suggestions for an understanding between the two groups.
However, even the staunchest of right wing Liberals
Goschen ) had no desire for such an experiment and, if anything,
the unionist Liberals took trouble to underline their Liberalism
by attaching the Conservatives whenever an opportunity
presented itself. It was sound tactics, but was little liked
by the Conservatives, who neither then nor later fully
appreciated their difficult and complex position, In addition
the unionist liberals had not forgiven the Conservatives for
their flirtations with the Parnellltes and the attitude, which
the Duke of St. Albans expressed in a letter on 12 February,
was shared by many i
... I do not think the Liberals can touch Parnell without
being defiled but I look with such contempt on the Tory
tactic3 that I shall be sorry if I am ever forced to give
my vote and any influence I may have against a Liberal
Government and as I told Mr. Gladstone I shall support his
Government till it becomes a question of Home Rule ... 3
1 Prof. T.W.Moody, "A general survey", Mister 3lnce 18001 123
(refers only to Ulster faro workers),
2
E.P.Bouverle to Partington, 22 March 1056, Chats.3M3.i95i.
3 Duke of St, Albans to Granville, 12 I-ob. 1556, P.R.O.,
30.29.22A,
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The first important move in public for an alliance was
1
made by Churchill, with Salisbury's consent, when he spoke at
Manchester on 3 Ilarch. Addressing himself to the unionist
Liberals he offered the most generous Conservative ©-operation.
"If you like to fom a government yourselves, we will support
you", he sale. "If, on the other hand, you wish for our
personal co-operation in that government we will give it you.
If there are persons to whom you object and with whom you do
not wish to serve, those persons will stand aside cheerfully".
Kg then suggested the formation of a new political party which
vol-Id combine all that was "best of the politics of the 'lory,
the b'hlg or the Liberal" and which night be known as the party
2
of the Knion. The speech was based on a superficial
understanding of the dissentients1 problems and the suggestions
which Churchill threw out had no chance of being taken up.
On the same day as Churchill's speech Salisbury took a
3
more down to earth stop. Ho knew Cartington only slightly,
but, using as a pretest an attack on the Conservatives by Janes,
if
he asked him for a talk, Parti ngton called on Salisbury and
y




Tlio Times, b March 1806.
3 Cecil, XII. 29lJ»
K
Salisbury to C-oschen, *+ March 1006, Cecil, 111,29;?.
5 ibid-
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conclusion reached was that there seemed to be no obstacle to
their acting together to resist home role, but that further
co-operation was "not within the field of practical politics at
1
present." Salisbury was disappointed. "It was said of the
Peelites of 1850", he wrote to Churchill almost a fortnight
later, "that they were always putting themselves up to auction
and always buying themselves In. That seems to me the Whig
idea at present# I do not think that it is necessary to make
2
any aore advances to them. The next steps must come from them."
Cn 13 March the Cabinet met to learn the nature of the
land purchase bill and were startled to find that it provided
for the advancement of up to a maximum of 1.12c,000,000 on
credit to the Irish tenants. This was firm ground at last and
Chamberlain prepared for action# First he wisely took care to
widen the battle front to include the home rule scheme#
... it was impossible, he contended, to 3udge this
scheme fairly without knowing what were to be the
provisions of the Home Rule Bill which was to accompany
it . . * if British money was to be advanced, it was
important to know whether the advance was to be made to
a part of the United kingdom under full control of
Parliament or to what might turn out to be a practically
independent nation.-3
^
After considerable discussion and some hesitation Gladstone
1 Ibid., and Sir H,James* diary, b March 1886, Ford Askwith,
lord James o£ IP reford. 171.
2 Salisbury to Churchill, 16 March 1886, Churchill, II. 73.
3 chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 193-V*
ilifcu
av
stated that he planned a separate parliament with full powers
to deal with all Irish affairs, which would include customs
and the civil forces, but with no control over the army and navy
or over foreign and colonial policy. Chamberlain reasoned
strongly against the nronosal and also severely criticised
2
the details of the land purchase scheme, Gladstone,
nevertheless, refused to give an assurance of any important
alteration and In consequence Chamberlain stated that he would
3
have to leave the Government.
Two days later Chamberlain sent in his official resignation.
In it he set out the reasons for his actions
... This (land purchase] scheme while contemplating only
a trifling reduction of the Judicial rents fixed before the
recent fall in prices would commit the British taxpayer
to tremendous obligations,4 accompanied in my opinion with
serious risk of ultimate loss,
. , , a new Irish elective authority , , , would
... be at once the landlords and the delegates of the
Irish tenants, I fear that . , , the tnants, unable or
unwilling to pay the rents demanded, would speedily elect
an authority pledged to give them relief and to seek to
recoup itself by an early repudiation of what would be
described as the English Tribute, . , .
1 gathered from your statements that although your
plans are not finally matured, yet that you have come to
the conclusion that any extension of local government on
Chamberlain to Gladstone, Vj March 1886, Add.Mss.W+lSG, f,l^b
(Chamberlain, 1^-6; and q.u.o., Garvin, II, 187).
2 Chamberlain1 s memoir, 19*f„
3 Ibid.
An interesting sidelight on this remark was that in February
Chamberlain had pressed on Rosebery a scheme of Chinese railway
construction which he reckoned would require loans of £>QG,CGu,OGC
spread over twenty years. (Garvin, II# *w8-9).
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raunicipal lines, including even the creation of a National
Council or councils for purely Irish business, would now be
entirely inadequate? and that you are convinced of the
necessity for conceding a separate Legislative Assembly for
Ireland with full powers to deal with all Irish affairs,
I understood that you would exclude from their competence
the control of the Army and navy and the direction of
Foreign and Colonial policy but that you would allow them
to arrange their own Customs fariff, to have entire control
of the Civil Forces of the country, and even if they thought
fit to establish a Volunteer Army,
It appears to me that a proposal of this kind must
be regarded as tantamount to a proposal for separation,
I think it is even worse, because it would set up
an unstable and temporary Government which would be a
source °f perpetual irritation and agitation until the full
demands of the Nationalist Party were conceded.
The Irish Parliament would be called upon to pay three
or four millions a year as its contribution to the National
Debt and the Army and navy, and It would be required in
addition to pay nearly five millions a year , „ . cn the
cost of Irish land. These charges would be felt to be so
heavy a burden on a poor country that • • • the due
fulfilment of their obligations by the new Irish authority
could only be enforced by military intervention , , ,
Trevelyan liked the proposed bills no better than did
2
Chamberlain and resigned along with him, Gladstone wrote
objecting that they were resigning not on his plans, about which
they had incomplete information, but on his ideas and requested
that the resignations be deferred at least until the proposals
3 **
should be ready for the Cabinet, To this both men consented.
^
Chamberlain to Gladstone, 15 larch 1386, Add.Mss,Mfl26, f.15**
(Chamberlain, 19*4—6; and q.w.o., Garvin, ll, 187)#
*■*
Irevelyan to Gladstone, 15 March 1886, Add.Mss.Mf335, f.199,
3 Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 15 March 1886, Add.i!ss.Mfl26,
f,160 (Chamberlain 197)? and Gladstone to Trovolyan (draft),
15 March 1886, Add.Mss.Mf335, f.201.
**
Chamberlain to Gladstone, 16 March 1886, Add.Mos.Mf126, f.162
(Chamberlain, 197-8)? and Trevelyan to Gladstone, 15 March 1866,
Add.Mss.M4.338, f, 203.
o6
Gladstone asked Ilarcourt end Spencer to mediate* (He made
1
the request to Spencer throuch Granville )* Spencer replied
that he would have a talk with Chamberlain if an opportunity
should occur naturally, hut that he feared it would be of no
use* vlnt night be of use, he suggested, would be if Gladstone
should himself see Chamberlain and take him as far as possible
into his confidence for part of the difficulty, he believed,
was that Chamberlain thought Gladstone did not sufficiently
value hin* "1 know the difficulties about consulting him".
Spencer significantly remarked, but added that he thought the
2
attempt at reconciliation should none the loss be made*
3
liarcourt had talks with both Chamberlain and Trevelyan,
but with no practical resn.lt* Chamberlain again explained his
objections to the bills and declined to discuss an Irish
settlement other than a federal system similar to that of the
V
United States* Nevertheless Harcourt, in sending Gladstone an
5
account of their conversation, urged him to see Chamberlain*
Gladstone replied that he was quite willing to see Chamberlain
to offer to reduce the land purchase sum from 120 millions to
1
Spencer to Granville, 17 March loS6, P*R»0,, 3G.2S.22A*
2
IH&.






60 millions, but added that it was not possible to work a
Cabinet on the basis of universal discussion without purpose -
at any rate at seventy-seven. The suggested halving of the
land purchase sum was undoubtedly a major concession, but that
it was accompanied by no suggestion of any alteration in the
home rule till mde it useless for retaining Charierlain in. the
Government.
Chamberlain recognising that Gladstone was not going to
meet his main objections to the home rule bill and knowing the
gulf which separated their Irish views seems to have abandoned
hope of a compromise and to have begun to contemplate a fight
to the death. Cn, or perhaps a day or two before, 22 1 larch he
called with Ilartington and had with him a surprising discussion.
Afterwards Ilartington discussed the event with Janes and we are
indebted to Janes1 diary for an account. Chamberlain urged
Hartington, the diary says, to undertake to form a government
should Gladstone be defeated or resign and made clear that ho
would be very willing to become a member. He then endeavoured
to persuade Hartington that they did not differ materially in
political opinion. Also he gave Ilartington a memorandum
sketching an Irish policy which he held could well be supported.
James, to whom Bartington showed the document, wrote of it
1
2
it substantially embodied llr. Gl.'s views
he landlords were to be bought out by
2L 172.
payment in "Irish consols"? (2) that two councils or
parliaments were to be established, one at Dublin and one
at Belfast (and "two" was queried in the document)? (3)
that the powers of such councils or parliaments were to
Be defined and restricted to affairs 01" a comparatively
local character; (*+) that an Irish representation in the
Imperial Parliament was to continue, subject to a
diminution in the numbers of Irish members 30 as to be in
proportion to the population.1
At the cabinet held on 26 Ilarch Gladstone said that he was
ready to explain something of his Irish government scheme and
that he thought the best way to clear up or define differences
would he by a resolution in favour of a legislature in Dublin
2
with power over purely Irish affairs. Chamberlain said that
the suggestion was too vague and asked for information on four
key points. As a result Gladstone stated that his plan removed
the Irish members from Westminster; gave taxation, including
customs and excise to the Irish Parliament as well as the
appointment of judges and magistrates; and allowed the Irish
parliament authority in all matters except certain ones
3
enumerated in the bill. Chamberlain was opposed to all of
h
these and Trevelyan could not agree to the giving over
"J
of police and the judicial system. Gladstone, however, made
little attempt to be conciliatory or to retain Chamberlain
and Trevelyan when they verbally resigned and left
1 IkM.
2
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 198.
' Ibid.. 19-3-3; lor ley, III. 302; and Hansard, ccciv, col. 119<
Gladstone to the Queen, 26 March 1866, Letters of tuecn
Victoria. 3rd Scries, I. 91-92; and lutnsard, ccciv, col. 1190.
5
Gladjtone to the queen, 26 March 1836; and Bansard, ccciv,
col. 1116.
1
the room. Some who were present thought that Gladstone was
2
at fault in this, but his attitude is understandable when
one remembers chamberlain1s broad based letter of resignation
of the lyth and his uncompromising attitude when approached by
barcourt, nevertheless, the main factor with Gladstone may
well have been an intense dislike of Chamberlain# Afterwards
he told Itosebory that nothing which had happened since the
formation of the Government had given him satisfaction
3
comparable with that of Chamberlain* s resignation# "b'ith
men like most of ny colleagues it is safe to go to an extreme
of concession", Gladstone i/a.3 to write to his chief whip a
month later# "But my experience in Chamberlain's case is that
such concession is treated mainly as an acknowledgment of Ms
superior greatness and wisdom, and as a fresh point of departure
accordingly". It is also possible that Gladstone very
seriously underestimated the following which Chamberlain would
take with him# Two days earlier Herbert Gladstone reckoned
that if Chamberlain, Partington and Janes were against home
rule forty-five members would secede, but that if land purchase
1
Note by Morley on conversation with Rosebery and Chamberlain
in 1392, Viscount itorley, ic-collcctlo is. I. 296? Korley, III.3O3;
and Gardiner, I# >77#
2
Morley, III# 303? and Chamberlain's occasional diary, 22 May
1363, and 30 June 1695+, Garvin, II# 196#
^ Sir Philip Itagnus. Gladstone-. . biorraahy. 3ko. (Mr I hilip
Kagnus may have obtained this information from the diary of Sir
Edward Hamilton (E.K.) which is closed to ordinary inspection
until 1956)#
** Gladstone to A, dor ley (draft), 20 A ril 1366, Ac d#Msg.
p. l'i-6#
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came first and was pushed to the fore the seceders would number
1
sixty or seventy with many abstentions. Chamberlain maintained
afterwards that he went to the cabinet wishing to be
2
conciliatory, but judging from his ideas and temperament it
seems improbable that Gladstone could have retained him for
more than, a few days except by a drastic and fundamental
recasting of the bills.
Stansfeld and Lalhousi© took the posts loft vacant by
Chamberlain and irevolyan, but Stansfeld alone was given a seat
in the Cabinet, before acceptin^ Stansfeld wrote warning
Gladstone that he- felt the exclusion of Irish representatives
from Westminster would place Ireland in the position of u
colony or dependency, but with charges and restrictions to
which Britain's other dependencies were no.; subject; that he
beli-ved the Protestant part of Ulster should not be compelled,
nor the slightest risk run of having to use force against it;
and that he could see no guarantee that the land purchase act
3
would be honestly enforced by law.
Salisbury in the last days of !larch was of the opinion
that an early dissolution with Gladstone in power and upon
homo rule would be the event most profitable to the
* Herbert Gladstone to Primrose (draft), 2h March loud,
Add.bss.*+6G3,.; f. 70.
2 Viscount Korley. neollc-ct.n.n;, I. £10$ note ly Itorley on
conversation with dose-buy and Chamberlain in 10%, ibid..
1. 296$ I-lorley, III. 303$ and Garvin, II. 193.




Conservatives, A coalition to include .farting ten, Chamberlain
and Trevelyan, he had decided, was impossible and a dissolution
by a "caretaker" Conservative government hazardous as it would
enable both the whigs and the dadical3 to fight the election,
not on house rule, but on some other question which would be
2
certain to arise. Surprisingly enough, Salisbury, even at
this late hour, held that homo rule would raise no popular
stirring and that the Conservative gain would be in the
3
splitting up of their opponents.
Perhaps as a result of these opinions Salisbury decided
on a further attempt to draw Moderate Liberals and Conservatives
together. On V April ho wrote to Partington proposing to call
k
with him to discuss the situation. The meeting toot: place at
5
Devonshire House, but no record is available of the subjects
dealt with or of the conclusions reached, nevertheless, the
event is noteworthy in that it established the practice of
direct personal communication between the two leaders, which,
especially as mutual confidence became more complete, was to
be of considerable importance. Although I'artington was in the
1 Cecil, III, 293; and Salisbury to Churchill, 31 March ldu6,
q.w.o,, Churcnil3 -, 11 • 73™" ,
2




Salisbury to Partington, j April luw6, Chats, 3W, 1961.
2 Cecil, III. 299.
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Commons, it became his castor.-, even in such matters as debate
1
tactics, to deal directly with Salisbury. The practice
undoubtedly resulted in smoother co-operation between the
2
two parties and Salisbury attached such imports ice to it.
Unfortunately for historians, it is also the cause of a dearth
of manuscript material where sometimes it would be valuable.
Churchill retained his Manchester enthusiasm for Liberal
co-operation and early in April succeeded in inducing Salisbury
3
arid chamberlain to meet* The only information available about
the event is that Salisbury went to it "not • • • without
trepidations and misgivings" and that it took place in a
little dingy room at the Turf Club, Churchill*a biographer
adds that it began "that strange alliance afterwards so
5
powerfully to affect the course of history", but such a
rhetorical exaggeration reveals nothing. A few days earlier
Salisbury had agreed with Ealfour that the Chamberlainites would
be more satisfactory allies than the Whij s "so Ion; as you can
6
work with them", but even so, one doubts if the Salisbury-
1 Xblcl»« and Chatsworth papers, pas si;.;.
2
The Larl of Midleton has recorded how in Ills presence Salisbury
once asked the name of a certain card game. On being told that
it was "bridge" he remarked, "I had better inspect it? it may
bring me into closer touch with Devonshire". (Carl of I'idleton,
"Politics and the statesmen, 1882-1932:" an article in a series
reprinted from ijie Times under the title hii'tv bears, 1332-1932).




6 Salisbury to halfour, 29 March 1886, b.C.Imgdale, Arthur »anos
lalfour. I. 101-2, and Cecil, III. 297.
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Chamberlain meeting can have resulted in more than afriendly
exchange of views#
from the formation of Gladstone's third ministry to the
introduction, of the bills was an exceptionally difficult time
for unionist Liberals# ho one quite knew what was happening,
or what to expect, or even whom they could trust among those
they hoped were their lenders. Many even doubted whether
Ilartington would really oppose Gladstone- and dissidents had
to b informed personally and in confidence that he was on
1
their side. Hot until Hartington spoke against the actual
bill on 9 April was the doubt finally eispelled# Also the
belief stubbornly persisted that Gladstone would produce
something so mild or so veil safeguarded that aluost every
Literal would be able to support him#
2
The Goschenites were eager to take the field at once,
but ilartington thought otherwise# On >' March he stated his
position at an Eighty Club dinner. It did not differ greatly
from when ho had refused office,
• • « The people of this country, he said, must know what
the scheme is. They must be able to bring their judgment
to bear on the question whether it presents dangers and
risks which they cannot bring themselves to face, or
whether it presents so little hope that they are unwilling
to face those risks# They must know whether the scheme
is one which will, or can, be accepted by Mr, Paraoll,, . •
lor these reasons# although I have not been able to be a
party to this policy of examination and inquiry, I have
1 The 1.liner papers (Edited by C.Headlan), I#21*
2 Elliot| II. 3b.
done nothing to put any obstacles in the way. I will not
be a party to any attempt to prejudge the policy of the
Government-,by agitation of a political or sectarian
character.
Nevertheless, Ilartington was fully soar© of the nature of
the struggle which must follow the introduction of the bills,
and was not adverse to quiet preparation. On 8 March he wrote
to John bright asiring for a talk with him and added that he
thought all who wore in an independent position and disapproved
of the course which the Government was likely to take ought to
2
com© to an understanding. At the end of March he tried to
gain the co-operation of Chamberlain., He wrote asking him to
call for a discussion and also to attend a small meeting of
3
Liberals which was to bo held, a few days later. Chamberlain
h
declined both invitations. He could, he said, give "most
5
help by barking separately for the present'1.
On 2 April the first meeting of any importance at which
Liberals and Conservatives appeared together took place at
the London Guildhall, The Mayor presided and thirteen members
of Parliament were present, Including the two Liberals Sir
J.Lubbock (London University) and M, Biddulph (8.
1
Hoes. 6 March 1336.
2
Ilartington to Bright, 3 March 1386, Add#Mss,V33oo, f, 19,
^ Chamberlain to Partington, 1 and 3 April I806, Chats.
3^0. I960 and 3VG, 1953.
u
msk.
Chamberlain to Ilartington, 1 April, 1336.
sj
1
Herefordshire). The meeting aroused wide interest tut as the
handful of Literals who were present had attended on their own
initiative and without encouragement from any leader no
consternation was aroused such as was to follow the meeting
at the Queen1 s Opera House twelve days later.
On 6 April unionist Liberals were encouraged by the return
of W.S,Caine at the Harrow bye-election and by a circular of
the National Literal Federation. V.'.d.Caine, a radical, had
made plain that he opposed home rule of the kind which it
2
was assumed Gladstone would advocate and yet waj returned by
3
a majority of almost one thousand. The Levonshire family
owned a very large amount of property and had much influence
in Barrow but the significance of this fact was much reduced
by the radicalism of Caine and the secret ballot. The
circular was issued to the local associations and asked them
to consider carefully the Cover meat* a scheme for Ireland so
that the real opinion of the constituencies might be known.
This cool, independent attitude seemed to indicate that the
Caucus was going to support Chamberlain and not Gladstone,
1 Tiie Times. 3 April 1866.
2 Caine had stated in his election address that he was prepared
to support self-government for Ireland provided it were of a
type which could be extended to the rest of the British Isles.
3 IllS Times. 7 April 13o6 .
96
CHAPTER III
TI1E LIBL'uALS liJ THE COMMONS DIVIDE
On 8 April Gladstone revealed his Government of Ireland
Bill amid an intensity of interest almost without parallel.
In the House of Commons every seat had been marked before noon,
and, even when the space between the mace and the bar had been
filled with chairs, a number of members were still not seated.
One Nationalist member (D.Sullivan) was said to have arrived
at half past five in the morning and nearly all of the Nationalists
had arrived by half-past eight.1 Admission to the visitors'
galleries was a highly sought privilege for which offers of a
2
thousand pounds were made in vii. Amongst those in the
galleries were some of royal blood and many ambassadors and
peers. Crowds had assembled in Downing Street and the approaches
3
to the House of Commons as early as half-past one. A little
before two o'clock Big Ben stopped and many noted the incident
b j
as an evil omen. About half-past three a steady rain began
and, a few minutes before Gladstone left 10 Downing Street, one
1
Standard. 9 April 1886, p. y.
2 Garvin. II, 202.





of the heaviest showers of the season broke. In Ireland
excitement was at fever pitch, and in Ulster, where thoughts
were turning to armed resistance, even morning papers published
editions at intervals as Gladstone1s speech was being
2
transmitted.
The following were the main provisions of the Government
of Ireland Bill, The Irish legislature was to consist of two
orders which were to sit together in a single chamber and were
to vote together unless a majority of one of them should have
previously asked for a separate vote. The first order was to
consist of seventy-five representatives elected for ten years
by £25 occupiers or owners of £if,000 of capital, plus the
twenty-eight Irish representative peers, who, however, were
to be replaced at the end of thirty years by elected
representatives. One half of the elected representatives
were to retire at the end of each five years, but could stand
again. The Irish representative peers were no longer to sit
in the House of Lords. The second order was to consist of
two hundred and four members, elected on the existing
franchise and for the existing constituencies, with an
additional two members for the Royal University should
the Irish legislature so decide. The Irish M.Ps were to
become members of the second order without having to stand
in the first election. The rules governing the dissolution of
1
Ibid.
2 Bailv Telegraphy 9 April 1836, p. 55 and F.Macknight,
lii&ter as it is, II. 127.
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the second order were to be similar to those of the House of
Commons except that the life of a "parliament" was to be
limited to five years. Either order could veto a measure
for three years, or until the next dissolution of the legislature
should that be longer than three years. The Lord Lieutenant
was to become a permanent representative of the Crown, and
could be of any religious denomination. He was to have the
right to exercise the royal veto on any act of the Irish
legislature. Ireland was to be represented in the Imperial
Parliament only on such occasions as the Government of Ireland
Act should be up for revision. Nevertheless, she was to
contribute annually to the Imperial Treasury one fifteenth of
the normal army, navy, and imperial civil expenditures, and
one fifteenth of the National Debt as it then stood, plus a
sinking fund of £360,000. The Imperial Government was to
retain sole responsibility for the imposition and collection of
customs and excise-customs. The Irish legislature was to have
power to legislate on any matter not specifically reserved
from it in the Act. The chief of these reserved matters were,
issues affecting the Crown, the making of peace or war, the
military forces, foreign and colonial relations, dignities
and titles of honour, treason, trade and navigation, currency,
and the post office. The Irish legislature was prohibited
from establishing, endowing, or penalising any religion;
from imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege on
account of religious belief; and from curtailing the right
to establish, or maintain denominational schools, or
99
denominational institutions or char!.ties. The Irish administration
was to appoint and pay the judges, who were to be removable
only for misconduct, and the final court of appeal was to be
the judicial comit toe of the Privy Council. The judicial
committee of the Privy council was also to be the final
authority on whether a matter was within the competence of
the Irish legislature. The Lord Lieutenant was to retain
control of the Dublin police for two years and of the Royal
1
Irish Constabulary for an unspecified period. Special
arrangements were made for judges, police, and civil servants
who might fear victimisation under the new regime because of
past services to the Imperial Government. In his speech
Gladstone stated that, although no provision for the special
treatment of Ulster had been included in the bill, he was
willing to give the most favourable consideration to any such
2
proposal, provided it should be generally recommended. Also,
he warned that the Government of Ireland Bill was closely and
inseparably connected with the land purchase bill which had
3
still to be introduced to Parliament.
1 Gladstone told Rendel in Nov. 1899 that Parnell in 1886
had want., d the constabulary left under Imperial control for
the sake of his own personal security, (lord Rondel's diary,
29 Nov. 189. 9 Lord Rcndel, COTgrsaUpaS iiiMl
.,-2. as, 79).
r" hansard» vol. ccciv, cols.
3 Ibid.. vol. ecclv, col. IO37.
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The Tines wrote that the bill made the separation of
Ireland complete and absolute in principle, and that the
restrictions to secure the supremacy of the Imperial parliament
and to guard against abuses by the Irish legislature were
worthless as they had no efficient sanction behind them. It
added that such a plan might have been worth considering if a
community such as a colony animated with loyal$ty to the mother
country were being dealt with, but that Ireland was no such
1
community. The Daily Telegraph declared that the scheme
would turn Ireland into a colony, but that unlike a colony
she would have to pay her share of the national Debt and of
Britain's imperial expenditure, and would be subject to
important restrictions which were not imposed on the colonies.
It pointed out that the scheme was hedged with restrictions
and special provisions, each based on distrust of the Irish
as legislators. "We are in fact," it remarked, "to play the
part of Frankenstein, and then tie up carefully with red-tape
the monster we have made." The good part of the bill, it
considered, was that the exclusion of the Irish members would
enable the Imperial Parliament to legislate with freedom and
2
vigour. The Standard was of the opinion that Ireland would
be given a colonial status, with restrictions and obligations
which would be extremely irksome and offensive to the Irish,
and of trivial value from the imperial point of view. The
1
Times. 9 April 1886, p. 9.
k Bally. Telegyqph, 9 April 1886, p. b.
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absence of any special provision for Ulster, it stated, -was
1
the first thing which condemned the bill. The Daily hews.
although it did not openly criticise the bill, showed no
enthusiasm for its provisions. It wrote that the best and
most patriotic action which the House of Commons could take
would be to lay aside partisan feeling and to endeavour to
perfect Gladstone*s scheme in the interests of Ireland and
2
the Empire. The Manchester Guardian was openly hostile.
It complained that this was not home rule as ordinarily
understood, but was substantially a repeal of the legislative
union. The bill, it asserted, would destroy the common
parliament and establish in. its place two entirely separate
parliaments with the Crown as the only link between them.
It insisted that to be acceptable a scheme would have to
retain at least a portion of the Irish members at Westminster.
If Ireland were substantially self-governed and contented
Great Britain would be none the worse off for a few Irishmen
in Parliament, it wrote, and, if she were not contented, it
would be better to fight the matter out at Westminster than by
3
sterner methods in another field. The Birmingham Bally Post's
immediate reaction was that the scheme might be made to work if
1 Standard. 9 April 1806, p. 5,
2 Daily :.,.wa. 9 April I806, p. 5.
° -finchestor Guardian, 9 April lo86, p. >'•
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1
largely amended. However, by the following day its attitude
had altered and it wrote that the bill provided for separation -
and separation so arranged that it must result in dissentions,
2
and ultimately in a bitter and dangerous conflict. The
exclusion of Irish representation from the Imperial Parliament,
the formation of two orders v/ith mutually destructive rights
of veto, aM the fixed contribution to imperial expenditure
3
were the provisions to which it especially objected. The
Scotsman admitted that the bill had admirable features,but
hastened to add that, even if all else were good, the exclusion
of the Irish representatives must be fatal to it, Gladstone,
it asserted, had given far more than was required; that
in short he had been asked for home rule and was going to
b
give repeal. The Glasgow Herald considered that Gladstone
had attempted the impossible in trying to reconcile Irish
legislative independence and imperial unity, and that his
efforts showed the danger of giving way, even an inch, on the
5
home rule question. The northern Whir wrote that it was
opposed to a separate legislature of any type. It held that
1
SlSaiagilM Dally 9 April 1886, p, b.
2 Ibid.T 10 April 1886, p. !+.
^ Ibid.f 9 April 1886, p. b.
b'
dcotsman. 9 April 1886, p. b*
5
Olqgppw Ilerqld, 9 April 1886, p. 6.
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to remove the Irish members from the Imperial Parliament must
result in the practical separation of Ireland from Great
Britain? while to create an Iri3h legislature, and at the
same time to give Irish representatives the opportunity to
obstruct Westminster in order to gain further concessions
1
would be absurd, indefensible, and preposterous. The
Christian Worlc. feared that Parnell aimed at complete
2
independence and would use the bill towards that end.
The Guardian condemned the measure as an attempt to
dismember the United Kingdom, and as a sacrifice of national
3
interests to Par^ necessities. The Methodist Times warmly
welcomed the bill and became one of its most whole-hearted
partisans. The Methodist Recorder wrote that the bill
pleased few except Parnell's followers, and pleased them only
because it provided the best means of reaching their ulterior
ends. It denounced the exclusion of Irish representation from
the Imperial Parliament and the leaving of Ulster to the
5
fanciful working of the two orders. The Nonconformist and
Independent approved the bill and pointed out that the doubt
and hesitation with which it had been received was to be
1 Morthern Whig, 9 April 1886, p. b,
2 Christian world, 15 April 1886, p. 306.
^ Guardian. llf April 1886, p. 525-
Methodist Times. 15 April 1886.
5 16 April 1886, p. 252.
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1
expected as the public mind had been totally unprepared for it.
The Inquirer admitted that home rule was inevitable, but held
that Gladstone's scheme would place Ireland in much the same
position as the American colonies before the Declaration of
2
Independence. The Christian Life wrote that it was simply
3
impossible that such a bill could be agreed to. The Baptist
confined itself to remarking that the bill seemed to tend in
the direction of separation. The Freeman, the other Baptist
paper, did not even commit itself to that extent, but published
two articles, one supporting and the other condemning the
5
measure. However, shortly afterwards it became a firm
advocate of the bill.
Trevelyan explained his resignation from the Scottish
Secretaryship on the same evening as Gladstone introduced the
Government of Ireland Bill, He said that when asked to join
the administration he had felt that to have refused would
have been an admission that the Liberal party was a home rule
party. Most of the Cabinet had at one time or another stated
their opposition to home rule and he had assumed that they
would "knock the measure about in the Cabinet as Cabinets do,
1 Ko^gnforaisJi I^eppadpup, 15 April 1386, p. 355.
2
I&cmi£££, 17 April 1886, p. 2*+8.
3 Christian Life, 10 April 1886, p. 17*+.
^
Baptist. 16 April 1886, p. 2*+3.
^ Freeman, 16 April 1886, p. 251.
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and mould it into accord with what had been our relative-
opinions, and which are mine now," He strongly attacked the
Government of Ireland Bill and especially the provisions which
handed over police and justice to the Irish parliament and
arranged for a permanent "English tribute." The land purchase
bill he condemned because he believed that in the long run
the only security for the noney advanced would be the unlikely
willingness of the Irish farmers to pay their annuities. He
objected because landlords were singled out for compensation
and all other creditors ignored. In conclusion he advocated
that home rule should take tho form of freely elected local
todies responsible for education, the superintendence of local
government, poor relief and the development of the resources
of Ireland. These bodies were to have powers of local taxation,
but the maintenance of law and order was to be the responsibility
of a central government directly responsible to the ministry
1
of the Imperial Parliament. The Times remarked of this scheme
that it was "pretty much the plan that has suggested itself
to every dispassionate man who regards not only the unity of
the Empire, but the safety of the loyal inhabitants of Ireland."
Parnell followed on Trevelyan, and in the course of his
speech showed that even the Nationalists did not receive
Gladstone's bill with unadulterated satisfaction. He complained
that the Imperial Parliament, by retaining control of customs,
1 Hansard, ccciv, cols. llQh-2?-i-.
2 'The Times, 9 April 1886, p. 10,
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retained control of three fourths of the revenues of Ireland,
that it was- unfair to asit Ireland to pay £1,000,0 j0 for the
Royal Irish Constabulary over which 3he was to have no control
for the present, that one twentieth and not ono fifteenth
would be a suitable proportion for Ireland's share in Imperial
expenditure, and that the power of veto for at least three
years would give the first order (necessarily conservative
because of the franchise) power to hang up any measure it
1
pleased and so create a deadlock.
Next morning Chamberlain, opening the debate, explained
his resignation and made a hig ily damaging attack upon the
Government of Ireland Bill. He declared that he would much
prefer separation, pure and simple, to the sham union
proposed by Gladstone and which was certain, he said, to
result eventually in complete separation. He reminded the
House of the opposition of the Irish Protestants, and
especially of those in ulster, and asked how it was to be
overcome except by coercion. His own proposal was that all
evictions should be stayed in Ireland for six months, and
loans granted to landlords placed in financial difficulties
through being forbidden to evict, and that the interval so
gained should be used to set up a commission, representing all
sections of the Commons, with the task of finding a satisfactory
settlement of the home rule question. He recognised, he said,
that "national councils" were no longer practicabl • and that
1 Hansard, ccciv, cols. 1130-33.
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nothing but a very substantial scheme would now be acceptable.
He then advocated that the best solution lay in the adoption
1
of a federal scheme. He did not wish, he said, that any one
existing federation, such as the American, or the German, or
the Italian should be copied, but that one should be evolved
which would take into account the special requirements of
2
the United Kingdom.
The unionist cress lauded Chamberlain*s destructive
3
criticism, but with the exception of the Ccotsraan and nailv
1+
ielegranh.. most were cold or indifferent to his advocacy
of federation. The .noectator dismissed it as a rival scheme
of disruption.
Chamberlain had planned to base his speech, not only
on his objections to the Government of Ireland Bill, but also
on those to the land purchase bill which had not then been
laid before Parliament. However, when Chamberlain was about
to read the part of his letter of resignation which dealt with
the lana purchase bill Gladstone interrupted and forbade him
to do so. Such a possibility had already occurred to
Mr. C.K.D.IIoward is inaccurate in stating in his article,
"The Irish "central "board" scheme, that Chamberlain
proposed in his speech of 9 April that Ireland should be given
"a constitution on the Canadian mouer (Irish historical
Studies (1992-3)» VIII, pp. 399-60). Chamberlain did not make
this proposal in Parliament until his speech of 1 June 1386.
r Hansard, ccciv, cols. 1131-207.
3 Scotsman. 10 April 18S6.
^ Uallv Telegranh. 10 April 1336.
CueetatorT 17 April 1836, p. >09.
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Chamberlains he was but partially unhorsed and, although
2
John Bright found it disappointing, the speech was both a
good defence of the course which Chamberlain had taken and a
powerful attack on the bill. Gladstone's intervention made
Chamberlain furious and he threatened to lay. the matter before
the House. The intervention and the fact that, apart from
the retention of customs and customs-excise under the
Imperial Parliament, Gladstone had not taken into account the
criticisms made by Chamberlain at the time of his resignation
may partially account for a friendlier attitude towards
3
Hartington with whom he had just had a misunderstanding about
the arrangement of the debate. But probably a much more
important factor was that Chamberlain must have been pleasantly
surprised by a passage in the speech which Hartington made to
the House a little while after Chamberlain had spoken.
Discussing local government Hartington had said s
It is quite possible, when the task is taken in hand,
that it may be found that the desire which is felt by
the people of the three kingdoms and the necessities of
the case are not limited merely to the creation of
County Boards or Municipal Councils, but that some
larger provincial, and perhaps even national organisation
1
Chamberlain to Dilke, 6 April 1886, Add.Mss. 1*3077, f. 37.
2 Bright's diary, 9 April 1386, The diaries of John Bright
(edited by P. Bright),
3 Churchill, II. 82-85; Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 213-1*+;
and Chamberlain to Dilke, *+, and 6 April 1386, Add. Mas. V3877,
ff. 36 and 37; Dilke to Chamberlain (copy), 7 April 1886 ,
A d. lies. 1+3953, f. 73.
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and co-ordination of local authorities may be required
in England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. When that time
comes, let Ireland share in whatever is granted to
England, Scotland or to Wales, but when it comes, it will,
in my opinion, be the outgrowth-of institutions which
have not yet been created . . .
This speech probably gave Chamberlain the impression,
which he had during the following critical weeks, that
Ilartington had moved closer to him. i or example on 15 Hay
he wrote to Bright that he believed hurtington had made "great
advances in the last few weeks" and would now have no difficulty
in agreeing with him on a scheme of local government which
2
would include Ireland. hot until Hartington's speech at
Bradford on 13 Hay did Chamberlain relinquish this impression
that Partington and he were substantially In agreement on
3
the fundamentals of an Irish scheme.
The first fruit of Chamberlain*s new attitude was a
letter to Hartington expressing in glowing terms admiration
ij.
for his speech. The speech was among the best that Ilartington
5
ever made and was worthy of the praise. For the first time
ha^qru, ceciv, col. 125J.
2
Chamberlain to Bright, 15 Hay 1886, Add.Mss.'4-3387, f, 2*+.
3 Garvin, II. 239.
,+ Chamberlain to Hartington, 10 April 1386, Chats. 3'f0. 1969.
? "Hartington far exceeded any previous effort, and spoke
with a warmth, sincerity, dignity, ano firmness which made
the whole Iiouse feel that he was a real leader of men."
(Lord John Manners to his brother, the Luke of Jutland,
10 April 1636, C, Whibley, Lord John Manners and his friends.
II. 238).
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he publicly took his place among those rallying resistance to
home rule. "I believe," he said, "that now, at all events,
the people of this country will require that their
representatives shall, in relation to Irish affairs, agree
to sink all minor differences, and to unite as one man for
the maintenance of this great Impire ..."
On lh April a combined Conservative and Liberal meeting
was held at Her Majesty's Opera House and was addressed by
both Salisbury and Hartington. Lord Cowper, a Liberal
Unionist and former Irish viceroy, was chairman and among
the speakers were the Liberals, Goschen, P, Rylands, Lord
2
Fyfe, and E.R.V.odehouse, Chamberlain had been Invited
to take part but had. declined because, as he explained
afterwards to Hartington, he believed that, if he were to
appear with Salisbury, the Radicals would be furious and
3
would desert him*
The meeting seemed to herald an era of' close co-operation
and so it might have done but for the Liberal electors. They
were much alarmed, especially the Radicals, and made clear
that they would have nothing savouring of an alliance with
the Conservatives. A week later a meeting of the Birmingham
1
Hansard, vol, ccciv, col. 1263.
2
IM IiS£2, 15 April 1886.
^ Chamberlain to Hartington, 1 April 1886, Chats, 3M3. 1966.
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1
"Two Thousand" hissed at the mention of Hartington, and on
the 26th his name was treated with almost as little respect
2
by his own constituents. The result was that nothing
resembling the Opera House meeting was again attempted, and
that afterwards, except for Goschen and one or two others, no
Liberal member could be induced to share a platform with
3
Conservatives. Three days after the meeting Goschen in
writing to the Queen (who was still eager that Conservatives
L-
and unionist Liberals should coalesce ) reported that even
Liberals "of standing and fair mindedness" were inclined to
believe that they and the Conservatives could not work
together even temporarily and that joint action damaged the
5
cause. In a furtier letter a fortnight later he informed
her that Liberal members could scarcely be induced to attend
meetings organised by the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Onion.
He himself, he added, would be present at two of their meetings
that week but did not expect to be supported by any other
6
member, and by comparatively few local Liberals.
1 Chamberlain to Mike, 22 April led6, Garvin, II, 216,
2 The Tines. 27 April 1836, p. p.
3 Lady Gwendolen Cecil (Life of ..fillsburv. III. 300) seems
to be inaccurate in writing that "it was decided" by the
Liberal leaders, who had taken part in the Opera House meeting
"that the experiment must not be repeated and all community
of platforms eschewed for the future.
14.
The Queen to Goschen, 25 April 1886, Letters of Queen
Victoria. 3rd Series, I. 111-12.
5 Goschen to the Queen, 17 April 1866, ibid.. IO7-9.
^ Goschen to the Queen, 2 May 1886, Ibid.r 109.
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The Conservatives were keenly disappointed at the
anti-climax of the Opera House mooting, Salisbury wrote to
Uoschen that, although he did not understand, he recognised
the existence of their fear of appearing friendly to the
Conservatives. "Their view [-the unionist Libera. s'J seems
to be," he wrote to a friend, "that in allying themselves
with us, they are contracting a mesalliance; and though
thc-y are very affectionate in private, they don't like
showing us to their friends till they have had time, to
2
prepare them for the shock."
The appropriateness of Salisbury's comparison was well
illustrated at a gathering of almost all the unionist Vlhig
peers, which took place at Lerby House two days after the
Opera House meeting. Churchill was present and left an
3
account which is the only available source for the
proceedings. Ilartington told the gathering they could not
have a coalition. He believed, he added, that Lord .Salisbury
and his party were fighting for the unity of the Empire and
not for personal advantage and that nothing could exceed their
good faith and loyal!ty. He could not make a definite statement,
he said, but Liberal Unionists might take it for granted that
in an election the Conservatives would support all Liberal
1
Salisbury to Goschen, 21 April liido, Cecil, III. 300.
r>
*
Salisbury to a friend, 22 April ldd6, ibid.
3 Churchill, II. 90.
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Unionist candidates. Those present were urged either by
Hartingtcn or more likely by the speakers in general -
Churchill's biographer does not make clear which - to use
their influence upon local Liberal loaders; to warn members
that their seats would be unsafe if they supported the bill;
and to attend meetings if possible under Liberal auspices.
The other speakers were .Argyll, Derby, Camperdown, De Vesci,
Ribblesdale and Selbomrne.
On 16 April Gladspone introduced his land purchase measure
to o Commons almost as crowded as on the introduction of the
Government of Ireland Bill. It was called the Bill for the
dale and Purchase of Land in Ireland and provided for the
purchase of estates at the values allotted by the land courts
in fixing Judicial rents. Its application was to be in the
hands of a State Authority, which was to be created by the
Irish legislature. Repayment by the tenants was normally to
be spread over twenty years and they were in addition to pay
h* interest on the purchase money for forty-nine years.
Landlords were not to be compelled to part with their estates,
but the tenants of those who chose to sell had no option but
to purchase. An exception was holdings with a rental of £*f or
under where the tenants did not wish to become freeholders.
In these the State Authority was to become the owner and the
tenants to continue as rent payers. In certain "congested
districts" ownership of the holding was to pass from the
landlord to the State Authority and not to the tenant. The
11*+
total liability of the bill was to be limited to £%,000,000,
but Gladstone admitted that, if the scheme were to succeed,
Parliament might eventually be required to authorise a further
1
large sum. The security for the money advanced *?as to be an
arrangement by which the Imperial Cover anent would appoint a
Receiver General through whose hands the whole of the Irish
revenues were to pass, together with the proceeds of the Irish
customs and customs-excise imposed by the Imperial Parliament.
The Receiver General was to deduct the amounts due for
interest and repayment of capital under the land purchase bill,
together with the Irish contributions to the Imperial Exchequer
under the Government of Ireland Bill. After these deductions
had been made the- sum which remained was to pass to the Irish
exchequer.
Chamberlain was exaggerating only a little when he
2
remarked that the land purchase bill had no friends at all.
The Nationalist benches listened to Gladstone's exposition with
a soberness which contrasted sharply with their reception of
3
the Government of Ireland Bill. In the debate that same
*+
evening, Parneli gave an indication of their discontent.
1 Hansard. CCCIV, cols 1803-5
^ Chamberlain to Labouchere, 30 April 1886, A. Thorold,
IM li£e of Henry Lflboqchepe, 299-300.
3 Daily Item. 17 April 1886, p. *+: and Chamberlain's speech,
Hansardf vol. CCCIV, col. 1820.
h HansardT vol. CCCIV, cols. 1852-7.
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The appointment of the Receiver General, he denounced, as a
very unnecessary, strange, and absurd proposal, and one which
would be nost offensive to Ireland. He refrained from expressing
outright the nationalists' hostility to the valuation allotted
to the estates, but warned that they could not accept a measure
-which over-corapensated the landlords. The Radicals agreed
with the Nationalists that the bill would give the landlords
more than was their due, and even non-Radicals admitted that
it treated the landlords with tenderness. The bill undoubtedly
treated them generously, and had it not been linked with home
rule would have been welcomed by many of them. William Johnson,
M.P. for South Belfast, and head of the Orange Order in
Ireland, thought it worth while to appeal to the poorer landlords
not to betray the unionist cause in return for the benefits
1
of the land purchase bill. Very many in Great Britain were
alarmed because they held that the Government of Ireland Bill
would remove practically all physical security at the very time
when the largeness of the sums to be advanced to the tenants
made, they believed, such security of vital importance. They
feared that the State Authority, although appointed by the
Dublin legislature, would in no way prevent the tenants from
looking upon Great Britain as the absentee landlord, who had
taken advantage of the craving for home rule to impose on them
an unfair bargain, and hence a bargain which they x^ould consider
themselves Justified in repudiating. They also feared that
in this the tenants would have the support of their
1
Northern Whig, 7 May 1886, p, 8,
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representatives in the Dublin legislature. Many held that,
under such circumstances, the retention by the Imperial
Government of control of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the
military forces in Ireland, instead of giving a sound security
for the payment of the land annuities, would provide a very
dangerous explosive element in the quarrels between the
Dublin legislature and the Imperial Gov rnment. Most of
those opposed to the measure appear to have agreed that the
initial amount of £^,000,000, which Gladstone proposed, would
be far from adequate, and that twice or three times that sum
would be necessary. Gone liberals, and especially Radicals,
asked "If commercial, religious, and other interests are to
be safe in the hands of the Irish legislature, why not
landlords?" A few of the more orthodoxly-rainded denounced as
land nationalisation the proposal that the state should retain
the ownership of holdings in congested districts and of those
1
tenants with a rental of xM- and under who requested it.
The immediate reaction of the press to the land purchase
bill was on the whole no more favourable than it ted been to
the Government of Ireland Bill, But there was this important
difference, that, as the contest for the bills developed,
several Liberal papers become more and more sympathetic to the
Government of Ireland Bill, but none, or very few indeed,
£.£. The Scotsman wrote, "This is nothing more or less than
the nationalisation of the land in those districts. Mr. Gladstone
has taken a page out of Mr. Henry George." (17 April 1BB6, p. B).
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became more sympathetic to the land purchase bill. An
outstanding example of the first trend was the Manchester
Guardian, which on 3 May completely reversed the stand that
1
it had taken on the exclusion of the Irish M.Ps.
The reaction to the land purchase bill soon made it
obvious that, if Gladstone \*ere to continue to insist that it
was Inseparably connected with the Government of Ireland Bill,
he would ensure the rejection of the latter bill also.
Gladstone's first love was the Government of Ireland Bill and
when he saw that the other measure was a millstone around its
neck he changed his attitude. On 1 May he Issued a letter to
his constituents in which he warned the landlords that the
sands were running in the hour-glass, and they had as yet given
2
no indication of a desire to accept the land purchase bill.
This warning was widely construed as an indication that
Gladstone would eventually pronounce the two bills to be
separate and independent, and that, if necessary, he would
sacrifice the land purchase bill in the interest of the other.
Chamberlain was the first speaker in the debate which
followed the introduction of the land purchase bill. His first
task was to complete that part of the explanation of his
resignation which Gladstone had forced him to omit in the
debate of eight days earlier. He acknowledged that the retention
of the Irish customs and excise under the Imperial Parliament
1
MaasfraaJtes 3 May 1886, p. 5.
Times, 3 May 1886.
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was a major improvement which had been made in the Government
of Ireland Bill subsequent to his resignation, and reioarked
that, if the Irish representatives were retained at Westminster
and the question of Ulster left open, the scheme would not
differ greatly from the "national councils" proposal. He
was severely critical of the land purchase bill, his remarks
forming one of the most damaging attacks made upon it,
Nevertheless, his concluding words were moderate. He said
that he was not an irreconcilable opponent, and that if
further modifications were made in the home rule bill he
1
would be relieved from opposing it. On the previous day
Chamberlain had written to Gladstone in an equally moderate
tone. Gladstone three days earlier had stated in the Commons
that he did not consider either the retention of customs and
excise by the Imperial Parliament, or the exclusion of Irish
representation from it, to be essential aspects of his home
rule bill, A possible solution to the latter problem, he
had suggested, might be one which whithread had put forward
by which Irish representation would be excluded for a number
of years and then, if Ireland wished, would be readmitted in
the proportion, and under the conditions, which might then
2
be thought best. Chamberlain wrote in his letter that this
conciliatory statement and the discussion which had taken
place seemed to have lessened considerably the differences
1 Hansard. CCCIV, cols. 1811-^.
2 Hansard. CCCIV, cols. 153l»-50
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which had arisen in the cabinet and that he hoped they night
1
be further reduced before the second reading. Possibly the
discussion which Chamberlain referred to was a further one
with Harcourt.
Chamberlain1s moderation may have been inspired by a
returning hope that Gladstone, in order to have his bill pass
the Commons, might after all come to terms with him? or
perhaps he now realised more fully that if he were to carry
with him the maximum number of supporters he must first
prove to them that he had done his utmost for conciliation;
or again, he may have been influenced by a fear for his hold
on Birmingham where he felt certain Schnadhorst, the
2
controller of the caucus, was working against him.
Chamberlain's friends had warned him that were he to keep up
his quarrel with Gladstone of a \*eek earlier he would damage
3
his position in Birmingham. There has been a tendency to
overlook how serious it was for a Liberal to go against
Gladstone and the party, and it was especially so for a radical,
Not until he had met his local caucus, and had it pass a
resolution approving the course which he had taken, was
^
Chamberlain to Gladstone, 15 April 1886, Add. Mss. M*126,
f. 181.
2 Chamberlain to J.T.Bunce (Editor, Birmingham bailv Post).
7 and 11 April 1886, q.w.o. Garvin, II. 2^9.
3 Garvin, II. 205
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Chamberlain able to give a secondary place to the dread of
1
being thrown over by Birmingham. Others were less fortunate.
The introduction of Gladstone's bills was followed by an
intensifying of the struggle in the constituencies. The
second reading was not until 10 May and first the lull within
the House and then the recess were used to carry trie battle
to the public platforms, snowing at last the exact nature of
Gladstone's schemes, a number of Liberals, including liar ting ton,
Chamberlain, and Goschen, hastened to justify themselves
before the constituencies. Many others declined to go against
Gladstone in public until absolute necessity should force them.
And then, of course, there were those - and they were a
numerous and important group - who approved of certain aspects
of Gladstone's schemes and were still hoping against hope
that some compromise solution which they could support would
in the end carry the day.
How that battle was joined unionist Liberals became quickly
conscious of their lack of organisation and so around 20 April
a committee to secure concerted action was formed. The
committee soon had an impressive list of Moderate Liberals on
its roll, but few Radicals. Chamberlain declined to join but
2
3ent a friendly letter. F, Maude, an unsuccessful candidate
in the previous election, was made secretary and offices were







much satisfaction and gave it the leading article. Out of
this committee a Liberal Unionist party machine was to develop.
One Ulsterman of the period has compared the conster.nation
caused among the lister unionists by the Government of Ireland
Bill to that which filled the Parisians on the Gunday in August
13?0 when they learned that the Germans had broken the frontier
2
defences. Very soon reports began to emanate from Ulster of
drilling and other preparations for armed resistance, On
6 Kay William Johnston, the head of the Irish Orange Order,
stated in a speech that Lord Wolseley had promised to resign
his commission and to lead the unionist military forces should
3
Gladstone's bill pass - a statement which, it seems, Lord
if
Kolseley would not deny. Many of these reports from Ulster
were undoubtedly much exaggerated, but the fact that among
the papers of Colonel Saunderson, the Irish Conservative leader,
are rifle quotations obtained at this time from foreign
5
firms indicates that the Ulster unionists were already as
resolute as they were to be when threatened by the home rule
1
Ilia -ilmea. 21 April 1386.
2
T, liacknight, Ulster as. i£ is, 13^.
^ northern Vhlr. 7 May 1886, p. 6. (Johnsfon made this speech
in Lelfast, and not in Lungarmon as reported in Lailv ^ews and
other papers.
^ Canpboll-Eannernan's answer to a question by T. .Healy on
Johnston's statement, :i- nsard. CCCV, col. 90b.
*
R. Lucas, Colonel Gaundersoi, P.P., 101.
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bill of 1912. liven the Irish Protestant Home Rule Association,
which was formed in Belfast on 21 May, had the retention of
Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament as one of its
1
objects. Bryee lias recorded that he tried to induce some of
the '"later Liberals to make suggestions for the amendment of
2
the home rule bill, but they refused absolutely. He commented
that their blood was up, and that they considered themselves
betrayed into the hands of the Parnellites, whom they disliked
3
and despised.
Chamberlain met his divisional council on 21 April and
defended the course which he had taken. The land purchase
bill he attacked without mercy. But his opposition to the
Government of Ireland Bill, he said, was condition 1 and
was largely grounded on the exclusion of the Irish members
from Westminster. If Gladstone were to meet his objections
he would support him with real gratitude and delight, he
declared, but if not - then at all hazards he would oppose
the measures. But he would act independently, he said, and




Irish hews. 22 May 1886, p. (The Belfast unionist
newspapers ignored this event).
2'
Bryce®s memoir, H.A.L.I isher, James Brvce. 219.
3 Ibid.
** The Tines. 22 April 1886.
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Chamberlain carried the meeting with him and a vote of
unabated confidence was passed by an overwhelming majority.
A proposal was then put forward that the meeting be adjourned
to a later date to allow time for reflection. This move would
have been much to the advantage of the Gladstonian element,
and was vigorously opposed b Chamberlain and Ceilings who
1
insisted that a decisive vote be taken that night. Their
opponents gave way and Dr. Dale, the influential radical
clergyman, moved a resolution committing the "Two Thousand" to
Chamberlain's position. It was carried with ease. Had it
not been carried the blow to Chamberlain's influence in
Parliament and the country would have been severe. On the
previous evening William Kenrick, Chamberlain's brother-in-law
and member for North Birmingham, had had a similar success
2
with his divisional council.
live days later Partington met his constituents at
Rossendale and was given a much less favourable reception.
His speech was a straightforward defence of the course which
he had taken and he defined his attitude towards Radicals and
Conservatives.
I desire to work . . ., he said, not with our Tory
opponents, but with men like Mr, Chamberlain and Mr.
Trevelyaa (groans) or like Mr. Goschen or Jir Henry
James (groans) in the Commons louse of Parliament, and
with men . . . like Lord Selbourne, Lord Derby and the
Duke of Argyll,3
1 A.W.W.Dale, Life of R.W.Dale of Birmingham. h6o.
Birmingham Daily lost, 11 April 1886.
^ 2&S Times. 27 April 1886, p. 5.
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When Hartington sat down, Instead of a resolution of confidence
in him being moved, a trimming resolution from which he
1
dissociated himself was put forward and passed. He did not,
however, have the humiliating experience, which was the lot
of some unionist Liberals, of having a resolution of confidence
in Gladstone passed at his meeting.
On 5 Hay the general committee of the National Liberal
federation met at the Westminster Palace hotel in London and
voted its conhieto confidence in Gladstone by an overwhelming
2
majority. The dissentient Liberals resljned and the caucus
became the obedient servant of the Gladstonians. Chamberlain
was helpless to avert the disaster, as the majority of the
local associations outside of the Birmingham area were
strongly for Gladstone. As the Annual to- istor noted, these
local bodies were much more in favour of Mr. Gladstone than
3
were the members whom they had returned a few months previously.
The loss of the caucus was a grave blow to all unionist
Liberals. Local associations had already been exercising
considerable pressure on behalf of the Government bills, but
now they considerably increased it as the numerous complaints
1
M.
2 Bally Lews. 6 Kay 1836. p. 6; and E.S.Watson, xhe National
Lifrvr;-4 ffecfc'jreuoa, 2321 i2 122a» %
3 AM ;la-s, 13 May 1886.
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testify. The newspapers contained many references to caucus
pressure and It was strongly complained about at Chamberlain's
1
meeting on 12 May.
Caucus pressure was not the only pressure which members
had to contend with. From the introduction of ti e Government
of Ireland Bill, and even earlier, a steady struggle had been
going on between Gladstonians and unionists to win over as
many as possible of the numerous vaverers by individual
persuasion. Sir a.E.Pease has recorded that Albert Grey,
Sir George Trevelyan, and Arthur Llliot were the principal
2
Liberal Unionist organisers of these activities. He wrote
that Grey was especially successful with young members
because of his tact, temper, and humour, but that his
conversations with them were only preliminaries for bringing
them along for a "chat" with Hartington or Goschen or Sir
3
Henry James. nevertheless, many of the victims of this
subtle tug of war continued to be genuinely perplexed and
undecided men until the eve of the division on the second reading -
1
Ibid.. 25 May lbu6.
2
Pease states that "there was no attempt whatever go counter
them [unionist attempts to convert the waverers] on the
Gladstonian side." He may have been given this impression
because he had no personal experience of such attempts - but
tiie.ii he was an advocate of the bills. Morley, a bettor observer,
writes - and the evidence supports his statement - that coaxing,
bullying, managing, and all the other arts of party emergency
wont on at an unprecedented rate and that no section had a
monopoly. (I lor ley, III. 325-6).
3 Sir A,E.Pease, Elections and recollections. 10b.
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1
and perhaps 110 wonder! Labouchere with his usual light-hearted
cynicism remarked, "Half of these people are like women, who
are pleased to keep up the 'I will and I won't' as long as
2
possible in order to be courted." He thought that generally
3
such people became Gladstonians.
Home rule divided the community in a way rarely known in
b
Britain. Many an old friendship via3 broken and even family
ties were severed, or strained to breaking point. In some
5
Liberal homes Gladstone's portrait disappeared from the walls;
6
in others it wa ;> Chamberlain* s. The bitterest feeling tended
On 7 June Sir A.E.Pease recorded in his diary, "The day
has come at last, and there are still waverers and shufflers
who do not know what they are going to do." (Jir A.M.Pease,
Elections an& recollections, 137).
p
Labouchere to Chamberlain, 29 May 16^6, Chamberlain, 222-5+,
and A.ihorold, The life of to inn Labouchere. 313-2- .
3 Ibid.
if.
This incident recorded by the Gladstonian member, Sir A.E.
Pease gives an indication of the feeling which home rule
aroused. He had been asked to respond to a toast at the
centenary meetings of the Incorporated Law Society. "The
majority present being Tories from a distance created an un¬
precedented scene in York. They would not let me say a single
word and kept on roaring at me after repeated attempts by the
President [Lord Riponj and the Toast Master to get me a hearing.
The occasion was non-political and 1 never intrude politics in
social gatherings." (Sir A.E.Pease's diary, Autumn, 1336,
quo .ed, Sir A„ 12.Pease, "...lections and recollections. 15+7).
I torley, III. 322.




to be between those who had previously been associates.
Gladstonian and. unionist Radicals were specially malevolent
towards one another and the same is true of Gladstonian and
unionist Whigs. The Irish Nationalists reserved their most
poisonous venom for Chamberlain, who had endeavoured to give
2
them "national councils". The Queen, the court, and society
were against home rule and Gladstenians had to endure much
social proscription. Sir Henry James considered that party
feeling in social circles was most bitter during the years
1836 to 1390 and that there had been nothing like it since the
3
Reform £111 of 13.32. ne recorded in his memoir that the
unionists were most angry with Rpencer, whom they considered
■T
an especial traitor, and with Harcourt, and that during these
•t
oir A,E.Pease noted in his diary (Ilay, 1837) ". . . they
[the Liberal HnlonlstsJ are more viciously bitter than our
Conservative opponents# Give me every time a Tory, who can
speak with civility at least, when he has to meet such social
outcasts as ourselves" r3ir A.E,Pease, og. cit.. 1?1).
c: The Prince of Wales took a different attitude from the
Queen. On 5 March wir E.N.Hamilton informed Gladstone that
a few weeks earlier the Queen had told the Prince of Wales
that hv. must do what he could to induce Gladstone to reveal .
his plans, but the Prince of Wales had refused point-blank
and instead of applauding peers, as the Queen had done, for
refusing office had counselled several of his friends to
accept. (Add. Kss. Mfl91, f. 65).
3
James' me-.oir, Lord Askwith, Lord Janes of Hereford, 139.
£.£. The representative of the British 'Weekly (W. Robertson
EicoH?) at the Liberal Unionist conference on^Dec. 1886
recorded that the mention of Harcourt's name in a speech
"provoked the strongest manifestations of contempt and disgust -
two gentlemen beside me relieving their feelings by spitting?
10 Dec. 1886, p. 3)
years no unionist would have asked either man to dine without
1
receiving the assent of their other guests to meet him.
In the House of Lords Gladstone was left with a mere rump
2
of his former supporters and in the world of intellect there
was almost as grave a landslide. Among those who had
previously supported or sympathised with the Liberal party
but now became unionists were Dicey, Seely, Froude, Spencer,
Lecky, Goldwin Smith, Martineau, Sir Willi- n Thomson (later
Lord ^olvin), Huxley, Tyndall, Tennyson, Browning, Matthew
3
Arnold, and Jowett. As Brett remarked, "all the argument,
all the authority, all the social influence" were against
Gladstone.
Chamberlain strove to induce Gladstone to meet his
objections to the Government of Ireland Bill. Labouchere,
who was in touch with Herbert Gladstone, Arnold Morley (the
liberal chief whip), and occasionally with John Morley, was
the intermediary. A letter, which Chamberlain wrote to him
on 17 April, began the negotiations. In it Chamberlain stated?
. . . be cannot leave the matter uncertain till after
the Second Reading.. . . in that case we shall get nothing
1
James' memoir, loc. cit.
2
See below p. 103.
3 The Times on h May 1G36 listed nine of the. above fourteen
names together with those of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Wolseley,
and Sir Frederick Leighton.
lr
R.B.Brett's journal, 29 Hay 1666, Letters and .journals of
i orinnId Viscount bshcr. I. 126.
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but be beaten in & tail on every division. All I ask is
that Mr, Gladstone should give some sufficient assurance
that he will consent - first, to the retention of the
Irish representation at Westminster on its present footing
or according to population, and at the same tine the
maintenance of Imperial control over Imperial taxation
in Ireland; and secondly, that he should be willing to
abandon all the so-called safeguards in connection with 1
the Constitution of the new legislative body in Dublin.. . .
Gladstone*s comment on these demands was that he could
not -write a "kootooing" letter to Chamberlain and that decency,
principle and policy alike forbade him to enter into private
2
arrangements about alterations of the bill in committee. He
would not, he assured Morley, move an inch in the direction of
3
Chamberlain without consultation and perhaps not much with it.
During the remainder of April Chamberlain continued to
impress on Labouehere that he could not vote for the second
reading of the home rule bill unless he were assured of
b
alterations. Chamberlain even hinted that, if his views were
not met, he would embark on an anti-Gladstone campaign in the
5
country. Then on 2 May he forwarded what 1'orley described
6
as a five barrelled ultimatum, and which Gladstone considered
7
sufficiently important to read to the Cabinet.
1
Chamberlain to Labouchere, 17 April 1386, Chamberlain, 210-11
and A.Tharold, The HIT of Henry nabouchcrv. 292.
2 Gladstone to Horley (copy), 20 April 1006, Add.Mss.Mf^W, p.lMi
^ Gladstone to Morley (copy), 21 April 1086, ibid.. p.lhO
Chamberlain to Labouchere, 17 (letter no. 2), 21, 22, and
30 April 1006, A.Thorold, The Life of henry dabouchere. Chap.xii.
5 Chamberlain to Labouchere, 1? (letter no. 2) and 22 April,
1-306, ibid.
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... I have asked for supremacy of the Imperial
Parliament, he stated, separate assembly for Ulster,
abolition of all restrictions and minority representation
devices. All these I am ready to leave to their chance
in Committee, if the Government will say before the 2nd
Heading that they will retail Irish representation on
its present footing. To leave it an open question is a
mere farce. Bright and the Whigs would vote against us
and the Government, while leaving the question free,
would use all their weight and give their vote against
the amendment.. . . You must give up the idea of "the
open question." hat would be an absolute and complete
surrender on my part.. . . You seem to assume that the
Land Bill will be dropped. Is this so? If not, what is
to happen when I propose its rejection?
I wish there was some way of withdrawing both Bills -
either before or after the 2nd.. Heading and accepting the
affirmation of the principles.
"The retention of the Irish representatives is clearly
the nlerro de touch#Chamber.La in wrote to Hike. "If they
go separation must follow - if they remain Federation is
possible whenever local assemblies are established in England
2
and Scotland." Apart from such reasoning Chamberlain's
decision to restrict his immediate demand so this one matter
was tactically a well chosen course. The exclusion of the
Irish aroused strong and widespread alarm and even Herbert
3 &
Gladstone admitted that he was against it. By narrowing
*]
Chamberlain to Labouchere (copy), 2 May 1886, Add. Mas.
Mfl26, f. 183.
2 Chamberlain to Dilke, 3 May 1886, Add. Mss. *5-3877, f. hi
(Gwyna and Tuckwell, II. 217).
3 Herbert Gladstone to Labouchere, 2 May I086, Hammond,
Gladstone M JM Waft 528.
If
The roll .all Gazette, edited by W.T.Gtead, opposed the
Government of Ireland Bill solely because it excluded Irish
representation from Westminster.
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his demand Chamberlain became the spokesman of a much larger
group, and at the same time he increased his hold on many of
his own followers for it enabled him to emphasise to the
maximum - not his opposition to the bills ~ but his repeatedly
stated desire for conciliation. Also it saved him from the
danger of being classed with the Whigs.
Prior to the end of April one does not like to be dogmatic
about Chamberlain's hopes or motives. Possibly he never had
any real expectation that 0ladstone would make concessions
on fundamentals of the • oveminent of Ireland Bill for none
would know better than Chamberlain that, if Gladstone were to
do so, he would be risking the loss of the eighty-six
Parnellites, plus Liberals such as liorley, liarcourt, and
Rosebery, in the hope of gaining at most some fifty
dissentients. From May onwards one is on firmer ground. On
the -jth of that month he wrote to liarcourt ". . . I may
frankly say that I do not want a compromise. I would prefer
to fight the matter out and abide the result 5 but I am
compelled to make advances to satisfy the anxiety of my
1
friends to keep the party together if possible." Next day
in an intimate latter to Dilke he elaborated on his ideas
and motives.
... I do not expect the Government to give way, and
indeed I do not wish it. To satisfy others I have talked
about conciliation and have consented to make advances,
but on the whole I would rather vote against the Bill
than not and the retention of the Irish members is only
with me the Flag that covers other objections. I want to
1 Chamberlain to Marcourt, 5 May lod6, q.w.o. Garvin,
II. 22'-f.
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see the whole Bill recast and brought bach to- the
National Councils proposals, with the changes justified
by the altered public opinion.. . .1
If one were unconvinced that this was the real Chamberlain
one need only turn to his letter to Partington on k Mays
It would be fatal to move a reasoned amendment to
the Home Rule Bill. By all means stick to the plain
negative. . . . there is so much pressure from the
constituencies that if you alter the motion of rejection
and give any excuse to the wavere-rs you will lose p'O
votes at least,
• . . Labouchere writes . . . that Mr. G. will give
way to me and allow the retention of the Irish members
at Westminster. I doubt it; but if it is true 1 must
vote for the 2nd Reading and I estimate that from $0 to
55 members will go with inc. In this case the 2nd
Reading will be carried, but J ca mot see how the Bill
can go further. 1'he retention of the Irish members
involves the following changes.. . .
1. A separate assembly for Ulster.
2. The complete subordination of the Irish Assemblies
to the Imperial Parliament.
3. Irish Assemblies to deal only with subjects
especially referred to them . . .
. . . the Imperial Parliament to collect all
taxation as now . . .
It is possible that if the Bill gets into Committee
it will go to pieces on one of these rocks. If I have to
voto for the 2nd Reading I shall make it clear that the
step does not satisfy me except as a step towards the
complete recast of the Bill.
I think it right that you should know exactly how 2
matters stand, but please keep this Information quite private?
2 Chamberlain to Lilkc, 6 May 1886, Add. Mss. V^77, f. '+6
(Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 221-2).
2 Chamberlain to Ilartingtoa, Slay 1886, Chats, 3*MD. 1939
(q.w.o., Garvin, II. 222).
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Twelve years later Chamberlain in conversation with
Earry O'Brien described, his aims at this period and in the
main his description rings true.
... I was not opposed, he said, to the reform of the
land laws• 1 was not opposed to land purchase. It was
the right way to settle the land question. But there
were many things in. the hill to which I was opposed on
principle. My main object in attacking it, though, was
to kill the Home Rule 1:13. As soon as the Land Bill
was out of the way, I attacked the question of the
exclusion of she Irish members. I usednthat point to
show the absurdity of the whole scheme.
By the end of April Chamberlain was strengthened by the
2
certainty, which the Gladstonians could no longer dispute,
that, with him against it, the home rule bill was doomed. On
30 April he reckoned that one hundred and eleven Liberals
were against it, and that fifty-nine of them had publicly
3
committed themselves. by h- May his list stood at one
hundred and nineteen of whom seventy were publicly committed
and twenty-three almost certain. Of the one hundred and
nineteen he reckoned that fifty-five would vote for the
second reading if he were to say that the amendments were
satisfactory. Two days later his figure was one hundred
1 Ft.B.O'Erien, The life of Charles Stewart ParnellT II. Ilf0.
*" A. I lorley to Gladstone, 3 May 1886, Add. Kss. M+253> £• 7,
and Labouchere to Chamberlain, 3 May 1866, A. .horole, Fife
of hpAfy La,Sphere, 303.
^ Chamberlain to Dilke, 30 April 1686, Add. Mss, V3877,
f ♦ 39| and Chamberlain to Latonehurt, 30 April 1686, A,Choroid,
OU. £l£., 299.
If
Chamber2air. to Labouchere (copy), 2 May 1836, Add. Mss.
W1-I26, f. 133, and Chamberlain to liarcourt, 2 May 1886,
q.w.o., Garvin, II. 223.
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1
and thirty-three with eighty-four certainties. The
Gladstonians thought Chamberlain over sanguine in his estimates
but the division on 0 June was to prove that he was not far
from the mark.
Gladstone was determined that, if humanly possible, his
party should go to the country with the valuable prestige of
having passed, their measure through a second reading, for the
unionism of the Lords made a dissolution certain, ic achieve
his object he had become willing, even before the introduction
of the home rule bill, to concede much if in that way he
could win over a sufficient number of the men whose objections
centred on the exclusion of the Irish members, however, the
suggestions which he had made had quickly revealed that an
important section of the Giadstonians, including licrley,
Spencer, and barcourt, were strong exclusionists, as was also
3
Parnell, and that llarcourt was ready to resign on the
b
question. At last on 5 hay Gladstone circulated a memorandum
to the Cabinet in which he suggested that the Irish members
should be admitted t~ the Imperial Parliament when taxation
affecting Ireland should be under discussion and on such
other occasions as the Irish parliament should request their
admission, and that a standing committee representing Lngland,
Scotland, and Ireland should be set up to consider the bills
* Chamberlain to liar ting ton, b I lay 1836, Chats. 3bC. 1939;
and Chamberlain to Labourhere, h buy 1306, A. fhorold, on. cit.
^ llarcourt to Chamberlain, 3 bay 1636, «j,.ur.o., Garvin, II, 223
and Labouchere to Chamberlain, 3 I&y loo6, A.lhorold, on.cit..
3 Morley to Glads to ie, 8 May 1366, AcJd.IIss. bb25a> f. 865
■Spencer to liarcourt (draft), Vj April 1366, Harcourt vol.,




and motions of secondary importance which affected Ireland but
1
were excluded from the authority of her parliament. The
Cabinet discussed these proposals at their meeting on the 8th
and decided that the Irish members should be admitted to the
Imperial Parliament for taxation involving Ireland, and that
plans to implement the other two proposals should be
2
considered favourably. Thus stood matters when Gladstone
moved the second reading on 10 Hay.
On the 3 May, the day after Chamberlain had written his
"five barrelled ultimatum", Arnold Morley asked Labonehere to
his room and inquired whether Chamberlain would vote for the
second reading if the Government were to support a clause
granting representation to Ireland, but leaving to the committee
3
stage the decision on how many should constitute representation,
Labouchere replied that he thought so, but that he had best
consult Chamberlain's letter. Throe days later Labouchere
wrote to Chamberlain that Gladstone refused to leave out the
clause excluding the Irish, but that he had devised an
alternative scheme which fully recognised the supremacy of
the Imperial Parliament and enabled the Irish to vote on
taxation, imperial matters, etc. The new scheme, ho added,
j
would not be definite until approved by the Cabinet,
* Memorandum by Glad ;tone, 5 May loo6, Add. Mss. M*772, f. 95*
2
Herbert Gladstone to Henry Gladstone, l*f May 18869 XL. Hdtnmovd,
op. oit. , -5"3o — /.




Labouchere to Chamberlain, 6 May 1886, ibid.. 305-6,
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Chamberlain, perhaps much influenced by this information,
next day sent a letter to the press in which he redefined his
attitude. The Government of Ireland * ill, he explained, had
been drafted on the lines of separation or colonial independence,
bun, he believed that it should have been a federal scheme
which could later include the other parts of the baited Kingdom
and, perhaps at a more distant hate, the overseas dependencies.
The vital factor, he emphasised, was the maintenance of the
full representation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament and
of Ireland's full responsibility in imperial affairs, and
that this was a matter of supreme importance which could
not be left to the hazards of committee, he assumed, he
wrote, that the treatment of bister was an open question and
would be decided according to the wishes of the Ulstermen.
He then proceeded to make upon the measure what immediately
strikes one as a surprisingly severe and unnecessary attack
if he were genuinely trying to induce Gladstone to come to
terms. He stated that the bill made necessary anomalies and
restrictions which no true Liberal could approve; that it
offered no prospect of finality, but would be a fulcrum for
further agitation; that It had brought civil war in Ireland
within measurable distance; and that it would create a foreign
and hostile nation whose reconquest was actually contemplated
as a possibility by the promoters of the bill despite the fact
that their measure would deprive Britain of all authority to
interfere, Was this, one wonders, but another example of
Chamberlain's irrepressible truculence, or was he deliberately
trying to stop Gladstone from offering him concessions -
concessions which, to judge from Labouchere's report, while
not going the whole way, would go far enough to win over many
of the bill's opponents? Gladstone's comment on Chamberlain*s
letter was that it made "it hopeless to frame a measure of
2
conciliation for him."
On the same day as he wrote this letter Chamberlain had
a long talk with Labouchere and at the end of it dictated to
3
hira his minimum terms - terms to which Labouchere was
T
confident that Gladstone would consent, ho record of them is
available, but they seem to have included the retention of
Irish representation at Westminster and the suggestion that
5
it should consist of ninety members. Next day Labouchere
went to Downing Street and sent the document into Gladstone
6
during a meeting of the Cabinet, In Downing Street
Labouchere had discussions with Arnold Morley, Wolverton, and
perhaps other Gladstonians, He suggested that Herschell, the
1 Chamberlain to T.H.Bolton, 7 May 1886, The Times. 8 May 1836,
p. 12.
2 Gladstone to Morley ( copy) , 8 May 1886, Add. Mss,
p. 168.
^ H.Labouchere, "The secret history of the first home rule




Labouchere to Chamberlain. 8 May 1886, A.Thorold, The
M£e S32&L 3°&-7.
6 H.Labouchere, "The secret history of the first home rule
bill", loc. cit.
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Chancellor, should meet Chamberlain for a discussion and found
that the idea was well received. Later in the day he met
Stansfeld on a train and learned that "all went right at the
2 3
cabinet", which news he telegraphed to Chamberlain,
Chamberlain, believing that the Government had capitulated,
telegraphed the news to two or three people. One was none
other than Captain O'Shea. O'Shea informed Parnell who at
5
once forwarded the telegram to Gladstone, Lid Chamberlain
hope by his action to precipitate a revolt by Parnell against
the concessions which appeared imminent?
By the following day (Sunday, the 9th) Chamberlain had
learned that both Gladstone and Herbert Gladstone had denied
6
that there would be concessions. He sent a sharp note
informing Labouchere of this, and added that, unless the
assurance in Gladstone's speech should be precise and
f
definite, he would vote for certain against the second reading,'
Alarmed, Labouchere drafted out a memorandum which Arnold
^ Labouchere to Chamberlain, 8 May 1886,
p






Chamberlain to Labouchere, 9 May 1886, A.Thorold, op, cit..




Morley sent post haste to Gladstone who was at Sheen.
Unfortunately the memorandum seems to be lost, but In It
Labouchere set out as essentials these three pointss
1. That the Cover .merit will assent to the principle
of full representation upon all questions of taxation.
2. That some means will be found by which the Irish
opinion on questions excluded from the Dublin Parliament
shall be conveyed to the Imperial Parliament, such as a
joint Committee representing England, Jcot land and
Ireland.
3. That the Irish Parliament will Imve the right by
address to clairur©presentation upon any question of
Imperial policy„
Gladstone wrote back to Morley that Labouchere's memorandum
was the best thing that he had seen, and that:
Point 1. Taxation. I au instructed from yesterday to
promise this shall be done if agreeable to the House.
°oint 2. I have authority to speak on this with favour.
oint 3- To the principle of this I am favourable and
I have no reason to believe the Cabinet are hostile.
I an not so certain, as with respect to the two former
that a practical proposal can be easily put into shape.
Eut I may refer to the subject in no adverse spirit.2
Arnold Morley explained to Labouchere that a satisfactory
plan had not yet been devised for the third point, or a
definition of "imperial" agreed upon, and that in consequence
Gladstone would be rather guarded on the third point in his
speech, but would make clear that he accepted it in principle.
Also, he said that should Chamberlain think Gladstone's words
too vague, or could suggest others, Herschell would consult with
1 Gladstone to Arnold Morley (copy), letter Ho. 9 May 13G6,






These further coimunications convinced Chamberlain that
the Government had resolved to give way, but left him unmoved
ia his determination to destroy the bill. He at once wrote
to Hartlngton:
. . . it is impossible for me to doubt that the
surrender will be ample and complete and that I shall
have to vote for the 2nd Heading, Surely if this should
prove to be the case, your line will be to comment on
magnitude of change and suddenness of conversion and ask
that the new fill should be produced before any opinion
is called for. . . ,2
In a note written the sane morning to Jesse Collings he said:
"1 on. assured that there is a complete surrender to me, I
expect a terrific row in this case - perhaps Parnell will
revolt" a remark which one instinctively,ana perhaps
rightly, connects with the telegram to G'Shea. In a letter
which he wrote that day, and which appeared in the press on
the 13th, he informed an Ulster Liberal Unionist,
. . , If llr. Gladstone should tonight yield the point
about representation, the nest great issue will be as to
the clains and position of Viator. You may rest assured
I 3ha11 do all in my power to obtain full and fair
consideration for them.
Gladstone moved the second reading on Monday the 10th
and 30 confident had the Chamberlainites become that they were -
1 Labouchere to Chamberlain, 9 Hay 1006, A.Thorold, or. cit..
30C-9.
2
Chamberlain to Rartington, 10 May 1006, cuw.o,, Garvin,
II. 226.
^ Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, 10 May 10^6, ibid.
** Chamberlain to Thomas Cinclair, 10 Hay 1006, bally
Tele-eraoh. 13 May led6.
Ihl
1
to use their whip, Caine's expression - about to be "squared"
that they came with speeches prepared for accepting Gladstone's
2
concessions* Gladstone, however, made no capitulation such as
they expected. The Government was willing, he said, to allow
Irish members to take part in the Imperial Parliament when it
should be dealing with Irish customs and excise. Also, he
vaguely suggested that Ireland should have her say in Imperial
matters through a system ox executive communications as in
certain other countries, or by a Joint commission representing
3
both the Imperial and Dublin parliaments. Chamberlain, Kate
Courtney informs us, looked black as thunder and tore up his
notes. "We are as we were - only more so," Caine told her
'J
busband.
Gladstone appears to have believed that the modifications
foreshadowed in his speech would satisfy Chamberlain, On the
previous evening he had told Herbert Gladstone that Arnold
1'orley had written that Chamberlain was satisfied and would be
6
the first speaker after the moving of the second reading.
~ Kate Courtney's diary, 10 may 1086, Courtney, XXII.
2 Ibid*
3 bansart. CCCV, cols.
Il
Kate Courtney's diary, 10 May 1886.
^ Ibid.
^ Herbert Gladstone to Henry Gladstone, It May 1886, J.L.
Hammond, GlrQgtbnO llMd mU&h 53--1. Herbert
Gladstone in his letter added, "...mowing what the Cabinet
{jan the previous day] had settled I was surprised but had no
grounds for discouraging the idea
After the speech Labouchere reported to Chamberlain that
Gladstone had walked off convinced that his speech was most
1
satisfactory. Herbert Gladstone asserted that the
misunderstanding occurred through Labouchcro, Arnold Horley,
and Chamberlain and that he thought it was mostly Iabouchere's
2
fault. Eve.a if Herbert Gladstone was correct in this, which
is doubtful, the discrepancy between Gladstone's speech and
his reply to Labouchere's three points is not explained.
There the important factor was most probably an entire
misreading by Gladstone of the first poind - that the
Government would assent to the principle of full representation
upon all questions of taxation. The phrase "all questions of
taxation" he probably interpreted as meaning all questions of
taxation imposed upon Ireland by the Imperial Parliament,
while Chamberlain, with the object of giving Ireland the
maximum amount of her share in imperial affairs, probably
meant every taxation question brought before the Imperial
Parliament no natter whether it would, or would not, be imposed
upon Ireland. Gladstone had replied "I am instructed from
yesterday to promise this shall be done if agreeable to the
House." but the conclusion at the previous day's cabinet had
been that the Irish members should be admitted for taxation
3
involving Ireland, by uhich presumably they meant taxation
Labouchere to Chamberlain, 1j Hay I806, A.Thorold, The
life of liewry Labouchere. 310-11.
O
Herbert Gladstone to Ilenry Gladstone, Ih Hay 1866.
3 IMsj.
which would be collected within Ireland# Under the Government
of Ireland Kill such taxes were limited to customs and excise -
the two enumerated by Gladstone in his speech,
Labotrchere, although as disappointed as anyone by
Gladstone* s speech, recommenced his endeavours to bring
about an understanding# He tried to induce Chamberlain
2
to meet Herschell as had been proposed, but Chamberlain
had had enough of the negotiations and as it happened
Gladstone had given a convenient excuse for mailing an end
to them# In his speech Gladstone had spoken of the
advantages of public declarations as contrasted with the
inconveniences of underground negotiations# After such a
statement, wrote chamberlain, he could not enter on further
private discussions#*
Unlike Chamberlain the Gladstonians were eager to
continue the negotiations# On the same day as Chamberlain
put an abrupt end to then by his reply to Labouebere Herbert
Gladstone was writing the following letteri
1 Labouehore to Chamberlain, 10 liny 1336, A# ihorold, xlie
XL& al Item. Mlqx&lwn, 31-11.
* Labouchere to Chamberlain, telegram, 11 May 1336, A#
Ihorold, 22# e^t., 311#
3 Labouchere to Chamberlain, 11 May 1336, Chamberlain, 217,
and A#ihorolci, or?, cii.. ill.
1V+
• , » I think there is a decided break in the clouds.
I have clone my level best this morning to put the n,K. in
exact possession of the position resulting from yesterday's
debate, and of Chamberlain's views. I see perfectly
that his position is a very difficult one but I hope he
will not assume from the speech yesterday that there is
not every wish, co is is tent with maintaining the principle
of the Bill, to meet his views fairly. I wasn't
satisfied myself with yesterday's "concession", but 1
an certain of this - that its deficiency was duo not to
a want of good will to meet fair objections, but because
Father had not sufficiently mastered the difficulties
which presented themselves to his mind, and which no
doubt mainly resulted from Saturday's Cabinet.
I think now he has arrived at what may distinctly
be a basis of conciliation, if his colleagues agree,
founded on the three points. The natter has been more
fully thought out and I am in good hopes that when
lerschel [sic.] sees Chamberlain tomorrow he my be able
to give substantive proposals. All this is of course
my belief as it is my strong desire. And I sincerely
hope that the situation of bunday and fonclay morning
may 'bo considered to hold good till tomorrow at any rate.
the objects which I have been striving to influence
my lather to work for more thoroughly of vital importance
to the bill are:
Cl) Full representation on taxation.
(2) Power to Irish Parliament to have direct share
in Imperial and excluded subjects.
(3) Effective supremacy of-.Crown and Parliament
over Irish Parliament.
Herbert Gladstone's appeal loft Chamberlain unmoved, he
doubted the advantage of further confidential communications,
O
he stated, but was willing to see Herschell as a friend.
Trevelyan seems to have taken no part in these negotiations.
He did not like them and later admitted that he was glad when
1 Herbert Gladstone to Labouchere, 11 Kay 1836, Chamberlain,
217-18.
*" Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 21b.
3.lf5
1
they were abandoned. He thought that if Chamberlain had
gained the concessions demanded Chamberlain would have
appeared successful, but that in reality Gladstone would
2
have been the only one to profit.
Once Chamberlain had discovered the exact nature of
Gladstone's concessions he called a meeting of his supporters
to take place at his London house on 12. May. The invitation
was addressed to all Liberal members in favour of granting
autonomy to Ireland but opposed to the Government measure as
3
it stood. Fifty-two attended and about twelve others sent
b
expressions of sympathy with the objects of the meeting.
In his address Chamberlain said that he had understood from
the negotiations of the previous week that the Government
had decided to retain Irish representatives in Westminster
and that he was completely surprised to learn differently
from Gladstone's speech. Some of the morning papers, he said,
hinted that Campbell-Bannerman would make further explicit
amendments on behalf of the Government, but he x^ould prefer
further communications to be made through a public medium as
private negotiations had so far resulted in nothing but
5
misunderstanding. Several others spoke, including Trevelyan
1
Trevelyan to Chamberlain, 25 May 1886, Chamberlain, 220-1.
2 ibid.
^
T&e Times. 13 May 1886, p. 5.
Daily Telegraph. 13 May 1886, p. -j,
$ The Times. 13 May 1886, p. 5*
1^6
1
and Caine. Agreement was unanimous that, unless the Irish
2
members were retained in Westminster, the bill must be opposed.
Hartington's name was well received and, according to The TimesT
the desire was expressed that the Whigs and Radicals should
3
come together. "The tone of the meeting was most cordial
and resolute, and it was entirely unanimous," The Times
reported, and added (with perhaps more optimism than
accuracy) that those present strongly favoured a Hartington-
l+
Chamberlain government should the bill be defeated.
Two days later Hartington held a gathering of
dissidents at Devonshire House. Sixty-four attended
(including twenty who had been present at Chamberlain's meeting)
and nine others sent expressions of agreement with the purpose
5
of the meeting. Chamberlain took the major step not only of
attending but of speaking.
Hartington explained his position at some length. He
would vote, he said, against the second reading. The bill
was bad as it stood, but the amendments proposed by the
Government would make it worse. If, as wa3 rumoured, the
Government were to announce that the second reading was to be






5 Ibid. T Vj May 1886, p. 11.
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the autumn, he would still vote against it, especially as the
tension which must ensue, particularly in Ulster, might lead
1
to serious consequences. .. Rylands, Sir H. Vivian, H.
Wlggin, R.B.Finlay, Sir H. Meysey-Thompson and one or two
others spoke also. Meysey-Thompson said that he hoped
Hartington, Chamberlain, and the other leaders would be able
to formulate a policy. On that Chamberlain rose and said
that the question of a policy was premature, but that the
leaders were practically united on the course to be taken in
dealing with the Government of Ireland and land purchase bills.
He then elaborated on the inadequacy of the concessions offered
by the Government, and added that even if all that had been
demanded were to be conceded they would now have to consider
the spirit of the concession. He agreed with Hartington in
rejecting the proposal to consider the second reading as a
2
resolution. Next morning The Times wrote that the meeting
proved the rejection of the home rule bill to be certain and
proceeded to discuss the personnel available for a Hartington
ministry for there was, it maintained, "no absolute necessity"
3
for a general election.
These bald descriptions of the Hartington and Chamberlain
meetings give no indication of the reluctance and anxiety with







brought out in a letter which Sir E.W.Hamilton wrote to
Gladstone two days after the Devonshire House meeting. The
letter read:
. . , last night I came across Sir II. James, Sir Ilussey
Vivian and other seceders, with whom I had much talk. . .
They referred much to the meeting at Devonshire
House on Friday. The one wish, they said, which
prevailed at the meeting was to find a bridge. They
abhorred the idea of parting company with you| and' they
equally abhorred the outlook for themselves which
separation from you involved:- they would be mere
"catspaws" of the Tory party, they would be living from
hand to mouth by Tory grace and favour and would be
thrown over at any moment by their hateful allies.
There was not a word fell at the meeting which contained
the smallest trace of hostility towards you. On the
contrary the tone of the meeting was such as would have
gratified you had you been present, ihere was n.ver an
allusion to your name which was not cheered. Much
significance was attached to Lord Hartington,s concluding
words; "Remember, gentlemen" - at least so they were in
effect - "that the situation is changed and we must be
prepared to face a far larger measure .-.of concession than
we ever dreamt of a few months ago." d
1 ventured to say: "That wa3 all very well but
what practical way out of the ermasse had they to
suggest?" The reply was s- "Only one - the abandonment
of the Bill? and*procedure by resolution which might
include anything short of a Parliament in Dublin." ...
All, however, that I \i?ish to dwell upon is the
apparently strong feeling which exists among the
secessionists for re-union, ... 3
He had been private secretary to Gladstone 1873-71* and
1880-85, and had again helped him when forming the government
in Feb. 1886. He was a luke-warm home ruler (Sir E.W.Hamilton
to Sir Henry Ponsonby, 25 May 1886, Acid. Mss. *+5725).
2 The contemporary press had no reference to this statement
by liar ting ton.
3 Sir E.H.Hamilton to Gladstone, 16 May 1886, Add. Mss.
M+191, f, 69.
1^9
A number of Liberals, of -whom the more important were
12 3
Samuel Whithread, Sir Henry Vivian, Sir Joseph Pease,
b 5
Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, and Labouchere, had turned
to the idea of withdrawing the Government of Ireland Bill in
favour of a general resolution, Whithread approached
Chamberlain on the matter and Chamberlain agreed to support
a resolution in the terms of the memorandum which Gladstone
6
had shown in February to those whom he had asked to take office.
Gladstone, a3 determined as ever upon securing a second reading
for the bill, suddenly saw in the proposal a device for
7
achieving that object. He wrote asking John Bright to come
8
to London as soon as possible. Bright replied that he wouJLd
^ S. Whitbread to Gladstone, 11 May 1886, Add. Mss, UMt97>
f. 1995 and Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 219-20.
^ Memorandum by H. Gladstone, 18 May 1886, Add. Mss. ^+611^,
f, 190.
3 Sir J. Pease to Gladstone, lU, and 20 May 1886, Add. Mss.
Ij.i4i4.97 ff. 223, and 2*f6; Sir J. Pease to Spencer, 1^ May 1886,
Miscellaneous, A1thorn; and memorandum by H. Gladstone,
18 May 1886.
** Sir U, Kay-Shuttleworth to Spencer, 13 May 1886.
Miscellaneous, A1thorp; and Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth to
Granville, lb May 1886, P.B.C. 30,29.22A.
5 Labouchere's speech, 18 May 1886, Hansard, cols, l^b^-6,
6
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 219-20.
7 On 13 May Gladstone wrote to Harcourt, "The state of
Parliamentary opinion is now the main matter for consideration
and the immediate question before us is, given a House of which
a majority are favourable to the principle of our Bill, how
to prevent this same House from throwing out the Bill on the
2nd R." (Copy, Add. Mss# P. 173).
u
Gladstone to Bright (copy), 12 May 1886, Add. Mss. ^5^8,
p. 172.
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arrive on the following day (the lVth) and that he believed
Gladstone should withdraw the bill without putting it to a
1
second division. In London Bright was met by Whithread who,
2
acting in accordance with Gladstone's wishes, proposed that
the bill should be given its second reading and then should
3
be "hung up for six months." Next day Bright had a letter
from Chamberlain urging him to press Gladstone to withdraw
li¬
the bills and reconsider the subject. At last on the 17th
Bright gave Whithread his findings. "I think there is only
one thing which Mr. Gladstone can do wisely, and with any
good result," he re-urged, that is to withdraw the Bill
before the 2nd reading Division," He explained that he had
not consulted Hartington as the Liberals at the Devonshire
House meeting had unanimously agreed that under no circumstance
would they vote for the second reading. But he had, he said,
seen Caine (the unofficial radical unionist whip) who had
5
confirmed that his group were opposed to Whltbread's proposal.
1
Bright to Gladstone, 13 May 1836, Add. Mss. M-fl.13, 1, 22*f
(Morley, III. 327-9).
Gladstone to Bright (copy), May 1806, Acd. Mss. UVjfrS,
p. 17^; and Gladstone to 8, Whithread (copy), 1!+ May 1386,
Add. Mss. p. 17*k
3 Ihe o£ John Brirht (edited by P. Bright), 5l9L.
^ Chamberlain to Bright, Ij May 1086, Add. Mss. l:-3307, f. 2?e.
^ Bright to Whi thread, 17 May lo.,6, G.L.Trevelyan, The life
of John Bright,
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On the 17th Chamberlain saw Haptington and tried to
persuade him not to oppose a resolution, but to absent himself
1
if necessary. Partington replied that he must five the idea
2
further thought and consult others before committing himself.
Later, after the House was up, Chamberlain had at his own
3
request a talk with Herbert Gladstone. The conversation,
judging from Herbert Gladstone's account, ranged over the
If.
political situation in general and Chamberlain's motive in
asking for it is not clear. Herbert Gladstone, It is
interesting to note, gained from it the impression that
Chamberlain appeared to be under an obligation to consult,
if not to co-operate, with dartington.
On IB May Hartington in a speech at Bradford firmly
6
opposed the substitution of a resolution. Next day Gladstone
wrote to his chief whip that a resolution was no longer
possible. He explained that it would require a general
consent which could not be had now that Hartington had publicly
opposed the adoption of a resolution, that the Irish would
oppose such a course, and that the arguments against abstract
1 Herbert Gladstone's minute on his conversation with







The Times. 10 May 1886, pp. 11-12.
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resolutions which might be taken verbatim from his own
1
speeches on various questions would be most awkward.
At a first fiance it might seem that the withdrawal
schemes sponsored by Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Bright had
something in common and that they should have been able to
reconcile then. There was, however, the fundamental difference
that Gladstone's object was to pass the bill through the
second reading while Chamberlain and Bright aimed at
preventing it from reaching that stage.
The National Union of Conservative Associations met on
16 May and the opportunity was taken to fortify the resolution
of dissident Liberals by the knowledge that in the ensuing
election they would have an excellent chance of the
Conservative votes in their constituencies. Salisbury and
both
Hicks Beach/told the conference that it would be the duty of
Conservatives to support Liberal Unionist candidates in
Liberal Unionist constituencies which would not have been
2
endangered had there been no Liberal split. The Times
commented that although the Conservative leaders could give
no absolute pledge they should say plainly that no liberal
who voted against Gladstone's home rule bill would be attacked
no matter what might be the prospect of success, or what might
3
have been the provocation in the past. The Conservative
1 Gladstone to A. Korley (copy), 19 May 1336, Add. Hss.
p. 1/6.
2 The Times. 17 May 1386, p. 6.
3 m, p. 9.
153
leaders must have been fully aware of the substance In The
Times criticism and in addition, if Churchill's report of the
meeting of the Liberal Unionist peers at Derby House on 16
April is accurate, they had already given a much more
comprehensive promise of Conservative support for Liberal
Unionist candidates. Possibly they had refrained from the
course which The Times advocated through deference to the
views of the Liberal Unionists themselves for the Liberal
Unionists still feared as much as ever any move which might
suggest that they were the protfeg£s of the Conservatives.
Some at least of the Conservative leaders were aware of the
Liberal Unionist attitude. In a speech a fortnight earlier
Iddesleigh had strongly recommended Conservatives to partially
efface themselves, and not to make difficulties for the
Liberal Unionists either by abusing Gladstone or over-praising
1
Hartington.
The decision of the National Liberal Federation on 5
and the determination of Gladstone to persevere with his
schemes made the creation of a Liberal Unionist party machine
2
an urgent necessity. With this object a full meeting of the
Liberal Unionist Committee, which had steadily grown since its
1
Ibid.. 30 April 1886.
p
Hartington's speech at the opening of the Ulster Reform
Club on 5 Nov. 1885 contains what seems to be the first use
of the term "Liberal unionist".
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1
formation in April, was arranged to take place on 22 May in
the Westminster Palace Motel under the chairmanship of
Ilartington. Chamberlain called a meeting of his supporters
on the 20th to consider the new development. They met at
a few minutes notice and as a result only thirty three
2 3
attended. Chamberlain, it was afterwards reported,
favoured joining the Committee, but the majority were against
doing so in a body and the meeting decided that each person
V
should join or not as he thought best.
Hartington, opening the Westminster Palace Hotel meeting,
said that Liberal Unionists would have to have an organisation
if they were to counter the pressure of the caucuses and be
able to fight successfully the general election which would
probably follow. Goschen moved the resolution establishing
the new association which was to be known as the national
Liberal Union. Its objects, he explained, would be to form
local committees as had already been done In Glasgow,
Nottingham, Liverpool, Derby and other places; to publish and
6
circulate litoratu.ro; and to raise party funds. Other
1 On 12 May The limes (p. 9) mentioned that forty M.Ps had now
joined the Committee.
2 The Times.. 21 May 1886, p. 10.
3 Ibid.
1■ ibid.
'J Ibid.. 2h May 1086, p. 8.
6 Ibid.
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speakers were Argyll, Derby, P. Rylands, J. Croffer, and
1 2
H.R.Grenfell. A general committee was then appointed.
It consisted of fifty nine people, Including nineteen from
3
the Commons and thirteen from the Lords. liar ting ton was
elected president and the offices and secretary of the initial
committee were retained for the new body. Chamberlain did
not Join nor did any of his more pronounced followers.
The debate on the Government of Ireland Bill had been
confined to the government nights (two per week) with the
result that it was protracted for almost a month. The
opposition bitterly protested that such a course was an
expedient to enable the maximum amount of caucus and other
h
unfair pressure to bo applied to the unionist Liberals.
Efforts were made by trie unionists to have the debate ended.
Hicks Beach and Hartington each declared that the subject
was exhausted and that the time had come for a division.
Chamberlain, too, appears to have contemplated a similar
7




^ Iho .Limes. 2h May 1636, p. 8.
^
£.£• Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's speech, 7 June 1886,
Hansard. CCCVI, cols. 1202-3.
5 Hansard. CCCV, col. 1663.
6 Ibid., col. 166k.
,7 Ibid., cols. 1665-y.
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fell back on the precedent of the debate on the repeal of the
Corn Laws, which lasted twelve nights, and although Hicks-Beach
pointed out that it had been prolonged not by the supporters
1 2
of the bill, but by its opponents, he refused to give way.
On the whole the opposition had ranch the b.st of the
debate. On h June the Times gave as its opinion :
. . . The most remarkable point to be noted in surveying
the course of the discussion is the extraordinary paucity
of independent support which Ministers have received.
The defence of the measure . . . has been left almost
exclusively in the hands of official personages and of
Mr. famell's chosen subalterns.3
A fortnight earlier Brett had noted i i his journal t
. . . His {Gladstone's] support in the Cabinet and on
the benches of the House of Commons has been weak.
Morley alone had given him help. Up to a few nights
ago not a single speaker had attempted to argue his ^
case. Then Bryce's speech made a welcome break.. . .
One cause of the poor defence by the Gladstonians was
that so many of them were home rulers against the grain.
Very many supported home rule simply as the lesser evil and
a number for less creditable reasons. Bright may not have
been literally correct in the figure, but he was expressing
a truth, when in a letter to one of his constituents (31
May) he wrote that, if Gladstone's authority were withdrawn
1 ibid., col. 18U-1.
2 Ibid., cols. 1337-^1.
J
The Times. h June 1836, p. 9.
^ H.B.Brett's Journal, 20 May 1886, Letters and iourmi Is of
do rise Id Viscount J'sher, I. 126.
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from the bills, he doubted if they would have, apart from
the Nationalists, twenty supporters in the Commons. Even
more startling is Morley*s expression of a similar opinion
about the Cabinet. Some- months later (15 February 1887) he
told Dilke that, apart from Gladstone and himself, the only
2 & 3
home rulers in the Cabinet had been Granville and Spencer.
Of these men, setting aside Gladstone, it is interesting that
Morley believed home rule would bring no material advantage
to Ireland, that Spencer was a home ruler largely because
he believed that all policies Involving coercion In Ireland
would sooner or later be sold by someone in return for the
5
parliamentary support of the nationalists, and that Granville
in his later years seems to have been content to follow
Gladstone's lead in domestic policy. Even Childers, who had
6
declared for home rule in the 1885 general election, was
very dissatisfied with Gladstone*s bill. Cooper, the Liberal
1
Bright to T, Grosvenor Lee, 31 May 1886, the limes. 2 June
1886, p. lo.
2 Cilice's memoir, Gwy;m and Tuckwell, II. 267.
3 On lh Aug. 1886 Morley remarked in a letter to Spencer,
"Half of the late Cabinet are sceptical and cynical at bottom;
especially Harcourt, . (Miscellaneous, A1thorp).
** Kate Courtney*s diary, 18 April, and 6 Juno 1886 (she
quotes conversations with Morley), Courtney, XXII.
2 See above p.66-67.
6 Childers' speech, 12 Oct. 1885, 'IM Tirana, 13 Oct. 1885;
Child..rs to Gladstone. 27 and 28 September 1885, Add. Mas.
ls-hl32, ff. 183 and 186; and Lieut-Col. Spencer Childers,
kUv correspondency of ui^h C.h.Childers. II.. 232-**.
lj?8
Unionist editor of the Scotsman. wrote in his memoir that
during the general election of July 1886 Childers repeatedly
told him that he thought Gladstone wrong and his home rule
1
bill a bad one. When Cooper pointed out the inconsistency
of- such views with a continued support of Gladstone, Childers
replied that he feared great evils from a party s-\Lit for no
seceding party had ever been able to maintain a separate
2
existence in Lritish polities.
Ey agreement the Conservatives had conceded that until
after the critical division the foremost place both in the
Commons and in the country should bo taken by the Liberal
3 * ^
Unionists. In the Commons this aim was fully achieved
for the majority of Liberal Unionist speeches were above
average in ability. They had, as a rule, a firmer grasp of
the constitutional problems of home rule than was usually
shown either by their opponents or by the Conservatives. An
explanation is that many of them had become Liberal Unionists
because they had examined the constitutional conundrums
unavoidable in any scheme of home rule and had been unable to
find a solution. The men with the attitude, "Oh, these are
1
C.A.Cooper, An editor1 s retrospect, 1+11.
L- IM&.
3 Cecil, III. 302.
1+
As early as 21 April Gladstone wrote to I'orley, "Was
there ever more egregious iolly than that of the Separatist
Liberals in taking all the difficulties and responsibilities
upon themselves and allowing the Tories to remain virtually
uncommitted". (Copy, Add. Mss. M+5*f8, p. 11+8).
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1
administrative details which you statesmen must deal with,"
had much less difficulty in throwing in their lot with
Gladstone. Hartington aided by his national reputation for
honesty and soundness of Judgment, in particular,
distinguished himself. One Gladstonian liberal who sat
through his speeches on the second reading has described
them as "strong, sincere, arguing out with unerring force
not prejudices, but fundamental difficulties and objections."
"Such speeches," he added, "hit hard, told in every sentence,
2
and reant steady transfer of votes to the Unionists."
As Morley verifies, never before during thirty years of
parliamentary life had hartington spoken with the same
3
power. Chamberlain, too, made a deep impression by the
two speeches which he made on the second reading. Sir
Richard Temple, Conservative member for Ivesham, described
them as remarkable productions of forceful argument and
Judicious moderation of expression, delivered with complete
self-control and unruffled coolness araid constant interpellations
. and ejaculations. "He never made speeches like that when he
A remark of Jesse Colling s as reported by liarcourt.
(Harcourt to Hartington, 2'f Dec. 13b;?, Gardiner. I. 553;
and Ilarcourt to Chamberlain, 13 Dec, 1836, Gardiner, II. 13).
2
F.A.cbanning, cenories o£ polUto, l&jrlSl",
57-Dc.
3 Morley, III. 313.
ti-
Sir R. Temple, Lexers ana cIm&ZteL l£23 tho
House of Commons. 1h2.
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was on our side," Gladstone once complained to a friend. The
friend, who was unusually candid, replied, "xes, he did, but
you never listened to them then." Goschen, Janes, and
Trevelyan each made an important contribution to the debate.
The only Liberal Unionists of standing who did not speak were
Bright and Courtney, Hicks Beach, Churchill, Balfour, and
D.R.Plunkett were the most effective of the Conservative
speakers. On the Gladstonian side „nly two men made a marked
impression by their speaking. These were Lorley and air
Charles Russell.
In an effort to reassure as many as possible of the
2
waverers, Gladstone called a meeting at the Foreign Office
for 27 May. The invitation was to all Liberal members who
desired the establishment of a legislative tody in Dublin
for the management of affairs specifically and exclusively
3
Irish. Hartington's followers and certain other
dissentients were thus excluded. A number of Chamberlainites
I. Bulmer-Thomas, TM nartv system in Great Britain. 36.
Mr, Lulmer-Thomas was uold this anecdote by 6ir George Leveson
Gower (private secretary to Gladstone, 1880-85, and Junior
Lord of the Treasury, Feb,-July 1886).
p
Gladstone on the day of his Foreign Office meeting reckoned
that the dissentients and waverers consisted of 8 Chamberlainites,
66 Hartlngtonians and others, and b" of whom he was hopeful.
(Memorandum by Gladstone, 27 May 1686, Add. Hss. bkGhJ. This
is a cabinet memorandum and is closed to ordinary inspection,
but is quoted by Mr, b.H,G.Armytage in "The railway rates
question and the fall of the third Gladstone ministry,"
English Historical Xovienj, LXV, 18-51).
^ The Times, 2? May 1886, p. 7#
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1
attended, but Chamberlain was absent,
Gladstone spoke for an hour. He explained that by the
second reading the Government wished primarily to establish
the principle of self-government and that a member who voted
for the second reading would not be committed in any way
as to the third reading, or the land purchase bill. He said
that the principle having been established the Government did
not intend to go furt ier with the bill until the autumn
session when either the committee stage would be entered, or
the bill re-introduced in an amended form. The Government,
he said, favoured the latter course, Gladstone reminded the
meetine of the statements in his speech to the Commons on
2
10 Kay that the Government was willing to admit Irish
representatives to the Imperial Parliament for taxation
involving Ireland, and favoured their admission on imperial
and reserved matters, provided that a satisfactory scheme
for achieving this could be evolved. He said that the
Government had made a further study of the latter question
and had concluded that a satisfactory scheme could be evolved.
He gave as the reason for his absence that he was pledged
by public declarations to vote against the 2nd reading nless
the Government conceded complete and continued Irish
representation, which they had not done, (Chamberlain to
Labouchere, 26 May 1686 (the letter was forwarded to li,
Gladstone) , J,:.. Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish nation.
bnO).
2 See above p. lh-1.
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As a result it was now willing, he stated, to propose schemes
for the admission of Irish representatives both for taxation,
1
and for imperial and reserved matters.
The meeting achieved its purpose. Many eagerly grasped
at the opportunity of at least postponing the day of entering
the wilderness. Before night no less than twenty dissentients
2
said that they were satisfied.
Chamberlain had a meeting of his followers shortly
after the Foreign Office meeting. Apparently only thirty-six
3
attended. The Daily holeoran-, reported that some of the
men present claimed that Gladstone had virtually conceded
their demand, but that others argued that they could not be
certain of this. The llrr'irr 0- :. Lailv Tost, on the other
hand, wrote that the meeting, with the exception of two or
three, considered that Gladstone's concessions did not amount
5
to much. The i-.-ai.lv Iclerranh may have been nearer the mark
for the meeting agreed that they should not attempt to come
to a decision just then, but should re-meet on the following
day when they would have had the advantage of having studied
^
The Tim-a. 28 May 1806, p. 10.
2
Morley, III. 33*+.
J Daily, Foal, 23 .fey 1886, P. O. The Daily
Telegraph (28 May 18b6, p. y) wrote that from forty to fifty
attended, but the Inrmlnrhar:- Daily Tost was more likely to
have been accurately informed on matters affecting Chamberlain,
and indeed, its account of the meeting reads very much as
though officially inspired.
**
Daily. Telegraph. 20 May 1866, p. y.
'J Birmlnphan Daily £a&$, loc. £!£.
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1
Gladstone's speech in print. This further meeting was later
postponed until 31 May.
Chamberlain appeared to be on the brink of disaster and
none knew it better than himself. W.S.Caine reported that
thirty supporters were wobbling or had gone over. In
desperation Chamberlain suggested to Hartington, who
3
informed Salisbury, that rather than risk a heavy defeat
Literal Unionists and Conservatives should abstain from
voting on the ground that to vote on a bill which was to be
withdrawn or remodelled would be a farce. Salisbury
consulted certain of his colleagues and replied that they
were unanimous in opposing the suggestion because, even if
the Conservative members for Great Britain could be induced
to adopt it, the Ulstermen would never consent to do so and
in the constituencies the electors would conclude that the
5
Union had been abandoned. The suggestion was made also
to a meeting of the Liberal Unionist Committee, but found
6
no more favour there than with the Conservatives.
The situation created by the Foreign Office meeting was
1
IMA', and Dallv j^ograih, l2£. cit.
2
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 222.
3 Cecil, III. 305.
** Salisbury to Bartington, 30 Kay 1886, Chats. 3*+Q. 1996.
5 Ibid.
6 billot, II. 72.
l6Ls-
short lived. Ilext day Churchill and Hicks Beach in scathing
attacks in the Commons pressed the Government to state
1
definitely what they intended to do with the bill , and in
the heated two hour debate Gladstone undid his achievement
of the previous day. "fever, never," he declared, would he
consent to the "reconstruction" of the bill, 'ahen he spoke
of remodelling it he was referring to the one clause which
dealt with Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament,
2
he said. The reaction was immediate and almost complete.
Chamberlain summoned the meeting for 31 May at which
his followers were to decide their course on the second
reading. As on 12 May the invitation was to Liberal members
who favoured some form of autonomy for Ireland, but
3
disapproved of the Government's bills as they stood.
Chamberlain wrote to John Bright on 30 May earnestly
requesting him to be present. He declined, but sent a
5
letter which was to have an importance he did not intend.
Bright had decided to vote against the bill, but thought
that it would be best if others were to abstain, so that the
bill, after being carried by a narrow majority, might meet
'
Mansard. CCCVI, cols. 317-21, and 327-37.
2 -bid., col. 326.
•' The fines, 1 June 1886, p. 13.
L.
Chamberlain to Bright, 30 May 1886, Add. Mss. H3387, f. 27
(Garvin, II, 2^3-Jf).
^ Bright to chamberlain, 1 June 1886, q.w.o., Garvin, II.
2hG.
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a slow death in committee.
Ky present intention, he wrote in his letter, is
to vote against the second reading. Mot having spoken
in the debate, I am not willing to leave my view of
the Bill or Bills in any doubt.
But I am not willing to take the responsibility of
advising others as to their course. If they ca 1 content
themselves with abstaining from the division, I shall be
glad - they will render a greater service by preventing
the threatened dissolution than by compelling it.. . .
I wish I could join you, but I cannot now change the
path I have.taken from the beginning of this unhappy
discussion.
The meeting took place in Committee Room 15 of the
2
House of Commons* Iifty-five members attended, including
from fifteen to twenty who had been to meetings at Devonshire
3
House. Chamberlain explained that they could either vote
against the second reading or else abstain from voting,
u
and impartially put the pros and cons for both courses . He
said that he would follow whatever course the meeting chose,
5
provided it was reached with tolerable accord. Then
without having attempted to sway the meeting he read Bright1s
6
letter. After that only one course was possible. Bright's
example mist be followed and not his advice* Trevelyan,
1
Bright to Chamberlain, 31 1666, Garvin, II, 2M+-5>
and G. !.Trevelyan, The life of John Lrirht.
2
Garvin, II. 2^5.
■ The Times, 1 June 1666, p. 13*
** Chamberlain to John Albert Bright, 16 Jan. 1699, q.w.o.,
G.M.Trevelyan, or. cit.. *+55 •
^ Times. 1 June 1666, p. IT.
Chamberlain to John Albert Bright, 16 Jan. 1699.
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CaIne, R.B.Finlay, D.Davies, Sir J.Pease, Sir J.Goldsmid,
Sir H.Vivian, P.Williams, and others spoke. Some were for
1
abstention, but the majority favoured direct opposition.
Trevelyan urged that active opposit on was both the logical
2
and honest course. The meeting vas then asked for their
views and thirty-nine held up their hands for voting against
the bill, thirteen were for abstention, and three wished to
3
support it. Chamberlain now let it be known that he
h-
agreed with the majority and on a further voting the number
5
for direct opposition rose to forty-eight.
The decision of Chamberlain's meeting destroyed the last
hope of a successful second reading. Even the 2 ews at
6
once admitted it. "There goes the man who killed the home
rule bill," was Parnell's remark on seeing Chamberlain pass
7
in the Lobby some weeks later.
hext day Ilartington held a similar neeting, dixty members
attended, including twenty who had been to Chamberlain's
J"
Ibid.. and The Times. 1 June 1886, p. 13.
2
The TimesT 1 June 1836, p. 13.
3
Garvin, II. 2**5 •
b
Chamberlain to John Albert I right, 16 Jan. 1899.
^ Garvin, II. 2*+5« t?he figures given by Garvin, The Itest
Daily Telerrauh. anil Sir A.I .lease (Elections and Recollections.
I3U)differ. The Times gives# 1st votes 30 for direct opposition;
12 for abstention; and 3 for the bill, and 2nd vote: bki b$
and 3. The Daily Telegraph gives: 1st votes 30; 12; and 3, and
2nd vote: by, h; and 3. Sir A.E.Pease gives: 1st votes 38;
12; and 5» and 2nd vote: '+6; h- and 3J.
6
Daily Hews, 1 June 1036, p. '+.
7
R.B.O'Brien, The life of Charles utcwart Parnell, II, 158.
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1 2
meeting. Three others sent messages of approval. Iluch less
interest was aroused than on the previous day as people
assumed that the result was a foregone conclusion. Hartington,
3
Seely, and Goschen spoke. At the voting fifty-eight favoured
a direct vote against the second reading and two refused to
commit themselves.
Gladstone responded to the situation by repeating in.
clearer and more definite terms the points which he had made
at the Torelen Office meeting. In correspondence, which was
published in the press on 5 June, he re-emphasised that anyone
voting for the second reading need only consider that they
had voted ior the general principle of an Irish legislature
for Irish affairs, that the Government would hold themselves
free to accept proposals made to them prior to the introduction
of the autumn bill, and that the autumn bill would arrange
for the representation of Ireland at Westminster upon imperial
5
and revenue subjects. Also, Gladstone wrote a letter to
Sir Joseph Pease, too close to the division on the second
6
reading to allow publication, but which decisively influenced





J F.Fletcher Houlton to Gladstone, b June 1886, and Gladstone
to F.Fletcher iloulton, b Juno 1886, The Times. 5 June 1886,
p. 12.
^ Sir A.I .Pease, .lections apd recollections, 108. (Sir
A.h,Pease states that the letter was sent to horley when he
was writing the life of Gladstone and was not returned. Morley
makes no reference to it in the life and there is no draft
among the Gladstone papers).
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Sir Joseph and some other members to vote for the second.
1
reading. Once again Gladstone gave an assurance that a vote
for the bill would commit one to nothing more than an
2
acceptance of the principle.
On the day following his decisive meeting Chamberlain
spoke in the Commons, First he dealt with Gladstone's
speech at the foreign Office meeting. He maintained that the
second reading could be treated neither as a resolution on
the principle of an Irish legislature for Irish affairs as
Gladstone had suggested, nor as a vote of confidence in the
Government, The person who voted for the bill, he asserted,
would be logicoily and honourably bound to vote for the
second reading of a similar bill, or of the same bill should
it be reintroduced in the autumn. He claimed that the
supremacy of the Imperial Parliament could be retained
unimpaired only If the Irish members continued to have
"full, complete, and continuous representation" at
Westminster. He laid emphasis on the question of Ulster and
the danger of Roman Catholic domination over the Irish
Protestants. He no longer, as in his speech of 9 April,
suggested the adoption of a federal type constitution.
Instead he now suggested that the relationship between the
Dominion Parliament of Canada and a Canadian provincial
3




3 Hansard. CCCVI, cols. 675-700.
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The last evening of the debate on the second reading
began at five o'clock on 7 June, Goschen was the first
speaker. He opposed the suggestion that the vote on the
second reading should be considered as no more than a
resolution. lie pointed out that members did not yet know
whether the bill was still Inseparably connected with the
land purchase bill, or whether the C-ov-rnment had reached
a decision on Ulster, or the nature of the plan, which
Gladstone had foreshadowed at the foreign office meeting,
for the- admission of Irish representatives to the Imperial
1
Parliament. Of the remaining speakers the two most important
were Parnell and Hicks-Leach. Darnell caused a sensation by
intervening in Hicks-loach's speech and stating that a
member of the previous conservative Ministry, when in office,
had informed him that his Government intended to concede
2
an Irish parliament with power to protect Irish industries.
Gladstone's face was pallid as he closed the debate, but
3
his voice had never sounded better. Ke said that he had not
promised to reconstruct the bill and hence was free to
reconstruct it, but not bound to do so. He took it to be
absolutely beyond dispute, ho- sale1, that what would be voted
upon that nlrht would be the principle of the bill, and not
its particulars. II© emphasised that members who voted for
the principle- would be entirely and absolutely uncommitted on
"** Hansard. CCCVI, cols. llJ+5-6d.
f" Hansard. CCCVI, cols. 1199-1,.00,
3 Morley, III. 33b.
1?C
the specific provisions of the bill. He recalled that the
Government had undertaken to provide for Irish representation
in taxation and imperial questions. He did not recede, he
said, from his statement on Ulster at the beginning of the
debate, but could not see that any plan for Ulster had made
serious or effective progress.
You have power, you have wealth, you have rani:., you have
station, you have organisation, he declared. ... As
to the harvest of the future, X doubt if you have so
much confidence, and I believe there is in the breast
of many a man who means to vote against us tonight a
profound misgiving, approaching even to a deep conviction,
that the end will be as we foresee, and not as you
d~ - that the ebbing tide is with you and the flowing
tide is with us. .Ireland stands-at your bar expectant,
hopeful, almost suppliant.. . .
The division took place at one o'clock in the morning of
d June and the Government was defeated by thirty votes. The
figures were : ayes, 313; noes, 35+3, and the latter included
ninety-three Liberals (not counting the independent Liberal
Sir E, watkin). A further seven Liberals walked out and
three (including the two unionists C.P.Vllllers and II.Bass)
2
were ill. Numerically the division was a record one for,
apart from the Liberals noted, only two Conservatives, both
of whom were ill, and the Nationalist Captain 0'Shea did not
1 Hansard. CCCVI, cols. 12l$-b0.
2 In the subsequent election three of the ten Liberals who
did not vote were returned unopposed as Liberal Unionists,
two after contests as Gladstouians, and five retired.
take part. (The Speaker A.W.Pael was a Liberal Unionist).
Gladstone decided on dissolution and later in the day
1
carried the Cabinet with him.
1
Gladstone to the Queen, 8 June 1886, Letters of Queen
VictoriaT 3rd Series, I. 1^3-^1 and Morley, III. 3*+!.
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CHAPTLR I?
THE LIBERAL SPLIT IN PARLIAMENT - AN ANALYSIS
Garvin reckoned that forty-six of the Liberals who voted
1*2
anoinst the Government were Chamberlainites. In this
he over-simplifies. Forty-five to fifty of them can with
reasonable accuracy be described as Hartlngtonians, but not
more than twenty to twenty-five as Chamberlainites. The
remainder of the ninety-three considered themselves neither
Hartlngtonians nor Chamberlainites, and in the main were men
who believed that some form of home rule was inevitable, or
desirable, but had been opposed to one or more aspects of
the bills (especially the exclusion of the Irish
representatives), and who had found in Cnamberlain a champion
of their views against those of Gladstone. A verification of
the number of true Chamberlainites was provided little more
than a week after the division when Chamberlain on forming a
new party organisation, the National Radical Union, was able
to induce no more than twenty or so members of Parliament to
join it.
1 Garvin, II. 25 •.
2
Arnold iiorley informed Gladstone that a careful analysis
of the 93 unionist Liberals showed that 67 of them were
against the principle of the bill, that 5 were Chamberlainites,
and that the remaining 21 were influenced mainly by
electioneering considerations such as promises of no opposition.
(A. Morley to Gladstone, 19 June liiu6, Add. Mss. M+253,
f. 13).
173
An unmistakable feature of the Liberal Unionist members
1
of Parliament -was their wealth. An attempt to discover how
much, or by what proportion, they were wealthier than the
Gladstonian members is not feasible, but that they were on
the whole wealthier is shown by an examination of what can
be discovered of the financial position of individual members,
the testimony of contemporaries, and the state of the relative
party funds. This fact has led a number of people to jump to
the conclusion that financial self-interest was an important
factor in sending the Liberal Unionists into the division
2
lobby against the Government of Ireland Bill, The people
who accept this view without inquiring further forget that a
comparatively poor man can be as sensitive to the welfare of
an industry or other undertaking as a rich man.
If financial self-interest were a major explanation of
the formation of the Liberal Unionist Party one would expect
to find that the majority of Liberal Unionist members had
1
£.£. Thirty-nine Liberal Unionists contributed £131,395 to
a special election fund prior to the general election of 1892.
Three had acted as collecting agents for an area, but the
remaining thirty-six contributed £10H-.1Q0. Their subscriptions
ranged from E50Q to ^20,000, (Wolmer (Liberal Unionist chief
whip) to Duke of Devonshire, 5 Sept, I892, Chats, 3k0, 2503?
and 3He. 2503A).
2
e.g. r E, Halfevy, History of £he English people. I. pllogqe,
I. lo. yialevy was so carried away by this assumption that his
comment on the fact that the lH-0 Gladstonians returned In 1895
for England and Wales contained 59 business men (H-23) and the
22 Liberal Unionists 8 business men (363) was "the large
proportion of business men among the Liberal Unionists reveals
the true character of the revolt"! Halfevy obtained his
figures from the Constitutional year book for 1896].
17k
TABLE I.
Economic interests of the Liberal unionist ami
Gladstonian Liberal members of Parliament. June I006.
In this table the Liberal Unionist and Gladstonian
Liberal members with a particular interest are expressed as a
percentage (to the nearest whole number) of the total number
of their respective party in the Commons, the Liberal Unionists
arc reckoned to number ninety-seven members, jL.o. the ninety-
three who voted apainst the Government, the three who did not
vote but who subsequently stood for election as Liberal
Unionists, and the Speaker, L#W„Peel.
An inquiry of this kind cannot, of course, be exhaustive
and is handicapped by shortcomings in the sources on which it
is based. 1he figures in this table were obtained from :
1 od8 a rorllanentarv c jvrn.iiioa
Dictiorar: of national biogranhy
V/ho' s who
oho ilia Whip, la9.7 - i\ ha
Obituaries in The ximes
Directorof directors
The now, house of Commons (published by the Times)
The roioiiar ruidc to the, house of Condons and record of
ihe election o£ 1386 (published by Pall Mall Gazette)
Pradshaw's railway shareholders' guide
Burke's landq.fl gentry
Bateman1s great landowners
3-. Boase, doctor:}. , ...icllsh. biographies








I inance and insurance 177 117
Railways 2b,: 12 > 2
Manufacturing, engineering
and mining 31,' 26 J









and ex-Indian Service 3' 3 '
As there were only 97 Liberal Unionists the figures in
this column are especially subject to the idiosyncrasies of
individuals.
This figure differs from Mr. P. ^Williams' estimate because
his includes only directors. (Mr. P.M.Williams, "Public
opinion and the railway rates question", .urli-sl historical
Ren**'i LXVII. 37-73).
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different economic interests from the majority of the
Gladstonians, and further, that their interests were ones
specially threatened by Gladstone's bills. An examination
of the economic interests of the two groups does not reveal
anything so definite.
Apart from the merchant interest, the four major economic
interests in both parties were land, manufacturing, railways,
1 ...
and finance. In each of three of these about five per cent,
and in railxtfays twelve -per cent more Liberal Unionists had an
Interest than had Gladstonians, This is less significant
than it first appears because it was partly due to a larger
proportion of the Liberal Unionists having their fortunes
2
divided among two, three, or more economic interests, and
also because, being in the main wealthier men, they held a
greater number of company directorships. One can discover
the company directors with comparative certainty; but even
exhaustive research leaves undetected many important economic
Interests of men who held no directorship. This is especially
true of railways and quite possibly even the twelve per cent
is to be explained almost entirely by it for at that time
railway stock was one of the most common forms of investment -
1
See TABLE I, suura jb. 17^5.
2
A table based on the primary economic interest of each
member would be valuable, but unfortunately it is not possible
to compile one for a whole party or even for a sufficient
portion of a party to be of use.
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the most common, it was said, after consols.
The Liberal Unionists and the Gladstonians tod each a
few men who owned estates in Ireland or were related to the
Irisii landlord class, but In both parties the overwhelming
majority of land owning M.P.'s had their property in Great
Britain, Many of them admitted that only by some form of
land purchase could Ireland's agrarian problems be solved.
Further, those of them who were opposed to Irish land purchase
were well aware that they would not stop it by going against
Gladstone for in the previous year one of the first acts of
the Conservative Government had been the Ashbourne Act - a
substantial land purchase measure, Ireland provided an
important market for finished goods and the heavy industries
of Belfast for iron and steel. Nevertheless, one doubts if
even the complete loss of the Irish market would have brought
financial disaster to any sizeable number of Liberal Unionists.
No Liberal Unionist appears to have tod an interest in the
1
Irish railways, and one cannot feel that the railway
interests of Great Britain could have influenced the division
2
list on 8 June, Financiers' interests were a different matter,
1
Ufqdstow' s pa^ay gftgreholdqffl1 guide, loo6, pa$gin.
2 See Mr, W.H.G.Armytage, "The railway rates question and the
fall of the third Gladstone ministry", English historical Review.
LXV, 18-51, for the suggestion that Mundella's Railway and
Canal Traffic Bill (introduced 12 March) was decisive in
deciding many Liberals to oppose the Government on 8 June,
and Mr. P.M.Kllliams, "Public opinion and the Railway rates
question in 1886", ibid., LXVTI, 37-73, for a refutation of
the suggestion.
Very many Irish landlords, hard pressed by the failure of so
many tenants to pay rents and by rent reductions imposed by
the lane courts, had borrowed heavily and. especially from a
number of London firms. The total sum of these loans cannot
be known, but Spencer, who had had a better opportunity of
forming an opinion than most, credited the contemporary
1
estimate of one hundred million.
The conclusion to be drawn would seen; to be that Liberal
Unionists interested in finance and certain branches of
manufacturing may have been influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by financial self-interest, but that, with the
possible exception of the financiers, few of them were likely
to have been decisively influenced. Very many of the Liberal
Unionists were first and foremost politicians and their prime
interest was not an economic one but their political career.
For such people the decision to secede meant casting away their
most cherished ambitions. Of course, on the other hand a number
of those among the rank and file whose political ambition was
limited to the mere possession of a seat in Parliament were
givt-n a direct incentive to become unionists by the hope or
promise of Conservative support in their constituencies. A
few may have succumbed to the temptation: p9j» of the Liberals
who divided against the home rule bill were county members
compared with 53^ of those who supported it. The counties
contained a substantial Conservative vote, and in addition
1 Spencer to Rosebery (draft), 30 bee. 1835, Imiscellaneous,
A1thorp.
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the peers and territorial magnates, new in the main unionist,
had still much Influence in the counties despite the secret
1
ballot. Of the twenty-seven Liberal Unionists (not counting
VJathin) who were returned unopposed, nineteen were for county
seats and only eight for boroughs.
Of ouch importance in deciding many Liberals to oppose
Gladstone were the almost insoluble problems inherent in any
form of home rule of the kind which ho had proposed. To take
but the most important of these problems - that of Irish
representation at Westminster - how could his scheme be
permanent or satisfy Irish nationalistic aspirations when it
authorised the Imperial Parliament to fix three-quarters of
Ireland's revenue (customs and excise) and to ajpropriate
some forty per cent of the proceeds, and yet excluded all
Irish representation from the Imperial Parliament* Once again
the cry would be "taxation without representation". On the
other hand, to admit Irish representatives and to allow them
a full say in the purely domestic legislation of treat
Britain would be unfair to Great Britain, and especially as
they would be pretty certain to use their voting power on Great
Britain's domestic issues to extort concessions on Irish
matters. One solution (and the one suggested by Gladstone to
the Foreign Office meeting) would have been to admit Irish
representatives only on reserved (including Irish customs and
1 See below pp.
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excise), and imperial matters. However, this raised, first
the very difficult problem of what was to be considered an
imperial matter, and secondly the question of what was to
happen if the government were in a majority on British domestic
legislation and, owing to the Irish vote, in a minority on
Imperial matters, or else vice versa. One suggestion for
reducing the ability of Irish members to interfere with the
domestic legislation of Great Britain was that, in consideration
of being allowed to deal with her own domestic affairs in
Dublin, Ireland should have a reduced representation in
Westminster, The proposal was a very unsatisfactory one, for
while it might have lessened the ability of the Iri3h members
to interfere, it would not have abolished it and would have
deprived Ireland of part of her rightful say in all matters
not dealt with by the Dublin legislature.
Gladstone claimed that the Government of Ireland Bill
ensured the unimpaired supremacy of the Imperial Parliament,
but many Liberals Unionists were not convinced. They admitted
that his c3.aim might be correct in constitutional theory, but
they felt that Chamberlain was nearer to reality when he
pointed out that the Imperial Parliament had already a similar
supremacy over the colonial legislatures, and that she dare
not exercise it in any criminal, agrarian, religious, or




Hansard. CCCVI, col. 683.
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The crime, brutality and open resistance to law and order
in Ireland, the irresponsible obstruction of the Nationalist
M.P.s in Parliament, their rigid party discipline, their petit
hour oois origins, and Pamela's speeches of the previous
autumn all contributed to convince many Liberal Unionists that
a Dublin parliament would injureGreat Britain and be disastrous
2
for Ireland. The opinion which Courtney had expressed in
the previous December could almost be termed representative.
"• • • England would suffer, but Ireland would be nigh ruined,
None of the checks that have been proposed seem to be of any
use., , • Property, education, trade, pauperism, the judicial
bench, the police - under each of these heads I see unchecked
3
danger." Liberal Unionists, despite Gladstone's protests to
if
the contrary, claimed that the elaborate safeguards to prevent
The occupational and social backgrounds of the Nationalist
M.P.s in 1836 were in the main similar to what they were post
1892, a detailed study of which is given in F.S,L, Lyons,
The Irish Parliamentary Party. 1890-1910. chap. IV.
2
The Daily News In one of its more independent moods wrotet
"The state of affairs in Ireland during tho past ten years, the
brutal murders, the houghing of cattle, the cowardly boycotting,
and the general state of terrorism in which society has lived
owing to the machinations of secret associations, have aroused
a feeling of deep indignation and disgust in the English mind.
Beyond this is the conduct of the Irish members in the House
of Commons. A nation that has seen the traditions of its
historical parliament traduced, its authority defied, and the
House of Commons turned into a bear-garden in the name of
Home Rule can scarcely be expected to espouse the cause thus
tainted." (12 April 1886, p. *+).
3 Courtney to Kiss Tod (draft), 30 Dec. 1888, Courtney, XIX,
p. 26.
lf-
e.£. Hansard. CCCXV, eol.
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exploitation of any minority by the proposed Irish legislature
were a direct admission by Gladstone of the genuineness of
their fears.
Few Liberal Unionists appear to have laid much store by
Parnell's assurance that he believed the Irish Nationalists
would accent the Government of Ireland Bill as a final
'
1
settlement. They remembered the more extreme statements of
Nationalists in the past, and noted that on their own admission
the Nationalists were keenly dissatisfied with the financial
provisions, the arrangement for the two orders, and other
aspects of the bill. They felt that Parnell had spoken with
more truth when In January of the previous year he had
declared, "but no man has the right to fix the boundary to
2
the march of a nation,M or when in November he had said,
"we will never accept, either expressly or implied, anything
but the full and complete right to arrange our own affairs and
make our land a nation, to secure for her, free from outside
control, the right to direct her own course among the people
of the world."
Nevertheless, many of the Liberal Unionists who held these
opinions about the Nationalists probably would have consented
1
Hansard. CCCIV, col. 113V; and CCCVI, col. 1173.
2 The Times. 22 Jan. 1336, p. 10.
3 IroemaA^ Journal, b Nov. 1835, P. b.
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(no matter how reluctantly) to sane form of borne rule hod
Ireland spoken with one voice. But she did not.. The Irish
unionists were bitterly and resolutely opposed to a Dublin
parliament, and they included almost all the Irish Liberals,
who in 1880 had returned fourteen Liberal members to
Parliament. Also, Irish Protestants of all denominations
were staunchly unionist and this was a fact which Free
Churchmen and Scottish Presbyterians could not entirely
Ignore.
Then there was the question of Ulster. The arguments
which the Nationalists advanced for the withdrawal of
Ireland from the direct rule of the Imperial Parliament
were equally valid as arguments for the exclusion of unionist
bister from the direct rule of a Dublin parliament. But of
more importance than the logic of their case was the dour
determination of the Ulstermen to resist home rule to the
uttermost and,if need be, by force. Very many Liberals refused
to credit this fact, and the more especially as they tended
to equate the bister unionists with the Orange Order, an
organisation with a well established reputation for reactionary
views and violence of language. The hail--- ' -c-\; •, wrote, "But
we have heard all this bluster from the North of Ireland
before. It has accompanied, like some undertone of stage
thunder, all the great acts of justice which Mr. Gladstone
has done for Ireland." The Liberals who wore informed on the
1 Daily News, 21 May 1886, p. D.
4
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matter knew better and the problem of Ulster seriously worried
even some of the stauncher Gladstonians. Bryce, who had been
born in Belfast and had relations in Ulster, was one such
person. Another was Sir A.E.Pease who recorded in his
recollections that the unionists would confront Gladstonians
with, "Howl Are you going to shoot down the Ulstermen?" and,
"Do you. think the army will obey vour orders?" The
Gladstonians, he admitted, could not answer these questions
and at best replied that they had no intention of shooting
2
Ulstermen.
Although the cry of "popery and wooden shoes" was a thing
of the past, anti-Roman Catholic prejudice was still very
much alive. Even hard-headed realists like Chamberlain
appear to have believed that Irish Protestants would be
subjected to injustices and unfair pressures under a Dublin
3
legislature. Most liberals seem to have agreed that Irish
Protestants would be safe from open persecution and that
discrimination against them was likely to be more subtle,
Many especially feared that the Roman Catholic Church would
capture control of the Irish state system of education and
5
use it for the advancement of its own sectarian interests.
"""
H,A,L.Fisher, James It 221.
2
Sir A.E.Pease, ££ffialle&&oaa» 131.
3 Chamberlain to a Welsh correspondent. The Times. 28 April
1886, p. 7| and Chamberlain's speech, 1 June 1886, Hansard.
CCCVI, cols. 687-8.
Bright. Bright to R.B.O'Brien in conversation,
R.B,O'Brien, SMslsa Sfrgwan Pamell, II. lV6.
l'J
e.„g. Goschen (HansardT CCCVI, cols, ll5i>-6) 5 or A.Craig
Sellar (ibid., CCVI, cols. 731-9); or A.li.Winterbotham (ibid,,
CCCVI, cols, 886-7)*
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Even the pro-Gladstonian Inquirer was tineasy and admitted
that the sectarianism which used public funds for its own ends
in England might be expected with doubled vigour in Island.
"The reprisals of one sect upon the other lie upon the surface,"
it wrote, "... But the slow processes which mould the
temper of a nation are more serious and lasting in their
1
effects."
The property qualifications which were to govern the
election of the first Order of the Irish legislature had few
friends among Liberals. Sir Joseph Pease told the Commons
that they were a return to an antiquated system which long
2
ago had been exploded at "Westminster. Chamberlain described
them as odious and hateful to every true Liberal, and contrary
to the practice and principles of British representative
3
government.
The fear that a Dublin parliament would adopt a policy
of tariff discrimination against Great Britain was widely
established in all classes. It had found expression following
Parnell's speeches of the previous autumn. Gladstone's bill
denied the proposed Irish legislature power to impose customs
and excise duties, but the men who believed that the nationalists
would u.;e the measure as a stepping stone to greater independence
Inquirer. 1 Kay 1336, p. 232.
2 Hansard. CCCVI, col. 1071.
3 Speech at Birmingham, 21 April lob6, fho Times. 22 April
1686, t>. 10.
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continued to be much influenced by the dread of Irish tariffs
on Great Britain's goods. The suggestion that an Irish
legislature would eventually build up industries to compete with
those of Great Britain appears to have been rarely taken
seriously. Numerous Liberal Unionists pointed out that the
question of a separate Irish legislature had not been before
the electors in any real sense during the previous , eneral
election, and maintained that in a democratic country no
scheme of the importance of Gladstone's ought to have been
1
brought forward without a clear mandate from the electors.
There was no evidence to show that Gladstone had been a
convert to home rule for some time before the general election,
and not a few Liberal Unionists firmly believed that, had the
Nationalists' votes not been essential for office, he would
£•£. Ilartington said in his speech of 9 Aprils "the
country had no sufficient warning - I think I may say the
country had no warning at all - that any proposals of the
magnitude and vastness of those which were unfolded. . .
were to be considered in the present Parliament. . . I
ara perfectly aware that there exists in our Constitution
no principle of the mandate.. . . But ... I maintain
that there are certain limits which Parliament is morally
bound to observe ..." (Jlnxsard. CCCIV, col. 12W ♦
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1
never have taken up the Nationalists' cause. Also, the
speed with which Gladstone had produced the bills and his
subsequent willingness to see them modified had not helped
2
to inspire confidence in their soundness.
Strangely enough, the motives of the Liberals who stood
by Gladstone have seldom been suspected in the same way as
those of the unionist .Liberals. Observers have tended to
assume that the Gladstonians were taking the natural and
obvious course and have inquired no further. Nevertheless,
in studying the events of Gladstone's third ministry the
fact which impresses one most is not that between ninety and
i
None of the speakers in the debate on the second reading
dared to level this accusation at Gladstone with the bluntness
used by some of the unionist press. The bub1 in Hevlew. of
April 1886 (p. 39*+) wrote; "Never before in the history of
English political life has any great leader of party, with
such cynical indifference to the judgment of posterity, with
such total disregard of Ms own repeated and emphatic
assurances, ventured to reverse his policy in order to secure
a short-lived tenure of office. Vie live in ; n age when
political morality is enforced upon mere electors by fine and
imprisonment, but sin in high places goes unpunished, and the
bribery of place and power is permitted to dispose or the
destinies of a nation". The lines stated that if eight-five
Paniellites had not been returned Gladstone1s Government of
Ireland Bill would never have been heard of (21 April 1886,
p. 9). Later it was to write of the greatness of Gladstone's
moral fall in taking up home rule for office ()+ July 1886, p. 9).
Sir J. Pease said in his speech of U- June; "I desire • . ,
to point out how hastily this Bill has been brought forward;
and the same is the case with regard to the changes which
have been made in it already. That, I think, is one reason
why the Government should look again at the whole measure, in
order that they may be able to bring in a Bill which the house
generally will desire to pass Chansarc;* CCCVI, col. IO73).
*i fwj
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a hundred Liberals left Gladstone, but that over two hundred
and thirty remained with him. In the previous autumn quite a
few of them had openly denounced the nationalist claim for home
rile and Gladstone himself considered that not more than about
one third of the Liberals in the Commons could have been induced
to oppose a declaration in favour of the legislative Union
during the debate on the address nrior to the fall of
1
Salisbury's administration. Further, many of the Liberals
who were not opposed to the principle of home rule were very
dissatisfied with the provisions of the Government of Ireland
Bill,
The most Important factor in the retention of the
Gladstonians to their allegiance was the prestige and personal
authority of Gladstone, Unionists bitterly denounced it as
gross servility on the part of his followers and the
Gladstonians themselves paid tribute to it. On the 33th of
the previous recember Spencer had considered that Gladstone
had no prospect of a following sufficient to justify his
£
talcing up home rule. At that date Spencer had believed that
Rosebery, Granville, Morley, and he were the only Liberals
3
likely to join an administration committed to home rule.
An account of the situation in Jan, I086 written by
Gladstone in the autumn of I097. Quoted, Ilorley, III. 2usf-j.




A few days earlier Balfour had remarked that it was manifest
that Gladstone could not form a government without Hartington,
1
Goschen, Chamberlain, or Dilke, Looking back on the same
period twenty two years later the Radical Labouchere, who
camot be accused of being overawed by Gladstone and who had
better opportunities for knowing than most, wrote:
. . . What most surprised me in the story of Mr.
Gladstone's first home Rule Bill was the wondrous
influence that he himself wielded.
. * . When the Parliament of 1885 was elected Mr.
Gladstone had against him on the Irish question not-
only a majority of the Liberal Party, but very
nearly all those from whom he had to select a ministry.
, . . One of then said to me,"Who will he get to serve
under him? Is the Cabinet to consist of him, Joe
Cowan, Parnell and you?" 2
.Among the Midland members, where Gladstone's personal influence
was equalled by that of Chamberlain and Bright, unionism
carried the day. Yet this very fact, while showing that
Gladstone's personal influence had limitations, also indicates
how decisive It may have been with the other Liberals.
The Gladstonians1 second great asset was the 'widespread
3
conviction that Irish home rule was inevitable. The events
x Balfour to Salisbury, 23 Dec. loo5, Blanche r.C.bugdalc,
Arthur Janes Du.gd.ale. I. 9'+-95.
2 H, Labouchere, "The secret history of the first home rule
bill," Truth. IV Oct. 19C8, p. 879.
3 The British Quarterly Review of 1 April (p. V02) noted:
"They [the ConservativesJ are mainly accountable for the
extraordinary change of feeling which constitutes one of Mr.
Gladstone's chief elements of strength. A few months ago
the very mention of Home Rule would have been received with
a howl of execration: today it seem to be half assumed that
some measure there must be . . ."
7 oo
of Salisbury's administration had established the belief
wid<l.y and firmly that the Conservatives when in office had
at least toyed with home rule and probably had been but
1
"beaten to it" by Gladstone, Such a belief undermined all
confidence that the Conservatives could be relied upon to
refuse home rule when they should find themselves again in
circumstances similar to those of their last administration.
Even Hartington as late as the following March still felt
it necessary to ash Salisbury for an assurance that the
2
Conservatives "would resist Home Rule to the end", The
conviction that home rule was inevitable - that if the Liberals
did not grant it the Conservatives some day would - sapped the
will to resist in many Liberals who otherwise might have opposed
Gladstone's policy. Spencer had been decisively influenced
3
by "the Tory surrender last July", and Harcourt, when in the
previous December he was weighing up his attitude to hone rule,
had declared that home rule had been a lost cause from the
b
moment the Tories had sold the pass to Parnell for office.
A
©•£. After Churchill's speech at Belfast in February the
Spectator (27 Feb, 1836, p. 273) remarkedt "He has, like his
chief, utterly abandoned the view that Ireland should have
Home-Rule, though be undoubtedly intended something of the
kind when he came into power," Or to take an illustration
from the Gladstonian side - on 20 April the Daily bows (p. if)
commented that the Conservatives' chief objection to




Spencer to Lansdown© (copy), 2 Feb. 1886, Miscellaneous.
A1thorp.
k
liarcourt to Chamberlain, 2'j Dec. 16uy, q.v.o., Garvin,
II. I*f7.
m
And here are*two examples of the same attitude from the rank
and file of the party: A W.P.Redington wrote to Herbert
Gladstone on 10 April, "I fear the Bill is doomed . . . and
in a few years Lord Randolph will bring in a Home Rule scheme
and prove that the Tories were always Ireland's best friends";
and in conversation with Sir A.I .Pease on 17 April Eilman, the
Clerk to the House of Commons, said that he hoped Gladstone's
Irish bills would go through as the Tories would pass worse
ones if they did not. lease adds that a week earlier Milman
had been down on him hot for saying a word in favour of home
2
rule. In the debate (9 April) Morley had taunted the
Conservatives that perhaps they would pass their home rule
3 -
bill should the Government's one be defeated. Two days
before the final division the Daily Dews, probably with an eye
to the waverers, had written that Salisbury's seven months
in Downing Street and Carnarvon's seven months in Ireland made
home rule inevitable, and that were Salisbury again trime
Minister he would be intriguing once more through Churchill
if
for the Irish vote within half a year. The belief that the
Conservatives might attempt "to dish" the Gladstonians by
1
iAf.P.Redington to H,Gladstone, ID April 1886, Add. Ess.
MS033, f. 99.
2 Sir A.E.Pease, 1-lections and recollections, 127.
3 Hansard, CCCIV, col. 126b.
M" Daily Hows. 5 June 1886, p. k.
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taking up home rule died slowly. Even Granville in. the following
1
December still thought such an outcome possible.
No democratically minded person could ignore Ireland's
return of eighty five home rule members in contrast to eighteen
unionists and it was a fact which weighed heavily with Liberals.
As an Irish Unitarian minister, and home ruler, expressed it,
"Those- Englishmen who make light of the expression of opinion
delivered by the Irish people make light of the spirit of that
2
constitution which is the bulwark of their own freedom." In
addition. Liberals could not forget their support in the past
of the causes of Italians, Armenians, and other dominated
peoples. It was widely recognised that if the Irish
nationalists did not gain home rule by constitutional methods
they were likely to resort to violence and unconstitutional
methods, which in turn would necessitate severe coercion.
Coercion had always been a humiliating and loathsome expedient
for Liberals and numbers of them considered that an Irish
legislature would be a lesser evil than the adoption by Great
Britain of what might prove to be an almost permanent system
3
of government by coercion.
Some feared that if Gladstone's policy were defeated the
Nationalist members would ruthlessly avenge themselves by
■i
Granville to Spencer, 9 Dec. 1866, Miscellaneous, Althorp.
2 Rev. R.A.Armstrong in, Ireland t a book of light on the
Irish Problem (edited A.Held), 173.
e.£. Rosebery (Rosebery to Spencer, 31 Dec. 1885, Miscellaneous
Althorp), or Sir Edward Grey (G.Il.Trevelyan, Grey of Balloden,
33).
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obstructing and sabotaging the working of Parliament on all
possible occasions. In his speech of 9 April Ilorley declared
that If he were about to refuse an Irish legislature he would
be all the more anxious to keep the Irish members out of
Westminster, because within it they would be in the strongest
position for dealing a deadly blow at imperial policy, and the
1
authority and efficiency of Parliament, Members who
considered I--orley's fear to be excessive, nevertheless, could
scarcely have avoided being a lit ,.le tempted by the prospect
of losing the Irish members when they remembered the long
night sittings and the slow progress of business when the
Nationalists had obstructed in the past.
One feature of the Liberal split was that while the
average ages of the Liberal Unionist and the Gladstonian
members was almost the same (52,15 and 51»^ years) the Liberal
Unionists had a considerably higher average of Parliamentary
service (b.'j7 years compared with the Gladstonian 5*25).
More arresting still - twenty eight Liberal Unionist members
(or 29' of the party) had not been in a previous parliament
while the figure for the Gladstonians was 109 (or k6,-.'). The
obvious explanation is that newcomers, having neither
experience nor contacts within the Commons, were much more
prone to fall under the spell of Gladstone and to drift with
the majority. This almost certainly was to a largo extent
true, but an additional factor was that the newcomers contained
1 Mansard. CCCIV, col. 1277
1 h
a higher proportion of men from the professional and lower
middle classes as well as ten direct representatives of labour,
and that these men had a special interest in standing by
Gladstone. Contemporaries were much impressed that so many
Gladstonians were drawn from these classes, lor example the
Spectator on 1 May wrote*
. • . if Mr. Gladstone carries his scheme through the
House of Commons it will involve this amongst all its
other mischievous results - that it will divide
dangerously and ominously the Liberals of the working
classes from the Liberals of the more educated class,
and leave the former without associates of a kind to
whose larger knowledge the artisans and labourers can
look-up. It will be the beginning of a social split..
« •
Gladstone himself in his letter to his constituents on 1 May
claimed that the opponents of his bills consisted "of class,
and the dependants of class" - a claim which he reiterated
3
when closing the debate on 7 June. One indication of this
class factor was that m-qJ of the Liberal Unionists in the
Commons had been educated at a public school or at Oxford or
Cambridge, and only 33,? of the Gladstonians. Also, pointing
in the same direction was the higher proportions of Free
Church M.P.s who were Gladstonians#
The more plebeian Liberals had strong inducements to
remain with Gladstone. They were intensely interested in
1 dueetator. 1 May Id36, p. 566,
2 Gladstone to the electors of Midlothian, 1 May 1336, The
Times, h Hay 1886, p. 5.
3 Mansard. CCCVI, col. 1239.
^
See APPENDIX I, M26-3O.
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disestablishment, and in temperance, education, taxation,
labour, and other reforms, and they represented or were under
pressure from the forces which before the end of the next
parliament were to force the "Newcastle Programme" of reforms
upon the Gladstonian party. These nen by opposing Gladstone
and the party would have ruined not only their own political
careers, but, in so far as they conic? Judge at the tine,
would by their action have given their support to the
indefinite postponement of the reform legislation which was
their cherished object. In this connection perhaps it is
significant that all twelve of the direct representatives of
labour became Cladstonians. On the other hand, the fact
that the-Radical Unionists, too, were tempted by these
inducements to follow the party line is a caution that they
can be over-estimated, nevertheless, one feels that the
following account written by Samuel Smith, Liberal member for
Flintshire, could equally well have been written by many
Gladstonians:
... I had to settle whether to follow Mr. Gladstone
and the main current, or to Join the liberal Unionists.
. . .It gradually became clear to me that I should go
with the main body• I had been a Liberal all my life.
I was deeply interested in Temperance and Social Reforms,
and looked for that to the Liberal Party, I wholly
sympathised with the underlying motive for Eome Rule,
vim., reparation for past misgovernment of Ireland, and
n longing to exchange conciliation for coercion. It
was one of those cases in life where one has only a
choice of difficulties. All one can do is to take the
course which seems to offer least difficulty.. . . -
1 S. Smith, Ky. life worn:, 230-1.
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The Free Churchmen were especially determined on securing
disestablishment, and temperance, and educational reform.
Also, some of then:, as a result of social and historical
factors, had an emotional antagonism to the Conservative party
which, made it difficult for them to consider anything savouring
of an alliance with it. At the time of the division on the
second reading of the Government of Ireland I ill there were
at least fifty-seven i roe Church liberal members in the
1
Commons. forty-six o:< them became Gladstonians, ten became
Liberal Unionists, and one withdrew from politics without
having committed himself. The ten Liberal Unionists consisted
of Chamberlain, his brother, and his brother-in-law; Bright,
and his brother-in-law; .v.S.Caine, who eventually transferred
to the Gladstonians; F.Taylor, who was a brewer and may
have been already partly estranged from the party by the
militancy of the strong temperance section; and three others.
Caucus pressure has been mentioned earlier, but lest it
2
should b© underestimated, must be mentioned again. Liberals
who were socially undistinguished and at best only moderately
wealthy were more than ordinarily exposed to it. fany of them
had no very special claim on their constituency and fully
realised, as also did the party organisers, that their place
1 doe APPENDIX I, ® ^26-30. v
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On 19 nay the hail:; Lews (p. >) noted: "The position of the
Liberal members who are resolved to vote against the Bill is
becoming more and more embarrassing. The overwhelming
majorities by which the Liberal associations pass resolutions
in support of the Government indicate the course which the
great mass of the Liberal electors will take when It comes to
their turn to vote for the Bill."
conic normally be filled without much difficulty. An indication
of how influential the caucus pressure was is provided by the
private warning which Chamberlain gave Ilartington on b April -
that is even before the National liberal Federation had thrown
in its lot with Gladstone. The members, Chamberlain informed
Hartington with perhaps some exaggeration, were under so much
pressure from the constituencies that a mot5.on of rejection
which gave any excuse to the weverars would cost the opponents
1
of the bill fifty votes at least.
An examination of the econoniic interests of the Gladstonians
reveals that they can have been little motivated by financial
2
self-interest. They had more merchants than had the Liberal
Unionists, but this was largely due to the social composition
of the Cladstonians. The only obvious financial motive
which may have influenced a few was the hope that by supporting
the bills the expense of an immediate election right be
avoided, for although the Act of 1883 had much reduced
election expenses, they were still important to the less
wealthy candidates,
As neither of Girdstone's bills reached the Lords, party
allegiance did not have the same urgency with the Liberal peers
as It did with the Liberals in the Commons. Only peers who
* Chamberlain to Hartington, b Hay 1886, Chats. 3*4-0. 1989
(q.w.o., Garvin, II, 222).
*- See TAELE I, sirrru pp
i:«o
oabLb II.
The . i'bcral snlit In the House of Lords.
The only contemporary publication which in listing the
Liberal peers attempted to distinguish the Gladstonians and
the Liberal rnionists was the Constitutional Year booh. Its
classification appears to have been as accurate ss was
possible at the tine, for when the three different categories
of Liberals are totalled the figures correspond to the
1
estimates of the Liberal leaders themselves. rihe first
year in which it made the classification was in 1838 and the







1333 95 38 61
1809 95 37 ph.
1390 93 37 b?
1391 95 33 b3
1392 91 bl 36
£•£• Hosebery to Gladstone, 12 April 1891> Add. Mss.
-A-hi■', f. 1355 or Lendel's account of a conversation with
Gladstone, 19 Jan. 1892, Lord Kendel, Personal pavers.
conversations \h,bh Gladstone* IdJO-ho, p. o*f.
took an active part in party politics had at once to commit
themselves. The remainder could sit on the fence for as long
as they wished. Even as late as 1892 one discovers that while
ninety-one peers were definitely Liberal Unionists and forty-one
Gladstonians, thirty-six were still unattached to either
group. wot until the division on the second hone rule bill
in September 1393 were the unionist Liberals and the
Gladstonians finally sorted out. en that occasion the
Gladstonians could muster only forty-one rien. If one can
judge from the consistency with which the number of peers
definitely Gladstonians remained at about forty between 1888
2
and lc-92, the Government of Ireland till., had it reached the
Lords, would have been rejected by a majority similar to that
of 1883.
The peers were immune from the electioneering considerations
which were so important in the Commons, Nevertheless, they too
had pressure to resist. Peers who had owed their creation to
Gladstone naturally were most reluctant to go against him. On
the other hand, social proscription was a powerful force on the
siue of unionism - more so in the Lords than in the Commons.
A number of Liberal peers owned Irish estates and others had
close family links with Irish landowners. In addition, those
with neither Irish land nor Irish relations were in their social
1 See TALLE li, su/urn p. 198
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activities continually mixing with Irish unionists and could




THE LIBERALS IN THE COUNTRY DIVIDE
Home rule was the central theme of the election - a
striking contrast to that of the previous year. The arguments
which had been urged in the House of Commons and the press
during the preceding weeks were taken up with renewed fervour
on the local platforms. The advantage lay with the unionists
for, apart from the principle of home rule, they had in the
Governments two Irish bills an abundance of material for
damaging attacks upon the Gladstonians. In speech after speech
they argued, and with effect, that Gladstonian home rule based
the maintenance of the Union on nothing but faith, the
supremacy of Parliament on nothing but theory, and left law
and order, at best, in the hands of the men who had controlled
the Land League and now controlled the National League, and
whom Gladstone himself had described as seeking to march
through rapine and plunder to disintegration. The land
purchase bill, they declared, would place vast sums of the
hard earned money of the people of Great Britain in the pockets
of Irish landlords with the good will of the National League
as the only security. The Gladstonians objected that they
were not committed to all the specific provisions of the bills,
but as this was pea ctically an admission that some of the
provisions had been ill advised it was in itself damaging to
their cause. Apart from Morley and a few others the land
1
purchase bill was without an advocate. Gladstone's statements
on the question of how far he stood by his bills were of a
2
Delphic ambiguity.
On both sides there was something of the crusading
spirit. The Gladstonians declared that they were fighting
n
J>
for justice to Ireland and the righting of former wrongs.
The unionists maintained that their cause was the saving of
the faithful Irish unionists from the despoiling Nationalists.
On the one side vivid pictures were drawn of a Britain
harassed by Irish assassins and dynamitarda, burdened with the
expense of a huge army in Ireland, and with her parliament
paralysed by the obstruction of the Irish Nationalists. On
the other side equally vivid pictures were drawn of an Ireland
in alliance with an enemy of Britain and filled with the troops
and ships of the enemy, or of an Ireland reduced to economic
ruin and sending over swarms of starving people to undermine
**■
"Everybody Is dancing on the dead body of the Land Bill",
Gladstone wrote to Spencer on 4 July 1886. (Miscellaneous Althorp).
2
e.£, Gladstone's speech at Edinburgh, 18 June 1886, The
Times, 19 June 1886, p.8.
^ ®1G Methodist Times wrote (15 July 1886, p.453)s "Finally,
let it be understood that w© support Home Bule . . . because
we believe that, like the Anti-Slavery Movement, the Temperance
Movement, the Social Purity Movement, and the Peace Movement,
it is one of the waves in the great tide of Divine progress
which is slowly carrying the human race to the peaceful shore
of the Millennial Age."
the wages of Great Britain*& workers, or again, of an Ireland
controlled by the extremists and indulging in pogroms of
persecutions of landlords or Protestants.
The Gladatonians* greatest asset was Gladstone. His
immense prestige, his age, his courage, and his moving appeals
for justice to an unfortunate people touched the masses
wherever he spoke and aroused enthusiasm such as he had never
1
seen before. He argued that home rule would strengthen and
unify the Empire, would lead to a reduction of expenditure by
the British Treasury, the development of Irish resources and
the healing of Irish feuds - but these were subsidiary
arguments mentioned in passing : his main theme was justice
to Ireland and a union of mutual affection. He hotly denied
that he wished to separate her from Great Britain and
maintained that on the contrary his purpose was to draw the
two countries into a genuine and durable union.
The Radical programme of the previous election became,
if not the authorised, at least the accepted programme of the
majority of Gladstonian candidates. Many of the men brought
in to make good the Liberal Unionist exodus were staunch
Radicals. The losses to the unionists in the middle and
upper classes meant that the Gladstonians had to rely all the
more on the comparatively radical working, and lower middle
classes. AI30, the positions left vacant by the resignations
Gladstone to the Queen, 2 July 1886, q.w.o., P. Guedella,
The Queen and Mr. Gladstone. II. 415-16. (The writer of this
thesis has not consulted the MS of this letter as the British
Museum gives access to the Gladstone - Queen Victoria
correspondence only with the consent of the Gladstone trustees).
of Liberal Unionists from the National Liberal Federation and
the local associations had very often been filled by Radicals
with the result that the powerful influence which these bodies
exercised on candidates was more strongly* radical than ever
before.
This development of the election makes one wonder how much
truth is in the assumption that Gladstone by taking up home rule
and splitting the party diverted British politics away from
domestic reform. In the long run it may have, and this i3
doubtful, but certainly the immediate result was that the greater
portion of his party was more or less radicalised.
Another consequence of Gladstone*s adoption of home rule
was an important step forward in the dissolution of the alliance
between the Liberal party and the Free Churchmen. The alliance
had never been anything like a complete one, and had varied in
strength from one denomination to another. The Methodists,
1
among whom Conservatives had predominated twenty years earlier,
contained a Conservative minority reckoned by the Methodist Times
2 ;
at about one third. The other English and Scottish nonconformist
3
denominations, too, had Conservative minorities,
1
M, Edwards, Methodism and England, 168.
2
Methodist Times, 29 July 1886, p.498,
3
During the previous election one Baptist minister wrote to the
Nonconformist and Independent regretting that "in our Dissenting
churches, whack are supposedto be a standing witness to the great
principles of Nonconformity and religious freedom, there should
be so many who hold Conservative opinions in i>olitics."
(Nonconformist and Independent, 19 Nov. 1885, p,1107).
although apparently smaller ones than the Methodists.
Home rule altered this situation appreciably. Among the more
influential Free Churchmen who became unionists were Rev.
Charles Haddon Spurgeon (Baptist), the best known British
preacher of the day; Dr. Alexander McLaren (Baptist),
only a little less well known; Dr. R.W.Dale (Congregationaliat)
the influential Birmingham Radical; Rev. Edward White, chairman
of the Congregational Union in 1886; Rev. William Arthur,
ex-president of the »»esleyanCoriference and until 1885
Liberal member for Lambeth; ^r. D. Frazer (Congregationalist);
Dr. Henry Allon (Congregational!at); Rev. W. IVIcCullogh
(Methodist); and Rev# Arthur Mursell (Baptist). Another
indication of the schism caused by Gladstone's Irish policy
is provided by the Free Church journals which became unionist -
a subject which will be referred to below .
Within the denoiiinations heated controversies broke out
2
on whether ministers should take part in politics , on whether
a church which allowed Gladstonians to hold a meeting in its
hall was morally bound to concede the same facilities to
Conservatives or Liberal Unionists, and even on whether a
church should allow any form of political meeting upon its
1
2
Gee below pp 223-5.
<e.£. "I'he Wesleyandispute", Spectator, 24 July 1886
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1
property. The historian of Congregationalism records that
prior to horn© rule when the denomination was almost entirely
Liberal it had been easy to introduce political resolutions
at the annual Congregational Union, but that afterwards the
2
situation was quite different. This seems to have b^en true
of the other Free Church denominations, none of them attempted
a resolution on home rule at any of the annual denominational
conferences. Even in the resolutions condemning coercion
as a policy, which were passed at such conferences during the
3
next few years, home rule was never referred to directly.
On the day prior to the division on the Government of
Ireland Bill Chamberlain had suggested the issue of a
b
joint election address by Ilartington, Bright, and him.
But Partington favoured separate addresses. He explained'
to Bright that ho could not adopt all Chamberlain's
proposals, or at least until ho should know more about
the Canadian constitution, and that anyway he doubted
if thoy should commit themselves definitely
&•£• Tixe iiethodist conference in London in August 1836
passed a resolution condemning the introduction of party
politics Into Methodist buildings or meetings.
times. 12 Aug. 1886).
2 A.Peel, Those hundred years. 300.
3 One such resolution at the Congregations1 Union of 1888
caused Br. Bale of Birmingham to withdraw from the
Congregational Union, (A.W.W.Dale, life of R.W.Balc of
Birminrrhai-. .
^ Chamberlain to Ilartington, 7 June 1886, Chats. 3*4-0.1993.
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to an alternative policy Chamberlain next suggested to
bright, who was member for Central -Birmingham, that the two
of them should issue a joint address to the electors of
2
Birmingham. Bright thought the suggestion inadvisable and
so on 12 June Chamberlain issued an address in his own name.
Much of Chamberlain's address was a condemnation of
Gladstone's Irish policy, and of his having kept the oountry
ignorant of his hoiae rule intentions during the preceding
election. On the constructive side he urged local
government for all parts of the British Isles, and recommended
" a larger arrangement ... under which, subject to the
concurrent and supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament,
the various portions of the United Kingdom shall be enabled
to exereise greater influence over local administration, and
over legislation for their special needs and requirements"."*
I'he dilemma of home rule or coercion he boldly faced.
He stated that the duty of every civilised government was to
maintain the law and that the enforcement of just laws could
not be properly called coercion.
Hartington to Bright, 8 June 1886, Add. Mas. 43388, f.25»
2
Chamberlain to Bright, 8 June 1886, Add. Mas. 43387, f.33*
3
In his original draft Chamberlain pointed to Canada as
the model for the United Kingdom (Hartington to Bright, 8 June
1886), but on the advice of Bright he struck out these
references to Canada (Chamberlain to Bright, 9 June 1886, Add.
Mss• 43387, f.35).
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The Timea welcomed the address as a weighty and
closely reasoned document and recommended all unionist
candidates to follow Chamberlain's example and to keep
Gladstone's concealment of his home rule intention
during the preceding election constantly before the
electors#"*" The Daily Telegraph wrote that, while it did
not undervalue Chamberlain's constructive proposals,
it believed that for the present the main task was to
convince the electorate that, whatever might be the
right way of dealing with Ireland, Gladstone's was the
wrong way. It approved Chamberlain's local government
proposals and held that such a plan would divide unionists
the least, and if pressed forward would dispose of
Gladstone's absurd claim that his scheme still held the
field. Chamberlain's plan for subordinate legislatures
it dismissed as a counsel of perfection which it would be
2
premature to entertain. The Standard commented : "The
sentence is for open war; and every sentiment of chivalry,
every tenderness for old associations is seen to be ruthlessly
set aside • • • when a leading Radical forms ouch an
indictment a3 this against his chief ... it will pierce
the dullest and most prejudiced ears."-^ The Daily News
objected that Chamberlain's arguments against the home




The Times, 12 June 1886, p.11.
Daily Telegraph. 12 June 1886, p.4.
Standard. 12 June 1886, p.5-
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and was to be remodelled in part. His proposals, it
pointed out, went too far for those who wished to leave
things as they were, but yet were not home rule. At this
time the Birmingham Daily Post was far from being Chamberlain's
obedient mouthpiece, but was as pro-Gladstone as its opposition
to the land purchase bill and many of the provisions of the home
rule bill would allow it to be. On this occasion it was one
of the few papers to defend Gladstone's precipitate adoption
of home rule. It stated that it agreed with Chamberlain
that the Government of Ireland Bill was in many of its
provisions unworkable and perhaps dangerous, but added that
it could see no solution which did not concede a legislature
to Ireland for the conduct of her own affairs. Chamberlain's
statement that law must be upheld in Ireland it countered by
maintaining that the Conservatives were pledged to coercive
legislation of a kind to which no Liberal could assent.
His proposal for subordinate legislatures it considered
useless because, being unacceptable to Ireland, it would have
to be Imposed by force. The Scotsman wrote that a more
powerful indictment of Gladstone's policy had never yet been
seen, and that Chamberlain had its full sympathy both in his





Daily Hews, 12 June 1886, p.5.
Birmingham Daily Post. 12 June 1886, p.4.
Scotsman. 12 June 1886, p.6.
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Hartlngton published his address five days later.
He too attacked Gladstone's Irish measures and censured
him for not having placed home rule before the electorate
in the previous election. On the positive side he stated
that the desire of the Irish people for a greater control
over their own affairs was within certain limits a reasonable
claim, and that the problem was to decide to what extent
it could be safely conceded. He was not prepared, he
continued, to commit himself on the details of any of the
plans which had already been proposed, but he believed
that a plan to be acceptable must have these essentials:
Parliament must continue to represent the whole and not
part of the United Kingdom; the powers of subordinate
legislatures or administrative authorities must be
delegated - not surrendered, and xaust be clearly defined;
Parliament must have the right to control and revise
the actions of the subordinate bodies; and the
administration of justice must remain in the hands of
an authority responsible to Parliament.
Hartington thus showed that on home rule he was
neither a reactionary nor a Rip van Winkle and that in
basic ideas he had come surprisingly close to those of
Chamberlain. Hartington, in his first speech on the
second reading, had already given an indication of this
important development in his views, but the full extent
of the development seems to have been imperfectly grasped
at the time and is now quite forgotten.
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The Time3 wrote that the address displayed manly
earnestness and masculine good sense, and that the sentiments
expressed were those of a statesman and an Englishman
and were in marked contrast with Gladstone's cowardly
policy of unconditional surrender and denunciation of
everything that -Britain had done in past struggles with
1
intractible evils. The Dally Telegraph approved
Hartington's willingness to give Ireland a certain control
of her own affairs. It pointed out that the return of
a Salisbury government need not mean the adoption of
coercion in Ireland for such a government would be
dependent upon Liberal Unionist support and would have
2
to shape its policy accordingly# The Standard
described the address as a plain, straightforward,
and courageous statement showing how far Plartington was
prepared to go in the direction of Irish self-government
and frankly accepting the consequences of refusing to
proceed any further# The Daily Dews commented that no
longer did they hear from Hartlngton that some reform
of local government was enough, but that now he talked
„ 4
of "subordinate legislative or administrative authorities •
Birmingham Daily Post ignored the address. The
Scotsman wrote that it was singularly modest, temperate,
The Times, 17 June 1886, p.9.
2
-"ally Telegraph, 17 June 1886, p.5#
^ Standard. 17 June 1886, p.4.
* P^ly Dews, 17 June 1886, p.5.
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and reasonable in tone and style, yet resolute, dignified,
and statesmanlike, and that six months earlier a policy -
with the limits which Hartington set would have been regarded
as large and liberal
John Bright was unopposed in Central Birmingham, but
2
nevertheless issued an address. Three days earlier
3
he had published a letter addressed to W.d.Caine, who
was re-contesting Barrow-in-Furness, and finally on 1
4
July he made a major speech in Birmingham. On each
occasion he struck hard for the unionist cause. He would
not, he declared, consent to the principle of home rule.
He accused Gladstone of having concealed his home rule
intentions during the previous elections, and denounced,
him for concealing in a similar manner his land purchase
bill intentions during the current election. He spoke
contemptuously of the servility of Gladstone^ supporters
and stated that scores of them denounced his bills in
private. His one positive suggestion was that the Irish
M.Es. could be formed into a grand committee and that bills
for Ireland, instead of having a second reading could be
discussed and settled by this grand committee and then
returned to the House of Commons where, after the repoxt
stage, they would be passed with only one more reading.
The suggestion made few converts. The Times commented that
it would not argue whether such a committee would be
Scotsman. 17 June 1886, p.5.
The Times, 25 June 1886.
3 Ibid.. 24 June 1886.
4 TM d , 9 Julv 1886
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suitable or how the Pamellites could now be induced to
accept it, but that it was at least intelligible and
certairily not revolutionaryOn 6 July Granville
reported to Spencer that Bright*s speech was supposed
2
"to have played the deuce". "'illian Summers, the
successful Gladstonlan candidate In Huddersfield, maintained
that Bright*s utterances were more influential than those of
the -j
allAother Liberal Unionists.'3 Kay-Shuttleworth, who was
unopposed in the Clitheroe Division, Lancashire, considered
that the Gladatonians would not have fared nearly so badly
4
in the elections, but for Bright*3 action. C, R. Spencer
(Spencer's brother), who won the lid Division, Northamptonshire,
5
believed that it had lost him much support in that division.
On 4 June the committee of Liberal Unionists, which
earlier had been formed in Ulster, met and created a
permanent organisation called the Ulster Liberal Unionist
6
Committee. (The name was subsequently changed to Ulster
Liberal Unionist Association). This meant that the only




Granville to Spencer, 6 July 1886, Miscellaneous, Althorp.
■3
William Summers, The Liberal Unionists and their leaders,4.
* Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth to ^penoer, 12 July 1886,
Miscellaneous, Althorp.
C.E.Spencer to Spencer, 4 July 1886, Miscellaneous, Althorp.
6 Northern Whig. 9 June 1886.
23.1+
Radical Unionists* To remedy the lack Chamberlain had
determined upon a Radical Unionist organisation of his
own with headquarters in Birmingham.
With this object he sent out a circular inviting the
recipients to a meeting of Liberals "in favour of a
uniform scheme of local self-government for all parts of
the United Kingdom under the supreme authority of the
Imperial Parliament". The meeting took place in Birmingham
on 17 June and was comparatively small and unimpressive.
The only members of the dissolved parliament present were
W.S.Caine, Jesse Pollings, George Dixon, William ICenrick,
2
and A.B.Winterbotham•
An organisation, the Rational Radical Union, was
created and Chamberlain elected president." The new
body was unmlstakeably Chamberlalnite as a perusal of
4
the list of 53.Bs. who became members will prove. Not
(Bar tt
(Tradeston, Glasgow), G.Dixon (JMgbaston, Birmingham), Viscount
Ebrington (Tavistock, Devon), Sir J.J.Goldsmid (S.St.Pancras),
M. Henry (Blackfriars, Glasgow), W.Kenrlok (N.Birmingham),
A #G .Hitching (Maldon, Essex), Viscount Lymington (S.Hoiton, Devon),
G.Pitt-Lewis (Barnstaple, Devon), W.C.West (W .Denbigh), M#
H.M.Story-Haskelyne (Crlcklade, Wiltshire), H.Wiggin (Handsworth,
Stafford), A.B.Winterbotham (Cirencester, Gloucestershire),
J.P.Williams (S.Birmingham), and perhaps also W.Jacks (Leith),
Sir J.J.Jenkins (Carmarthen, Dist.), and G.O.Trevelyan (Hawick).





counting Trevelyan, Jenkins, or Jacks (three borough members)
they consisted of eight borough Members and nine county
members.
Liberal Unionist relations with the other parties
varied greatly from one area to another, and oven from
one constituency to another. In Birmingham Chamberlain
spurned all open assistance from Conservatives and treated
them as the hated enemy with whom expediency demanded a
momentary truce. At the other extreme were a few like
Gosohen who boldly appeared on Conservative platforms.
The Liberal Unionists knew that the closer they co-operated
with the Conservatives the more Conservative votes they
would gain and the more radical and diehard Liberal ones
they would lose, and so in each district the Liberal
Unionists adopted the amount of co-operation which they
thought would pay the best dividend in votes. In the four
double constituencies of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northampton
York, and Portsmouth the device was tried of running both
a Conservative and a Liberal Unionist in the hope that many
votes which would be refused to the one candidate would
be given to the other.
The Conservative leaders and Central Office strove
hard to induce their party to observe faithfully the
understanding that no Liberal who had voted against the
Government of Ireland hill would be opposed by a Cqnservat*
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ive. behind the scenes Salisbury did his best with
recalcitrant local leaders. In a letter to Goschen he
stated that he was pressing as hard as he could upon M.,
had failed with W., was doing all that he possibly could
in the 3.case, but feared that 2. was in a state of open
rebellion."*" In a couple of letters to Hartington he
mentioned that he had arranged for the retirement of a
Conservative opponent of GolGsaid, that he had prevailed
with his supporters nat to oppose Maclean, and that he
hoped to have the opposition to Lord Wolmer withdrawn,
2
but was hampered by being related to him. yo successful
were these efforts that in only four constituencies of
Liberal Unionists who had voted against Gladstone did
contests occur between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives.
In one of them (Torquay, Devon) the "Liberal Unionist"
candidate, L. Mclver, refused to join the local Liberal
Unionist association and was so unsatisfactory in his
declarations that the Liberal Unionist Lord Lbrington felt
justified in taking part in the campaign against him.^
However, 15 Liberal Unionists or I&?* of the party compared
with m of the Gladstonians did not seek re-election.
Even allowing that three of the vacated Liberal Unionist
seats were contested by other Liberal Unionists, one fools




Salisbury to Hartington, 20, and 21 June 1886,
Chats. 340. 2009, and 340. 2011.
^ Hews, 14 July 1886, p#5.
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Unionist and Gladstonian retirements must have "been due
at least in part to the reluctance, or refusal, of local
Conservatives to support a Liberal Unionist candidate.
An indication pointing to such a conclusion is that six
of the seats abandoned by the Liberal Unionists v/ere won by
Conservatives and that of three other seats, which were
vacated by Liberal Unionists who went elsewhere to fight
contests, two were won by Conservatives.
Behind the scenes Hartington, too, was at work using
his influence to prevent Liberal Unionist - Conservative
contests. In the main he was successful and in only two
constituencies did Liberal Unionist candidates defy all
efforts to have them stand down. nevertheless, the
Liberal Unionist leaders, desirous of holding every possible
Liberal rote, appear to have been reluctant to press their
followers publicly to support Conservative candidates.
At last on 21 June Salisbury wrote to Hartington that he
feared the Liberal Unionists would content themselves with
abstaining from the polls in Conservative constituencies and
asked Hartington to advise them in one of his speeches to
1
vote Conservative. Hartington responded to the request
and gave the desired advice in a speech at Glasgow four
?
days later."
* Salisbury to Hartington, 21 June 1886, Chats. 340.2011.
^
^imes. 26 June 1886, p.8.
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In Birmingham Chamberlain* s own Influence and his
attitude to the Conservatives, the great influence of John
Bright, the lesser but Important influence of the
1
Congregational clergyman, Rev, R.W.Dale, and the decision of
the Gladstonlans to contest none of the Liberal Unionist
constituencies apart from Bordesley all combined to enable the
Chamberlainites, not only to keep in their hands the National
Liberal Federation machinery of the area, but even to retain
within it the Gladstonian members. The key to this remarkable
achievement was the refusal of either Chamberlain or his
followers to regard the party split as more than a temporary
misfortune, and their sturdy anticipation that their objections
to Gladstone* s home rule proposals would be conceded in
the end and reunion achieved. Chamberlain began the
election by declaring that he neither sought nor desired
2
Conservative aid. Later he modified his attitude to the
extent of advising Liberal Unionists to vote for Conservative
candidates. In a published letter he implied that the only
factor which might prevent him from giving a vote, which he
had in the Harborough Division of Leicestershire, to the
Conservative candidate would be the difficulty of travelling to
1 E.E.Kellett, a resident of Birmingham, considered that
Chamberlain might have failed to hold Birmingham but for the
moral support of Bright and Dale. (E.E.Kellett, As I remember.
162-3) •
o
Chamberlain to II. Payton, chairman of the Liberal Council
of W# Birmingham, n.d., Birmingham Daily Post. 11 June 1886,
P. 5. .
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Harborou&h on polling day. In this Chamberlain went
further than many of his Birmingham supporters were willing
to go* In the Bast Division, where the Gladstonian
W.T.G.Cook opposed the Conservative Henry Matthews, Rev*
2R.W.Dale1" and other Chamberlain!tes spoke on Cook's behalf*
The Bianingham Daily J'oat supported both the candidature of
Cook and of the Liberal Unionist Jesse Pollings, who was
standing for Bordesley, the only other Birmingham
constituency to be contested.
The Irish Liberal Unionists stood five candidates in
Ulster and three in the rest of Ireland. AH were in
constituencies where they had hopes of gaining the votes of
*oiaan Catholic unionists who would not vote Conservative
because of the Conservative alliance with Grange!an, and
secondly, of a number who might abstain rather than vote for
what they considered to be the landlords * party* The Irish
Liberal Unionists claimed that the Irish Conservatives took
unfair advantage of their abnormal victories in the previous
year and that the siae of the Liberal Unionist following in
the country entitled them to more than eight candidates*'
Chamberlain to T.K.l'apling, the Conaervatlve candidate,
Harborough hiv., Leicestershire, 24 June, 1886, Birmingham
Daily Post, 29 June 1886.
i:
A.W*W#Dale, Life of h»'«V.Dale of Birmingham, 463 •
3
Northern >;hig, June and July 1886, passim.
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The Liberal Unionists had an advantage over the
Gladstonians in having much more adequate funds for the
election."*" On 11 May The Times stated that the Duke of
Bedford had sent the Liberal Unionist Oommittee a blank
2
cheque; after the formation of the National Liberal Union
on 22 May it was reported that contributions had poured
in freely and that several were of £1,000;" and on 9 June
the Central News reported that, although the Liberal Unionists
had as yet made no direct appeal, nearly £30,000 had been
4
subscribed to their funds. The accuracy of these statements
cannot be checked, but one may assume that by the end of the
election a sum had been subscribed much larger than £30»000,
and perhaps even as large as the £131»395 which was subscribed
5
for a special Liberal Unionist election fund in 1892.
Probably one reflection of the state of the respective party
central funds was that, at least in certain areas (£•£•
Manchester**), the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists had a
greater abundance of posters and electioneering literature
than had their opponents.
This fact was publicly known at the time. ror instance
on 10 June the Birmingham Uaily Post (p.4) wrote ". . . Lord
Hartington's Libera1 unionist -Committee ... is now in the
sacred cause of liberty breathing out threatenings against
members who have dared to think for themselves by supporting
the leader of the Liberal party; and which emphasizes its
threats by daily shaking its money bags in the face of the public"
2 The Times. 11 May 1886, p.13.
£ally Telegraph. 24 May 1886, p.3»
* Birmingham Pally Post, 9 June 1886, p.5.
"olmer (Liberal Unionist chief whip) to Duke of Devonshire
5 Sept. 1892, Chats. 340.2503, and 340.2503 A.
Manchester Guardi1886. p.'
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Another Liberal Unionist advantage was that they had no
great difficulty In finding good or satisfactory candidates,
not only for the constituencies which they hoped to win, but
1
also for a number of seats, such as Dundee , where defeat
was certain but in which they had a substantial following.
(This device of fighting a contest for the sole purpose of
encouraging and consolidating the party's supporters in the
district appears to have been well established in 1886, but,
was less common than today). The Giadstonians on the other
hand were able only partially to make good the loss in
2
personnel caused by the Liberal Unionist secession. On
1 July, the day before the first pollings took place, Arnold
Morley wrote to Gladstone that the greatest difficulty had
been the provision of good candidates, but that most of the
seats worth fighting were occupied. Two days later Lord
Monson, the Gladstonian whip in the Lords, wrote to Spencer
that notable features of the election were, the great diminution
in subscriptions, the greatly inferior class of candidates to
volunteer their services, and the number of candidates wanting
money aid. One indication of the Gladstonian shortage of
1
VJ.G.Irving, "Dundee and .District Liberal Unionist Association",
The Liberal Unionist. 1 April 1889, p. lV-f-.
2 The public were aware of the Gladstonian difficulty In
finding candidates. &,£, The Daily Telegraph (p.5) wrote on
16 June, "It is an open secret that whereas both Conservative
and Unionist Central Committees have a glut of good candidates
volunteering their services even to the extent of leading
•forlorn hopes' the Government party . . • are not so fully
served in that respect",
3
A.Morley to Gladstone, 1 July 1886, Add.Mss.1^!^, 15•
Lord Monson to Spencer, 3 July 1866, Miscellaneous, Althorp,
222
suitable candidates was that they allowed 110 unionists
<86 Conservatives and 2k Liberal Unionists) to be returned
without a contest. In the previous election the number of
unopposed Conservatives had been 10. The corresponding
figures for the Liberals were **2 unopposed in this election
and 13 in the previous one. The increase of 29 is
explained, not by a scarcity of unionist candidates, but
by the 1885 election having been fought on the new franchise,
and with both sides 'unwilling; to consider any seat hopeless
until they should have tested it by a contest. A
candidate's local connections had then an importance greater
than now, and a further indication of the Glads tertians'
candidate difficulty was the number of candidates who were
1
complete strangers to their constituencies. The candidate
difficulty in conjunction with his determination to win
if humanly possible led Gladstone to adopt the innovation
of sending letters and telegrams from himself to candidates
- an innovation which aroused much adverse comment among
&•£• The Glasgow Herald, 2 July 1886, (p.6) wrote,
"The Separatists have at the eleventh hour succeeded in
finding a candidate [for Greenock]!, but we do not know that
they are to be congratulated very much. Who and what is
Mr, Harold Wright it would be rash to say, for nobody
except the Government whips seem to know. That he is the
son of a father of an English local reputation is about
all that can be said for his personality, and that he is
a blind follower of Mr, Gladstone is all that can be
said of his politics. In these circumstances Mr. Sunderland.
[Liberal Unionistj should have a comparatively easy task".
(The Greenock result was, Sunderland t 2905? and Wright
s 2208).
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unionists and in the unionist press."'' The unionists in
their turn did not hesitate to break with convention for a
number of their peers took the unprecedented step of
continuing to speak on the platforms after the issue of the
writs. Gladstone was eager that his peers should do the
same^ and Granville circulated a memorandum on the subject
to at least Kimberley and Harcourt. -^oth men opposed
the suggestion3 and it seems to have been dropped.
The Liberal Unionists were exceptionally fortunate
in their newspaper support. Among the Liberal publications
which Gladstone's home rule had made unionist were
1
<3.g. Kate Courtney noted in her diaiy (16 July
1886)7 "One of the rather painful and at the same time
ridiculous features of the Election has been Gladstone's
letters and telegrams recommending candidates which
went flying all over the country and were full of mis¬
representations and demagog!sm which one usually expeots
from an election agent". Courtney, XXII.
Memorandum by Granville, Fl July 1886 ), Add. Mas.
44179, f.142. a
3
Comments by Kimberley and Harcourt, 2 July 1886,
pencilled on Granville's memorandum of the previous day.
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Daily Telegraph (Circulation c» 220,00Q1), Spotsman
(circulation c, 70,0Q02), Glasgow Herald (circulation
c. 70,000^), Spectator, Economist. Observer, Daily
Chronicle, Manchester Examiner, York Herald, and
Northern Whig, as well as many others of lesser importance,
4
In addition The Times was very sympathetic to the Liberal
Unionists and often could have been mistaken for a Liberal
Unionist paper. The Birmingham Daily Post at this time
can best be described as Gladstonian in sympathy, but
5
opposed to many of the provisions of Gladstone's bills.
1







The circulation of The Times decreased steadily from
1868 (History of "The Times", ITT 115) until in 1908 it was
38,000 (ibid., IIITTSBTI In 1878 it was upwards of
60,000 (TSTcT,, III, 118),
5
The Birmingham Daily Post took satisfaction in the return
of Gladstonian candidates an4 favoured the principle of home
rule. On 13 July(p,4) it wrote; "Catholic emandipation,
parliamentary reform, repeal of the corn laws, all illustrate
the same process - Liberals at first divided and progress
delayed; Liberals at last united and victory obtained.
What has been will be . . . Such changes din the Government
of Ireland Bill} will have to be made as will ensure the
supremacy I of the Imperial Parliament and guarantee to all
subjects of the wrown protection to their liberty and
property".
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Not until some time later can one term it unionist with
confidence. In this it was typical of very many of
Chamberlain's Midland supporters. The religious press
had a political influence during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century suoh as it had never had before and
does not now have. Among the more important religious
journals which became unionist were, Christian world,
which in 1886 had a much larger circulation than any
other religious journal,"*" the Radical Baptist, the
Unitarian Christian Life, the Anglican Moderate Liberal
Guardian (circulation 15,000 - 20,0002) and Spurgeon's
Sword and the Trowel. The Free Church British Quarterly
Review became unionist also, but by 1886 its circulation
had fallen to 500 copies^ and it ceased publication during
the year. The Methodist Recorder, too, became unionist,
but it was one of the few Free Church journals which had
always been a little Conservative in its outlook.
1
T.H.Barlow, William Robertson Nicolli life and letters.
58. (Barlow mentions that the' circulation of the Christian
world at one time reached 120,000).
2
H.A.B., About newspapers; chiefly English and Scottish.
3
Ibid., 64•
In common with the Conservatives, the Liberal Unionists
received valuable assistance from Irish speakers provided
by organisations such as the Irish Loyal and Patriotic
Union, the Ulster Anti-Repeal Union, and to a certain
extent the Ulster Liberal Unionist Committee# These
speakers were chosen from all ranks of society and were
exceptionally useful propagandists as they spoke with the
authority of "men on the spot" and with earnestness arising
from the knowledge that the triumph of home rule in Great
Britain would mean civil war in Ireland#. Liberal Unionists
were themselves in high demand for Conservative platforms
and so many requests for Liberal Unionist speakers were
received that Lord Camperdown, who was in close touch with
the party headquarters in Spring Gardens, remarked in a
letter to C0sahea that one would think the Conservatives
had been afflicted with dumbness
Two outstanding features of Liberal Unionist contests
were the improvised nature of the Liberia Unionist party
machinery and the rowdineos of their meetings. The
first task of the great majority of Liberal Unionist
candidates was hastily to gather together a local party
organisation sufficient for the purposes of the election.
Conditions varied much from constituency to constituency.
In some a fair number of unionists were at hand who had
resigned from the local Liberal association, but in others




almost entirely among men with no electioneering experience.
In many areas the one section of the population in which the
Liberal Unionists had least converts was the Liberal roughs.
These, ably assisted by Irish in the areas with Irish
colonies, broke up numerous Liberal Unionist meetings and
disorganised many others. On several occasions platforms
were stormed and their occupants manhandled. xo add to
candidates* difficulties "by ticket only" meetings of any
I
size were usually -Impracticable as no one knew who the
Liberal Unionists of the area were. The result was that
some candidates even gave up the attempt to hold meetings
of any sort and relied almost entirely on their election
addresses and on canvassing. Such was the course taken
by Chamberlain's brother, Richard1, who was returned by
West Islington with a majority of nearly two to one. At
his first and only meeting of the contest he had for forty-
five minutes vainly striven to obtain a hearing and than
had had to escape through a back door when his platform
was stormed**»
R. Chamberlain, "Liberal Unionist organisation,"
The Liberal Unionist, 1 Feb. 1888. (One man was imprisoned
Tor a month with hard labour for his part in breaking' up




On 26 June The Times wrote that the election meetings
in London had been the scenes of violence and disorder on
a scale hitherto unknown, and that a unionist meeting in
the south or east of the city was taken at once as a
signal for a riot. On 9 July it stated that the election
had been marked in many parts of the kingdom by unusual
turbulence, and that in London, whfc.ro the political
atmosphere had hitherto been cooler than most places, there
had been a discreditable amount of it. It trusted that
this turbulence was a transient and exceptional phenomenon
for no one, no matter how they might admire the past,
could wish to revert to the broken heads and drunken
orgies of elections in the good old times. The -..■ally
Telerrauh wrote that many of the characteris tics ami
incidents of the election had been honourable all round,
but that like other elections it had bred much bad blood
between many English gentlemen and had stimulated coarse
appeals to the lower passions of the populace. It stated
that hundreds of Conservative and Liberal Unionist candidates
had seen their meetings broken up and that instead of fair
and open discussion of she great issues involved heated
1
partisans on both sides had howled down opposition.
Heart day the Daily hews expressed quite a different view.
It maintained that on the whole the elections had been
1 Dally Telegraph, It- July 1886, p. t-.
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conducted both in England and Ireland with remarkably little
violence, and that, considering how very important had been
the issues and how deeply each side had boen aroused, the
country had been wonderfully and creditably quiet.
London, it admitted, had had more disorder than any other
part of England, hut claimed that even there the disorder
1
had rarely gone beyond a very rough kind of horse play.
Although the Daily Hews looked at the matter through
Gladstonian spectacles its opinion contained a truth
for in very many countries an election on such an issue
could not have been completed without bloodshed. In
p
Great Britain there had at least been none of that.
Even in Ireland the election passed with surprisingly
little incident. The most important was an attack, in
which several people were injured by bullets, on the
Conservative Club in Dublin^. The savage riots which had
broken out in Belfast on 1 June, and which recurred
spasmodically during the following weeks, were independent
of the general election, and the same was true of a riot
which arose out of a 12 July Orange Order procession in
°o. Tyrone.*
1
Daily News, 15 July 1886, p.4.
2
The Conservative candidate for 3.Islington died a few
days after a meeting at which he and his platform party (which
included the Duke of Norfolk) had been manhandled by roughs,
but the claim that he died as a direct result of the occurrence
was unfounded.
3
Irish Times, 7 July, 1886, p.5.
4
Northern Whig, 14 July 1886, p.8.
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316 Conservatives, 191 Gladstonian Liberals, 77 liberal
Unionists,1 and 35 Parnellites were returned. 47 Liberal
Unionists were returned for county divisions, 29 for borough
divisions (including 2 in London), and 1 for the University
of London. Iheir county returns consisted cf 34 in England,
9 in Scotland, 2 in Wales, and 2 in Irelandj and their
borough ono3 of 21 in England, 8 in Scotland, and none in
Wales, or Ireland. Altogether the Liberal Unionists fought
139 contests and had 28 men (incliiding 2 from Scotland and
1 from Wales) returned unopposed* Of the 93 who had voted
against the second reading, 75 stood again for the same
constituencies, 15 retired, and 3 unsuccessfully contested
constituencies other than in 1885* Of the 75 who re-stood
for the name constituencies, 23 were returned unopposed,
37 after contests, 1 (Sir H. Hussey Vivian) as an
independent Gladstonian, and 14 were defeated. 12 Liberal
Unionists who had not been in the previous parliament
2
were returned, all of them after contests. 7 captured
their seats from Gladstonian3, 2 from Parnellites, and
3 were for constituencies from which the sitting Liberal
Unionists had retired. Of the 11 Liberals who had abstained
from, or been unable to vote on 3 June, 4 (including the
Speaker, A.W.Peel) were returned unopposed as Liberal
Including Sir E.W.Watkin who was not included in the
93 who voted against the Government on 8 June.
2
Including Jesse Collings who was unseated on petition
In April 1886,
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Unionistsj 2 as Gladstonians, but with contests; and 5
did not stand again* The Liberal Unionist victories were,
England : 33; Scotland : 13; Wales : 1; and Ulster : 2*
Their unopposed returns, England : 25; Scotland : 2; and
Wales : 1* Their defeats, England : 46; Scotland . 30;
Wales : 6; Ulster : 31 and the rest of Ireland : 3»
The higb^proportion of representatives of county
constituencies, which, as has been noted in the previous
chapter/* was an aspect of the pre-election Liberal Unionists,
was more marked than before in the new parliament* The
percentages of county representatives in the three parties
now were t Liberal Unionists, 61$; Gladstonian Liberals,
53$; and Conservatives, 40$*
The Ohamberlainites did remarkably well in the election*
Eighteen members of the national Radical Union were returned,
including Jesse Ceilings, who had been unseated on petition
in the previous April, and D.K.^oghill and W* Morrison,
neither of whom had been in the previous parliament. nine
of the Chamberlain!te3 were for county constituencies and ten
for boroughs. In Birmingham the Oladstonians allowed five
of the seven seats to go uncontested to Liberal Unionists,
and in the remaining two they were defeated by Jesse Pollings
and the Conservative, K. Matthews* Chamberlain's influence
See above p. 1?0*
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In the surrounding districts told heavily against the
Gladstonians even where no Liberal Unionist was standing,
A week after the commencement of polling Gladstone's
chief whip admitted to him that Chamberlain's influence
in this region was greater than he had anticipated. He
added that it had resulted in one Gladstonian candidate
changing into a Liberal "Unionist at the last moment in
order to avoid a contest. It also told in areas other
than the Midlands* The Gladstonian candidate Lewis
Morris considered that Chamberlain's influence had been the
main cause of his defeat in the Welsh borough of Pembroke
P
and Haverford West*
The Ulster Liberal Unionists returned two members,
T.W.Russell (S. Tyrone) and T. Lea (3. Londonderry).
■°oth were for county divisions and both captured their
seats from Rationalists. In spite of being only two in
number, Russell and Lea were to have an influence when
Irish matters came before the new parliament, not often
accorded to ordinary members for they were accepted as the
spokesmen of the Irish unionist tenant farmers - a group
which by its existence alone was of incalculable value to
the unionist cause,
An area in which the Liberal Unionists did well was the
1
A. Morley to Gladstone, 7 July 1886, Add. Mss.
44253, f* 19*
2
Lewis Morris to Gpencer, 20 July 1886, Miscellaneous,
Althorp.
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strongly Free Church^Devon and Cornwall. There seven of the
eight sitting Liberal Unionists successfully defended their
seats against Gladstonian candidates, and the eighth, the
not very sound Liberal Unionist, L. Mclver (Torquay Div.),
lost his seat, not to a Gladstonian, hut to a Conservative.
In Wales and the north of England the Gladstonians held their
own, and in acotland, although they lost seventeen seats to
the Liberal Unionists, they had only two losses to the
Conservatives. However, the returns for southern and
midland England turned what would have been a defeat into
a rout. In the latter regions the Gladstonians lost
thirty-five county and twenty-eight borough seats. Half
of the borough losses were in London. The counties of
Middlesex, Surrey, Kent, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire,
Berkshire, Hampshire, Huntingtonshire, Butland, Worcester,
Shropshire, and Hereford returned none but unionists.
In London eleven Gladstonians were returned and fifty
unionists - a result which, Arnold Morley admitted, was
2
worse than his lowest forecast.
A little over two and a half million electors voted
compared with almost four million in the previous general
Frank Tillyard, "The distribution of the Free Churches
in England", Sociological Beview (Jan. 1935), XXVII, 13•
2
A.Morley to Gladstone, 7 July 1886, Add. Mas. 44253,
f .19.
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election. ' This decline in the total poll was due partly
to abstentions and partly to the 152 unopposed returns.
On making allowance for the unopposed retvnas one finds
that upwards of 800,000 electors must have abstained.
Abundant contemporary testimony states that the majority,
although by no means all, of these abstentions were by Liberals
and an examination of the returns supports this. Gladstone
interpreted them to mean that very many people had not yet
1
made up their minds about home rule. Undoubtedly this
was true of many, but at least some were decided on the
question of o separate Irish Legislature - and were opposed
to it - yet through sentiment for old associations, or
2
loyalty to Gladstone, or ingrained hostility to the
Conservative party could not bring themselves to vote
against a Liberal. In a similar way not every Conservative
could break down his repugnance to voting for a Liberal -
even though a unionist Liberal. This must have been
especially true of a number of the less discerning
Conservative electors who tended to equate the
whole of Liberalism with Radicalism. One
ic ssons^of^the^i * hlstora S& £2 MS&5
2
The Gladsto.nlan election agent in the hid Division,
Northamptonshire considered that the fall in the Liberal vote
was in large measure due to a counterpoise between respect for,
and gratitude towards Gladstone and distrust of the home rule
bill.(J. Locke to cJpencer, 5 July 1886, Miscellaneous, A1thorp).
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Conservative farmer of Worcestershire has recorded that
he found it most unpleasant to recognize in the Liberal
Unionists "the black-coated, cotton-gloved gentry who, but
yesterday, had been trying on the village greens, to
prejudice the farm workers against their employers".^
Many staunch Conservative opponents of disestablishment, or
"free schools", or certain other feared proposals had
similar feelings to overcome before voting for a Liberal
Unionist•
On the completion of the borough elections the Daily
1'elegraph reckoned that the Conservatives could have
gained a further twenty or thirty seats if instead of
supporting the Liberal Unionists they had taken advantage
of the Liberal split, and further, that only a dozen
Liberal Unionists such as Chamberlain owed their seats
entirely to Liberal votes, or to the unwillingness of
2
Liberals to oppose them. Any such estimate could
have been at best little better than a personal opinion.
All that one can say with confidence is that many Liberal
Unionists would have been defeated, but for Conservative
support. As was only natural, the greater the Liberal
majority in 1885 the more likely was defeat for a Liberal
J.A.Bridges, Reminiscences of a country politician,
2
Daily telegraph, 13 July 1886, p.5«
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Unionist in 1886.
The factor which contributed most to the Gladstonian
disaster was the defections and abstentions among the
Liberal county voters, and especially among the farm
workers of whom some 400,000, it was estimated, were
enfranchised. These farm workers, whose enthusiastic
response to the "three acres and a cow" cry had given
victory to the Liberal party in the previous December, had
felt themselves betrayed when the Government devoted its
energies to home rule and not to the provision of the
expected allotments. Then too,Chamberlain and Oollings,
whom the farm workers had come to regard as their
champions, were now against Gladstone and urging them
to follow their example. Even the Standard acknowledged
these facts. The losses of the Government were not, it
wrote on 14 July, due altogether to a wave of pure
unionist sentiment, but were explained in part by a
reaction after the extravagant hopes of 1885 and by the
influence of Jes3e Collings. Pew sections of the community
suffered more from cheap Irish labour than the poverty-
stricken farm workers. This not only gave them a
greater antipathy to the Irish than most, but may have
made them more susceptible to the claim that home rule
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would ruin Ireland and fill Great Eritain with swarms of
starving Irish willing to work at almost any wage. C.R.
Spencer, the Gladstonian candidate in the agricultural Mid
Division, Northamptonshire, complained that the unionists had
flooded the constituency with pamphlets stating that
Gladstonian policy would swamp the labour market with
1
Irishmen* Then too - unlike so many of the urban workers -
the majority of farm workers were Anglicans and the
disestablishment agitation either left them unmoved or
inclined them towards the Conservatives. The absence
/
of a number of farmworkers from their homes because of the
2
hay harvest appears to have had an influence also.
The Gladstonians, In the main, fared worst where
the farm worker vote had the most influence - in the
predominantly agricultural constituencies of large farms
worked by paid labour. In Yorkshire, Durham, and
Northumberland, where both counties and boroughs remained
solidly Gladstonian, very many of the county voters were
miners or industrial workers whose political interests
were similar to those of the workers in the boroughs.
In Wales where Gladstone held all his county seats, and
in large areas of Scotland where he did equally well, a
proportion of the constituencies were likewise ones in
which miners and industrial workers predominated, but
in the majority the bulk of the voters were dependent
•i
~
C.R.Spencer to Spencer, 10 July 1886, Miscellaneous, Althorp.
2
During the contest C.R.Spencer considered that he had most
to fear from apathy and the hay harvest. (C.R.Spencer to
Spencer, !i, and 10 July 1886, Miscellaneous, Althorp).
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on agriculture. However, in many of these agricultural
constituencies the largest number of voters were not farm
workers, but tenant farmers with grievances similar to
those of the Iri3h tenant farmers and eager for the remedial
legislation which they had come to associate with the
Liberal party. This was especially true of the
Scottish highlands and islands. Unlike England
disestablishment was a burning question in the rural
communities of both Scotland and Wales, and a3 elsewhere
disestablishes could look only to the Gladstonians for
the achievement of their object. The loss of so many of
the Liberal landed families to the unionists told heavily
against the Gladstonians in the country, for as yet the ballot
act had no more than curtailed the landed families' local
political influence. Afterwards the Congregational Review
noted that in districts where members of the great Whig
families had been regarded as natural chiefs of the party
2
the Gladstonians had suffered humiliating defeat. Sir
Herbert Maxwell wrote in his memoir that his re-election
for Wigtownshire was the easiest he had experienced, and
explained that this was because Lord Stair had become a
1
Possibly even direct intimidation of voters was not yet
absolutely extinct. After the election of the previous year
cottagers suspected of having voted Liberal were turned out
of their homes on some of the large estates in the Berwiok-
on-Tweed Division. (G.M.Trevelyan, Grey of Falloden. 23)•
2
"Is Liberal reunion possible?", Congregational Review,
Oct. 1886.
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Liberal Unionist and had given his great local influence to
1
the Conservatives. C.S.Roundell, in a letter to Spencer
shortly after the election, mentioned that in the Skipton
Division of Yorkshire (won by the Liberal Unionist, W.
Morrison) the Devonshire, Ribblesdale, Sir C.Tempest, and
Morrison influence had all been thrown on the unionist side
and that he had been almost the only person of standing on
2
the Gladstonian side.
The urban workers and the miners had many inducements
to vote Gladstonian for they believed that it was the only
party which offered any real prospect of disestablishment,
and of the temperance, education, taxation, labour, and other
3
reforms which so many of them intensely desired. The
Chamberlain!tes certainly were more fully committed to these
objects than was the Gladstonian party as a whole, but in very
many areas they had no candidate and, in addition, were doomed,
it seemed, never to assist in legislation except by rejoining
the Gladstonians. As has been noted, part of the secret of
Chamberlain's success in Birmingham was the belief that he and
his followers would eventually rejoin a Gladstonian party
purged of its more objectionable home rule errors.
1
Sir H.Maxwell, 177.
^ C.S.Roundell to Spencer, 22 July 1886, Miscellaneous, Aithorp.
3 One is startled to find this in Hammond's Gladstone and the
Irish nation, 557 ' "In 1886 there were no voters who had
reason to think they were consulting their own interests or
the interests of their class in voting for Home Rule. Gladstone's
ill devised procedure had made the election a plebiscite on
Home Rule. Ho elector who wanted anything else had much reason
for voting for him."
2*f0
Observers were impressed by the amount of apathy among
Liberals in this election, and especially when they remembered
1
the enthusiasm of the Liberal voters in the previous November.
The party's sudden abandonment of domestic reform in order to
give a separate legislature to Ireland and generous compensation
to her landlords caused a mood of disillusionment, not only
among the farm workers, but among all those eager for
reforms. As the Rev. W. Tuckwell recorded in his
reminiscences, they felt that their devotion had been thrown
2
away and their confidence abused. In the constituencies
where home rule was pressed forward during the election to
the exclusion of domestic reform the disillusionment would
have been merely intensified. The historian of the miners'
unions of Northumberland and Durham records that when radical
miners' agents began to advocate home rule with all the vigour
which they had previously expanded on the union cause there
1 In one north of England constituency in November, 1885
one man sacrificed a day's pay in order to walk to the poll
and back, a distance of 2?+ miles, and another, although the
day was a holiday, rose at five o'clock in the morning in
order to be the first person to vote in the constituency
which was one ^ust created by the Redistribution Bill, In
the same constituency many voters bought new pencils which
they used to mark the ballot paper and then laid past as
family heirlooms. (An account of canvassing experiences,
gfcElatlaa 19 Dec. 1885, p. 612).
2 Rev. W.Tuckwell, EgQiaiafiSagfia o£ a Jgfllgal pqjrgori, 60.
2*1-1
were protests, for not every miner could convince himself
that home rule was a labour question and the Land League a
kind of trade society* Patriotism was not a preserve of
any one section of the community. During the July general
election a speaker* addressing a very large radical audience
in a staunchly Gladstonian area asked, "Why should anyone
object to home rule?" and was answered by a number of voices,
"Because it will lead to the break up of the Empire".
The speaker in the heat of the moment retorted, "Who cares
whether it will or not?" and from that moment his hold on
the meeting was lost. The pro-Gladatonian Inquirer, which
recorded the incident, commented that the British people
2
did care, and cared very much for the integrity of the Empire.
The Irish vote from which the Gladatonians had expected
much proved a broken reed. Part of the explanation seems
to have been an overestimate of the part which the Irish vote
had played in the previous general election. On that occasion
the Irish voters had not obeyed the order to vote Conservative
to the extent with which they were generally credited. The
Irish National League of Great Britain (the Nationalist party
machine in Great Britain), it would seem, reckoned that 40,000
1
E. Welbourne, The miners' unions of Northumberland and
Durham, 199 - 200.
2
Inquirer. 24 July 1886, p.484 - 5.
2-2
Irish voted in the Greater London area out of a possible
57,000, but that only some 28,000 of them obeyed the order to
vote Conservative.^" The proportion of Irish Nationalists who
voted Conservative varied very much from constituency to
constituency. Sir Wilfred Lawson assumed that all the Irish
voted against him in the Cockermouth Division of Cumberland
2
in 1885, but L. A* Atherley Jones believed that he was given
at least a moiety of the Irish votes in the N.W.Durham Division."*
Then too, the siae of the Irish vote may have been overestimated
in a number of areas. A high proportion of the unmarried
Irish lived in lodgings of insufficient value to qualify for
the vote, and others were disqualified through not having paid
4
the poor rate, or for having been in receipt of parish relief.
John Denvir in The Irish in Britain reckoned that about one
in ten of the Irish in Great Britain were voters. Another
factor, and one which may have been as important a3 any in
explaining the inability of the Irish to bring assistance to
the Gladstoniana to the extent which had been anticipated, may
1
"The Irish Vote? The Times, 3 Dec. 1885, P»7« The article
is based orx information which could have come only from a
source within the Irish party machine.
2
G.W.'B.Russell, Sir Wilfred Lawson : a memoir, 187.
3
L.A.Athorley Jones, Looking back, 27.
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have been that the Irish by their willingness to •underbid the
local workmen on the labour market and their past record of
1
strike breaking, as well as their general improvidence and
low standards of living caused so much anti-Irish feeling in
the areas where they settled that no great stimulus was needed
to carry many people into the unionist camps. In the previous
year many Conservatives had reacted to Parnell's patronage
of the Conservative party by fearing that it would lose
them more support in the constituencies than it could bring
2
them. After the 1885 general election a correspondent of
The limes mentioned that the early promise of the Irish vote to
Milfred Blunt in Morth Camberwell was said to have been a factor
Melbourne, discussing the Northumberland and Durham miners1
reaction to home rule, x^rote : "The influx of Irish black-legs,
ignorant, violent, Improvident, drunken, priest-attended, had
not yet been forgotten. Nor was it forgotten that stout
north-country pitmen had been driven to America by the wage
competition of these strangers ..." ('Iho miners' unions of
Northumberland and Durham. 200),
2 Harrowby wrote to Carnarvon on 22 July 18859 "Already
there is a growing distaste in the country for our supposed
Irish alliance and distrust has been excited by Randolph's and
Gorst's unfortunate speeches on the Maamtrasna affair , , ,
The vote in question Lon a grant desired by the Iri3h Roman
Catholic bishops for University College, Dublin] would be
considered as showing that the compact was signed, sealed and
delivered, and in addition to the horror of Ireland and of
Irish alliances we should awaken the whole Protestant feeling
which is only slumbering • . (P.R.O. 30,6.55> letter 8).
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which had contributed to hie defeatThe areas in which the
Irish were most concentrated were London, Liverpool, Glasgow,
Manchester, Salford, Dundee, Greenock, the Lancashire cotton
2
towns, and the Scottish coal mining and industrial areas.
In practically every one of these the Gladstonians were worsted,
or were much less successful than could have been anticipated.
1
"The Irish vote," The Times, 3 Dec. 1885, P-7.
2
The census of 1891 (Census of England and Wales, 1891,
vol. Ill and Census of Dcotian&,' 18'Dl"*, vol IT, parF"!)"gives
the following figures for 'these areas : London, 66,465
Irish born or 1.58$ of the population; Liverpool, 47,243
or 9.12$; Glasgow, 59,822 or 10.57$; Manchester, 23,005
or 4.56$; Salford, 9,265 or 4*66$; Dundee, 7,918 or 5*16$;
Greenock, 7,860 or 12.39$; Lancashire (including Manchester and
Salford), 164,489 or 4*19$| Lanarkshire (including Glasgow),
107,863 or 9*75$; Renfrewshire (including Greenock), 24,668
or 10.69/?; Ayrshire, 11,074 or 4*89$; Dumbartonshire, 9,845
or 10.04$; Stirlingshire, 4,001 or 3*39$, and West Lothian,
3,646 or 6.90$. The Iri3h communities contained a large
number of "Irishmen" born in Great -Britain, and there were
almost certainly more Irish born persons in 1886 than in 1891.
The 1891 census recorded 104,059 or 18.5$ fewer Irish born
persons than the 1881 census.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LIBERAL UNIONISTS CONTINUE TO SIT WITH THE GLADSTONIANS
Once men saw how the tide of the election was running
their thoughts began to centre on the question of the
government which would succeed Gladstone's, On 12 July-
Derby wrote to Hartington that The Times, the court, and
the plutocracy wanted a coalition, and gave five reasons
why he thought a coalition would be a dismal mistake.
On the following day Hartington wrote to Chamberlain that
he expected that Salisbury would not take office without
o
making desperate efforts to form a coalition. Chamberlain,
who was holidaying in Italy, replied s
, , , of course I could not join any Coalition?
it would be absurd in me, and I need not argue it.
With you it is somewhat different. You might
join and be perfectly consistent#
But if you do you must make up your mind to
cease to be or call yourself a Liberal,
The force of circumstances will be irresistible,
and you will be absorbed in the great Constitutional
party,• . #
I do not supi>ose that you desire this, and I
have therefore always assumed that you would refuse
to head or to join a Coalition Government, In that
oase we must all give a loyal support to the
Conservatives provided that they do not play the fool
"**
Derby to Hartington, 12 July 1886, Chats, 340,2019,
2
Hartington to Chamberlain, 13 July 1886, q.w.o.,
Garvin, II, 263.
2k6
either in foreign policy or in reactionary measures
at hone. They night count on some years of power -
after which, if Mr. Gladstone is out of the way, the
Liberal party will probably pick itself together
again, and ± hope may be strong enough to turn thorn
out.
. . . 1 think we might suggest a : olicy winch would
last a year or two, and that is as much as can be
expected at this tirae.J-
Iho fines pressed for a coalition government under
the premiership of Kar ting ton. The k-:aerator plied the
same advice, and suggested that Salisbury should be Foreign
secretary and lender in the Lords. The o^sndard set out
reasons why Hartin ton should join a walisbury administration,
but was resolutely opposed to a liartington premiership. On
13 July the aailv Iclcnrarh wrote that Conservatives and
Liberal Unionists should coalesce into a "national Party",
but three days later admitted that the uif1ieulties in the
way of a coalition government were insuperable. The Scotsman.
61a3row ferode, Irish dimes.and northern .ddp all advised or
suggested a coalition. The ■■all IIgws assumed that there
would be no coalition, but that the Liberal Unionists would
ive a Conservative government their benevolent support
until it should attempt reactionary legislation, or until
Liberals should have adjusted the differences which divided them.
j- Chamberlain to liartington, 16 July 1666, Chats. 3P0.2021
v JoHand II. 166-9),
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^*18 Birmingham Dally Post did not expect a coalition
either, and prophesied that a very few months would show
that united action between Conservatives and Liberal
Unionists was as impracticable as it was indefensible in
principle,
Hartington did not have Chamberlain's optimism about
a future Liberal reunion. His attitude at this time is
indicated in a letter to Goschen on 22 July, He wrote
that he expected Salisbury to ask Goschen to take office,
and sug ested that he should not hastily reject the offer
as his presence in the government would strengthen it,
and p rhaps also provide a better means of communication
between the two unionist parties,
• , , Chamberlain and I, he continued, could pro¬
bably keep the Liberal Unionists together for a
time at least. The most serious objection is that
it would probably be a final separation between you
and the Liberal Party; that is from the Liberal
Party as now constituted. But is it likely that you
will ever be able to return to it, or remain in it ?
I don't feel very confident that I shall be able to
do It myself| if I do, it will be because I have a
greater capacity for swallowing unpleasant morsels
than you have. If as some people think, a total
reconstruction of parties must come, you will only
have preceded me a little, 1
The Gladstone administration resigned on 20 July,
Two days later the Queen wrote to Salisbury, who was at
Royat, asking him to form a government "and as strong a
liartington to Goschen, 22 July 1886, Llliot, II,
95-96.
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one as he possibly can form.M She was as eager as ever
for a coalition.
... It seems to her, she wrote, to be a time
when every nerve should be strained, every personal
and party feeling should be set aside for the public
good, and it would be a great thing and what the
country earnestly wishes for and expects, if he
could secure theassistance of some of the Liberal
Unionists.
Salisbury arrived in London on the 23rd, Kext morning,
before going to Osborne, he called with Hartington and
tried to induce him to undertake the premiership.^ ^ater
in the day Salisbury wrote to Hicks-Beach that Hartington
had countered his arguments in his usual sleepy manner, but
that evidently he had made up his mind for he had ended by
reading from a manuscript a long extract setting out the
reasons for his refusal."* Salisbury would not accept an
immediate refusal and Hartington agreed to consult his colleagues,
and to send their formal reply that night*
It is likely that the manuscript referred to is one
5
which is still among Hartington's papers.'' In it he set
out in some thirteen hundred words the case against
^ The Queen to Salisbury, 22 July 1886, The letters
of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, I. 164-5. and Cecil III,
yr&r.
Salisbury to Hicks-Beach, 24 July 1886, Cecil, III. 310.
3 Ibid,
4 Ibid.
5 Chats. 340. 2025.
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Liberal Unionists taking part in a coalition. This document
coupled with Salisbury's account to Hicks Reach makes one
sceptical of the statement, in a letter which Hartington
wrote to Gosc en,1 that the conclusive factor in his
declining to form a government was that Salisbury said he
could not sit in a cabinet with Chamberlain.
2
Hartington saw James, Horthbrook, Derby, Stalbridge
and perhaps others and sent his reply that night to Salisbury.
(It is very largely a summary of the document just referred
to). He wrote :
... I have come to the conclusion that the
difficulties in the way of my forming a Government
are so insuperable that it would be useless for me
to attempt it.
I have had some means of ascertaining the
opinions of the unofficial, as well as the ex-official
members of the Liberal Unionist party, and I am
convinced that I could not obtain the support of the
whole or nearly the whole of then for a Government
the main strength of which must be Conservative.
They have represented themselves to their constituents
as Liberals, and nothing will induce many of them to
act with Conservatives in general opposition to Liberals.
... The important fact is that the Liberal opposition
to Home Rule would be broken up, and the section of the
party which declined to fol ow me would inevitably
gravitate towards the Home Rule portion of the party
led by Mr. Gladstone,
Hartington to Goschen, 24 July 1886, Holland, II.
171, and Lliiot, II. 56-97.
Hartington to Salisbury (draft), 24 July 1886,
Chats. 340,2024 (Holland II. 169-70); and Hartington
to Goochen, 24 July 1886.
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• « * national as well as party interests are
concerned in a step which, so far as it might succeed
at all, would have the effect of withdrawing from
the Liberal party all its most moderate elements,
and leaving it a jjurely Radical and Democratic party.
• • • If Home Rule is to be resisted it must be,
not by the Conservatives alone, but by the assistance
of a party which not only is, but is acknowledged
to be, Liberal, There is no name which could be
invented which would prevent an Administration
resting mainly on the support of 320 Conservatives
being, in the public estimation, a Conservative
Administration, The Liberal resistance to Home Rule
would devolve on Mr, Chamberlain and his friends,
whose position would shortly become un-tenable, and
the Liberal party as a whole would soon be identified
with Home Rule,
I believe, therefore, that , , » the most useful
part which I can now take is to afford you an independent
but friendly support. In this course I think that I
can rely on the assistance of Mr, Chamberlain, though
I have had but little conversation with him since the
elections. At all events, I am sure that it is in this
position alone that his active co-operation with me
will be possible, and that it is of the greatest
importance to secure it.1
There were few Conservatives of outstanding ability to
whom Salisbury could turn for his cabinet. This time he
decided to concentrate on the premiership and gave the
2
Foreign Office to Iddesleigh, Hicks-Beach declined to
remain in the leadership of the Commons and was given instead
the Ix-ish Chief Secretaryship, Churchill became both leader
in the Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer. His appointment
^
Hartington to Salisbury, 24 July 1886,
2
He had offered it first to Lord Lyons and then to
Lord Cranbrook,
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was widely commented on and made many Conservatives uneasy.
IIo one doubted his ability, but had he sufficient stability
1
and balance?
The Liberal Unionists were resolved that they should be
an independent Liberal group, and that they should be publicly
recognized as one. They had two good reasons: it was the
only course which would meet with the approval of the Liberal
Unionist electors, and it promised the maximum of influence
on government policy. Latur there were to be differences
between Cliaiuberlainltes and liar ting tonians on what Liberal
Unionist independence should involve, but never on the principle.
The Liberal Unionist determination to bo fully independent
led at once to the question of where they shouL. sit in the
new parliament. liar ting ton thought that below the gangway
2 3
or the opposition side would be best, but Chamberlain,
b 'j 6
Janes , Derby , Craig dollar ,
1
Hartington wrote to Goschen, "R.Churchill is certainly a
dangerous experiment: but as he would in. any case have been
the real Leader, or have influenced the Leader, it may be better
that lie. should have the responsibility as well as the power".
(1 Aug. Ijuo, quotation, Elliot, II. 101).
T
" liar ting ton to Gelborne, b Atq . 10G6, Earl of delborne,
liCQorms i Perewl. £*£ mlUX£S&, lpfa-Si) II . 233: Holland,
II. 17'4: and Uarvin, xl, 2d6,
3 Chamberlain to Jir II. James, 23 July loc6, Chats. 3*4-0.2022,
b
Chamberlain to Ear ting ton, 20 July loiiG, Chats. 3*k>.2030.
2 Derby to Kartington, b Aug. 1086f Chats. 3^0.2036.
6
A.Craig Cellar to dartington, 2o July 10b6, Chats.
3HO.2O29.
252
Heanaje, and probably others were agreed that it would be
most expedient to sit with the Gladstonians as though there
2
had been no party split. The plea of ■olmer that the proper
place was below the gangway on the ninisterial side carried
little weight as it was recognised that few liberal Unionists
would consent to it.^ After much discussion and correspondence,
and not until iiartington had asked Gladstone if he had any
objection, or could sug est any other arrangement, the plan
to ait with the Gladstonians was adopted. The decision was
confirmed at the meeting of Liberal Unionist members held on
5 August and was perserved in until the defeat of the
Conservatives in 1892.
A most uncomfortable arrangement it proved to be and one
prolific in incidents which bred and intensified ill-will.
Augustine Birrell, who was elected as a Glad3tonian in 1889,
records how he often saw Gladstonians and Liberal Unionists
Ibid.
Lord Wolmer to Goschen, 30 July 1886, Chats. 340.2032;
and Lord Wolmer to A.Craig Cellar, 30 July 1886, Chats. 340.2031.
Hartington to Selborne, 4 Aug. 1886, Earl of Selbome,
op. cit.. II 233-4; Goschen to Hartington, 1 Aug. 1886,
wiats. 340.2033; and Goschen to the Queen, 12 Aug, 1886,
Letters of Queen Victoria. 3rd Series, 1.175.
Hartington to Gladstone, 3 Aug. 1886, Add. Mss. 44148, f.




edging one another off benches. The arrangement made more
effective Chamberlain1s stabbing thrusts, but was disconcerting
and very much of a trial for most speakers. Even Gladstone
with his long experience once admitted how he was chilled
when in his orations he would swing towards his own benches
and find himself staring into the frigid and disapproving
2
face of the Liberal Unionist, R.B.Pinlay,
Chamberlain' came through the election with undiminished
prestige and in the new Commons was as marked a man as ho had
been in the previous one. But no longer was his following
swollen by the men who, although not Chamberlain!tes, had
rallied to him because they shared his objections to the
Irish bills. In addition his parliamentary strength was no
longer magnified by it being his to tip the balance,
liarting ton* s larger following now gave that power to him,
and as a rule Chamberlain would be able to share it only
in so far as he might be Identified with Kartington.
-Perhaps one result of the new situation was that the
Chamberlain!tes dropped much of the independent, self-
1 Augustine Birrell, Things past redress, 120.
2 lbId.
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sufficient attitude which they had maintained towards
the moderate Liberal Unionists. At the beginning of
August Chamberlain, Caine, Collinga and other Radical
Unionists joined the Liberal Unionist Committee^ and on
the 5th of that month Chamberlain publicly recognised
Hartington as leader at a pre-seaaion meeting of the Liberal
2
Unionist members.
Chamberlain was still "The Radical," but he no longer
displayed quite the old truculence. His outlook was based
on the belief that once the seventy-seven years old
Gladstone should have disappeared from politics, his Irish
policy would be abandoned by his followers and Liberal reunion
follow.-^ He held that until then the Liberal Unionist policy
must be, not only to help to retain the Conservatives in
office, but to use their full influence to induce them to
promote "Liberal" measures.* His close association with
^
^he Times. 9 August 1886.
^
rbiid., 6 August 1886,
^ Chamberlain to Hartington, 16 July 1886, Chats, 340.2021
(Holland, II# 168-9); Chamberlain to James, 14 July 1886,
Lord Askwith, Lord Jame3 of Hereford, 186, and 23 July 1886,
Chats. 340.202*27 Chamberlain to Ii'ilke, 10 July 1886, Add, Mas*
43877, f«54; Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, 29 July 1886, q.w.o.,




Churchill, whose influence in Conservative councils was
surpassed by that of Salisbury alone, would lead him to hope
that his own views would be felt in the making of Government
policy. Ho had also tie more formal, but useful, contact
with the administration through bartington.
Many of the Gladstonians in the new parliament had very
bitter feelings towards Chamberlain. They considered him
responsible for the defeat of Gladstone's administration and
the subsequent Liberal disaster in the general election and
could not forgive him. As the parliament progressed these
bitter feelings were to become increasingly intense and
increasingly widespread among Gladstonians. The key to this
development was not so much a growing divergence in political
views as the recognition by the Gladstonians that they had
in Chamberlain a determined, influential enemy whose attacks
they were unable to repay in kind. As Lucy noted in his
diary, "they hate their lost leader with a hate that is more
than hate. Singly or in battalion they are impotent against
him in debate."1 Their vicious attacks appeared to leave him
unperturbed and, more exasperating still, Chamberlain continued
to retain an important position in parliament and the country,
and was widely credited with a liberalizing influence on
Government policy. Had he been a political failure they would
probably have forgiven him much. The Conservatives in the new
parliament were thankful, of course, to have Chamberlain's
abilities and influence on their side. Nevertheless, many,
1 Sir H.W.Lucy, A iii&QL of i&llS&ZgL
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and not all of them die-hard Tories, had still no great liking
for the man and would have agreed with Lady Monkswell when at
a later date she jotted in her diary, "It is wonderful how his
p.Teat. bad qualities have been guided to do so much good work
for us in fighting Home Rule."
On 23 July Chamberlain wrote a letter to Jame3, which
was intended for Hartington as well, and gave his views on
what should be the Government* s policy. He wrote :
... I hope they are in no hurry to settle the Irish
question. They may fairly claim time for consideration
and if I were in their Government I should urge the
Immediate issue of a small practical commission to enquire
into the working of the Land Acts and especially into the
condition and organisation of the small tenants. Whether
they should not go further and make some temporary provision
against unreasonable evictions is a more difficult question,
but if they do not do this there will certainly be a
refusal to pay rent and outrages.
When Parliament meets in October I should appoint
a committee of both Houses to consider the whole question
of Irish Government, and then I should take Procedure
as the first business after supply.
The question of Coercion does not immediately arise,
but if there is an outburst of crime I should be ready
to vote for any reasonable provisions to secure the
execution of the law.
I hope they will take the "Times" advice and
appoint Irishmen to all Irish posts.. • .
1 Lady Monkswell's diary, 17 June 1895, A Victorian diarist,
1373-1895 (edited, L.C.P.Collier), 271.
^ Chamberlain to James, 23 July 1886, Chats. 3^. 2022.
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Five days later he wrote directly to Hartington "but on
the Government's policy confined himself to remarking
that they should not attempt to suppress the National
League without first obtaining statistics of outrage
from the evidence of a committeeOn 1st August he
again wrote to him and this time dealt primarily with
Government policy j
I entirely approve of the postponement until
February of any attempt to deal with Ireland. ...
But I am very strongly in favour of the
immediate announcement of a small Royal Commission
to enquire into the land question.. . . If it were
settled I doubt if Home Rule would be any longer a
burning question.
My idea is that the Commission should be non
political and consist of really practical men
including at least a couple of good land agents.
I should offer a seat to Healy.. . ,
A very important question arises as to whether
the Commission— or another, should enquire into the
question of public works, main drainings, communications,
fisheries and the revival of any industry suitable to
the country.
I have a fair belief that money exj)ended wisely
and prudently and in connection with some large complete
and well considered plan of improvement would be a great
investment.. . •
As regards Local Government in all its forms I
think that the Cabinet should consider the subject
carefully and decide how far they will go. Then let
them introduce their scheme in February in the shape of
resolutions and refer these to a very strong committee —
Chamberlain to Hartington, 28 July 1886, Chats,140.2030.
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perhaps a joint committee of both Houses to consider
and report,, , , 1
These recommendations of Chamberlain surprise one by
the unwonted note of caution. He wished most of all, it woiild
seem, to avoid having controversial questions in the new
parliament and thus he advocated roy.i com issions so that
the way might be smoothed for the more important legislation,
and inter-party controversy reduced to a minimum. Probably
for the same reason he recommended the Conservatives to
2
avoid introducing "vital questions". His attitude is
understandable. A struggle between the Government and the
Opposition on an important issue would gravely endanger
Liberal Unionist unity and might cost them secessions, and
further, would either widen the breach with the Gladstonians
or else endanger the Government,
Hartington appears to have been thinking along lines
rather similar to Chamberlain. At any rate he agreed in
principle with some of his main conclusions. At an interview
with Salisbury on 6 August he recommended the Government "to
take time in considering Irish measures, and to institute enquiry
into Land question and local improvements and several other
Chamberlain to Hartington, 1 Aug, 1886, Chats,
340.2037 (q.w.o., Garvin II. 265-6).




The Gladstonlans were appalled by the decisiveness
2
of their defeat at the polls. Host of them, from Gladstone
downwards and including the expert Schnadhorst, had entered
the contest with optimism and they tended to react to the
other extreme and to regard their defeat as being even more
decisive, end a greater disaster than it was. Their
alliancfe with the Rationalists gave them uneasy forebodings.
They assomed that the new Government would be met with
defiance and outrage in Ireland, and that willingly or
unwillingly the Rationalist party would be involved,-*
with the indirect result that the unionists would be able
to represent the Gladstonians as the associates and patrons
Salisbury to the Queen (cypher telegram), 6 Aug. 1886,
Letters of Queen Victoria. 3rd Series, I. 172,
o
In a letter to the Queen (2 July) Gladstone mentioned
that the predictions of the experts were favourable to his
party and that there was a popular enthusiasm in the Liberal
masses such as he had never seen equalled. He stated that
the Conservatives had little chance, if any, of a majority
in the new parliament, but that the Majority, no matter whose
it was, would be a small one. (q.w.o,, P. Guedelia, The
Queen and Mr. Gladstone. II. 415-16).
^ Spencer to Granville, 2 Sept. 1886, "I think
the position is very disagreeable, we cannot go hand in
glove with the Parnellites, their methods are not ours,
yet we must keep with them. There will be nasty work
in Ireland « , (P.R.O., 30.29.29A).
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of the instigators of crime and lawlessness.
This Gladatonian mood of despondency and frustration
probably intensified their desire for Liberal reunion, and
especially as they tended to underestimate the extent and
nature of the chasm which home rule and the general election
had now driven between themselves and the liberal Unionists,
Even Gladstone in the second week of July assumed that in the
new parliament most or many of the Liberal Unionist rank and
file would still be his followers except upon home rule.^
He even feared lest they might support a powerless Gladstonian
2
government in preference to a Conservative one. Quite a
few Gladstoniana were willing to purchase reunion at the
price of a compromise on home rule and, except among the
Radicals, this willingness appears to have been stronger and
more widespread than the newspapers of the time indicate. To
take but one illustration, Granville after a dinner at the
Edinburgh Liberal Club at the end of September reported to
Gladstone to Granville, 6 July 1886, P,R,0,, 30,29,29A,
^
Gladstone to Granville, 9 July 1886, ibid.
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Gladstone that half the company had been Liberal Unionists
"which was supposed to be a triumph", and that there had
been more talk of bridging the gap thai, he quite liked."'"
Of the Gladstonians opposed to compromise the more responsible
were nonetheless desirous of reunion. Gladstone himself
stated that next to settling the Irish question he desired
2
most to reunite the party. He assumed that the Liberal
Unionist leaders were his out and out antagonists^ and bo,
instead of approaching either of them, he decided to sound
Sir Henry James on the possibility of party reconciliation.
By leaders Gladstone presumably meant Harrington and Chamberlain,
against whom he was just then quite embittered. Hartington,
he complained, was much more active now that he was against
a
him than he had ever been as a friend and colleague. But
Hartington was, he admitted, a gentleman, whereas of Chamberlain
5
it was, he declared, best not to speak.
Granville to Gladstone, 30 Sept, 1886, Add. Mes. 44179,
f. 182,
p
Gladstone to Hareourt (copy), 2 Aug. 1886, Add. Mss,
44548, p. 245.
^ Gladstone to Granville, 6 July 1886,
4 Ibid.
c
Gladstone to Granville, 9 July 1886.
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Gladstone approached James through Sir E.W. Hamilton.
Hamilton wrote asking James for a talk and they met on the
evening of 9 July."*" He told James that Gladstone wished to
discuss with him ways of uniting the party, James replied
that he was advising Hartington not to join a Conservative
ministry and that he thought Gladstone and he should not meet
until the ministry had been formed lest people should say
2
that Gladstone had influenced him. Hamilton also informed
James that, while Gladstone would not ask to see Hartington,
•j
he would gladly meet him if Hartington desired it. Eleven
days later Hamilton had a further, but perhaps accidental,
meeting with James, Afterwards he reported through Mrs.
|K
Gladstone that James was as loyal to Gladstone as ever, and
that he thought Gladstone should have a talk with him later
on.*
In contrast to Gladstone, Harcourt was eager to approach
James* memorandum on the meeting, quoted, Lord Askwith,




4 Sir E.W, Hamilton to Mrs, Gladstone, 21 July 1886,
Add. Mas, 44191, f. 80.
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Chamberlain, On 20 July he wrote to Chamberlain suggesting
that they meet for a discussion. His views, he informed him,
were very much what they had been in the previous December -
namely that, if Gladstone insisted on home rule, home rule had
to be tried. "It has been tried," he continued, "and for the
present has failed. Whether anything else will succeed better
remains to be seen. If not, Home Rule will have to be revived
in some other form.Some days later Chamberlain paid Harcourt
a visit and they discussed reunion. Harcourt forwarded an
account of the conversation to Gladstone, but unfortunately
the letter appears to be lost. Gladstone replied that the
test of Chamberlain's statements must be in his acts and that
the coming by-election for East Birmingham (caused by the appointment
of Henry Matthews to the Home Secretaryship) would supply ouch
a test. Chamberlain's genial word3, he added, ?/ere worn out
by frequent use. But the letter did contain one positive
suggestion. Gladstone observed that he had even asked himself
whether the new parliament could frame some form of initial
plan of federation and deal with the Irish part of it first,
and that that, if feasible, would correspond with one at least
Harcourt to Chamberlain, 20 July l8b6, q.w.o.,
Gardiner, II. 3-4.
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of Chamberlain's many declarations
Later, towards the end of August, Gladstone published
2
a lengthy manifesto in which he sought to prove his
consistency on home rule and to extract gleams of hope from
the election results. One interesting aspect of it was that,
as the Annual Register noted, "it was interpreted generally as
an invitation to the Liberal Unionists to return to their
allegiance, by minimising the points of difference between
i
the various sections of the party.,,J
The Liberal Unionists were no less eager for reunion than
the Gladstonians. On the assembling of Parliament their leaders
requested that Liberal Unionists should receive the Gladstonian
party whip like ordinary Gladstoniana. This request was
granted and the practice was continued in the Commons until
5
at least the following summer, and in the Lords apparently
Gladstone to Harcourt (copy). 2 Aug, 1886, Add. Mas.
44548, p. 245 (Gardiner, II. 4-5).
2
The Irish question ; history of an ideaj lessons of
the "election, pp. 68.
^ Annual Register. 1886, p. 274.
A.Morley to Gladstone, 6 Jan. 1887» Add. Mss. 44253,
f. 54; Granville to Gladstone, 20 Jan. 1887, Add. Mas.
4410O, f. 12; and A. Morley to Granville, 21 Jan. 1887,
P.I.O., 30.29.28a,
5
Jesse Colllngs to A. Morley, 1 April 1887,
Liberal Unionist, 6 April 1887, p.19•
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until a much later date,"*"
The Liberal Unionist members met at Devonshire House
on the morning of the opening of the new parliament (5 August)
and Hartington made the first official statement of policy#
He reminded his listeners that they, and not Parnell, now
held the balance of power, and that they would be able to
use it both to prevent the return of a Liberal government
committed to the disruption of the Empire, and to prevent
the Conservative government from taking retrograde or
dangerous steps either in foreign affairs or domestic legislation.
Their duty, he said, was to remain united as a security
against a revival of the disruptive policy, and as the basis
for the reconstruction of a sound Liberal party. He explained
that these two objects would govern their attitude to all
questions involving the existence of the Government. They
would continue to be Liberals, he stated, and would not
unnecessarily, or ostentatiously, constitute themselves a
separate party. lie expressed the hope that they would be able
to act in common with non-unionist Liberals on many subjects.
In Jan. 1888 Spencer suggested to Granville that
the Gladstonian peers should be asked by private notes
to be present on the first night of the session as Liberal
Unionists would not know who had received these notes.
Further, he thought the usual "opening of the session"
circular should be sent to both Gladstonian and Liberal
Unionist peers. (Spencer to Granville, 19 Jan. 1888,
P.H.O., 30.29.29A).
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He said that he believed that should the Government require
more time to consider Irish ana other measures they should
be given it* He dealt also with the question of where Liberal
Unionist members shoula sit in tne House and the reasons which
led him to decline the premiership. He explained that his
acceptance of the premiership would nave made permanent the
breach with the Gladstonlans} would have destroyed Liberal
Unionist unity as only a fraction of them would have supported
him; and that a Liberal head and a few Liberal members would
not have been sufficient to prevent the Government from being
virtually a Conservative one.
After short speeches by other Liberal Unionists
Chamberlain rose* He said that he agreed with the policy laid
down by Hartington, and that he recognised his leadership and
would support actions taken by him. He expressed confidence
that now that the country had shown its approval of the
unionist cause Liberals would ere long find a basis of agreement.
Nevertheless, he advocated that Liberal Unionists should in the
meantime aohievegreater unity. He suggested in particular that
the Liberal Unionist Committee and the National Hadical Union
should associate more closely. Also, he said that he
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believed the party should have its own whips and expressed
the hope that another whip would be appointed in addition to
W.S. Caine. (Lord Edward Cavendish became the second whip
a few days later).
The unionist press was well satisfied with the policy-
laid down by Hartington and with Chamberlain's inireserved
acceptance of his leadership. It also noted with satisfaction
the news that Chamberlain had joined the Liberal Unionist
Committee. The one fly which it found in the ointment was
Chamberlain's attitude in the by-election for East Birmingham
where Henry Matthews was threatened with opposition by V,T.G.
Cook. Cook had stood in the general election as a G-ladstonian,
but now came forward with a more Chamberlain!te programme.
Chamberlain was frantically appealed to, especially by
Churchillto use his influence which was believed would be
decisive. He, however, in keeping with his policy of doing
nothing which might seem to identify him in any way with the
Conservatives for some time declined to interfere. Finally
he did intervene and Cock withdrew — but by then The Times
was able to point out th*.t Cooks action had been taken
shown Matthew's return to be certain.
2
Churchill, II. 133-4
The Time3. 12. /Aug. tvzt, p.cj.
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The new parliament assembled on 5 August, but after
the re-election of A«¥«Feel to the speakership and certain
routine business was adjourned for a fortnight* The
Government's plan was a short session to deal with the
estimates and then to adjourn until February* When
Parliament reassembled on the 19th, a brief speech from the
throne"3" disclosed that the Government intended to pass the
estimates of the previous ministry, but made no reference
to Irish, home, or oversea questions* Later Salisbury in
the Lords2 and Churchill in the G'ommons^ gave a fuller
indication of the Government's intentions* As had been
recommended by Hartington and Chamberlain, two royal
commissions were to be appointed; one to examine the
Land Acts of 1881 and 1885 and the possibility of extending
them, and the other to examine the feasibility of
developing the resources of Ireland by public expenditure,
especially on fisheries, arterial drainage, and communications.
Local government bills for Great Britain and Ireland,








it wan hoped, for February* Finally, it was planned
that Major-General Sir Fedvers Bailer should take charge,
with direct responsibility to the Chief Secretary, of
the police in Kerry and certain neighbouring districts
where moonlighting was most rife.
The main event of the session was the Tenant Relief
Bill introduced by Pornell on 10 September. The bill was
badly drafted, and although the Gladstonians supported it,
they showed little enthusiasm* Gladstone speaking on its
behalf objected to many of its provisions, but said that
1
he approved the principle* Nonetheless, the bill was an
embarrassment to Liberal Unionists and gave them a practical
demonstration of the difficulties inherent in their position.
2
The Government wa3 eager for their support, but they were
divided both on the merits of the bill and on the expediency
of supporting the Government. Chamberlain -wrote to
Hartingtou (7 September) that if, as he expected, the bill
should contain provisions which he had publicly supported
in the past he could not possibly oppose it and that the
best course for all Radical Unionists would be to absent
themselves from the debate. He advised Hartington to take
IMd., CCCIX, cols. 1044-60
Salisbury to Hartington, 12 bept. 1886, Chats. 340.2045;
and Churchill to Hartington, 13 Sept, 1886, Chats. 340.2049
(q.w.o., Churchill, II. 148, but with no indication of the
omissions).
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the same course and pointed out that if the Gladstoniana were
to see a rift in the Libel's! Unionist; party they would
endeavour to widen it by new proposals. He urged that the
Government would Iiave a majority without the Liberal Unionists,
and that in addition they had not been consulted before
Paraell was given permission to ihtroduoe the bill# I'wo
days later he again wrote. After once more pleading the
inadvisability of Whigs and Badicals taking different courses
he expressed the hope that the Government would not yield
an inch to Parnell because if they did it would rehabilitate
him in the eyes of the Irish tenants. He explained that he
would have preferred the Government to have proposed measures
for preventing harsh eviction, but now that they had not
done so it would be a fatal mistake to accept any proposal
from Parnell because the only chance for the future was
that the Irish people should see that they could gain no
p
more by agitation. Chamberlain was thus primarily
interested, not in the merits of demerits of the bill, but in
adopting the most expedient tactic.
Chamberlain to Hartington, 7 Sept. 1886, Chats.
340.2042 (q.w.O. Garvin, II. 268-9).
2
Chamberlain to Hartington, 9 Sept. 1886, Chats.
340.2043 (q.w.O., Garvin, II. 268-0).
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Chamberlain*s second letter is of special interest
as in it he de^lt with the wider problem of which the
Parnell bill difficulty was a manifestation.
... Our great difficulty, he wrote, is that in
order to preserve the Union we are forced to keep
the Tory Government in power. But every time we
vote with them we give a shock to the ordinary Liberal
politicians outside, and if we do it too often, we
shall be completely identified with the 'lories
and we shall lose all chance of recovering the lead
of the Liberal Party# Our real policy ia never to
vote with the lories unless they are in danger and
to vote against them whenever we can safely do so,
This policy would be the best for them as well as
for us, for if we lose our hold on Liberal opinion,
we can bring them no strength on critical occasions.
The resiilt of any other course will be that
what X may call your section will gravitate to the
Tories arid will be absorbed by them; while mine will
make their peace with the Gladstonians#. . •
Partington was less extreme in his attitude to
Pamoll* a bill than was Chamberlain. On 10 September he
wrote to Salisbury that if the Government should oppose the
second reading he would vote with them for he believed
that Parnell would be unable to draft an eviction suspending
clause which would not encourage tenants to refuse rent
which they were able to pay. At the same time ho
emphasised that evictions should be kept to a minimum,
and suggested that the GovorrLment should consider
accepting any provisions in the bill which the Irish
administration might think advisable# Hartington also
1
Hartington to Salisbury, 10 Sept. 1886, Holland,
II. 176-7.
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put forward this latter suggestion to Churchill and
1
Hicks-Beach. Hicks-Beach, too, favoured the adoption
p & i
of part of the bill. 1 Hartington expected that
Parnell would make his measure as moderate as possible
on the assumption that it was certain to be rejected by
the Government. However, when the bill was laid,
before the Commons Partington found that by his standards
it was far from moderate. In the debate he denounced
it as a device from stopping the payment of rent
throughout Ireland and as an attempt to dispense with
5
the Common Law.
In the division on the second reading (21 September)
the Government was supported by only thirty-one Liberal
Unionists, but had a majority of ninety-five. Chamberlain
1
Partington to Churchill (draft), 14 aept. 1886,
Chats. 340.2050 (Churchill, II. 149-50).
2
Lady Victoria Hicks-Beach, Life of Sir Pichael
Hicka-Beaoh, 1.284; and Churchill", 17721117
3
Afterwards the false story circulated that the
Cabinet, influenced by Churchill and Matthews, had inclined
towards meeting in a conciliatory spirit Parnell's proposals
for the staying of evictions, "but that Lord Hartington
made the support of the Unionists dependant upon a
distinct refusal to make terms with the Irish nationalists."
(The quotation is from Annual Register, 1886, p. 278).
4
Hartington to Salisbury, 10 Sept. 1886.
5
Hansard. CCCIk, cols. 1152-65*
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abstained"*" and one Liberal Unionist, J.W.Barclay
(Forfarshire), siipported the opposition. Four days later
Parliament was prorogued.
Early in October Chamberlain left for a holiday in
Turkey and Greece from which he did not return until
13 December. Shortly before leaving he called with
Dilke who recorded that "he seemed to think that he could
keep Mr. Gladstone out for life, and was persuaded that
Kandolph could give him all he wanted and leave Hartington
2
and Salisbury in the lurch". This at best was probably
but a crude description of Chamberlain's views.
Nevertheless, Chamberlain had cause for satisfaction in
early October for many things indicated that Tory Democracy
was in the ascendant in the Cabinet, and that hi3 own
opinions were having their influence there.
Hicks-Beach's task in Ireland promised to be an
unusually difficult one. The low prices for farm products
boded ill for peace and, unlike his predecessors, he had
neither a "coercion act" to strengthen his hand nor the
co-operation of the Nationalist leaders. In addition,
certain landlords were determined to have their full
J.L.Hammond in Gladstone and the Irish nation (p.563)
wrongly stated that Chamberlain voted with "the Government.
2
Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 265*
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legal dues irrespective of whether their tenants could
pay. Hicks-Beach set himself against such folly and did
his best to induce landlords to be moderate in defiling
with tenants. He even warned Lord Clanricarde, an
absentee and one of the most grasping of landlords,"*"
that if he continued to refuse all rent reductions he would
find on applying for police and military to carry out
evictions that "compliance with the request would certainly
be retarded by the pressure of other claims and duties,
and would most probably be postponed, to the utmost extent
2
permitted by law".
On 21 October United Ireland in an article entitled
the "Plan of Campaign" urged tenants to take collective
action against oppressive landlords. It proponed tnat
tenants on an estate where the landlord refused to reduce
rents should pay what they tnemselves considered the
appropriate rent into an "estate fund" which would be
used in the fight with the landlord, and especially to
assist evicted tenants. blacklegs were, of course, to
1
The enforcement of evictions on the Clanricards
estate cost the atate £-27,895 in twelve years. (Report
of Evicted Tenants Commission, 1893)•
2
Hicks-Beach to Glanricarde, 25 Oct. 1886, Lady
Victoria Hicks-Beach, Life of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,
1.292-4. '
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be boycotted. Timothy Harrington, a Nationalist member
of Parliament, had been given the idea of the scheme by
an episode which had taken place earlier in the year on
the Woodford estate of Lord Glanricarde, There the
tenants, when their request for a reduction in their
exorbitant rents had been refused, had agreed among
themselves to pay no rent until their request should be
conceded. Clanricarde had replied by ordering evictions,
which were so strenuously resisted that they had to be
enforced by no less than five hundred policemen.
The Plan of Campaign was a very practical tactic
and a number of nationalist leaders (especially Dillon
and O'Brien) were soon active in organising its application.
Pamell, at last conscious of the importance of public
opinion in Great Britain, disapproved1, but did not
openly oppose it.
Plan of Campaign methods entailed serious hazards
for those adopting- them and as a result were resorted
to only on estates where landlord-tenant relations
were acute and embittered. But there was a sufficient
number of such estates to make that winter the most
disturbed which Ireland had known since 1882. By the end
Paraell's speech at Eighty Club, 8 May 1888, The
Times, 9 Way l888j and R.B.O'Brien, The life of Charles Stewart
Parnell, 11.90.
'c.%
of the year the Plan of Campaign had been adopted on forty
estates, and during the months which followed the number
gradually increased until finally it stood at eighty-
2
four• The scheme was a success in that it resulted in
an agreement between the landlord and his tenants on sixty
of the eighty-four estates^, and had a moderating influence
on all landlords. But it had also a dark side for a
number of landlords did not capitulate, but evicted their
tenants and replaced them by Beots. Hot until 1907 were
these evicted people, or their successors, enabled to
return to their holdings.
It had been known for some time that Hartington
wished to leave during the recess for a holiday in India.
The Conservative leaders were disturbed at the news. In
a letter to Hartington on 13 September Churchill wrote
that if the visit to India should mean Hartington's
absence until March or April the uovernment would fall
through lack of his support in Parliament, and that
4
Hartington would then have to try to form a ministry.
Churchill's letter was a little hysterical and Hartington
Annual Register, 1886, p.316
2




Churchill to Hart:*.mton, 13 Scut. 1886, Chats.
340.2049 (q.w.° •, Churchni» 11 • 145/.
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may have discounted the forebodings in it.
1 2
Kore than a month later the Queen, Salisbury,
and Hicks-Beach^ all wrote on the 3ame day to dissuade
him from going to India. The Queen appealed to him "in
the strongest terms" not to go. It might be necessary,
she wrote, especially because of the serious foreign
situation, to call Parliament earlier than planned, but
that even without such a necessity it was "of the utmost
importance for his party that he should be here to keep
them together and to prevent others being brought too much
to the front". The Queen's letter alone must have ensured
Hartington's presence during the following months.
The letters of Salisbury and Hicks-Beach illustrate
not only the importance which both men attached to
Hartington's presence in the Commons, but also the value
which they placed on the expectation of being able to
consult with him when drafting the Government * s more
important measures. Salisbury wrote:
... No one is competent to supply your place,
either in keeping your party together or in
enabling the Government to avoid proposals that
would be unwelcome to it. I do not apprehend
The Queen to Ilartington, 19 Oct. 1886, Chats. 340.
2053A (q.w.o., Holland, II. 178).
2
Salisbury to Hartington, 19 Oct. 1886, Chats.
340.2053.
3
Ilicko-Beaoh to Hartington, 19 Oct. 1886, Chats.
340.2054.
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that we shall get to actual legislation very early:
the question of the rules of the House will probably
occupy some time. But we may not be able to avoid
laying our measures on the table at an early date -
and it is possible that we shall have to include
among them a Local Government Bill for Ireland.
If so - it would be a very serious misfortune if we
had to frame it, without the advantage of being able
to know your mind on some of the thorny questions
which it involves. Consultation may also be necessary
on the Local Government Bill for England and on the
framing of the clauses. But they are less important.
• • •
Hicks-Beach in a letter to Hartington on 22 October
wrote that he had. learned from Stalbridge that Hartington
wished to confer with the Government in the working out of
Irish policy. "I feel, therefore, bound to add", he
continued, "that in ray opinion your absence from England
would be a most serious loss to us, and might indeed lead
to fatal differences between the Liberal Unionists and
ourselves: for there is obviously no one who could speak
for them on such matters with your authority, or in whom
we could so completely confide".1 A letter which Stalbridge
wrote to Hartington, also on the 22nd, throws additional
light on Kicks-Beach's attitude to co-operation with him.
... I gathered that he not only intended, but was
anxious to constat you, and you alone as representing
the Liberal Unionists with regard to their policy
in Ireland, when it was put into shape, but that
there was little prepared as yet ... He pointed
out what we know very well, that they would have
some difficulty in communicating with Joe 0., but
he went so far as to say that it would be imperatively
1
Hicks-Beach to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1886, Chats.
340.2055.
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necessary for him to he in communication with you
when they were in a position to formulate their
Irish policy.. • .3-
The Government was not disappointed in its hope of
close consultation with Hartington in drafting the more
controversial parts of their proposed domestic and
p
Irish legislation* During the remainder of the year
Liberal Unionist opinion as expressed by him played an
important part in their councils. This was especially
so at one stage in the development of the local government
scheme. The original plan was to set up county and
district councils based on household sufferage. However,
when the Cabinet discovered that that would involve the
abolition of the boards of guardians and would give the
farm workers a decisive say in the administration of the
poor law they all, with the exception of Churchill, agreed
that they had best confine their scheme for the present to
the creation of county councils."^ Salisbury admitted to
Cranbrook that he was in "some despair" over the problem,
1
Stalbridge to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1886, Chats*
340.2056.
2
A letter from Salisbury to Hartington (16 Nov* 1886,
Chats• 340.2062), in which the Anglo-German agreement on
the slave trade is the chief topic, indicates that the
consultations sometimes ran ;ed beyond hone and Irish
le; islation.
3
Salisbury to the Queen, 26 Nov. 1886, Letters of
Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, I. 226-7.
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and that their difficult less were considerably aggravated
because the Liberal Unionists would und ubtedly agree with
Churchill."1, On the following evening Salisbury had a
pre-arranged meeting with Partington and found that he,
instead of agreeing with Churchill, admitted the poor
law difficulty and even proposed that the local government
scheme for Great Britain should he postponed in favour of
2
one for Ireland. He reasoned that it would avoid the
poor law difficulty as no one was "foolish enough to wish
to give absolute power over the Poor Law to the Irish
agricultural labourer". He said that in addition
Gladstone would challenge the Government to produce their
Irish plan at once and that if they did not do so it might
not be possible to hold together the Liberal Unionists."*
Perhaps as important a factor as any with Partington may
have been the fear that the franchise problem would
result in a dangerous quarrel between the Radicals and
the more moderate Liberal Unionists.
Salisbury's colleagues disapproved of Partington's
1
Salisbury to Crnnbrook, 25 Nov. 1886, Cecil, III.327.
2
Salisbury to the Queen, 26 Nov. 1886, Letters of
Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, 1.227, and Cecil, Ili. 2^8.
3
Salisbury to the Queen, 26 Ifov. 1886.
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proposal and he himself soon came to doubt its wisdom.
Churchill's biographer claims that Churchill "succeeded,
by the influence of a friend, in persuading Lord
Hartington to abate his Irish claims,"^ but one would not
be surprised if thi3 were an exaggeration and that
Hartington was most influenced by the opinions of leading
Liberal Unionists. The Cabinet finally decided that
the local government scheme for Great Britain should be
limited to the creation of county councils, but that in
deference to Hartington,^ the Queen's speech should promise
an Irish local government bill at a later date.
At Dartford on 2 October Churchill, speaking as
though co-leader, sketched out a programme which The
Times Weekly Edition described as "so comprehensive
5
and progressive a3 to take the old Tories breath away".
First he referred to the four principal royal commissions
which the Government had decided to set up and made a
few complimentaiy remarks about the Liberal Unionists.
1







Salisbury to Hartington, 2 Dec. 1886.
5
The Ti^es Weekly Edition, 31 Dec. 1886, p.12.
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Then, after advocating that parliamentary obstruction he
dealt with by a simple majority closure, he launched out.
The Government, he told his listeners, would concentrate
on the establishment of a genuinely popular form of local
government, and that their scheme would involve a re¬
arrangement and re-adjustment of local taxation, and the
taxation of personal property. He hoped that the new
local bodies would be able to settle most of the
licensing controversies. He said that "it was the
decided intention of the Government" to introduce a
measure which would enable local authorities to provide
farm workers with freehold plots and allotments. He
indicated that the tithe law would be altered so that
the landlords and not the tenants would make the actual
payment of tithej that a measure would be introduced
to cheapen and simplify the buying and selling of land;
and that changes would be made in the law governing
glebe lands so that they could be sold. He warned the
railway companies that unless they abolished rates which
favoured foreign interests "their rights and property
might be placed in very serious danger and jeopardy".
He hinted that there would be legislation in a popular
direction when the commission which was sitting; on
Education should have reported. Turning to Ireland
he foreshadowed land legislation to accelerate the change
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from double to single ownership, and remarked that the
Government would endeavour to lay at least the foundation
for Irish local government. His own special object, he
promised, would be to keep to the minimum public expenditure,
and consequently taxation. In foreign policy he denounced
the kidnapping of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria. The
liberty-giving policy of the Treaty of Berlin, he said,
would have to be maintained, and he intimated that the
Central Powers would have Britain's support in a policy of
peace and national liberty in the Balkans.
The speech was the most important that Churchill
was ever to make. It caused a sensation at home and
aroused much interest abroad. In the Conservative party
the programme of domestic reform which he outlined gave
rise to almost as much consternation as it did satisfaction.
Standard described his remarks on foreign affairs as
moderate in tone, sensible, and well expressed, but stated
that if several of the domestic reforms which he had
mentioned were not passed for the next three or four years
the country would not be much the worse for it. Any
scheme of small holdings on the lines advocated by Jesse
Collings, it warned, would be no boon to the farm -workers
and would be an encroachment on the very rights of which
Churdhill claimed to be the champion. It advised, that
23b
an appreciate reduction in the national expenditure
would probably do more for the atability of the Government
than any number of reforms such as Churchill described."**
The Timea commented that nothing could be more reasonable,
temperate, and practical than the exposition of ministerial
policy, and that the Conservatives had broken with the
obsolete tradition of high and dry Toryism.2 The £aily
Telegraph wrote that not a sentence in Churchill's able
address conflicted with anything in historical Liberalism,
and that the passages on allotments, retrenchment, and
law reform would not have misbecome Chamberlain himself.^
The Daily Hews considered that there was something startling
even to advanced Liberals in the comprehensive radicalism
of the Government proposals.^ if Churchill were to
succeed in carrying out his programme, remarked the
Birmingham Daily Post, he would go a long way towards
"dishing the Hadicals.f,5
1
Standard, 4 Oct. 1886, p.4«
2
The Times, 4 Oct. 1886, p.9«
Daily Telegraph. 4 Oct. 1886, p.5«
4
Gaily News, 4 Oct. 1886, p.4.
5
•Birmingham Gaily Post, 4 Oct. 1886, p.4.
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Strangely enough, the most important aspect of
Churchill's Bartford speech is the one which is still most
persistently ignored - namely that, as he assured the annual
conference of Conservative associations some three weeks
later, he had spoken "with the full knowledge and assent
of his colleagues In the Cabinet". In March of the
following year Churchill in conversation with Rosebery
said, "Oh, as to the Bartford speech. Salisbury came to
my room in the House of Commons: I told him the whole of
2
what I was going to say and he approved it all".
However, one has not to rely entirely on Churchill's own
word. 'Ihe speech caused much resentment among the right
wing Conservatives, The Carlton was reported to be vexed
3
and sulky, Churchill was much criticised for riding
rough-shod over the views of his colleagues, and his
colleagues were criticized for allowing him to do sc. The
outcome was that W.E.Smith <Secretary for War) published
a letter in flic limes on 30 October in which ho stated
that the Cabinet had both 'mown and. approved of the
statements which Churchill had made.
The fact that the Cabinet had given its prior consent
to Churchill's statements is of special interest in a study
of the Liberal Unionist party because it throws a little
Speech to the annual conference of the National Union of
Conservative and Constitutional Associations, Bradford, 26
Oct. 1335, ihv Times. 27 Oct. 3.336.
2 Rosebery's account of the conversation, Marquess of
Crewe, Lord Rosebery. II. bog.
3 Churchill, II, 175.
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light on the difficult question of how far the Liberal
Unionists influenced Government policy during the six years
of Salisbury's second administration# At the time the
Liberal Unionists claimed that the impressive record of
reform and constructive legislation was very largely due
to a continual goading of the Government by thorn. This
claim has been credited to the Liberal Unionists by very
many people ever since. When one remembers Salisbury's
Newport speech of October 1885# and secondly, that
Churchill had sketched the more important legislation in
his Dartford speech with the approval of the Cabinet it
becomes evident that one must treat such a view with great
caution. The truth seems to be that, inspired by
Disraeli's example, progressive Conservatism was In the
ascendant, especially in the party leadership, and that
the programme for which Churchill was the spokesman would
have been largely adopted by the Government even had it
not been dependent on the Liberal Unionists for its
existence. Looking at the period as a whole the most
1
This question of Liberal Unionist influence on the
Government cannot be answered with confidence until more
of the private papers of the Conservative leaders become
available for research. The 3rd Marquis of Salisbury
papers, which may contain much on the subject, are now
(1955) deposited in Christ Church, Oxford, but will not be
available until they are catalogued.
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important aspect of Liberal Unionist influence appears to
have been in counterweighing the strong reactionary forces
within the Conservative party which otherwise might have
made impossible, or greatly modified, much of the legislation
which was passed* This in itself was of much importance
and, in addition, Liberal Unionist views often went far
in determining the actual details of a measure, and
sometimes secured major alterations*
During the weeks following the Dartford speech the
suspicion that Salisbury was allowing Government policy
to be largely controlled by Churchill and by the Liberal
Unionists made many Conservatives increasingly dissatisfied.
On the 8 December Salisbury in a speech to the City
Conservative Association endeavoured to restore confidence.
He assured his followers that the Conservative and Liberal
Unionist parties retained their individuality, and that
the Conservatives were as attached to their opinions and
as resolute to carry them out as ever they were. He took
the measures one by one, which it had been admitted that
the Government intended to introduce, and he endeavoured
to show that all were based on sound Conservative principles
1
e_.g. The Government's concession to the Liberal
Unionist's in July 1887 of a revision of judicial rents in
Ireland. See below p. b02.
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and had not been adopted because of Liberal Unionist
pressure. "Bat what I insist on is that these are not
new doctrines adopted to please the Liberal Unionists}
these things are what we said in opposition," he declared.
At the same time Salisbury did not neglect to keep the
Liberal Unionist alliance in repair. There were, he said,
questions on which Conservatives must differ from at least
some of the Liberal Unionists* but, fortunately, those
questions were in the background and "the straightforwardness
and simplicity of intention" of Hartington and his followers
1
made co-operation with them a very easy task.
1
The Times, 9 lee. 1886
2d9
The National liberal Federation held its annual
conference in Leeds on 3 November. Objects approved, or
re-approved, for the party programme were, county councils,
reform of the law governing the holding of land, local
option in spirit licensing, "free schools", reforms in
parliamentary procedure and electoral registration, and
non-intervention in European affairs so that ultimately
the army and navy estimates could be reduced. Disestablishment
was not formally approved, but a resolution was passed urging
equality between the state and the different religious
denominations. A resolution which was accepted by most
Gladstonians as the official defination of the party's attitude
was passed on home rule-. The resolution stated that Ireland
would have to be given a settlement which would satisfy the
views and wishes of the Irish representatives and that the
settlement would have to include a legislative body for the
management of what Parliament should decide to be distinctly
1
Irish affairs.
liven had he not realised it earlier, the events of the
new session must have shown Gladstone very quickly how
groundless had been his hopes that many Liberal Unionists
would still be his followers on non-home rule questions.
1
Daily News, 4, and 5 Nov. 1886.
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But the realization of how far the two groups were now
apart made him only the more eager for a reunion before
time and internecine strife should solidify the cleavage.
He was alarmed at the radicalism of his followers in
1
the new Commons and he may have been influenced in his
reunion eagerness by the desire to counterweigh his
Radicals by the Liberal Unionists, whom he regarded as
2
containing at most some six or eight Chamberlainites.
Gladstone had a few of Ms colleagues to Hawarden
3
for consultation shortly before the annual conference
of the Rational Liberal Federation at Leeds,
1
He wrote to Harcourt (16 Hov. 1886), "Randolph,
by taking up the Liberal programme, has, as was to
be expected, caused a superfoetation of Radicalism
on our side . • ♦ I will not break with the 200
[i.e. the Rational Liberal Federation] or the radical
section of them if I can help it. But I am rather
too old to put on a brand set of new clothes."
(Draft, Add. Mss, 44200, f. 178).
p
Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 3 Jan. 1887, Add.
Mss. 44201^tl*w»o., Gardiner, II. 26),
^ Ripon to Granville, 6 Nov. 1886, P.R.O., 30.29.22A.
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1
Granville and Morley were present, and probably Harcourt.
Gladstonian policy towards the Liberal Unionists was
discussed, The conclusion reached appears to have been
that for the present no reunion advances should be
made to the Liberal Unionists, but that nothing should
2
be done which might further alienate them. Gladstone
emphasised that home rule could not be shelved for
3
an indefinite period.
One wonders if Gladstone could have been convinced
fully on the undeBirability of reunion advances or the
shelving of home rule. During the next three weeks he
came to the opposite conclusions. On 23 November he
set down his new ideas in a memorandum which he showed
to Granville and other colleagues. He proposed that
there should be a conference between representatives
of the two parties - or as he phrased it "an informal
meeting arid a friendly conversation"# The participants,
he suggested, should be two or three thorough Liberals
from each side who had not been deeply or sharply
1
Ripon to Granville, 6 Nov. 1886; and Morley to
Spencer, 8 Nov. 1886, Miscellaneous, A1thorp#
2
Ripon to Granville, 6 Nov. 1886; and the speeches
of Morley and ilarcourt at the Leed's conference, which,
Ripon mentions in his letter to Granville, were based
on the conclusions reached at Hawarden#
3
Morley to Spencer, 8 Nov, 1886#
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involved in the controversy. The basis for their
discussion, he stated, should be the assumption that
both groups continued to stand by their views on
Irish policy and would use every legitimate means
to promote them. The objective should be :
a. to promote the general purposes of the
Liberal party in legislation for Great Britain.
b. to consider what can be done towards
expediting the settlement of the Irish question
by causing an early production of the Government
measures for Local Government. It cannot be
expected that they will satisfy the late
Government, but they may be in themselves good.
Together with any other points, or details,
on which those who meet might think it expedient
to centre.1
Gladstone thus was prepared to purchase reunion - even
a temporary reunion - at the cost of postponing home
rule for an unspecified,but presumably, a considerable
length of time. In the covering letter which he sent
to Granville with the memorandum he suggested Herache11,
Whitbread, Hampden, and Kimberley as suitable negotiators,
and on the Liberal Unionist side Derby, Jcanes, and
Bright.
1
Memorandum by Gladstone, 23 Nov. 1886, Add. Mss.
44179, f. 189.
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Rosebery, he added, would have been another good choice
1
had he been in Britain. (He had gone to India).
Granville disapproved strongly of Gladstone's
suggestions and replied that full powers to negotiate
could not be given to the men whom Gladstone had named,
and that he felt certain Derby, James, and Bright would
not act meekly under instructions from Hartington and,
anyhow, could not be appointed without Hartington's
consent. Granville further maintained that Hartington
would refuse to pledge himself to press the Government
to produce measures for Ireland and that that seemed
to be the only common ground if both sides were to
retain their principles on home rule. A meeting might
be of immense use, he admitted, if Hartington indeed
wished for reunion, hut it would have to be one between
Hartington and Gladstone with one or two assistants on
2
each side. Gladstone protested that for him to try to
bring about a meeting with Hartington would be a waste
of time and would revert upon himself, but that he did
not object if Granville wished to make the attempt.
1
Gladstone to Granville, 23 Nov. 1886, P.R.O,,
30.29.29A.
2
Granville to Gladstone, 26 Nov. 1886, Add. Mss*
44179, f. 191.
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He did not, Gladstone added, see why he could not
apjiroach Bright, who had done no act of submission
to Hartington, or James who since the election had
avoided the House of Commons except when he,
1
Gladstone, was present.
Even a3 he was thus defending his conference
suggestions Gladstone wan veering away from them.
On the same day he wrote both to Granville and
Carapbell-Bannerman that the latest news seemed to
foreshadow that the Government would resort to
coercion and that with such a prospect he saw no
advantage in communications with the Liberal Unionists
just then, but supposed that for the present the
2
party need only rest upon its oars. This mood
was a temporary one. Two or three days later he
appears to have been encouraging Uorley to have an
3
interview with Chamberlain - a surprising move when
Gladstone's recent post-election views on Chamberlain
are remembered. Unfortunately there is no evidence
1
Gladstone to Granville, 27 Nov. 1886, P.K.O.,
30.29.29A,
2
Ibid.; and Gladstone to Campbell-Bannerman,
27 NovT"1886, Add. Kss. 41215, f. 25.
3
Morley to Gladstone, 1 Dec. 1886, Add* Mss.
44255, f. 131.
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whether this interview proposal originated with
Gladstone or Morley. It is certain that Morley
had no liking for Gladstone^ conference ideas#
Gladstone, he complained to Spencer, was asking
for reunion in a way which seemed dangerous and
1
was willing to humble himself in the dust.
Morley seems to have considered a meeting with
Chamberlain less objectionable for shortly
afterwards he contacted Chamberlains influential
supporter, Rev. hale of Birmingham, with that as
2
his object, hale was a good choice as he was very
eager to advance Liberal reunion and since the split
3
had identified himself with neither Liberal camp.
A fortnight earlier Gladstone had mentioned to
Hareourt that he would like to know how the
Rationalists would regard an intermediate home rule
measure, good in itself although insufficient, and
1
Spencer to Granville, 8 Dec. 1886, P.R.O.,
30.29.22A.
2
Morley to Gladstone, 18, and 23 Dec. 1886, Add.
Mas. 44255, ff. 146, and 149.
3
A.W.W. hale, Life of R.W. hale of Birmingham, 464.
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added that he himself was inclined to favour such a
1
scheme. He now returned to the idea. On 7 December
Morley and Spencer had an interview with Pamell and
Gladstone took the opportunity to discover his views
on "a small measure as a step to his ultimate demands
2
in order to reunite the Liberals." Parnell rejected
the suggestion with emphasis and said that such a
course would be repudiated by the active men of his
3
party.
On the same day another event took place which
had important repercussions on the question of reunion.
This was the Liberal Unionist party conference which
met in London. However, before dealing with it a
speech which Herschell made in Bristol on 13 November
has to be noted. Herschell said that he believed all
Liberals were agreed that Ireland must be given a
certain amount of self-government and decentralisation,
and that no such concession should be of a kind which
could endanger British national safety. Where Liberals
Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 16 Nov. 1886,
Add. Has. 44200, f. 178.
Spencer to Granville, 8 Dec. 1886, P.R.O., 30.




unfortunately differed, he maintained, was in their
opinions on the extent of the danger to Britain and the
safeguards to be taken against it. Their differences,
he asserted, although great, deep, and real, were onos
of degree rather than of irreconcilable principles.
Most of the other Gladstonians appear to have considered
that Herschell went too far in his eagerness to find
common ground with the Liberal Unionists. Granville,
for instance, described his speech as very like a
surrender and assumed that Hartington would interpret
2
it as such. The Daily Hews, which did not give it even
a proper report, commented that the speech was yet
another Gladstonian declaration in favour of reunion,
and that the Liberal Unionists so far had neither
recognised the desirability of reunion nor responded to
x i-rlstol Mercury and Daily lost, 15 Nov. 1086. (Most
newspapers either ignored or gave scrappy accounts of
the speech).
Granville to Gladstone, 10 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss.
M+179, f. 20*+; and Granville to Spencer, 10 Dec. 1.886,
Granville vol1, A1thorp.
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efforts to promote it.
The Liberal Unionist party conference which met on
7 December was attended by some 800 delegates and was
followed by a banquet in the evening. Among those who
spoke at the one or the other gathering were Eartington,
Goschen, Derby, Selborne, Northbrook, Westminster,
Trevelyan, Heanage (Great Grimsby), G.Dixon (Edgbaston,
Birmingham), T.W.Russell (S.Tyrone), R.B.Flnlay
1
(Inverness), and Mrs. Fawcett. Hartington began the
proceedings by reading a letter from Bright and a
telegram from Chamberlain. Bright's letter was a strong
condemnation of Gladstone for continuing to ally himself
with the promoters of strife and discord in Ireland, and
for refusing to use his influence to restrain them. The
conference, he hoped, would be large and influential and
would add strength to the Government "so far as it may be
2
our duty to support them." Chamberlain's telegram, which
3
was coolly received, ran :
Wife of Henry Fawcett who had died, 6 Nov. 188*f.
2 Bright to Ilartington, 28 Nov. 1886, Chats. 3^0, 2063
(The Times. 8 Dec. 1886, p. 6).
3 MsmL Ii££lster, 1886, 299; Garvin, II. 272;
Morley to Gladstone, 9 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. Mf2p5t f• 1*+!?
British Weekly. 10 Dec. 1886, p. 3.
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Regret my absence from England prevents
my attendance tomoi-row. While Separatists
maintain defeated programme organisation of
Liberal Unionists is a necessary duty# The
speech of Lord Herschell at Bristol fairly
states the problem. If the Gladstonian
Liberals sincerely desire reunion they should
invite both sections of the party to a free
conference as to the extent and character of
reforms which can safely be granted to Ireland,
without reference to the discarded scheme of
the late Government. Our opposition is confined
to the defeated policy. If that be frankly
abandoned we are ready to discuss any safe scheme,
but must first have assurance that the old plan,
or one equally objectionable, will not again be
proposed. Agreement on this cardinal point
necessary preliminary to any joint action.
Failing this responsibility of division rests
with Separatists.!
Hartington in his address said that if all
Gladstonians would approach Liberal reunion in the
spirit of Herschell it would be as practicable as it
was desirable. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Morley had
not clone so, he said, but had stated in their speeches
that a separate Irish parliament and executive must
continue to be the policy of the Liberal party, and
that as a result he could not see "the slightest {-round
for hoping" for an understanding between the two sections.
He pointed out that so far the Government had given even
1
The Times, 8 Dec. 1886, p.6.
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the most ardent radical little to complain about, and
that the only complaint which he had heard of its
Irish administration was that it was too lax# He advised
the Government to approach local government in a wide and
comprehensive spirit and approved their proposal to give
similar but not identical institutions to the three countries.
He condemned the Plan of Campaign and promised Liberal
Unionist support in maintaining law and order in Ireland.
Next morning the unionist press expressed satisfaction
with the proceedings. The Times wrote that the importance
and value of the demonstration could not be over-estimated
and that it was an enormous encouragement to the Cabinet
at a critical., moment, [critical because of the Plan of
Campaign.] The Standard wrote that the proceedings had
afforded the fullest and most decisive confirmation that
the Government could rely absolutely on the loyalty and
2
unswerving support of the Liberal Unionists. The Daily
Telegraph commented that the chief interest had been to
learn whether on Liberal reunion Hartington would go to
1
The Time3, 8 Dec. 1886, p.9.
2
Standard, 8 Dec. 1886, p.4.
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Ilawarden or compel Hawarderi to come to hiri, and
that he and his followers had more than fulfilled
1
the universal expectation. The Birmingham Pail/
Post was strongly critical "because the leaders had
urged little except resistance to home rule and
2
continued support of the Conservative Government.
The Times considered that Chamberlain's
telegram put in the clearest light the insuperable
obstacles to any reconciliation with the Gladstonian
section so long as it held to its characteristic
3
doctrines. The Standard noted his statement that he
must first have an assurance that the old plan or one
equally objectionable would not again be submitted,
and confidently asserted that the Gladstoniana could
4
now give no such assurance• The Daily Telegraph fixed
1
Daily Telegraph, 8 Dec. 1886, p.5.
2
Birminghsm Daily Post, 8 Dec. 1886, p'.4»
3
The Times, 8 Dec. 1886, p.9»
4
Standard, 8 Pec. 1886, p.9*
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on the same statement and Interpreted it to mean that
Chamberlain agreed with Hartlngton In rejecting the
suggestion (which Gladstone had made a little earlier)
that Gladstonians and Liberal Unionists should, ao a
step towards reunion, join in pressing the Government
to produce their Irish measures. Liberal reunion, it
added, might after a time be established by a general
conference, but could not be aided by a sinking of
principle in a helter-skelter rush to the Treasury
1
bench. The Blrminghnr.i bail./ Post found in Chamberlain's
telegram the one exception to the hopeless tone of
separation and antagonism which, it declared, had
characterised the conference. It expressed the hope
that an earnest attempt would be made to have a reunion
2
conference such an Chamberlain had suggested.
The Gladstonians, especially those who knew how
Gladstone's mind was centered on reunion, had awaited
the conference with much interest ao they knew that at
it the Liberal Unionist leaders would have to define
1
Daily Telegraph, 8 Dec. 1886, p.5.
2
Birmingham Daily Post, 8 Dec. 1886, p.4.
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their altitude towards the other parties. Those of
then who were eager for reunion were keenly disappointed
and, on the whole, concluded that the only course was
to bide time until perhaps a more favourable situation
might develop. Even Ilerscfceli*s hopes were extinguished
and he too agreed that for the present nothing could
1
be done. "You praised my tempers it is a pity you
2
did not imitate it," he told one Liberal Unionist.
Hartington was unimpressed by Chamberlain's
telegram. When a rumour sprang up that Gladstone was
willing to accept the telegram in its entirety Hartington
commented that, if true, it could be only a device for
placing him in a difficulty for no agreement was likely
3
from a conference. flareourt considered that the
4
telegram had been nasty without being strong. Spencer
5
thought it quite offensive. Morley noted that it
1
Morley to Gladstone, 12 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44255»
f.l42j and Harcourt to Spencer, 16 Leo. 1886, Haroourt
vol., Althorp.
2
Morley to Gladstone, 12 Dec. 1886.
3





°pencer to Granville, 11 Dec. 1886, P.K.O.,
30.29.22A.
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marked off Chamberlain from Hartinston and the Government,
but doubted the sincerity of the reference to Ilerschell and
1
a conference.
Gladstone recorded the Liberal Unionist conference
as being ranch less decisive than did most of his followers.
At it the Liberal Unionists, he admitted, had been rather
savage - "Chamberlain contemptuous as usual towards us and
Hartington rather too like a bull in a china shop". But
he thought that the fewness of the Liberal Unionist Il.P.s
3
who had been present (some forty were present ) was of
significance and that, since many of the Liberal Unionists
were not attached to their leaders, the Gladstonicns could
still appeal to thorn either on a nodus vivenui or on the
duty of resisting any coercion w! ich might be proposed without
U-
"Liberal political legislation for Ireland".
Gladstone was so little deterred by the conference that
on the following day he wrote to Granville and proposed that
1
"
Morley to Gladstone, 9 Lee. 1GG6, Add. llss. M+2p5» f. 1^1.
Gladstone to Hipon (draft), 9 Leo, 1GG6, Add. Uss.
bb2o7, f. 6:.
''
rrog.ra .ire of the Libera I Unionist coit'ureace at Willis
Il-.-oms on 1'nesday. 7th Decenter. Ihuo, Add. Lss. 77633 ,
7. ~l7o. "
**
Gladstone to Ripon, 9 Lec. 1806.
305
Granville should write to Herschell suggesting that
lierschell write to Sir Henry James inviting a conversation
on the Liberal Unionist attitude to reconciliation.^
Granville, who did not receive the letter until the 10th,
replied that the only people with whom he had discussed a
possible approach to the Liberal Unionists were Speneer
and ^olverton, and that both thought no good could coine
of it. He understood that Horley thought the same.
Such a move, Granville maintained, would look as though the
Liberal Unionist conference and Salisbury's speech had
frightened the Gladstonians. He would write to Herschell,
he explained, but only if Gladstone specifically instructed
2
him to write. Gladstone answered that he would by
3
no means press him nor would he act himself. In a
further letter Granville pointed, out that Hartington
had now gone abroad and that James would not act without
him. He mentioned that he had Just had a conversation
with James, who had spoken with much regard for Gladstone,
but had said that ho thought reunion impossible for the
4
present.
A Gladstone to Granville, 8 Dec. 1885, D.R.O.,
30.29.29 A.
Granville to Gladstone, 10 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas.
44179, f.204.
3
Gladstone to Granville, 12 Deo. 1886, P.K.O.,
30.29.29A.
Granville to Gladstone, 13 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas*
44179, f. 211.
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Gladstone's persistence in his reunion eagerness
made his colleagues uneasy. Harcourt considered that
Gladstone's dream of an immediate conference and
reconciliation was wholly delusion for the Liberal Unionists
would not have peace at any price •"** Upencer believed
that Chamberlain and G0schen and, he feared, Hartington
2
had parted with Gladstone for good. Me much resented
Gladstone's wish for negotiations. "Mr. G.", " he wrote to
Harcourt on the 13th, "is ready to grovel in the dust to
bring about reunion, either from remorse at having divided
3
the Party or because he feels time is against him".
Wolverton, too, was opposed to negotiations. He was
confident that any such move just then would be taken as a
/
sign of weakness and would dishearten the party. He
had no hope, he stated, that "Hartington and such like"
5
would rejoin them.
On 12 December Morley had a further interview with
Parnell. Afterwards he reported to Gladstone that Parnell
would accept a bill limited to local government, but that
he was resolutely opposed to any measure which could be
mistaken for even a partial settlement of the home rule
question. He would have nothing like a central council
J
Harcourt to^Granville, 14 ^ec. 1886, P.P.O., 30.29»29A,
and Harcourt to GpenCer, 16 Deo. 1886, Harcourt vol., Althorp.
Gpencer to Granville, 11 Dec. 1886, P.P.O., 30.29.22A.
Quoted, Gardiner, II. 19.
Wolverton to Granville, 11, and 15 ^ec. 1886, P.R.O.,
30.29. 22A, and 30.29.28A.
^ Wolverton to Granville, 15 Dec. 1886.
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as that would be an attempted substitute for a parliament.1
Gladstone could now be certain that Liberal reunion
on the basis of a mild measure of home rule would gain
him the hostility of Parnell and his eighty-four supporters.
Neither this knowledge nor the opinions of his colleagues
persuaded Gladstone that an immediate attempt at reunion
was altogether inadvisable. After the misfire of his suggestion
that the Liberal Unionists he approached through James, he
began to entertain the idea of himself making an approach
by means of a public speech. lie wrote asking his chief
whip for his opinion on the matter. Arnold Uorley replied
that he had consulted John Morley and that both of them
thought such a novo inexpedient unless they could be
certain that the Liberal Unionists would at least receive
it in a friendly spirit - a possibility which John Korley
doubted, John Forley, he added, would find out
Chamberlain*s attitude in the next two days and would
write to Gladstone at once. Arnold Morley wrote that as
far as he could judge she Gladstonians would be opposed
to any attempt at conciliation which had the appearance
of weakness or misgiving. The failure of such an attempt,
he feared, would seriously damage the prestige of the party
leaders, but that, on the other hand, if the move were
Forley to Gladstone, 12 Leo. 1886, Add. Mas. 44255,
f. 142.
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reciprocated it would give very great and general
satisfaction
Next day (18 December) Morley wrote to Gladstone that
on the question of communication with Chamberlain he had
received a "strong and very good letter" from Rev. Dale
urging the tender of an olive branch, and that he had
returned a sympathetic reply. He also reported that a
friend had seen Chamberlain in London and had learned
that Chamberlain intended to do nothing which would endanger
union among the Liberal Unionists or their alliance with the
Government. Chamberlain*a plan, the friend had gathered,
was to prevent the Government from resorting to coercion
as he believed that in that way he could keep the home rule
question quiet and the Government in power for two or three
years. Morley commented that this looked ill for reunion,
but that he would like to see Chamberlain (if it could be brought
about respectably)before feeling certain that these were his
2
fixed intentions. Next day Morley sent Dale a letter
which he had reason to expect Dale would show Chamberlain
A. Morley to Gladstone, 17 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas.
44253, f. 46.
Morley to Gladstone, 18 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas.
44255, f. 146.
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on the following evening. On the following evening
2
Dale did not have the opportunity and whether he showed
it to him later cannot at present be verified. Writing
to Chamberlain on 22nd, ilorley assumed that he had not,"*
but one would be surprised if a reunion enthusiast like
Dale had not stirred himself to the extent of passing the
4
letter to Chamberlain in the next day or two.
On the 20th Morley again wrote to Gladstone. This
time he reported that a reliable person, who had had talks
on the previous day with both Chamberlain and Churchill,
had informed him that Churchill had been beaten in the
Cabinet on the local government bill; that Chamberlain
had come to London to consult with him on the matter; and
that Chamberlain now said he would have to oppose the
bill with all his might with the result that he would be
forced away from both Hartington and the Government.
Chamberlain on the 21st sent Morley a barrel of
1




In A.W.W.Dale. Life of K.W.Dale of Birmingham, the
only reference to Dale's reunion activities at this time
is the following : "Privately he continued his efforts
to bring about a better understanding, and in December
he attempted to open a way of approach between Mr.
Chamberlain and the Liberal leaders. ror a time there
seemed to be some hope of success." (p.469).
liorley to Gladstone, 20 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44255*
f. 148.
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oysters, his customary Christmas gift, and a friendly
letter in which he expressed the fear that they were
destined to go on for the rest of their lives disputing
about the one subject on which they differed, but that
2
he hoped there would be no permanent bitterness.
Chamberlain may have been influenced by information
from Dale or he may have been motivated solely by regard
for his old comrade, for Chamberlain had a warm, generous
streak in his nature although it was not always apparent.
Morley adopted the second explanation and replied in an
equally friendly tone.^ Morley informed Gladstone of
the exchange, adding that Chamberlain's letter had been written
"sua sponte, and without knowing of Bale's negotiation
with us",^ but did not give the reasons which led him
to that conclusion. His letter to Gladstone ended with
the remark "^o the way is now open, if the time should come
for pourparlers."
On the same day as Morley was writing this letter to
Gladstone two events occurred which transformed the




Morley to Gladstone, 23 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44255,
f. 149.
3
Morley to Chamberlain, 22 Dec. 1886, Garvin, II. 276.
4
Morley to Gladstone, 23 hec. 1886.
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Gnu was Churchill's resignation from the Government
and the other was an appeal "by Chamberlain for Liberal
reunion, which he made in a speech in Birmingham#
The sensation caused by Churchill's resignation was
all the greater as it came without warning and men could
only guess at the explanation. Few suspected the truth
that Churchill, grown over-confident and having "forgotten
Goschen", was attempting to demonstrate his indispensibility
in the belief that in this way he would secure for himself
an even greater influence than he already possessed. The
Government was shaken to its foundations and many both at
1
hone and. abroad expected it to come toppling down. Hicks-
Beach even advised immediate resignation unless the Liberal
2
Unionists should consent to a coalition. On the following'
day Salisbury wrote to Hartington who was holidaying in
Italy pressing him to consent to a coalition.^ He urged
that the G0nservative front bench was so weak that it must
be continually in serious danger of being overthrown in "the
1
jug.'.The Manchester Guardian wrote that the Government
would""either have to submit to Churchill or perish, and that,
as submission was difficult, practically a new government
would have to be formed (24 Dec. 1886, p.5).
2
Hicks-Beach to Salisbury, 25 Dec. 1886, Lady Victoria
Hicks-Beach, Life of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, I, 301-2.
3
Salisbury to Hartington, 24 Dec. 1886, Chats.
340.2070.
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chanoe medley" of the Commons and that, once defeated,
constitutional usage would prevent Conservatives and Liberal
Unionists from then coalerjcing. He pointed out that,
"as Chamberlain had evidently made up his mind" to leave
them, the exclusion of the Gladstoriians would depend on
the staunchness and discipline of Hartington's followers,
and that there was all the difference in the world between
loyalty to a minister and loyalty to the chief of an
independent section. He informed Hartington that as in
July he was willing to serve under him.
Hartington arrived back in London on 29 December."*"
He expected to refuse Salisbury's invitation, 2 but first
set about consulting Chamberlain, Oosohen, an^ other
important Liberal Unionists.* Advice also came to him
by post. Selborne wrote pressing an immediate coalition.4
In his opinion the Government had no strength to spare
before the resignation and he did not see how it could
get through such difficulties as procedure, Irish legislation,
1
Hartington to Duke of Devonshire, 29 Dec. 1886,






Selbome to TIartington, 25 Dec. 1886, Chats.
340.2071.
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local government, or defences if it had a weak leader in the
Commons, a damaged prestige caused by disunion, and Churchill
as an enemy or a "candid friend". Derby wrote that the
Ijooition was similar to the one six months earlier, and
that the reasons which had weighed then had lost none of their
force."*" Churchill's quarrel with his colleagues, he
suggested, might have been not on whether the estimates
should be raised or lowered by a million or two, but on
whether they were to be framed on a war footing to enable
Britain to take part in an anti-Russian alliance. They
should therefore, he advised, be doubly cautious not to
entangle themselves with men of whose present engagements
and future intentions they cotild not be sure. John
Bright wrote that he thought the crisis less serious
than the newspapers described it and advised Hartington
not to join the administration. He held that the
Conservatives, even though it meant risking a general
2
election, should remain in office uhtil defeated in the
Commons. He warned Hartington that were he to join the
1
Derby to Hartington, 26 Dec. 1886, Chats. 340.
2073.
2
Bright believed that an election would result in Liberal
Unionist losses (Bright to Ilartington, 28 Dec. 1886, Chats.
340.2075) as also did Col. H.M.Hozier, the secretary of the
Liberal Unionist Association (Col. H.M.Hozier to Hartington,
31 Dec. 1886, Chats. 340.2081).
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Governmentthe Liberal Unionists who should support him
would be cast off by the electors and the remainder would
subside into the Gladstonian ranks.'1"
■fc'rom his consultations Hartington soon learned that
Liberal Unionist opinion was practically unanimous against
his joining with the Conservatives in any form of composite
2
government. He himself was less convinced on the matter,
but bowed to the wish of his followers. Shortly afterwards
he confessed in a letter to Granville:
... I wish I could feel as convinced as you are
that I have done right. There seems to me to be a
good many reasons why the chance of forming a
tolerably strong Government by those who agree on
most of the immediate and practical questions
should not be sacrificed to the very doubtful
prospect of my recovering any influence with the
Liberal party as a whole.. . .3
On the last day of the year Hartington told Salisbury
that he had decided with the unanimous support of his
associates not to join the Government as that step must lose
1
Bright to Hartington, 28 Dec. 1886.
2
Hartington to the Queen, 31 Dec. 1886, Holland,
II. 179-81: Salisbury to the Queen £ cypher telegramJ ,
31 Dee. 1886, Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, I.
240; Hartington to Granville, TJan, 1887, P.R.O.,
30.29.22A (q.w.o•, Holland. II. 183-4); Salisbury to
Iddesleigh Coypher telegram'^ , n.d. given by decipherer
£31? Dee. 1886 J, Iddesleigh,421/4.
3
Hartington to Granville, 2 Jan, 1887.
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him all influence over the Liberals in the country"*". For
the same reason, and also because of the strong opposition
within the Conservative party, he could not, he said, accept
the responsibility of himself forming a coalition unless it
were to avoid a dissolution, or if the Conservatives by
resignation should have admitted their inability to cariy
2
on. Salisbury replied that he could not make such a
confession of inability as it would be both untrue and
humiliating.^ A Conservative administration, Hartington
promised, could rely on his support even should Chamberlain,
whose opinions he believed to be unchanged, go over to the
Gladstonians
Salisbury was not surprised5 and, although he tried
to reassure Hartington on Conservative opposition
1
Salisbury to the Queen, 31 Dec. 1886; Hartington
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Hartington to Duke of Devonshire, 31 Dec. 1886,
Chats. 340.2080.
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to a coalition,"*" he did not press him much to change
2
his decision. Instead he proposed that ^oschen should
be invited into the Government.^ Hartington approved
the suggestion and promised Salisbury that he would use
his influence to induce ^oschen to accept.^"
Later in the same day Partington wrote to Salisbury**
that he had had a long conversation with G0schen in which
he had urged every argument he could think of, but feared
that ^oschen would decide against joining. He explained
that soachen felt he would be isolated in a Conservative
Cabinet and that the Conaervative party had on the whole
no great wish for his inclusion. On the following day
Hartington had a further meeting with Goa0hen and learned
that he had changed his mind and was willing to accept
Salisbury's offer. Goaohen's conditions were that he
should be at liberty to state that he joined the Government
as a Liberal, and that first he should have a full
consultation with Salisbury on "general policy, foreign,
1
Salisbury to the Queen, 31 Dec. 1886; and Salisbixry
to Iddesleigh£31? Dec. 1886J.
2
Hartington to Duke of Devonshire, 31 Dec. 1886.
3
Salisbury to the Queen, 31 Dec. 1886; Hartington to
Duke of Devonshire, 31 Deo. 1886; and Salisbury to Iddesleigh
E31? Dec. 18861.
4
Hartington to Duke of Devonshire, 31 Dec. 1886.
5
Hartington to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1886, Holland, II.
181-2.
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domestic, legislative, and financial" as he wished to
feel certain that he could act with the government on all
of them."*"
Hartington passed the news to Salisbury who at
once prepared to make almost any arrangement to suit
^oschen. He wired to the Queen:
... Lord Salisbury regards the attainment of
this result Cyoschen's inclusion in the GoveramontJ
as a matter of enormous importance at this juncture
and earnestly hopes that your Majesty will L take
the same view of the situation and will give him the
necessary powers.
It would be a grave national misfortune if
this arrangement were to break TdownJ on any
personal grounds. 3
Salisbury and ^oachen had an interview two days
later.^" There was no clash of views over poliey, but
Goachen, to Salisbury's surprise, strongly urged that
Iddesleigh, who was suspected of inefficlenoy, should be
removed from the foreign Office. Salisbury consented.
1




Salisbury to the Queen Ccypher telegram,] 2 Jan.









He also consented to try to meet ^osehen's wish that-
one or two Liberal Unionist peers should join him in the
Government.'*" He asked Lansdowne, who was then Governor
General of Canada, and Northbrook, but both declined.
Lansdowne pleaded the state of Canadian internal affairs,
and that the fishers'" dispute with the United States was
2
at a critical stage. An additional factor in Lansdowne's
decision was his ignorance on many aspects of the Government's
policy and especially their Irish policy.^ The reasons
**•»
given by Horthbrook for his refusal are not recorded by
his biographer. Derby in a letter to Hartington wrote that
he did not expect Horthbrook to accept as he was independent,
rather lazy, a thorough Whig and unlike Goschen, had been
in the pre-home rule cabinet.
The outcome was three important changes in the Cabinet:
Salisbury became foreign Secretary; GoaChen undertook the




Salisbury to the Queen, 8 Jan. 1887, q.w.o., Letters
of> Uueen Victoria, 3rd Series, I. 250, foot-note 2l and"
Xansdowne" to "his mother, 6 Jan. 1887, Lord Rewton,
Lord Lansdowne; a biography, 43-44.
3
Lansdowne to his mother, 6 Jan. 1887.
4
Derby to Hartington, 5 Jan. 1887, Chats.
340.2092.
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Commons. The latter position, which Churchill had held in
addition to the Exchequer, was debarred to Goschen because of
his insistance on remaining a Liberal Unionist."'"
The news that uoschen had joined the Cabinet was received
by most Conservatives with relief and satisfaction. He
was one of the ablest finanoiers in the country, an excellent
debater, noted for the moderation of his views, and - most
important of all - coalition was averted. The majority of
the Con3ervative rank and file had learned of the possibility
of a coalition with aversion and Hartin ton had been wise in
taking their views into account when making his decision.
Even the Cabinet had not been unanimous on the matter.
Iddesleigh had been opposed to the admission into the Cabinet
of any Liberal. Unionist, including Goschen.^
The Liberal Unionists were equally glad that the
situation was saved. On Goschen#s transference Northbrook's
opinion was representative:
• . • Gosohen has been in some respects something
of a Conservative; and although his speeches were




Memorandum by Iddesleigh (copy), n.d., Iddesleigh,
895/4.
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of the Union last year I hardly think he is a strength
to the Liberal Unionists, for our Radical section is
the most likoly to split off, and by them I fancy
Ooschen has for some time been looked on as hardly a
Liberal at all. • . • 1
s
1
Northbrook to lJ.artington, 3 Jan. 1887, Ghats. 340.2086.
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CHAPTER VII
THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE
The occasion of ChamberIain's reunion appeal was not an
auspicious one. The Gladstonian wing had been steadily gaining
influence within his Birmingham party machine and the speech was
made to a special assembly of the Birmingham local associations
in order to quell what threatened to be an open revolt.
Chamberlain began by emphasising the importance of Churchill's
resignation. He said that he feared "the old Tory influences"
had gained the upper hand and that they might have to deal with a
Government whose proposals no consistent Liberal would be able to
support. He pointed out to the Gladstonians that the new situation
provided them with a great and perhaps final opportunity for bringing
about a reunion. The two sections of the Liberal party were agreed,
he said, on ninety-nine points of a programme and disagreed on one
only. They were, he believed, agreed upon every important point of
Liberal policy for England, Scotland, and Wales. Those who had so
strongly opposed the "unauthorised programma" twelve months earlier
now subscribed to it. Even in Irish matters, he continued, the
number of points on which they were agreed surprised him. In the
first place they were agreed that there must be law and order in
Ireland. They also were agreed, he said, on the importance of the
Irish land problem, and to overcome any differences of opinion which
there might be as to the best practical solution, he suggested a
plan :
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. • , I am convinced now that, sitting around a
table end coming together in a spirit of compromise
end conciliation, almost any three men, leaders of
tha Liberal party, although they may hold opposite
views upon mother branch of the question, would yet
be able to arrange some scheme wfich would fulfil the
conditions 1 have laid down, which would not involve
unnecessary risk to the British taxpayer, and yet
would make the Irish tenant owner of the land he
cultivates.. • •
ihey were agreed, he continued, that Ireland should have local
government similar to the local government which would be given to
Great uritain, with alterations of detail where they might be
necessary. Of purely municipal type government he was prepared,
he said, to give any extension, and no one, he assured his audience,
was more prepared than he to decentralise "the system of adminis¬
tration known as Dublin Castle". But on home rule proper he held
out no hope of agreement. He urged that it be shelved completely
until "all those vast changes, all thcee important reforms" should
have been accomplished, and that not until then should Liberals
think of turning to "the debatable ground upon which at present, at
all events, agreement is impossible."
The speech was thus not so much on appeal for a compromise as
a bold invitation to the Gladstonians to come to terms with himself
Chamberlain held out no hope of any major concession on his own
part. Law and order were to be maintained in Ireland which, of
course, meant "coercion" if necessary, and home rule was to be
shelved for an indefinite period. Once again Gladstone was asked
to choose between Chamberlain and Parnell, a point which Chamberlain
must have grasped for during the subsequent conference he refused,
1
Times. 24 Dec. 1886.
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even when In his most conciliatory raood,^" to break off his bitter
vendetta with the Nationalists.
Chamberlain had at most some twenty adherents in the House of
Commons and an unsteady hold on his Birmingham party machine. Yet
he invited Gladstone with his one hundred and ninety supporters to
come to terms with him - and at the very moment when Radical
Unionist expectations had been blighted by Churchill's resignation.
Chamberlain had a better eye for political realities than most men.
Part of the explanation, one feels (but through lack of available
evidence cannot prove), may have been that Chamberlain had learned
of Morley's approach to Dale and possibly also of Gladstone's
reunion suggestions. Someone among the number who knew of
Gladstone's suggestions had been gossiping for on the 24th Brett
reported to Hartington that Gladstone was "burning with ardour
difficult to restrain - for denunciation of the 'plan of campaign'
O
and for a 'conference' with the Unionists." Pointing to the some
conclusion is the rumour, which sprang up after the Liberal
Unionist conference, that Gladstone was fully willing to adopt the
3
proposals of Chamberlain's telegram.
One result of the circumstances under which the speech was
made was that the majority of people, and especially Gladstonians
and Nationalists, refused to give it a literal interpretation.
They assumed that Chamberlain, with no prospect before him but of
1 e.£. Chamberlain's Hawick speech, 22 Jan. 1887, The Times.
24 Tan. 1886.





years in the wilderness in the company of Whigs and Tories, was
manoeuvring for an opportunity to rejoin Gladstone. Some were not
satisfied by so simple an explanation, "but suspected that he and
Churchill were in league,1 or that he was endeavouring to prevent
Hartington from joining the Conservatives in a reconstructed
p
ministry, or that perhaps he was trying to demonstrate to the rank
and file that Gladstone was the "big obstacle to reunion, and he its
x
champion. The more responsible newspapers on the whole were
cautious in their immediate reaction, few committing themselves to
more than tentative remarks and speculations. Nevertheless, in
almost all the press comments it is clear that the question in the
mind of the commentator was, Is Chamberlain going to return to
Gladstone? and that with very few of them was it, Will Gladstone
come to terms with Chamberlain? Individuals were more positive
in their expressions of opinion. "Chamberlain has evidently made
up his mind to leave us," wrote Salisbury. Gladstone's conclusion
was "We stand midway in his estimation between the Government plus
<5
Churchill and the Government minus Churchill.*' Courtney remarked
to his wife, "Everyone says Mr. Chamberlain can't give way to Mr.
Gladstone, but no one says he won't.
Gladstone's conclusion expressed, not only the general opinion
1 .e.g. Spencer to Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1886, P.R.O. 30.29.22A; or
WoTverton to Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44349, f.221; or
Fianchester Guardiart. 24 Dec. 1886, p.5.
2 £.£. H.A.Lascelles to Hartington, 24 Dec. 1886, Chats. 340.2069.
3 e.£. Kate Courtney's diary, 24 Dec. 1886, Courtney, XXIII.
4 Salisbury to Hartington, 24 Dec. 1686, Chats. 340.2070.
5 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 30 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas 44200,
f. 222.
6 Kate Courtney's diary, £early Jan. 1887], Courtney XXIII.
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of the time, "but the one which was to become so thoroughly
established that to this day the current assumption is that
Chamberlain's speech and the subsequent Round Table Conference had
their genesis in Churchill's resignation.* Even J. L. Garvin in
his life of Chamberlain does not go much beyond it, but works on
the hypothesis that Chamberlain was motivated almost completely by
the belief that no longer could he expect reform from the
p
Conservatives. Such explanations are over-simple and take no
account of a number of factors.
Undoubtedly Chamberlain was startled, and assumed that
Churchill had been forced to resign by the determination of his
colleagues to keep liberal legislation to a minimum, and he made
his speech in that belief. But Chamberlain's telegram to the
Liberal Unionist conference on 7 December proves that his reunion
appeal was more than a "spur of the moment" performance.* The
abrupt, dictatorial tone of the telegram contrasts sharply with the
plausibility of the speech, but when the speech is reduced to bare
essentials there can be no mistaking that the one was the prototype
of the other. Chamberlain himself referred to the speech as an
5
extension of the telegram. The main difference between the two
1 e.£. R.C.K.Ensor, England 1870-1914. 175; and J.L.Hammond,
Gladstone and the Irish nation. 566.
2 Garvin, II. Chap. XXXIV, passim; and ibid., II. 434.
3 Chamberlain's speech, 23 Dec. 1886, The Times, 24 Dec. 1886.
Chamberlain wrote to Brett (23 Dec. 1886), "What do you think of
the little rift now? Salisbury is a bold man and is no doubt
prepared for all the consequences." (Journals and letters of
Reginald Viscount Esher. I. 129). "" —
4 For text of telegram see above p. 299.
5 Chamberlain to Churchill, 3 Jan. 1887, Churchill, II. 267-8.
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was that in the telegram the Gladstonians were asked to abandon
completely any attempt at establishing an Irish legislative of the
kind envisaged in the defeated Government of Ireland Bill, while
in the speech they were asked to postpone such an attempt
indefinitely. On both occasions Chamberlain suggested that, as a
preliminary to reunion, agreement on a common Irish policy should
be secured between Gladatonians and Liberal Unionists by means of
a conference.
The Government's reluctance to press matters likely to arouse
strong opposition within the Conservative party undoubtedly
weighed heavily -with Chamberlain. Nevertheless, he still had as
good, or perhaps better, reasons for expecting reforms after the
fall of Churchill tnan he naa in tne preeeaxug August when, as has
been seen, ne appears to have been an much interested in avoiding
controversial legislation as he was in securing the adoption of a
reform programme. Salisbury and other important members of the
Government were publicly committed to much of the "Dartford
Programme." In addition, a government which relied for its
existence on the support of Liberals, and had both Chamberlain and
Churchill as independent critics, could not avoid making itself
responsible for some reform. What Chamberlain could no longer
confidently expect were the radical reforms, which, under the
influence of Churchill, he seems to have been in high hopes of
when he left England in October.
Chamberlain, after the general election, had been guided by
the expectation of a Liberal reunion when Gladstone should disappear
from politics and held that, in the meantime, nothing should be done
either to widen the gap with the Gladstonians or to overthrow the
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Government. However, during the weeks which followed, the
difficulties of serving both Liberal unity and Government safety
were demonstrated to him in a practical manner and he must have
seen that, in spite of his desire to achieve the contrary, Liberal
Unionists and Glad Etonians were steadily drawing further apart, and
that each clash between the two nailed the home rule flag the more
firmly to the Gladstonian mast. Then, too, Chamberlain was a
restless and ambitious man and when, in mid-summer, he decided on
a waiting policy he chose the one to which temperamentally he was
least suited. When the tide of events started to run against him,
one feels that it was only a matter of time until his combative
instinct would lead him into launching some active scheme.
If only as a deterrent against the temptation to assume that
Chamberlain made his reunion appeal in total ignorance of the true
state of affairs within the Cabinet, it is worth noting that
Chamberlain had fuller information on what had been taking place
in the Cabinet than almost anyone outside it. Since his return to
Britain (12 December) Churchill and he had been in close consul-
\ fa O
tation and from him he knew that, until at least three days
beforehand, the controversial question had been whether to include
1 Churchill to Chamberlain, 19 Dec. 1886, Garvin, II. 272-3;
Chamberlain*s memoir, Chamberlain, 233; and Brett's journal, 23
Dec. 1886, Journals and letters of Reginald Viscount Ssher. I. 131-
2 A common tactic with Churchill was to endeavour to obtain his
own way by pointing out to his colleagues that his views were also
those of Chamberlain and by reminding them of the danger that
Chamberlain might rejoin Gladstone should he be dissatisfied with
the Government's measures. (£.£. see Churchill to Chamberlain, 19
Dec. 1886). The tactic was little liked by Salisbury. Shortly
after the resignation Salisbury wrote to a friend that Churchill
had been especially difficult to work with because of his resolution
to make the interests of the budget overrule the wishes and neces¬
sities of the other departments, and because of his friendship with
Chamberlain "which made him insist that we should accept that
statesman sis our guide in internal politics." (Salisbury to Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen, 30 Dec. 1886, Cecil, III. 336-7).
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in the local government bill the ex officio representation pressed
for by many Conservatives end such men as Goschen. The local
government bill, however, was the ono question on which Chamberlain
was intensely anxious that Churchill should have his way, and the
p
one on which Chamberlain was most likely to go to extremes. On
foreign policy, and such coercion as might be necessary he was
prepared, he had said, to give "a generous consideration."
Two letters which Chamberlain wrote to Churchill on 23 and
26 December throw interesting light on his attitude .just then.
They show that he had no more than a slight hope that anything
important would cone of his Birmingham speech. Neither letter
contains any indication that Chamberlain was wallowing in the
slough of despond, as has so often been assumed, but on the contrary
and especially in the second, there is a sturdy note of optimism
end the old unyielding determination.
... I have to speak tonight, he wrote on the 23rd
and must express my first thoughts on what is an
entirely changed situation.
I wish I was able to communicate with you
beforehand, but if you have any wishes or ideas let
me know. If necessary we will arrange a meeting,
and I will run up to London again.
The Government is doomed, and I suspect we may
have to reform parties on a new basis.4 You and I
1 Churchill to Chamberlain, 19 Dec. 1806; and Chamberlain's
memoir, Chamberlain, 233-
2 Ibid,., Chamberlain to Lord Rothschild, £l9 or 2(^ Dec. 1886,
referred to, Garvin, II. 273; Brett to Hartington, 24 Dec. 1886,
Chats. 340.2068; and Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 265-
3 Churchill to Chamberlain, 19 Dec. 1886.
4 This sentence, on a first glance, makes one suspect that
Chamberlain was thinking of Liberal reunion, but when it is taken
in conjunction with the letter of three days later it seems more
probable that he had in minct a coalition government ana an
independent alliance between Churchill and him.
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are equally adrift from the old organisations.*"
In the second letter he wrotei
. . . You will have a hard time to go through. Your
case will he mine almost exactly, and I can tell you
it is a bitter pilgrimage which is in prospect. The
party tie is the strongest sentiment in this country -
stronger than patriotism or even self-interest. But
it will all come right in the end for hoth of us.
I assume that you will maintain an independent
position, and in that case you will he a power that
your party cannot ignore. The Standard has a right
to be angry, and the Caucuses will denounce you;
hut in their hearts they know you are indispensable,
and when they find they cannot bully you into sub¬
mission they will come to your terms. Next time,
however, that either you or I join a Cabinet we must
be certain of our majority in it.
My speech has fluttered the dovecotes tremen¬
dously, and my correspondence shows that raany of the
Gladstonians are very uncomfortable and anxious to
come to terms. But I do not believe that there will
be any practical result. Mr. Gladstone does not 2
give way on the main point - neither will I . . .
Gladstone thought that the natural sequel to Churchill's
•*
resignation was a Conservative - Liberal Unionist coalition.
He assumed that Churchill could not go back and that an attempt
to fill his place with Goschen would be on the level of Bright's
A
pills for an earthquake. He thought the situation should
be judged primarily for its effect on the Irish question and was
tempted to hope that Hartington would join the Government as that
would clear the ground. He rejoiced to think, he remarked to
1
Chamberlain to Churchill, 23 Dec. 1886, Churchill, II. 252.
^
Chamberlain to Churchill, 26 Dec. 1886, Ibid.. II. 252-3.
5 Gladstone to Granville, 23 Deo. 1886, P.R.O., 30.29-29A; and
Gladstone to Morley (draft), 25 Dec. 1886, Add. Ms3. 44255, f.
154, (q.w.o., Morley, III. 364-6).
4
I£ld-
** Gladstone to Morley, 2$ Dec. 1886.
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Morley, that, come what might, the resignation would advance the
Irish question.Gladstone's desire for an immediate approach to
the Liberal Unionists vanished. Chamberlain's speech, he admitted,
was a new fact of great weight, but added that he thought the momen*
2
for taking account of it had not yet come.
i
Morley considered Chamberlain's speech second in importance
*5 i \
only to Churchill's resignation. He pointed out that, although
Chamberlain had not committed himself to any definite advance from
his position of the previous January, his tone was now very
different. "If he can be got to advance, and if P[arnellJ were
moderate in the sense of his last conversation with me, there
4
might be some chance of daylight," Morley wrote to Gladstone.
He added that he did not wish to act as an intermediary with
Chamberlain, but would accept as a duty whatever Gladstone should
think desirable.^ Nevertheless, like so many other Gladstonians,
Morley suspected Chamberlain's motives. Was he simply foxing? he
wondered.^ Morley believed that bitter disruption would follow in
both unionist camps should Hertington join Salisbury in a
0
government, and that home rule would reap the benefit.











1 Morley to Harcourt, 24 Dec. 1886, referred to, Gardiner, II. 19*
®
Morley to Gladstone, 27 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44255, f. 158J and
Morley to Spencer, 27 Dec. 1886, Morley vol., A1thorp.
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Gladstone's desire for overtures and was much relieved to learn
that Gladstone was not disposed "to dash into negotiations" with
Chamberlain.* Spencer denounced Chamberlain as being purely an
p
opportunist, and was uncertain whether he was seeking reconcilia¬
tion with the Gladstonians or was preparing to make a final break
with them, preparatory to joining Churchill in the formation of a
•3
new party. Spencer admitted that he wished the land question
could be settled apart from home rule, but saw no prospect of such
an arrangement as the Pamellites would be opposed to it.^
Granville agreed with Gladstone that Churchill's resignation
5
much strengthened the home rule cause. On Chamberlain10 speech
his only available remark is that Chamberlain was the prince of
opportunists, but that his help would be very important.® Ripon
stated that he would be glad to see Chamberlain reunited with the
7
party, but not at the cost of any sacrifice of principle.
Wolverton feared that Churchill and Chamberlain were acting
8
together. Arnold Morley remarked that, although Chamberlain's
1 Spencer to Granville, 27 Dec. 1886, P.E.O. 30.29.22A.
2 Ibid.
3 Spencer to Granville, 26 Dec. 1886, P.K.O. 30.29.22A
A Ibid.
5 Granville to Gladstone, 24, and 25 Dec. 1886, Add. Malik 4417\,
ff. 222, and 228; Granville to Spencer, 24 Dec. 1886, Gr%ville
vol., A1thorp.
6 Granville to Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1386, Add. Kss. 44179, f. 234.
7 Ripon to Gladstone, 29 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44287, f. 67.
6 Wolverton to Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44349, f. 221.
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speech contained very little concession, it was all which could be
expected under the circumstances.*' He suspected that it resulted
from the considerable pressure which he understood "Dale, Harris &
Co" were applying to Chamberlain to get him to take a conciliatory
attitude,2
Chamberlain's reunion appeal aroused greater enthusiasm in
Harcourt than in any other Gladstonian. On reading the speech
•3
he wrote by the next post assuring Chamberlain that he earnestly
desired to co-operate in anything tending towards party reunion
and offered to go up to London to meet him should he think a
meeting of use.* Next day he wrote to Gladstone that Chamberlain's
speech, together with private indications, caused him to believe
that Chamberlain was holding out the olive branch and that he felt
very strongly that the Gladatonians should go halfway to meet him.
The occasion, Harcourt asserted, invited an attempt at reunion
which if let slip might not recur. He stated that he might see
Chamberlain soon and asked permission to tell him that the
(5
Gladstonians recognised and welcomed his spirit of reconciliation.
Harcourt considered Churchill's resignation the most
extraordinary event sine© the break up of the Rockingham ministry
1 A. Morley to Gladstone, 24 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44253, f. 50.
2 Ibid.
5 Harcourt to Chamberlain, 24 Dec. 1886, q.w.o., Garvin, II.
280-1.
4 Ibid.
5 Harcourt to Gladstone, 25 Dec. 1886, Add. Hss. 44200,
f. 195.
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and believed that its consequences might he as important.* He was
p
confident that the Government must "go smash," and that neither
•K
Partington nor Goschen would join it. But for the persistence,
the good will, and the active measures of Harcourt the Hound Table
Conference might never have materialised, or if it had, would have
collapsed quickly. "Let us go in hot and strong for compromise
and not mince matters too much if the thing can he done," he wrote
to Morley. Harcourt it was who obtained Gladstone's luke-wsrm
consent to the experiment.
Chamberlain did not rush forward with the enthusiasm of
Hereourt. As Garvin pointed out, "Chamberlain, at the outset of
this dubious affair, was a blend of adventurous optimism and
5
instinctive precaution." A mistaken impression as to the cause
of Churchill* s resignation may have influenced Chamberlain*s speech
of 23 December, but it was not a factor which influenced his
decision to take pert in a conference. Hot later than the 26th
Chamberlain learnt much of the real story of the resignation from
Churchill and was by no means impressed by the reasons which he
6
gave for his action.
1 Harcourt to Gladstone, 25 Dec. 1886.
2 Ibid.
3 Harcourt to Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1886, Add. Mas. 44200, f. 199
(q.w.o., Gardiner, II. 20).
4 Harcourt to Morley, 26 Dec. 1886, quotation, Gardiner, II. 20.
5 Garvin, II. 235.
6 Chamberlain to Churchill, 26 Dec. 1886, Churchill, II. 252-5.
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Chamberlain replied thus to Harcourt's offer of co¬
operation :
. . • The land question in Ireland is the most urgent,
whether you have regard to social order or to the
Parliamentary position. If we were all agreed upon
a strong land bill, the Irish members must support it.
Their constituents would stand no nonsense on this
point and would not allow the question to be post¬
poned for Home Rule or anything else.
When I spoke of "3 Liberals around a table" I
thought of you, Herschell and Fowler, as the three
conspicuous Gladstonians who have done nothing to
embitter the differences which have arisen and have
shown moderation and fairness throughout. To such
a Committee I would gladly submit in detail various
suggestions for dealing with the land question. I
should have confidence that you at least would not
use these confidential proposals in subsequent public
discussion ...
The Committee would also of course be in
possession of the views of Mr. Gladstone and of any
other leader who has given study to the subject.. . .
I imagine they would find it necessary to formulate
some scheme of local or municipal government and . . .
I do not anticipate that there could be any serious
difficulty in arriving at a common conclusion.
If the Committee were successful thus far, I for
one should begin to entertain hopes of further agree¬
ment. At the present time there appears to be a car¬
dinal difference of opinion between Mr. Gladstone and
the Liberal Unionist leaders on the subject of an
Irish Parliament.
I cannot pretend to see my way as yet out of
this difficulty but time and full discussion may
work miracles.
... I do not contemplate complete personal
reunion as the result of any conference or mediation.
I have been most bitterly wounded by the Injustice
and the ingratitude of former associates and I feel
that, for me at any rate, a temporary effacement is
a necessary prelude to any future \xsefulness. But
I am sincerely impressed with the danger to
Liberalism, to all for which I have struggled and
laboured - if present dissentions are allowed to
continue.
Hitherto I have done nothing - or very little -
to organise opposition to Mr. Gladstone's proposals;
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but this must come and when a Liberal or Radical
Unionist Committee is established in every con¬
stituency, the Tories will hove an easy time of it,
and all that I care for in politics will be inde¬
finitely postponed ... 1
Chamberlain thus still wished to exclude home rule fi-om any
immediate reunion discussion, and in Harcourt, Herschell, and
Fowler he chose three Gladstonians, who not only were very eager
for his return to their ranks, but had almost as little liking as
he for home rule as planned in the Government of Ireland Bill.
Had his proposal been accepted the chances of an agreement would
have been excellent - at least within the conference.
Gladstone answered Harcourt*s letter on the 27th. He agreed
that Chamberlain's speech was an important event of which account
had to be taken. He even thought it should lead to a modus
Vivendi. But he himself, he stated, could make no binding
declaration until he should know the composition of the new
government, and be able to make a. reasonable forecast of its
policy. The importance of Chamberlain's speech, he observed,
lay more in its unwonted moderate temper than in the plan "which
with characteristic facility and rapidity" Chamberlain had laid
down. He thought that a modus vivendi did not lie in a land bill
and the proclaimed postponement by the Gladstonians of home rule
(a course which he declared Chamberlain should have seen from the
beginning was impossible). It lay "rather in ascertaining whether
if Home Rule cannot be had at once, there can be had a measure
worth Ireland's taking in the province of Local Government with
the assent of 1. the Liberals, 2. the Nationalists, 3. the
1 Chamberlain to Harcourt, 26 Dec. 1886, Chamberlain, 235-7.
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Dissentient Liberals, either the whole or a section of them."
Already Gladstone was uneasy at Harcourt's pro-Chamberlain enthu¬
siasm and by his evident inclination to appoint himself as inter¬
mediary. Chamberlain, he pointed out, although he had gre"t power
of opposing and damaging in debate had no large following to offer,
nor one in which the quality would compensate for the quantity.
He tactfully hinted that, should an intermediary be reqiiired,
Morley, who, he explained, was already in the process of approaching
Chamberlain, was the man for the task.^
But Harcourt was in no mood for taking hints from anyone.
On receiving Chamber-lain's letter he had at once gone up to London
and, after discussing the matter with Morley, had sent a message
asking Chamberlain to come on the following day to London for a
P 3
discussion.' Chamberlain telegraphed that he would come. Harcourt
in reporting Chamberlain's reply wrote to Gladstone that he quite
agreed that Chamberlain's speech would not serve as the basis of
a modus vivendi, but that, if the spirit of reconciliation should
be present, he believed the other matters would prove elastic.^
These developments were far from reassuring to Gladstone
who complained to Granville that Harcourt was inclined to travel
a little too fast, and that he wished Granville had been at his
elbow. He considered Morley, he wrote, "to be very solid 'on his
1 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 27 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200,
f. 207.
2 Harcourt to Gladstone, 28 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200, f. 209.
3 Harcourt to Gladstone, 29 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200, f. 214.
4 Gladstone to Granville, 30 Dec. 1886, P.R.O., 30.29.29A.
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pins' and sure to keep straight." He added that receptivity,
tranquility, patience and caution, seemed to him the prescription
for the moment.1
Chamberlain can have had little hope of Hartington joining
the proposed discussions when even the optimistic Harcourt had
2
none. Nevertheless, and perhaps mainly in order to safeguard
his alliance with him, Chamberlain had an interview with Hartington
on 29 December and again on 2 January at which he attempted to
x
persuade him to join. Hortington had no liking for the suggestion
end warned Chamberlain that he was placing himself in a risky
position.^ But Hartington did admit that he was still prepared
to go as far towards a central Irish body as he had gone in his
5
election address of July.
Harcourt and Chamberlain met at Harcourt's London home on
30 December. Chamberlain wanted the proposed conference to be
confined at the outset to an attempt to discover a mutually
acceptable policy for Irish land and local government, and to
1 Ibid.
2 Harcourt to Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200, f. 225
(q.w.o., Gardiner, II. 23).
3 Chamberlain to Harcourt, 29 Dec. 1886, and 2 Jan. 1887,
Garvin, II. 282; Chamberlain to Hartington, 2 Jan. 1887, Chats.
340.2084A; Lord Harcourt's journal, 31 Dec. 1886, Gardiner,
II. 23-24; Morley to Granville, 1 Jan. 1087, P.R.O., 30.29.22A;
ai Morley to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44255, f. 169;
and Morley to Spencer, 1 Jan. 1887, Morley vol., Althorp.
4 Ibid.







include home rule on the agenda only if they should succeed in
their first aim."*" The great difference betx^een Gladstone and
himself, Chamberlain said, was that Gladstone treated Ireland as
a separate nation, while he regarded it as a state or province of
2
Britain in the same way as Nova Scotia was a province of Canada.
He stated that he had little hope of this difference of attitude
being surmounted, and that he was unwilling; to enter the conference
a
if home rule were to be the first topic. Harcourt objected
strongly that to postpone the question of home rule would give the
impression that the Gladstonians were willing to abandon their
principle of an Irish legislature for Irish affairs.^ At last
Chamberlain for practical purposes yielded and agreed that the
conference should from the beginning discuss the problem of home
rule "if thought desirable.'"^ They agreed that Morley should be
proposed as a representative in addition to the men whom
fi
Chamberlain had originally suggested. Chamberlain, knowing that
1 Harcourt to Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1886; Harcourt to Spencer, 1
Jan. 1887, Harcourt vol., A1thorp; Chamberlain's memorandum,
30 Dec. 1886, Chamberlain, 237-8; and Harcourt's speech, 27 Feb.
1809, The Times, 28 Feb. 1089, p.6.
2 Chamberlain's memorandum, 30 Dec. 1886.
3 Ibid.
4 Harcourt to Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1886.
3 Ibid♦, Harcourt to Spencer, 1 Jan. 1887; and Chamberlain's
memorandum, 31 Dec. 1886, Chamberlain, 239-40.
6 Ibid.
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he could rely on his sympathy,* was eager to retain Fowler and
urged the desirability of having him as a financial expert on the
p
land question.' The suggestion that Trevelyan should be invited
to take port seems to have been discussed also.
Next day the two met again and after an hour's discussion
Harcourt suggested that they send for Morley. Chamberlain "hummed
and hawed," but as he produced no good reason Harcourt went out
A
and reappeared with Morley. Both Harcourt and Morley pressed for
the inclusion of one or two Liberal Unionists and suggested
5 6
Trevelyan. Chamberlain reluctantly consented. He thought it
better, he said, to bring them in later when perhaps a measure of
7
agreement had been secured. Should the conference fail, both
sides, it was agreed, would be at liberty to resume their original
s
positions without having been in any way compromised. Subject to
Gladstone's approval, the first session was fixed for 13 and 14
1 H. Fowler (Wolverhampton) had in the past shown a sympathetic
moderation when speaking of Liberal Unionists; on the previous day
(29 Dec. 1886) he had in a public speech welcomed Chamberlain's
"olive branch" and in private he was doing his best to make recon¬
ciliation possible. See S. H. Fowler, Life of Lord Wolx^erhampton,
Chap. XIII.
2 Harcourt to Gladstone, 30 Dec. 1886.
3 Chamberlain's memorandum, 30 Dec. 1886.
4 Lord Harcourt's journal, 31 Dec. 1886, Gardiner, II. 23-24.
3 Harcourt to Gladstone, 31 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200, f. 230;
and Lord Harcourt's journal, 31 Dec. 1806,
6 Ibid.
7 Lord iiarcourt's journal, 31 Dec. 1886.
8 Chamberlain's memorandum, 31 Dec. 1886, Chamberlain, 239-40.
3b-o
January.1 A few daya later it was finally settled that Trevelyan
2
should join the conference .in place of H. Fowler, whom the
•5
Gladntonians ruled out because of his suspected pro-Chambcrlainism,
end that the other members should be those already suggested ;
Chamberlain, Harcourt, Morley, and Herschell.
Chamberlain's reluctance to have Liberal Unionists other than
himself at the conference is at first a little surprising. But
Chamberlain's attitude is understandable. He could be cert-' in
that, as long as Hartington held aloof from the conference, no
Liberal Unionist other than a radical would consent to take part,
and the radicals, except for Trevelyan, contained no one of ouch
standing. To have suggested Powell Williams, or Jesse Collings,
or W. S. Caine would have merely emphasised, or even exaggerated,
how utterly Chamberlain stood alone. Trevelyrm, the one possi¬
bility, Chamberlain held in low esteem.4* Also, he nay have been
uneasy lest Trevelyan should follow a line of his own in the
5
conference.
On both days of his discussion with Chamberlain Hsrcourt
sent Gladstone a full account of what had passed. In concluding
his second letter he declared that they should now strike while the
1 Lord Harcourt*s journal, 31 Doc. 1886.
2 Gardiner, II. 26-27.
3 A. Morley to Gladstone, 31 Dec. 1886, Add. Msa. 44253, f. 52;
Spencer to Gladstone, 20 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44313, f. 110:
Spe-cer to Granville, 20 Jan. 1887, P.R.O., 30.29.22A;
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 242; and Garvin, II. 283.
4 Granville to Harcourt (draft), 2 Jan. 1887, 1.2.0., 30.29.28A;
and is shown by Chamberlain's conduct towards him during the
conference.
5
Trevelynn had no b joined the National Liberal Union and had
always declined to use the tern Liberal Unionist when referring
to himself, ( Trevolvan's speech, Glasgow, 25 July 1887, The Times,
26 July 1887, p.8 >.
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iron was hot and pressed Gladstone to write him a letter for
publication approving of the conference suggestion. 8uch an
approval, he urged, was essential in order that the conference
might have sufficient authority as only Gladstone's word would
carry weight with his party and the Pamellites.^ Harcourt was
aware of Gladstone's hostility to negotiations between him and
Chamberlain, and so to reinforce his plea for Gladstone's public
approval he wrote on the following day to Granville and to Spencer
2
asking them to use their influence with Gladstone. If they did
not do so the whole affair, he warned them, would collapse and he
•x
at least would have nothing further to do with it.
Harcourt's appeal to Granville and Spencer was needless for
on 3 January he received from Gladstone a letter for publication
such as he had asked for. Gladstone enclosed with it the
following important statement:
. . . By a modus Vivendi I understand a partial
agreement, without prejudice to what lies beyond
it, supplying a plan of present action, and prompted
by a desire that a wider accommodation may in due
season be found practicable.
I consider that in a conference of this nature
opinions given on one point may naturally depend on
what is thought as to some other point, and that all
who take part are at liberty to resume their previous
attitudes, unless in so far as they may arrive at
any understanding otherwise.
1 Harcourt to Gladstone, 31 Dec. 1886, Add. Mss. 44200, f. 230.
2 Harcourt to Granville, 1 Jan. 1087, P.R«0., 30.29.29A; and
Harcourt to Opencer, 1 Jan. 1887, Harcourt vol., A1thorp.
3 Ibid.
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I assume it to "be impossible for Mr. Chamberlain
aa it evidently is for us to recede from the main
contention or to do anything in disparagement of it.
But it stands to be considered.
1. What we can arrange in the way of common
action.
2. How we can handle our differences, or how
far we can reserve thera, so as not to bring about
contention.
Individually I do not at this moment see my
way as to the construction of a new Land Purchase
Bill ... If however others find the ground more
open than I do, by no means let me stand in the way
of their deliberations.
As to 2. I put aside all idea of a serious
effort to press a plan of Home Rule on our basis
under the present circumstances, but leave open
the question whether there should or should not be
a vote in its favour, which it would be difficult
to decide at the present moment.
As to 1. The possible basis for common action
seems to me to be :
(a) Some Bill on the lines of a Liberal Local
Government for Ireland....
(b) Bills of Liberal policy, on points accepted
by the whole party. Or motions deemed politic,
£.£. public expenditure, if so deemed.
(c) Procedure i to press our own opinions in
the sense (a) of more Devol\ition (b) of cloture by
majority.. . .
While well disposed to any really useful measure,
and strongly impressed with the necessity of avoiding
anything equivocal in our general position, I am
more anxious for harmony than for activity.. . .1
Chamberlain*s attitude to the conference is indicated
in two letters which he wrote on 4 and 6 January again urging
1 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 1 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss.
44201, f.3.
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Hartington to take part.
... By modus vivendi. he wrote on the 4th, we
understand the possibility of partial agreement
without prejudice to anything further and with both
parties at full liberty to resume at any time their
original attitude. Nothing vrill induce me to consent
to a Parliament in Dublin with an executive dependant
on it. On the other hand, Mr. GGladstone]can hardly
be expected to proclaim that he has entirely abandoned
what he has declared to be a cardinal principle. But
the Conference will show : 1st, whether we can agree
on other branches of the Irish question, viz. the land
and local government; 2nd, whether there is any
'tertium quid* - any alternative on which we can also
agree as good in itself without requiring from either
side any formal repudiation of previously expressed
opinions.!
In the second letter he wrote s
... I do not fear that any conference will alter
the opinion I have publicly expressed.
I can hardly expect that Mr. Gladstone will
surrender his opinions either, but it is possible,
that admitting his inability to give effect to them
now, he may be ready to lay them aside either
absolutely or in favour of some substitution which
discussion may suggest.
I think, as I always have done, that land ought
to be dealt with first - that there is a possibility
of agreement on this branch of the question, - and
that if it were once settled the Home Rule agitation
would be reduced to manageable proportions.. . .2
1 Chamberlain to Hartington, 4 Jan. 1887, Chats. 340.2090,
(Chamberlain, 243-4, q.w.o., Garvin, II. 284, and Holland,
II. 183).






If Chamberlain had seen a letter which Gladstone wrote
to Hareourt on the following day he would have been even less
optimistic of a successful outcome for the conference.
... In your conversation, you three will represent
in one sense 280, and in a fuller sense say 19b
votes. They two will represent six or eight ? The
19b with firm ground under their feet; the six or
eight (if there be so many) floating in the air.. . .
Should you want another hand, you might think
of Sir C. Russell.. . . Chamberlain is tinder a
great necessity of moving. We are not! All our
necessity is to avoid a reasonably founded charge
of overlooking a pacific overture which might have
been accepted without compromise of our policy.. . .1
G1adstone's attitude had thus very much hardened during the
preceding week and perhaps as significant as anything was his
suggestion of the staunchly Gladstonian Sir Charles Russell as a
delegate. The fear that Harcourt and Herschell were pro-
Chamberlain, the conviction that by itself the course of events -
especially coercive actions by the Government - would go far
p
towards winning the struggle for home rule, further reflection
on the smallness of Chamberlain's following - six or eight of them
he reckoned -, pressure from the radical and other Gladstonians
3 4
opposed to a conference, and fear of estranging Parnell were
1 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 8 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44201,
f. 21.
2 'When writing to Harcourt about the conference on 3 Feb. Gladstone
remarked, "Mjr feeling has always been that the battle was for the
present largely out of our hands, but that it would be fought for
us partly by experience of Ireland and partly by the proposals and
errors of the Government." (quoted, Gardiner, II. 31).
3 In his letter to Harcourt (8 Jan.) Gladstone stated that the
greater part of his correspondence expressed "jealousy against
undue concessions."
A In his letter to Harcourt (8 Jan.) Gladstone wrote, "I take it
we shall not lightly do anything to split away from them [the
Nationalists] on the main Irish issue." Earlier in a letter to
Morley he had assured Parnell that he had no cause for alarm (3
Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 442bb, f. 17b).
3^
probably all factors contributing to Gladstone's new attitude.
Although Hartington thought the Gladstonians had more to
1
fear from the conference than had the Liberal Unionists, he
did not expect that it would serve any useful purpose and steadily
refused to participate. Even had he wished to do so, he could
hardly have participated after the part which he had taken in
the events which culminated in Goschen joining the Government.
Hartington, although he had not been consulted before the
Birmingham speech, bore no malice and seemed to act on the
principle that it was best to allow Chamberlain to take his own
course and to hope that he would come back a sadder and wiser
Liberal Unionist. On 9 January Hartington wrote to Buckle, the
editor of The Times, stating his own position and suggested that
The Times should take as friendly a line towards Chamberlain as
it could. He pointed out that as far as he knew Chamberlain had
said nothing which showed any inclination to recede from his
previous position on the question of an Irish parliament and
2
executive. Buckle replied that anything which The Times could
•3
do to keep Chamberlain to his guns would be done.
When Harcourt had been carrying out the preliminary
negotiations for the conference Morley had persistently warned
him to be less trustful of Chamberlain. 4 However,the meeting
1
Hartington to Buckle (draft), 9 Jan. 1887, Chats. 340.2099.
2
Hartington to Buckle (draft), 9 Jan. 1887, Chats. 340.2099.




with Chamberlain on the 31st assured Morley - at least-
temporarily - that Chamberlain was acting in good faith and
with a real desire for reconciliation."'' Morley did not expect
the conference to result in a modus Vivendi, but thought that
it might "soften things" and at worst could do no harm.
He suspected Harcourt and Herschell of being willing to
sacrifice the party's home rule principles to secure Chamberlain's
3
return.
Granville was even less optimistic than Morley about the
outcome of the conference. At best he hoped for a friendly
4
parting. Success, he observed seemed impossible, but if
obtained would be excellent. He believed that Herschell was
not firm on home rule and that Harcourt could not be relied upon,
but he had, he declared, much confidence in Morley.^ The fatal
Morley to Gladstone, 31 Dec, 1886. Add. Mss. 44235, f. 165.
Morley to Granville, 1 Jan. 1887, P.R.O., 30.29.22A
%
Writing- of the Round Table Conference in his life of Gladstone,
Morley stated, "Sir William Harcourt * . . thought the break up
of a greet political combination to be so immense an evil, as to
call for almost any sacrifice to prevent it." (vol III. 364).
He described as a farce Chamberlain's original suggestion that
the delegates should be Harcourt, Herschell, and Fowler (Morley
to Gladstone, 4 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44255, f.177), end A. Morley
reported to Gladstone (6 Jan.) that John Morley was anxious lest
Harcourt and Herschell should be inclined to sacrifice principle.
(Add. Mss. 44253* p.54). See also Morley to Spencer, 3 Jan. 1887,
Miscellaneous, A1thorp.
^ Granville to Gladstone, 13 Jan. 1887. Add Mss. 44180, f. 4.
5 lhia•
6
Ibid.; Granville to Gladstone, 7 Jan. 1887, Add, Mss. 44180,
f. Y Y'and Granville to Spencer, Miscellaneous, A1thorp,
3 Jen. 1886.
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result, he informed Gladstone, would be if Chamberlain were
enabled to say that no serious difference existed between
himself and the negotiators and that Gladstone was the obstacle.*
I
Spencer was comparatively friendly to the idea of the
2
conference and was glad that Gladstone gave it his approval.
He believed that should it fail no harm would have been done and
3
that to decline to meet Chamberlain would be a heavy responsibility;
Nevertheless, he feared that it would reveal diametrically
4
opposed views on certain primary matters. He thought it
satisfactory that the proposal came from Chamberlain and remarked
that the Gladstonians would have to take care to carry Pamell
a
with them, A couple of days later Spencer had modified his
views to the extent of admitting that a failure of the conference
would strengthen Chamberlain.^ He still doubted that little
would come of it, but thought that should Chamberlain really
7
mean to rejoin the Gladstonians he would find out a way.'
* Granville to Gladstone, 13 Jan. 1887.




Spencer to Granville, 4 Jan. 1887, P.R.O. 30.29.22A.
7 Ibid.
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Wolverton was opposed to the conference. He mistrusted
Harcourt and feared that Merschell was neither a genuine home
ruler nor a match for Chamberlain.'1' He thought that the bulk
2
of the staunchest Gladstonians had no wish for reunion,
and he dreaded lest the conference should weaken Gladstone's
x
"splendid position," v or that the impression should be given,
just when home rule was making progress, that the Gladstonians
4
were willing to postpone or to modify their policy. The
Conservative majority, he believed, would be eliminated once
5
the Government should have made a few more blunders, and how,
he asked, could Chamberlain avoid voting with the Gladstonians
on all Liberal questions?**
The prospect of negotiations with Chamberlain gave rise to
a surprising amount of satisfaction among Gladstonians. Arnold
$orley reported to Gladstone on 31 December that the conference,
Wolverton to Gladstone, 5 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44349, f.223;
and Wolverton to Granville, 6 Jan. 1887, P.R.O., 30.29.28A.
Wolverton to Granville, 30 Dec. 1806, P.R.O., 30.29.28A.
Wolverton to Granville, 6 Jan. 1887.





even should it result in no agreement, would go a long way
to satisfy some impatience which was being expressed at the
absence of any response to Chamberlain's speech* * Some wished
for Chamberlain's return because of genuine respect for him,
and some simply because his loss would weaken the Government
and be a disaster to the Liberal Unionists. Others were like
Acton who wrote to Gladstone that they must not overestimate
the strength of their cause and would do well to concede
2
something to unrighteousness. The group most consistently
hostile to the conference was the Radicals - Chamberlain's
enthusiastic supporters of twelve months earlier. With their
characteristic scorn for half measures they had in the main
committed themselves to full satisfaction of Irish Nationalist
demands and now were alarmed lest the party's Jrish policy
should be compromised in order to buy back the man whom they had
1
A. Morley to Gladstone, 6 Jan. 1887, Add. Mas. 44253# f.54.
P
Acton to Gladstone, 9 Jan, 1887, Selections from
the correspondence of the first Lord Acton, fedited by
J.N. Figgis and R.V. Laurence, I. 178-9.
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coiae to hate and fear more than any other - the arch enemy
"Judas" Chamberlain.*
The conference held its first sittings at Harcourt's
London house on 13 and 14 January and then adjourned until
2
after the assembling of Parliament. At the first meeting
the delegates agreed that no one other than Gladstone and
Hartington should be informed of the proceedings. Irish land
purchase and Irish local government were the main subjects
discussed on the first day. Chamberlain submitted a scheme of
land purchase which made Irish taxation the security for tenant
repayment. His scheme aroused much criticism, but was accepted
as a fair basis for further discussion. The conference agreed
that Irish local government should be based on the principles
that Liberals advocated for Great Britain, including the popular
vote. Towards the end of the session Harcourt raised the question
of home rule and Chamberlain suggested the Canada Act of 1867 as
a foundation for their discussion. Also, Chamberlain admitted that
provided the words "legislative authority or authorities" were
Labouchere, the Radical leader, wrote to Churchill
(23 Dec. 1886)j "You have no idea of thefeeling of the Radicals
against him ^Chamberlain^. There is a good deal of sentiment
in these things; and just as Gladstone is their Christ, Joe
is their Anti-Christ." (Churchill, II. 254).
2
Except where indicated, this account of the two sittings is
based on Haf-court Gladstone, 13 and 14 Jan. 1887, Add.Mas.
44201, f. 28; «■£ on Chamberlain's minutes on the sittings,
Chamberlain, 248-50 (q.w.o., Garvin, II. 286-7); and Harcourt's
speech at Derby, 27 Feb. 1889, The Times. 28 Feb. 1889.
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inserted, he had no objection to the Leeds resolution.1
The second meeting was devoted to home rule. The internal
constitution of Canada was taken by common consent as a
satisfactory basis from which to evolve a scheme. The Irish
legislature, it was agreed, should be similar to a Canadian
provincial assembly, and the Imperial Parliament should have
an authority over it similar to that exercised by the Dominion
Parliament. The conference then discussed in some detail the
nature and powers of a suitable Irish legislature and agreement
was reached on the following? that its powers should be
specifically enumerated; that it should be given control of
education and public works, and have an Irish local government
board; that it should have some form of executive (whether
or not it should control a police force seems to have been left
unsettled because of objections from Trevelyan); that the
Imperial Parliament should have its own Irish police force;
and that no independent Imperial administration should be
necessary in Ireland except for the armed forces and the
Imperial police.
This is an impressive list, but of much greater importance
was the fact that no agreement was reached on the problems of
Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament and of Ulster.
The resolution defining the party's attitude to home rule
passed at the National Liberal Federation Conference on
3 Nov. (See above p. 289)* The part of the resolution which
stated that Ireland must be given a. settlement which would
satisfy the views and wishes of the Irish representatives
appears to have been conveniently Ignored in these discussions.
3$2
Everyone, except Morley, wished to retain the Irish members
at Westminister, but only Harcourt thought that they should
have the right to vote on all subjects, Morley held to his
old belief that they should be excluded altogether and either
then, or at a later date, said that should the conference decide
on full Irish representation he would yield, but would probably
also retire from public life,''* Chamberlain, who introduced
the subject towards the close of the meeting, insisted that
it was fundamental that Ulster must not be forced under the
Irish legislature against its will and that it, or a part of it,
must be given a separate one, Harcourt argued the difficulties
and Morley said that he wished to consult others before finally
committing himself. Both Chamberlain and Harcourt, in their
accounts of the meeting, commented that they feared the Ulster
problem would be the most difficult of all,
Morley, when describing the conference some fifteen years
later, claimed that on home rule "Chamberlain gradually advanced
p
the whole length". During the conference he assured Ripon
that the Gladstonian delegates had conceded nothing and that
Chamberlain would not carry off "a single scrap of substance
•5
from us." Such statements show hov/ little Morley understood





Morley to Ripon, 7 Feb. 1087, q.w.o., Lucien Wolf,
Life of the First Marquess of Ripon. II. 192.
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Chamberlain1a position on home rule. At the conference
Chamberlain's attitude remained unaltered from what it had
been in the struggle against the Government of Ireland hill.
His indispensible conditions still were, the supremacy of
the Imperial Parliament, special treatment for Ulster, and
the powers of the Irish assemblies to be specifically
enumerated. Chamberlain's one major concession seems to have
been his consent that the Irish legislature should control an
executive.
Hareourt considered Trevelyan more recalcitrant in the
discuasions than Chamberlain,1 while Morley described him rs
"a mere Ku><f>ov trpoerwtrov - weak, irresolute, and shadowy."
Afterwards Chamberlain told Hareourt that he would pay no
3
attention to frevelyan's hesitancy, - an attitude which may
have been an important factor in deciding Trevelyan some weeks
later to revert to Gladstone.
In spite of the apparent progress made at the sessions
on the ljth and 14th, certain things boded ill for ultimate
success. One was the cool, almost unco-operative attitude
1 Harcourt to Gladstone, 14 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 4'" 201, f. 28.
2
Morley to Gladstone, 15 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss. 44255, f. 178;
and Morley to Spencer, 15 Jan. 1887, Morley vol., A1thorp.
^ Harcourt to Morley, 17 Jan. 1887, Gardiner (Appendix, I),
II. 605-8.
of Gladstone. He stated that he had little hope of the
conference succeeding for he believed that the Government
of Ireland Bill had been too near the "irreducible minimum" *
and that no financial provisions as good as those of the
accompanying land bill could be devised without placing a
hand on all Irish public receipts and making Irish authority
p
dependent on surplus. He informed Harcourt that he preferred
that the Government should be allowed to apply their policy and
on its failure that the Liberal Unionists should be allowed
■3
to apply their policy until it, too, should fail.
A further unpropitious circumstance was that Morley* s
confidence in Chamberlain's good faith had been short - lived.
Chamberlain and he met in a spirit of mutual distrust and
nursing the smarts which they had inflicted 011 each other in
verbal encounters during the preceding months. The discussions
of the 13th and 14th did not alter Morley's opinion, ^ and he
forecast that Chamberlain would use the Ulster question to break
5
up the conference when it should suit him. Harcourt




Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 21 Jan. 1887, Add. Mss.
44201, f. 53.
Morley to Gladstone, 19 Jan. 1887, Add, Mss. 44255, f. 182.
5
Lord Harcourt's Journal, 14 Jan. 1887, n.w.o.,
Gardiner, II. 28.
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patiently strove to reassure Morley but without success.^
Also of ill omen was the hostility, not only of the
Parnellites, but of the Gladstonian Radicals. One of them
(W*L« Bright, Stoke-upon-Trent) remarked to Dilke that the
o
problem was to keep Gladstone in the Gladstonian p«rty.
A few of them, as though acting on that idea, made speeches
little calculated to aid the negotiations.
On the same day as the conference adjourned Chamberlain
sent Hartington a brief general account of what had taken
3
place. Next day they met and Chamberlain gave fuller
4
details than he had included in his letter. Afterward®
he told Hareourt, with whom he spent the following few days,
that at the interview he gained the impression that on the
whole Hartington was neither hostile to, nor annoyed by
a
the conference find was wary rather than antagonistic.
Gardiner, II. Chap ii, passim. One particularly violent
outburst against Chamberlain provoked Harcourt into retorting,
MTo my mind the least hopeful part of our business consists
in your incurable inveteracy against J.C. I believe it to be
unjust, but I despair of the task of convincing you of it."
(Harcourt to Morley, 19 Jan. 1887, q.w.o., Gardiner, Il.29)»
2 Dilke to Chamberlain (copy) Add. Mss. 43953, f. 97; Gwynn
and Tuckwell, II. 267; and Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain,
247.
*
Chamberlain to Hartington, 14 Jan. 1387, Chats. 340.2103.




At Hawick on 22 January Chamberlain made a speech of
studies moderation in which he "tried to say smooth things
all round except to the Parnellites." He even expressed a
belief that schemes could be evolved for the solution of the
Irish land problem and for the granting of self government on
the Canadian provincial model which would meet the objections,
not only of both Liberal parties, but of Conservatives and
2
Nationalists! This advocacy of a national rather than a
party settlement was for the benefit of Hartington and the
•5C
Liberal Unionists, Chamberlain had explained to Karoourt. '
If Chamberlain had hoped that his speech would be followed
by Gladstonian declarations in favour of the party going forward
to meet him he was disappointed. Here and there he was praised
for his moderate tone, and hopes of a reunion were expressed.
Nonetheless, during the following few days it became increas¬
ingly clea r that even the more conciliatory Gladstonians were
determined to stand by Gladstonian home rule. As Mundella
Chamberlain to Hartington, 23 Jan. 1887, Chats. 340.2108.
2
IH® Times. 24 Jan. 1887.
3
Chamberlain to Harcourt (copy sent by Harcourt to
Gladstone), 20 Jen. 1887, Add. Mss. 44201, f. 57.
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explained on the 2lfth, the Gladstoniuns would not abaadon
"the grand central principle of Home Hula as agreed upon at
Leeds," but were willing to discuss details and to strengthen
1
safeguards, the- attitude of the Radicals remained unaltered
2
and they continued with their attacks.
The result was that when Chamberlain spoke in Birmingham
seven days later the note of moderation was gone and in its
place was one of defiant independence, Liberal reunion and a
settlement of the Irish question were possible, he said, but
only if all concerned - Irish as well as English - were to be
moderate and mutually conciliatory. But as ominous for
Liberal reconciliation as his hard speaking was chamberlain's
statement that he was "ready to support in Parliament in the
present session all efforts to restore order in Parliament and
to maintain the law in Ireland." At the same time he warned
the Government that should their legislation turn put to be
reactionary or inadequate, "the Government must take the
responsibility of breaIcing up the Unionist party, for they
know perfectly well that they cannot expect and have not
3
obtained any pledge of unconditional support from any Liberal."
1
Speech to a conference of Gladstonians at Cardiff, rally
Hews. 25 Jan. 1337.
2
truth (owned by Labouchere) was especially vindictive.
3
Tjhe 31 Jan. 138?, p. 10.
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The speech achieved its object of demonstrating that,
although xfilling to negotiate, Chamberlain was in no mood for
capitulating. Unfortunately, it also exasperated all
p
Gladstonians and some struck back with very outspoken attacks.
Even those most eager for a reconciliation asked one another
whether it was worth while to persevere with the negotiations.
Harcourt, who knew that Gladstone would pass through London
on 2 February, wrote asking that he meet Morley and him in
3
order to decide whether or not to continue with the conference.
Harcourt advocated that it should go on, but admitted that
Chamberlain's speech, although not unsatisfactory in substance,
had created "the worst possible feeling."4 Gladstone replied
asking Harcourt and Morley to meet him at Buston, but his
letter miscarried. At Euston Gladstone soon guessed what had
e.g. The Times commented, "Mr. Chamberlain . . . speaks to
the electors o"£ "Birmingham in tones not at all resembling those
of a man who has made up his mind to capitulate to Mr. Gladstone,
Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Dillon." (31 dan. 188?).
?
.£•£• Dr* Spence Watson, the president of the Newcastle
Liberal Association, when opening Morley's Newcastle meeting
on 9 February, advised Chamberlain to keep a civil tongue in
his head if he were anxious for peace, and said that the only
thing which made the conference tolerable to the Radicals of
Newcastle was that they had a reliable representative in Morley.
(Daily News. 10 Feb. 1887 ).
^ Harcourt to Gladstone, 1 Feb. 1887, Add. Mas. 44201, f. 64.
4 Ibid.
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happened and "before continuing his journey wrote to Harcourt
advising that the conference should not be broken off, but
adding that neither signal nor telling good could come from
the conclusion of an alliance with Chamberlain at that
moment.^
Parliament reassembled on 21 January and in the Queen's
speech was presented with a more then sufficient programme
even had there been no prospect of obstruction. Alterations
in legal procedure to enable the administration to cope
effectively with the Plan of Campaign were promised, and it was
foreshadowed than an important land measure would follow on the
report, which was to be presented shortly, of the Commission
on the working of the Irish Land Acts. The remainder of the
programme was in the main similar to what Churchill had sketched
in his Dartford speech* local government reform in England
and Scotland to he followed, "should circumstances render it
possible", by local government reform in Ireland; the
improvement of the process of private bill legislation;
facilities for cheaper and more rapid transfer of land, for the
provision of allotments for small householders, and for the
sale of glebe land; alterations in the method of levying tithes;
reforms in the Scottish universities; the amendment of Scottish
criminal procedure; the regulation of railway rates; and the
prevention of the fraudulent use of trade marks.
1 Gardiner, II. 31.(Ho draft in Gladstone papers).
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The debate on the address lasted for more than three
weeks# Then, as had been expected, the Government Introduced
a measure amending the rules of procedure. Once again the
Nationalists obstructed and not until 18 March was the measure
finally passed by 262 votes to 41. On the motion of W.H. Smith
it was made at once a standing order of the House. The power
to use the closure was taken from the Speaker and given to the
members themselves, with the limiting proviso that a motion
for its use must have the support of more than 20^ members, or
be opposed by less than 40 and supported by more than 100.
Hartington spoke on 2 February at Newcastle-on-Tyne.
He explained at length why the Liberal Unionists had declined
to join in a coalition during the governmental crisis and
censored Churchill for his resignation. He emplasised that
it was a Liberal Unionist duty to assist the Government to
enforce the law and to maintain order in Ireland. The Round
Table Conference he -wished well, he said, but added that he had
thought it better not to take part himself because, "While
negotiation is going on it is necessary that there should be
someone who will stay at home and guard the position which we
occupy, and who will keep a watch upon the movements of the
enemy - and I thought that my place was rather there." He
understood that Chamberlain's idea was to extend to Ireland
(and to other parts of the British Isles should they wish it)
on a larger scale and over large areas something similar to the
municipal government of the big cities. He said that he thought
such an idea was not so very different from his own and would not
3-51
endanger imperial interests. But he then warned that if
the Conference were to concentrate on the details of a scheme
rather than on general principles they would succeed only in
causing greater confusion and. in making the problem of reunion
more insoluble than ever."''
Possibly a majority of Liberal Unionists, in and out of
Parliament, coiild have been induced to subscribe to Hartington's
statements about the conference and municipal type government
for Ireland, but probably not so very many would have been
willing to go much beyond thera. A number were openly hostile
to the conference and opposed to anything more than local
government for Ireland. Among the latter were the Irish
Liberal Unionists. ^
Chamberlain keenly resented a speech which Morley made
3
on 9 February. Morley went far towards approving the
Canadian province as a model for Ireland, but he also said that
Chamberlain's recent speeches justified the resentment which
1 The Times. 3 Feb. 1887.
p
The committee of the Ulster Liberal Unionist Association
passed the following resolution: "That this committee,
representing the Liberal Unionists of Ulster cordially
sympathise with Mr. Chamberlain's programme for the reunion
of the Liberal party - viz. to deal effectively with the
questions of land reform and local government, but expresses
its emphatic conviction that no reunion of the Liberal Party
is possible on terms which would involve consent to the
establishment of an Irish legislative body or of an executive
not responsible to the Imperial Parliament or which would
propose the abandonment in any degree of loyal Irishmen to the
rule of the Nationalist local majority." (Northern Whig.
14 Feb. 1887).
Chamberlain to Harcourt, 10 Feb.1887, q.w.o., Gardiner,
II. 32; and Chamberlain to Harcourt, 26 Feb. 1887. q.w.o.,
ibid., 34-35.
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they had aroused, and that Chamberlain lacked good taste in
discussing in public matters before the conference. Chamberlain's
anger was increased by other factors. He was much irritated by
a daily column, which he wrongly believed Morley inspired, in the
2
Newcastle Leader. Also the Daily News over which Morley did have
■5
a strong influence had become less friendly.
The conference reassembled at Trevelyan's house on 14 February
for a third and, as it proved, a final meeting. At first
Chamberlain was so cold and almost insulting to Morley that
Trevelyan feared lest Morley should leave the house.^ With the
arrival of the good-natured Harcourt, a better spirit came to
5
prevail. The only matters on which agreement was reached were
that Morley and Herschell should study certain aspects of
Chamberlain's land scheme, and that Harcourt should draft a home
rule scheme on the Canadian model, leaving as reserved the points
6
on which there had been as yet no agreement.
The Times. 10 Feb. 1887.
2
Chamberlain to Harcourt, 26 Feb. 1887; Harcourt to Chamberlain,
1 March, 1887, q.w.o., Gardiner, II. 36-37; Morley to Chamberlain,
7 March 1887, Garvin, 11.291.
**
When the proposal for a conference was being discussed at the
beginning of January, Morley had written to Harcourt (3 Jan. 1887)
"I think I will keep my hand on the D.N. [Daily News"! helm for a
few days, if the giant who edits it will let me." Gardiner, 11.24.
^ Lord Harcourt*s Journal, Gardiner, II. 32.
Gardiner, II. 32.
ft
Chamberlain's minutes on the meeting, Chamberlain, 251, and
Garvin, II. 292.
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Distrusts and strainsd personal relations may have contributed to
the lack of progress, but one suspects that the main explanation
is that most of the matters on which agreement was possible had
already been discussed, and agreed upon, at the first two sessions.
During the next few days events continued as before. The
widespread belief that Chamberlain was engineering a "face saving"
arrangement before capitulating remained unabated. Both speeches
and press comments continued to make clear that the Gladstonians
as a whole were not willing to make concessions except as to the
form in which their next home rule measure would be cast. Gladstone
in a published letter had accused the Liberal Unionists of blocking
Liberal legislation, and especially "Welsh disestablishment. The
editor of the Baptist asked Chamberlain for his comment.^
Chamberlain seized on the request and in a short article cast in
the form of a letter to the Welsh non-conformists he roughly
lectured the Gladstonians:
If the Welsh constituencies intend ... to support his
LGladstone's. / contention that no legislation for Scotland
or Wales can be undertaken or even contemplated, until the
Irish Question has been settled on his lines, then they have
no right whatever to complain of the delay in their hopes .••
The conversion of the country • • . may be, and probably will
be, slow and protracted ... but whether the process occupies
a generation or a century, "poor little Wales" must wait until
Mr. Parnell is satisfied and Mr. Gladstone's policy adopted.
They will not wait alone. The crofters of Scotland and
the agricultural labourers of England will keep them company.
Thirty-two millions of people must go without much-needed
legislation because three million are disloyal, while nearly
six hundred members of the Imperial Parliament will be reduced
to forced inactivity because some eighty delegates representing
the policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago Convention,
are determined to obstruct all business until their demands
Garvin, II. 292
3 u-f
are conceded .... So long as the majority of the Liberal
party is committed to proposals which a large section of
Liberals and Radicals firmly believe to be dangerous to the
best interests of the United Kingdom, unjust to the minority
of the Irish people, and certain to end in the disruption of
the Empire, so long the party will remain shattered and impotent
and all reform will be indefinitely postponed ... The only
wise and prudent course for Welsh Nonconformists is to press
on their leaders the absolute necessity for reuniting the
Liberal party, so that this great instrument may once more
be brought to bear with unimpaired efficiency to secure the
reforms on which Liberals are practically agreed. The plans
and methods for settling the Irish question which have been
rejected must be set aside, and some alternative must be found
which will take account of the objections conscientiously
entertained by so many good and consistent Liberals. The
breach which has been made must be repaired, and this can only
be done by conciliatory action, and not by threats of
expulsion or charges of treachery ....
The letter was reprinted in the daily press (25 February)
and immediately wrote finis to the Round Table. It placed the
Gladstonians in a position where they could continue the negotia¬
tions only by appearing to go down on their knees to Chamberlain.
Gladstone, who had consented to draw up a memorandum on the points
upon which the conference had reached agreement, now asked Harcourt
to inform Chamberlain that the Baptist letter prevented him from
doing so, but that the Gladstonians were willing that the discussions
should stand for resumption at a convenient season.1
In the recriminations which later broke out the Gladstonians,
understandably enough, claimed that Chamberlain had written the
Baptist letter with the deliberate intention of making an end to
the conference. The truth appears to be that Chamberlain, who on
more occasions than this showed a surprising insensitivity when
forecasting the reactions of others, did not fully realise the
gxavity of his action until too late. The attempt to reopen
Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 25 Feb. 1837, Add. Mss
44201, f. 75.
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negotiations on reunion which he was to make some five weeks later,
and again in the following August,1 makes it improbable that he
chose deliberately what was pretty certain to be the irretrievable
3tep of breaking up the conference. Dilke notes in his memoir that
Chamberlain admitted to him that the Baptist letter had been
p
indiscreet. Chamberlain and his little band of followers had been
returned by the kind of constituency which elsewhere had voted
Gladstonian. Their victories had been largely due to Chamberlain's
radicalism in the past, and to the loyalty of the Midland voters to
their hard hitting champion of the political ring. But the weakness
of a support which was based so much on the prestige and personality
of one man was that it would be only as permanent rs those qualities.
This may well have been one reason why Chamberlain reacted so
violently to the widespread assumption that he had returned repen¬
tant and by the conference was merely trying to find a way in which
he could revert to Gladstone with the minimum of humiliation.
Possibly, it was determination to disprove this which was the
decisive factor in his decision to make the defiantly independent
speech of 29 January and finally to send the fatal letter to the
Baptist.
Gladstone had already completed his promised memorandum
before the appearance of the letter and the document is still
among his papers. It was couched in conciliatory language, but
See following chapter.
Dilke's memoir, Gwynn and Tuckwell, II. 268.
3
Memorandum by Gladstone, circa 24 Feb. 1887, Add. has.
44773, f. 8.
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the hard substance was as follows. The conference, he observed,
had shown that on home rule certain supposed differences did not
exist and that the differences which did were not of a nature to
prevent hope of an eventual accommodation. He pointed out that
he was not entitled to approve or reject any proposed alteration
in the Gladstonians' plans nor could his colleagues. He stated
that in his long experience the ground for co-operation had
always been supplied by a general confidence until the time for
actual legislation had arrived, and that he thought an immediate
attempt to settle too much legislative detail would be dangerous,
lie was not confident, he admitted, that the conference could do a
great deal more just then, but, if Chamberlain desired it, he was
willing to call his colleagues together and to learn their views
on whether, and hoi* far, negotiations could be continued beyond
what had been done. In the last paragraph Gladstone did make one
major concession. He stated that, although he should like to sift
the matter further, he considered that a good and effective land
purchase scheme could be framed without the use of Imperial credit,
and that the question was almost ripe for decision.
The memorandum prompts one to speculate on what would have
been the outcome had Chamberlain not written the Baptist letter,
Gladstone declined to commit himself on a separate assembly for
Ulster, on how the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament was to be
guaranteed, or on whether or not the powers of the Irish assembly-
would be specifically enumerated. All three were fundamental
demands on Chamberlain's part. On the other hand, Gladstone had
gone so far to meet Chamberlain on the land question that if he
367
could have heen induced to consent to the postponement of home rule,
as Chamberlain had originally suggested, the prospect of a reunion
would have been promising. However, the evidence indicates that
Gladstone's prime object was not reunion, but home rule, and one
suspects that, as in the previous summer, he was again willing to
sacrifice his land scheme in the hope of fiirthering home rule.
Hence one feels that it i3 most likely that even without the
Baptist letter the conference would have been broken up by
Gladstone's memorandum, or by the discussions which might have
proceeded from it.
On the appearance of the Baptist letter Harcourt immediately
wrote to Chamberlain pointing out that no amount of private
negotiation could be of any use when he adopted such an attitude
in public* He felt, he told him, that they had been engaged in
the work of Sisyphus and that Chamberlain by his outburst of
temper had sent the stone to the bottom just when, with great
labour, it had been rolled to the top.1 Chamberlain replied at
once and his letter provides a better key to an understanding of
him at this period than anything since written by biographers or
historians* He wrote:
I thank you for writing so plainly. I will do the same.
I agree with you that our task is almost impossible - there
is so much sensitiveness and feeling on both sides that the
difficulties are nearly insurmountable.
You seem to think that I am bound, while negotiation
is still incomplete, to take no notice whatever of all that
is offensive and objectionable to me in the communications
that proceed from leading Gladstonians, and that I am to pass
over in silence their repeated asseverations that no change -
no concession of any kind is to be made by them, find that I
am only to be allowed to come back, as they say, after suffi¬
cient and complete acts of submission and penitence. But I
Harcourt to Chamberlain, 25 Feb. 1087, q.w.o., Gardiner,
II. 33-34.
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do not found myself only on the speeches of such men as Stans-
feld, Campbell-Bannerman and Sir C. Russell, although the
tone of these speeches is disagreeable in the highest degree.
Neither will I refer again to the otitrageous attack made upon
me by J. Morley at Newcastle - nor to the general line of the
ori-an of the Party - the Daily News - but I must advert to
the language used in recent letters and speeches by
Mr. Gladstone himself.
When in 'Wales he took more than one opportunity of
nailing his flag to the mast. Everyone who reads his recent
letters must draw the inference that he adheres to the whole
of the policy to which I and other Liberals objected, and
that he is not prepared to make the slightest concession.
The effect of these statements has been very marked. It is
said in the Liberal papers, without exception, that as
Mr. Gladstone has declared that he will not give way, the
only chance of reunion must lie in my "caving in," and that
this is what 1 am now doing. To use the words of J. Morley's
organ at Newcastle, I am "furtively preparing for surrender."
• • ♦
I must. point out to you that a compromise is one thing,
but an abject surrender such as is attributed to me is
another, and I cannot afford to give colour to such an
accusation.
Now as regards my article. I do not admit that it bears
the interpretation you put upon it.. . .
I consider the present Dilation very grave. Never has
party feeling run higher ... and if the future programme
of the Liberal Party is to include plans of campaign, obstruc¬
tion and Heaven knows how many wild theories of revenge or
destruction, I must stand aside or join to resist them., . .
I hove hitherto done my best to prevent Partington from
joining a Coalition and I have always rejected the possibility
of my doing so. But if things continue on their present
footing I must either go out of politics altogether - or
assist in forming some third Party that will strenuously
resist the new Programme of Labouchere and Co. while ready
to give^effect to the older policy of Constructive Liberalism.
•
• • •
During the next few days a heated correspondence passed between
Chamberlain and Hareourt, but with Harcourt showing a marked desire
Chamberlain to Harcourt. 26 Feb. 1887, Chamberlain, 254-6
(q.w.o., Gardiner, II. 34-55;.
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to prevent the break up of the conference."^ On 1 March Chamberlain
pressed for a decision on whether the conference was at an end or
o
to be continued," but next day Harcourt replied that he saw no need
%
for haste. Also on the 1 March, Chamberlain sent Hartington the
rough draft of a home rule scheme which he informed him he hoped
the conference might be induced to adopt. He asked for criticism
and if Hartington could negotiate on such a basis.^ (Chamberlain
had already given him a copy of his Irish land purchase scheme at
the time when he laid it before the conference.-*).
Next day Chamberlain and Harcourt met and Chamberlain was left
with the impression that the Gladstonians had decided that a
continuance of the conference must depend on Hartington's attitude.**
C'■ ambferlain - Harcourt correspondence, 26, and 27 Feb., and
1 March, Gardiner, II. 35-37; and brief synopses of correspondence,
26, 27, 28, and 29 Feb. and 1 March, Chamberlain, 256-7.
2
Chamberlain to Harcourt, 1 March 1887, brief synopsis,
Chamberlain, 257.
■5
Harcourt to Chamberlain, 2 March 1887, brief synopsis,
Chamberlain, 257.
Chamberlain to Hartington, 1 March 1887, Chats. 340.2112.
Chamberlain to Hartington, 23 Jan. 1887, Chats. 340.2108.
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 258. Chamberlain did not
completely misunderstand Harcourt. Harcourt in a speech at Derby
on 27 ¥eb. 1889 (The Times. 28 Feb. 1889) stated that he had
expressed the opinion to 'Chamberlain that Hartington's views should
be more fully ascertained, and that he had pressed for the
resumption of the conference after a sufficient interval, Morley
in conversation with Chamberlain five weeks later claimed that the
break down of the conference had two causes: "a. his own
Chamberlain's masterful demeanour, as shown in the Baptist letter
and other deliverances, b. the fact that Hartington had made it
impossible for himself and friends to desert the Tories and
Goschen, - whatever vie did at the Round Table." (Morley to
Gladstone, 10 April, 1887, Add. Mas. 44255, f. 191).
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Chamberlain jumped to the conclusion that the Gladstonians had
decided to side-step him by direct negotiations with Hartington.*
p
To defeat what he assumed was their plan he contacted Partington~
and asked him for a written statement of his views which he could
3
communicate to the conference at its next session. Hartington
agreed to the request and, in addition, he appears to have at last
consented to join in the negotiations - provided, of course, that
A
he could do so on his own terms.
Hartington's statement does not reveal any major fact which
is not already known from his previous statements (especially his
election address of the previous June and his speech of 2 February).
Once again he is shown to be neither a reactionary nor a "Rip Van
Winkle." Although genuinely hankering after reunion, lie was as
determined as ever not to modify his attitude on home rule.
The letter ran:
... The discussion [at the Conference] seems to have assumed
its most definite form on the question of Land Purchase on
which you have prepared a scheme. I see nothing in the general
character of this scheme to which I need take any objection
in principle. ... As to Local Government, I understand your
position to be that ... you have expressed your willingness
to discuss proposals, provided that the measure of last year
is definitely withdrawn; and subject to the conditions which
you have stated in your speeches. Further, you have insisted,
not as new conditions, but as consequences of those which
you have previously contended for, that Ulster or a part of
Ulster should be represented by a separate council, that judges
should be appointed by the Imperial Government, and that the
Irish constabulary should be maintained and controlled by the
Morley to Gladstone, 10 April 1887; and Dilke's memoir,




Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 258.
Chamberlain to Hartington, 7 March 1887, Chats. 340.2114.
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same authority. I believe that these conditions do not differ
in principle from those which I attempted to formulate last
year in my address to my constituents. I do not consider that
they were complete or exhaustive, but I have no desire to
make thera more stringent.. . • it is certain that unless the
provisions for the maintenance of the authority of the Imperial
Parliament and Government ar made strong, simple, and effective,
the concession which may be made will be used for extorting
complete separation and independence.
For this reason I doubt the applicability of the precedent
of the constitution of the Dominion of Canada.. . • it might
possibly be safer to look for a solution in the direction . , .
of such extended municipal institutions and powers as have been
conferred on our large cities, and a3 are proposed to be
conferred upon counties.. . . I sua very far from saying that
I have a clear idea of the extent to which this principle
might be applied to solve the Irish question. Neither do I
say that the difficulties of the subordinate responsible
Government system are insuperable. But I feel strongly the
necessity ... to bear in mind the danger of assuming that a
system which might work admirably in the case of a people
which desired union would be prudent in the opposite case of
a people who had been brought to desire the largest possible
measure of separation.!
Chamberlain at once wrote informing Harcourt that he had
received Hartington1s letter and, having pointed out that
Hartington would not enter the conference until he knew that his
conditions were accepted, pressed for an immediate meeting to
2
discuss both the letter and Gladstone's memorandum. He then
informed Hartington of his letter to Harcourt, remarking that the
next step was to see how far Gladstone and his colleagues assented
"to the fundamental conditions on which you and I alike insist."'
He stated that should the meeting, which he had asked for, not be
granted he would assume that Harcourt wished to break off







(draft), 6 March 1887, Chats,
and q.w.o., Holland, II. 106-8).
7 March 1887, Chats. 340.2114
372
Next day Chamberlain received a reply from Harcourt, in which,
according to Chamberlain's memoir, Harcourt repeated his views on
the Baptist letter and refused either to break off the conference
or to proceed with it at once. This Chamberlain regarded a3
sufficiently unsatisfactory to warrant the ending of the negotia¬
tions, a step which he took at once.1 Thus ended the Round Table
Conference.
Once again Chamberlain's two later attempts to reopen the
negotiations prevent one from hastily concluding that he broke
off the conference in order to prevent an accommodation. Super¬
ficially, it is true, the prospect that Hartington might be induced
to join appeared the most important and most promising event since
the conference was first mooted. But, as Chamberlain was probably
well aware, the reality was different for it was improbable that
Gladstone would consent to the adoption of Hartington's municipal
type home rule as a basis for negotiations. The Government
were about to introduce their promised coercion bill, at least the
principle of which, Chamberlain was determined to support, and he
may have felt that a conference which already had had such a
precarious existence could never survive the inevitable public
clashes between the Gladstonians and himself on coercion. But
perhaps most important of all, Chamberlain had come to the conclu-
?
sion that the Gladstonians no longer wished to do business with him.
Chamberlain to Harcourt, 0 March 1887, q.w.o., Garvin, II. 294.
2 Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 262.
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Chamberlain believed that the Gladstonians were hopeful that if
they were to bide their time he would be glad to accept their terms
when he should be faced with the alternative of publicly supporting
coercion.1 "But they felt," he states in his memoir, "that if the
conference ended in the adoption of a Land Scheme proposed by me,
and of a Local Government Scheme based upon the internal
constitution of Canada, it would he held to be a victory for my
views, and would not be accepted by a large number of their
followers."^
x
Morley to Gladstone, 10 April 1887, Add. Mss. 44255, f. 191;
and Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 262.
2
Chamberlain's memoir, loc. cit.
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CIIAPTER VIII
THE LIBERAL UIJIOiJISTS BIjCGME RECONCILED
TO THEIR POSITIOli
In spite of the break up of the Round Table Conference,
hopes of reunion lingered among both Liberal Unionists and
Gladstonians. These hopes, combined with the reluctance of
either side to be credited x^ith having repulsed the other,
influenced events for some time. Trevelyan had a
three-quarters of an hour interview with Gladstone early in
the second week of March. Afterwards Gladstone told
Granville that it had been very amiable, "but you cannot
2
get out of a box more than is in it." In the same week
Ilerschell had a long conversation with Ilartington and gained
3
the impression that Ilartington was altering his opinions.
Morley thought this likely but expected that the alterations
b
would not be sufficiently extensive.
On 12 March Chamberlain spoke in Birmingham. He listed
eight conditions to which a future home rule bill would have
to conform if Liberal reunion were to be possible. These
1 Granville to Spencer, 10 March 1887, Miscellaneous Althorp.
2 Ibid.
3 Morley to Spencer, 12 March 1387, Morley vol., Althorp.
h Ibii.
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conditions he claimed had been specified not only by himself,
but by Hartington, James, Trevelyan, and other Liberal
Unionists in their criticisms of Gladstone's Irish bills of
the previous year. He declared that he had done all that he
could towards reconciliation and that a settlement now
depended upon Gladstone and on him alone# Chamberlain said
that he would support the Government in maintaining law and
order in Ireland, but that in return he expected it to deal
with oppression by landlords. He expressed the hope that
the Government would produce a major land measure which would
give the tenants practical ownership of their land. Finally,
Chamberlain advised the Radical Unionists to take into account
the possibility that there would be no reunion and to extend
their party organisation, especially outside of Birmingham.
They must be prepared, he said, to fight three-cornered
1
contests whenever possible.
Harcourt was still determined to do all things possible
towards achieving reunion. On reading Chamberlain's speech
of the 12th he wrote at once to Gladstone that (strange as
it may seem!) he considered it to be Chamberlain's largest
advance towards conciliation as yet and that it required
serious consideration. Chamberlain, he stated, evidently was
being conciliatory under strong pressure from his friends.
Chamberlain1s threat to organise Radical Unionists throughout
the country with the object of fighting three-cornered
1
2&aaa> 1*+ March 1887, p. 10
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1
contests he dismissed as "a mere silly brutum fulmen.w
Gladstone was to speak at a dinner on 17 March, On the
16th Warcourt wrote pressing him to use the occasion to
express willingness to re-consider the particulars of the
home rule bill of the previous year as distinct from its
underlying principles, and to announce concurrence in
Chamberlain1s statement that British credit should not be
2
pledged in any Irish land purchase scheme.
At the dinner Gladstone seems to have- done his best to
meet Harcourt's views. He referred to the Liberal Unionists
in friendly and respectful terms and stated that his policy
was "real and effective self-government in affairs properly
and exclusively Irish, subject to the unquestionable supremacy
of the Imperial Parliament", He said that he could not
recede from that policy, but that he sought improvements in
the legislative proposals which he had made. He recognised,
he said, that the country, as well as the majority of
Liberals, was against his scheme to use Imperial credit for
the buying out of the Irish landlords. He affirmed that he-
still had faith in that method, but admitted that an alternative
scheme could be framed which would avoid the general use of
Imperial credit. He added that such a scheme would have to
be dependent upon the prior creation of an Irish government.
1 Harcourt to Gladstone, 13 March 1887, Add. Mas. Vu201,
f, 31.
2
Iiarcourt to Gladstone, 16 March 1887, Add. Mss, M+2G1,
f. 37.
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In spite of this last condition, Gladstone thus publicly
conceded Chamberlain's main demand on Irish land purchase -
a concession which it will be remembered he had included in
the suppressed memorandum of c, 2k February.
This major concession and the conciliatory tone of
Gladstone's speech may have upset Chamberlain's belief that
Gladstone had no wish for an arrangement. At any rate
towards the end of the month he mentioned to Lady Ilayter
and to Lord Thring that he would have liked to have discussed
1
the political situation with Gladstone. Both passed the
remark to Gladstone and in a day or two they were able to
inform him that, if he were to make the first move,
2
Gladstone would consent to a secret interview.
Chamberlain adopted the suggestion and an interview was
arranged for 5 April. Neither man seems to have had more
than a slight hope that it would result in anything practical.
Gladstone wrote to Chamberlain that, although considerable
progress had been made on home rule and land purchase at the
Round Table Conference, coercion and closure had since then
3
widened the party breach and would have to be considered first.
Chamberlain in his reply painted a glowing picture of the
1
Granville to Lord Thring (draft), 31 March 1887, P.R.O.,




3 Gladstone to Chamberlain (draft), 3 April 188", Add. Mss.
M+126, f. 189 (Chamberlain, 262).
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1
amount of agreement reached at the conference and laid
the blame for the subsequent widening and hardening of the
party split on the refusal to provide him with Gladstone's
views. He then pointed out that in default of an
alternative policy the great majority of Liberal Unionists
had become practically pledged to support the second reading
of the "coercion" bill, and that it was very doubtful whether
they could now be brought to co-operate with Gladstone's
2
followers even if a suitable policy were to be found.
3
At the interview Gladstone said that he thought
Hartington would never agree to any scheme which Parnell
would accept, and that he feared coercion would have to be
fought out in Parliament and the country before Liberals
He wrote, "The exact nature of the policy on which
agreement was possible had been ascertained. It was only
necessary o approve or reject what we had done in order to
settle the question of reunion and the future actions of the
Unionist Party with respect to the Govern: ent." One is
tempted to assume that Chamberlain was over-stating the
amount of agreement reached in order to justify his having
asked for an interview. However, his statement was in a
sense true if one were to ignore Morley's reservations and
objections at the conference. On 2 July 188? Karcourt wrote
to Gladstone, "I was of opinion that we had reached a
substantial agreement at the Conference and that a basis of
reunion was established. That as far as I can make out was
the opinion of all the parties at the Conference except
perhaps Morley." (Harcourt to Gladstone, Add. Mss. *+4-201,
f. 132). Seven years later Harcourt was still of the same
opinion. (Morley's notes on a conversation ttfith Harcourt,
189*+, Viscount Morley, SsgQllgfi&oaaU I» 297).
2 Chamberlain to Gladstone, *+ April 1887, Add. Mss. *4+126,
f, I89 (Chamberlain, 26*i~5) •
3 This account of the interview is based on Gladstone's
memorandum, 5 April 1887, Add. Mss. *+*+773, f. 35? and
Chamberlain's memorandum, 5 April 1887, Chamberlain, 266-8
(q.w.o,, Garvin, II. 295-6).
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could make with profit a further attempt to agree upon an
Irish policy. He suggested that the Liberal Unionists
should produce an Irish local government measure and that
the Gladstonians might accept it as the best under the
circumstances. Chamberlain replied that such a step was not
possible. With perhaps unnecessary frankness he admitted
that coercion was damaging the Liberal Unionists in the
country5 that the right wing of the party would probably
join the Conservatives! and that he himself might leave
Parliament should Toryism become dominant.
In the memorandum which Chamberlain drew up later on
the same day he stated that the interview had given him
the impression that Gladstone confidently expected the
unpopularity of coercion to bring on an early general
election which he would win, and that as a result he
neither desired to go further with concillatlonror believed
that his party would let him. Chamberlain may have
considered this information to have been in itself a
sufficient justification for the interview. Knowing that
all hope of reunion depended on Gladstone's attitude, he
must have welcomed an opportunity of discovering what that
attitude was. He could then lay his own plans accordingly
and with a confidence which he could not otherwise have had.
On 5 March Hlck3-Beach resigned the Irish Secretaryship
1
for health reasons. Salisbury appointed his own nephew, the
1 Lady Victoria Hicks-Beach, Life of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.
I. 312-13.
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young arid untried Arthur Balfour, to his place. The
appointment aroused much misgiving, but Balfour more than
justified the choice and proved himself a firm and constructive
ruler. Ke had not quite Hicks-Beach1s sympathy for oppressed
tenants, or at least he did not imitate his gallant
attempts to put extra-constitutional pressure on ruthless
landlords.
Balfour on 28 March introduced the awaited "coercion"
measure - the Criminal law Amendment (Ireland) Bill.
The measure granted powers which could be put into force
at any time by a vice-regal proclamation and, unlike
previous "coercive" measures, was to have no time limit.
It provided for preliminary inquiries by magistrates into
crimes where no one was charged, and re-established a
summary jurisdiction to be exercised by two stipendary
magistrates (with power to punish with up to six months
imprisonment) in cases of criminal conspiracy, boycotting,
rioting, assault on the police, and forcible or wrongful
possession. Special juries and the removal of trials were
arranged for as in the act of 1882. A dubious and more
novel proposal allowed a change of venue to England in
grave criminal cases when the attorney generals of both
countries certified that a fair trial was not otherwise
possible. The Lord Lieutenant was given the power to
proclaim certain types of organisations and to subject to
summary jurisdiction anyone who should defy the proclamation.
An important restriction was that a proclamation had to be
submitted at once to Parliament.
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The Times stated that the bill was imperative if
1
Ireland was to remain a civilized community. The standard
considered that the situation fully justified its
2
provisions. The Daily Mews wrote that the measure was
simple, Intelligible, and bad, and that if the Liberal
Unionists were to support such a monstrous bill they and
3
the Gladstonians would have to part company. The Daily
Telegraph declared that no well-disposed and law-abiding
Englishman, whose sense of right and wrong had not been
corrupted by political partisanship, would regard the
unquestionably stern provisions as one wit too severe.
The Manchester Guardian wrote that the bill was a declaration
of war upon the Irish Nationalists and would be welcomed
by every mischief monger who wished to perpetuate the
ill-will between Ireland and England. The acotscan held
that the question to be faced was whether the National
League or the Government was to rule Ireland and maintained
that the bill would strike only criminals and persons who
incited to crime. The Northern whig strongly disapproved
of the bill, which it described as coercion, and in certain
1
Tj^g Times, 29 March 1887, p. 9.
2 Standard. 29 March 1887, P# *+•
^ Daily News. 29 March 1867, p.
lf"
Daily Tel^ggqpb, 29 March 1887, p. 5.
5 Manskaa&g Guardian, 29 March 1687, P. y.
^
Scotsman. 3O March I887, p. 6.
382
respects stringent coercion. It complained that the measure
1
as a whole was not clear, intelligible, or systematic.
Ik© Irish Times admitted that the bill was a severe one,
but it considered that it was less arbitrary than Gladstone's
crimes bill had been. It approved the proposed permanency
2
of the bill. The Liberal Unionist Christlan 'World wrote
that the permanent abrogation of some of the most cherished
rights of free men would be bitterly resented and would
make the government of Ireland more difficult. It pointed
out that, if the press and platforms were gagged,
disaffection would find expression in secret and dangerous
3
societies, and in outbursts of savage crime. The
Gladstonian Methodist Times declared that the bill would
deprive Irishmen for ever of the sacred rights which
^
distinguished human beings from the cattle of the fields.
On the whole the Liberal Unionists reluctantly accepted
the principle that conditions in Ireland made necessary some
form of "coercion". But they considered that the "change
of venue" and certain other clauses in the Government's
measure interfered unnecessarily with the liberty of the
individual and they at once began to press for their
alteration. The Government gave way. At a meeting of the
1 northern Whip. 3° March 1887, p.
2
Irish Times. 29 March 188?, P. --U
3 kL2ri£, 7 April 1887, P. 263.
h mmite Haas, 7 April, 1887, p. 209.
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Liberal Unionists members at Devonshire House on 30 April
Hartington \ms able to state that the Government did not
consider the "change of venue" clause to be vital, and
that it -was willing to make in the bill any reasonable
alterations which the Liberal Unionists should consider
1
- essential. The Devonshire House meeting agreed to take
no public action which might erabarrass the Government and
it appointed a committee to draft the amendments which
2
Liberal Unionists wished to have adopted. These
amendments the Government eventually accepted and the bill
was ensured of full support by the Liberal Unionists In
the third reading, which despite the new closure rules,
did not take place until 9 July,
Coercion had always been distasteful to Liberals and
the Liberal Unionist support of the Criminal Law Amendment
Bill cost them a number of supporters in the
constituencies, ana one member (A.B.Winterbotham,
3
Cirencester) iri the Commons. Chamberlain's Birmingham "Two
1 The Times. 2 May 1387, P« 9.
2 Ibid.
*
^ Altogether during this parliament six Liberal Unionists
reverted to Gladstone and one Gladstonian, Sir A.Cowell-
Stepney, became a Liberal Unionist. In the Lords three
Liberal Unionists became Conservatives and two, Bessborough
and Bibblesdale, returned to Gladstone, The six Liberal
Unionist members were t T.R.Buchanan, V. Edinburgh (resigned
and restood for his seat as a Gladstonian, Feb, 1888 and was
re-elected)" W.S.Caine, Barrow-in-Furness (resigned and
unsuccessfully restood for his seat as an "Independent
Liberal", June I890. Elected for E.Bradford as a Gladstonian,
July 1892)5 Sir T.F.Grove, Wilton, Wiltshire (re-elected for
Wilton as a Gladstonian, July 1892)5 alir B.Hingley, N.
Worcestershire (re-elected for N. Worcestershire as a
Gladstonian, July 1892); C.R.M.Talbot, Mid.Glamorgan (died
Feb# 18, and A.L.winterbotham, Cirencester, Gloucestershire(re—elected for CiPftfinAooi'on «« ^ . — - —
Thousand" defied him by passing a resolution condemning
1
the bill. Chamberlain, whose prestige load already been
damaged by the misrepresentations of his alms and motives
during the Round Table Conference, was much disquieted by
its action. He declared that, but for the responsibility
which he shouldered, he would gladly resign at once and
£
leave politics altogether. The Liberal Unionist ranks
would have suffered a much more substantial exodus but for
two facts. The first was the knowledge that John bright
3
gave a general support to the measure. The second, and
perhaps more important, was the publication by The limes
L-
on 18 April of a letter in facsimile which, if genuine,
proved Parnell to have been in contact with Irish
nationalist extremists, and to have connived at the
murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish and T.H.Burke in 1802.
Unionists with hardly an exception assumed that the
facsimile letter was genuine, and not many Gladstonians
would have eared to wager heavily on the certainty of its
being a forgery. Unionists were jubilant at having found,
1
Garvin, II. 31o.
2 Chamberlain to Rev. R.8.Dale, 28 April I887, Garvin, II.
318.
3 Bright voted with the Government on the motion for
precedence for the Criminal Law (Ireland) Amendment Bill.
"(28 March 188?).
l.
Id April was the day on which the second reading of the
Criminal Law Amendment Bill took place and possibly The Times
had deliberately chosen it in order to give the maximum of
assistance in the passing: of that measure.
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as they thought, the Achilles' heel of home rule* The
reaction of the majority of Gladstonians was typified by
that of a Gladstonian friend of R.B.O'Brien. On seeing the
facsimile the friend exclaimed, "There goes Home liule
and the Liberal Party too", and straightway lost all
appetite for his breakfast. Late on the evening of the
18th Parnell denounced the letter in the Commons as an
2
audacious and unblushing fabrication* The rimes replied
by challenging him to prove his assertion in a court of
3
law, Parnell declined to take up the challenge and, much
to the immediate advantage of the unionist cause, took no
step to disprove the accusation until the summer of 1838.
had originally intended to publish the
facsimile letter on the morning of the opening of Parliament
in the hope that it would do much to secure an effective
if
"coercion" bill that session. It had desisted when it
discovered what appeared to be doubl -dealing by the
secretary of the Irish I oyal and Patriotic Union from whom
5
the letter had been obtained. The secretary was able to
6
satisfy on his honesty of purpose, but The Times then
1
R,B,G'Brian, The life of Charles Atewart Parnellt II* 198,
2 Hansard. CCCXII, cols. 1225-32*
3
Th^ Times. 20 April 188?, p. 11.
h




decided to further delay publication in order first to
prepare the public by a series of articles aimed at proving
that Parnell and his colleagues were closely linked with
disloyal and criminal extremists. Four of the articles
appeared before 16 April and a further ten at intervals
during the rest of the year. For long to come these
articles provided unionists with a convenient store of
munition for the war of accusation and verbal abuse which
was never still for long on the public platforms.
The introduction of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill
was followed throe days later by the introduction of the
Irish Land Bill in the House of Lords. For the first
time leaseholders, who numbered some l;.G,00u, were to be
given the right to a judicial revision of rent. A landlord
who had obtained a judgment of eviction was to be allowed
to make the tenant "a caretaker11 instead of evicting him
at once. County courts were to have the power to stay
evictions and, when the tenant was honestly insolvent, to
relieve him from the whole or part of his debts as though
he had been declared bankrupt. If the court should consider
him deserving the tenant was to be replaced in his holding at
a fair rent. Kinor provisions were that a landlord who
could not collect rents was to be excused the payment of
rates, and that a leaseholder who had sublet could throw
up his lease should a court reduce the rent of his tenants.
The measure ignored the twc most important recommendations
1 *+9-50.
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of the Cowper Commission. These were that judicial rents
should be fixed according to the price of produce, and that
the revision of them (especially those fixed before 1886)
should be allowed after a shorter period than fifteen years.
The Irish Land Dill pleased the Liberal Unionists in
some of its provisions but keenly disappointed them in otters.
The Chamberlain!tes, and the Ulster tenant farmer
representatives, Russell and Lea, especially deplored the
refusal to allow the revision of judicial rents, or the
fixing of rents according to the price of farm produce.
Many Liberal Unionists condemned the "bankruptcy clauses"
and other aspects of the measure, nevertheless, the
Government had been careful to consult Hartington on the
main features of the bill and he had assented to their
proposals. liarting ton admitted this in a speech some time
later. He explained that he had decided against the revision
of judicial rents lest such a step would retard the passing
1
of a major land purchase scheme.
Balfour sent Chamberlain a draft of the bill on the eve
of its introduction to the Lords. Chamberlain replied that
it was quite inadequate and warned that disaster would follow
unless it were amended. Everything was guarded in the
interests of the landlords, he declared. He pointed out that
the Criminal Law Amendment Bill would strengthen the landlords
and hence the Irish Land Bill must be so shaped that no one




could doubt that it was to protect the tenants. Kext day
in a further letter Chamberlain stated his attitude more
concretelyi "What we want broadly Is that no tenant shall
be evicted and deprived of his property on the ground of
inability or unwillingness to pay an unjust rent, and we
want the Court to say in every case whether the rent is
2
under the circumstances unjust,"
The Times described the Irish Land Bill as a large and
3
thorough-going measure. The Standard emphasised that it
was not intended to be a full or permanent settlement as the
Government believed that such a settlement could be found
only in the extinction of the dual ownership system of land
h
holding. The Daily Telegraph welcomed the measure as an
honest and courageous attempt to correct some of the graver
5
mischiefs inherent in the Land Act of 1831. The Spectator
thought the bill a good one and much more far-reaching than
6
it appeared at first sight. The Birmingham Daily :ost
wrote that it was unquestionably a real effort to solve the
1
Chamberlain to Balfour, 30 March I887, Garvin, q.w.o.,
II. 303-1+,
2
Chamberlain to Balfourt, 31 March 1887, q.w.o., ibid..
II. 30^5.
^ Times. 1 April IS87, p. 9.
^ Standard. 1 April 188?, p. *+•
5 Daily Telegraph. 1 April 1887, p. If.
^ dueeta tor. 2 April I887, p. 1+51.
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immediate difficulty and thus to give time for the preparation
of a larger and final measure. The bill, it remarked, was a
marvellous advance i:pon the views on Irish land hitherto
1
held by Conservative ministers. The northern Whir welcomed
the bill as a remedial measure, good in so far as it went,
and assumed that it would be followed up by a major land
2
purchase bill. The Daily Hews commented that the provisions
of the bill were few, but that, such as they were, they
convicted ministers of the grossest inconsistency and
3
entirely justified Parnell*s action in the autumn session.
Gladstone in further speeches on 19 April and 11 May
restated that he did not adhere to his defeated home rule
bill in all particulars, but only to the underlying
V
principles. Then on lo Kay Trevelyan made a conciliatory
5
speech at the Manchester Reform Club. By the latter date
Harcourt had become convinced that Gladstone's general
declarations were inadequate, and that the only hope of
reconciliation lay in a public statement by Gladstone of
the specific changes which he would consent to in the
Government of Ireland Bill, and especially in the clauses
1
Birmingham, Dqjly Poa£, 1 April 1387, P. *+♦
2 Bor them Whir. 1 April 1887? p. ls-.
3 Daily Mews. 1 April 1887, p. R.
h Siae Times. 20 April 1887, p. 12, and 12 May 1887, P. 10.
^ Ibid.. 19 May 1887, p« 6.
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excluding Irish representation from Westminster. Gladstone
2
had no inclination to commit himself in such a manner and
relations between Harcourt and him became strained. Morley
reported that he lad never seen Harcourt so violent as he
3
was with Gladstone on the front bench of the Commons.
Finally Harcourt demanded a meeting of the ex-Cabinet for
the purpose of deciding what changes in the Government of
Ireland Bill, and especially in the provision which
excluded the Irish members, they should publicly announce
themselves willing to make, Gladstone argued the
objections but liarcourt persisted and Gladstone reluctantly
6
prepared to meet his request. A little later Harcourt
changed his mind and wrote to Gladstone that he no longer
7
wanted the meeting. Perhaps he had come to realise that a
step with such an appearance of bullying Gladstone would be
1 Gladstone to Granville (letter 2), 20 May 1887, P.H.O.,
30.29.29A; and Harcourt to Gladstone, 2*+ May 1837, Add. Mss.
¥*201, f. 111.
2 Gladstone to Granville (letter 2), 20 May 188?. In this
letter Gladstone commented, "H[arcourt] will I think harp
upon the idea, to my mind most visionary, that the Dissentient
M.P.s are reciaimable. But he appears so set out on this
excellent but impossible purpose in the manner rather of a
gobe-mouches. He first of ail took it on the credit of
Chamberlain who made some pretentions and might carry five
men. Now he harps upon the speech of Trevelyan who I believe
makes no pretentions and does not carry one."
3 Granville to Gladstone, 20 May 1887, Add.Mss, W+180, f.38,
** Ibid.
5 Gladstone to Granville (letter 2), 20 May I887.
^
Ifoid.: and Gladstone to Granville (letter 1), 20 May 1887,
P.R.O., 30.29.29A.
^ Gladstone to Granville (letter 2), 20 May I887.
391
much resented (Spencer and Granville agreed that it was
1
monstrous ), and that Morley, Spencer, and Granville would
be certain to resist strenuously the admission of the Irish.
Ilarcourt had not abandoned his views. On the 2^-th he
wrote that, although originally he had supported strongly
the exclusion of the Irish members, he now believed that if
the home rule cause were not to retrogress their admission
"must be definitely conceded and that by a -positive
declaration on your part." He argued that to admit the
Irish members for specific subjects would be impossible in
practice and that they world have to be admitted to all the
2
business of the Commons.
Gladstone, although unwilling to make public commitments
of the type demanded by Harcourt, was keen to detach
Trevelyan from the liberal Unionists. After discussions
with Morley, Granville, Whithread, and Spencer he sent him
a letter (2b May) and invited him to dinner on the following
3
day. In the letter Gladstone pointed out that he had
never taken his stand on unconditional exclusion of Irish
representation and he assured Trevelyan that ho would not
stand in the way of a more restricted scheme of home rule
than the Government of Ireland Bill, provided that the
1 Granville to Gladstone, 20 May 1887.
2
Harcourt to Gladstone, 2b May 1837, Add. Mss. Mf2CI,
f. 111.
3 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 25 May 1887, Add, Mss.
Mf201, f. 117.
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scheme was desired by the Irish nation. He also wrote that
he was willing to meet Ilartington in a conference should
1
Eartington wish it. This last statement Gladstone described
as perhaps the principal part of the letter and admitted
2
that it had been suggested by h11thread. Gladstone had
intended his letter for publication but both Harcourt and
3
Trevelyan advised against it. Harcourt wrote to Gladstone
that he feared the reservations in t :e letter to Trevelyan
more than counter!'lanced the assurances, and that it
would be regarded as a declaration against alterations in
the proposals of twelve months c.arler. lie objected that no
one was prepared to produce a scheme of limited home rule
and that the Nationalists would not accept it. There was
not the least prospect, he stated, that Ilartington would
express a wish for a conference because he was much too
well satisfied with conditions as they were. He maintained
that the only hope lay in Independent declarations by
Gladstone which might detach from the Liberal Unionists the
men sincerely anxious for reconciliation. Harcourt then
informed Gladstone that Chamberlain was about to take his
1 Gladstone to Irevelyan (draft), 2b May 1887, Add. Kss.
bb-335, f. 216.
2 Gladstone to liarcourt; (draft), 25 May 1887.




stand at a conference in Birmingham on four propositions
(a copy of which he enclosed) and that he b lieved these
four propositions expressed the sentiments, not only of the
Liberal Unionists, but of the great majority of their own
party. If Chamberlain were able to represent himself as
an advocate of them and the Gladstonians as opponents he
would increasingly draw the Gladstonian supporters into his
2
ranks, Harcourt asserted.
Trevelyan accepted Gladstone's invitation and at dinner
3
on 2-j May they had a long discussion. Although Gladstone
-S-
gavc- him no guarantee of any alteration in policy,
Trevelyan shortly afterwards joined his party. Trevelyan
5
publicly emphasised that his views remained unaltered.
1x The propositions listed were : 1. The continued
maintenance of the unqualified supremacy of the Imperial
Parliament, and the consequent subordination of any local
assemblies which might be hereafter created for the
transaction of the purely domestic business of the different
parts of the I nited Kirn dom* 2. Retention of the full and
continuous representation of Ireland In the Imperial Parliament.
3. Protection of the Protestant minority in Ireland, among
other means by the separate treatment of the province of
Ulster, h. The retention by the Imperial Parliament of all
powers of legislation and administration necessary to the
maintenance of law and order and to the dispensation of
justice in Ireland. (Add. Mss* MM-201, f. 127).
^ Hareourt to Gladstone, 27 May 1387*
3 Gladstone* s memorandum on conversation with Trevelyan,
25 May 1387, And. Mss. MM-773, f. Ml.
Iftid. Later in October Morley told the Courtneys that he
had dram Gladstone's attention to assertions by Trevelyan
that Gladstone had made him concessions and that Gladstone had
answered, "I keep myself studiously ignorant of George
Trevelyan's pledges." (Kate Courtney's diary, 11 Oct. 1837,
Courtney, XXIII).
speech, Glasgow, 25 July 1887, The Times.
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He defended his action by pointing to Gladstone1s statements
that he adhered only to the underlying principles of the
Government of Ireland Bill and. would not insist on the use
1
of imperial credit for Irish land purchase. A factor which
may have influenced Trevelyan was the high-handed way in
which Chamberlain had treated him - especially in the period
2
following the February meeting of the Round Table Conference.
Trevelyan1s action was the more embarrassing to himself
because of the militancy with which he had opposed
Gladstonian home rule ever since Chamberlain and ho had
resigned their posts in the previous year. It was also
exceptionally exasperating to the unionists. Sir Henry
James has recorded that their condemnation of him even
3
eclipsed their condemnation of Spencer and liarcourt.
At the Rational Radical Union conference which met
in Birmingham on 1 June Chamberlain stated that recent
1
£.£. Ibid. Trevelyan's biographer wrote that Trevelyan
rejoined Gladstone because of the violence of the upper class
against Liberals; the common abuse of the Irish; and the
nascent imperialism. (G.K.lrevelyan, Sir ucorre Otto
Trevelyan. 121).
2
In a public apologia of his part in the conference, which
he made when standing as a Gladstonian candidate in July,
Trevelyan stated : . the fact is that during this long
space of time [after the Feb. meeting of the conference] an
active correspondence was going on between Mr. Chamberlain and
Sir william Harcourt - a correspondence of which I did not see
a word.. , . The first that I heard of what was going on
was on the 9th March.. . • On that evening I met Mr.
Chamberlain at an evening party and he told me that he had
written a letter, then I came home I found the letter in
which he told me that he should not rejoin the Round Table
Conference and that if I would call at his house he would show
me the correspondence of which that determination was the result
. . .» 2? July 13d7, p. 10).
3 Sir Henry James' memoir. Lord Askwith. Lord James of
IIerqfW, 190.
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speeches by Gladstone and his supporters had contained
nothing except vague and rhetorical assertions of principles
which nobody disputed, and. that he agreed with liartington
(who had sent a letter to the conference) that the Gladstonians
preferred and had chosen alliance with the Parnellites in
preference to reunion. Hence he was forced, he said, to
conclude that the cleavage of the Liberal party had become
complete and irretrievable, he affirmed that the Liberal
Unionists would continue to support the Government as long
as the Union was endangered and pointed out that it had
offered a programme which, two years earlier, Liberals would
have accepted with enthusiasm. The fines commented that
the dominant note of the conference was the final recognition
that reconciliation was impossible and a plainness in dealing
with Gladstone's tergiversations hitherto uncommon with the
2
Liberal Unionists,
Chamberlain, undoubtedly, was turning his face towards
new horizons, though perhaps as yet with little enthusiasm.
Bis new attitude appears to have drawn him closer to
Churchill. Both men in their speeches began to advocate
the creation of a national or central party. Chamberlain
had been contemplating something similar for some time. As
may be remembered, he had written to liarcourt at the end of
February that if the situation were to remain rnaltered he
1




would "go out of politics altogether - or assist in forming
some third party that will strenuously resist the new
Programme of Labouchere and Co, while ready to give effect
1
to the older policy of Constructive Liberalism,"
Churchill1s biographer describes the "national Party"
scheme as a vision of a great new party free alike from
vested interests and from holy formulae, able to deal with
national problems on their merits, patient to respect the
precious bequests of the past, strong to drive forward the
2
wheels of progress." One feels that any such vision was
at most but a part of the explanation. Chamberlain and
Churchill were ambitious, practical men, little inclined to
launch, without other motives, a crusade for any such
mystical ideal. A good down to earth explanation in at
hand. Salisbury's government was far from secure and its
collapse was a possibility which no politician could ignore.
Chamberlain and Churchill not only recognised the possibility,
but looked forward to it- as they expected that such an event
would result in a coalition government under Eartington in
3
which they would hold major positions. i'o prevent the stigma
of being a box - Worth affair,such a coalition required the
advance propagation oi a ralson d1etre and that, one feels,
was what Chamberlain and Churchill were in the main
1 Chamberlain to liarcourt, 26 Feb. 1887. (wot-d above p» 367-3).
2 Churchill, II. 3V;.
3 See below pp. l'-°l-2.
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endeavouring to do in advocating the "national Party".
Gladstone, in a speech at Swansea on U- June, aimed at
1
appeasing liarcourt. He listed five basic conditions which
he had laid down during uie debate cn the Government of
Ireland Bill and said, that he still aab red to them, but
that he was willing to see all other aspects of home rule
cUalt with as good policy and good sense might dictate. The
inclusion or exclusion of the Irish members, he intimated,
should be dealt with as expediency and the views of the
country might determine. He suggested that a settlement of
the question should be deferred until home rule had been
established and that in the interval the Irish representation
in the Imperial Parliament should remain unaltered.
Gladstone said he understood that Sir George Trevelyan had
suggested a conference between liarting ton and him to
consider reunion. If Partington wore to indicate a wish for
such a conference he would readily respond, he said. He
himself could not suggest such a conference, Gladstone
explained, because when last he had communicated with
Partington on Irish affairs Partington had refused to admit
that he had ever assented to any form of assembly for the whole
Gladstone wrote to Hareonrt on 5 July, . I felt that
1 had used every effort to fall in with your view in my
speech at Swansea, and thought I had all hut affirmed in
terms your main contention about Irish members at Westminster,
(draft, Add. Mss. M+201, f. lhO).




ITarcourt may have used Gladstone's statement, luke-wara
though it -was, to obtain an interview with Partington a
2
few days later. At this interview Hartington consented to
moot Gladstone and said that he was prepared to dismiss a
home rule measure with him, provided it were of a certain
3
kind. ?Tarcourt* s letter to Gladstone three weeks later,
which is at present the only source of infornation for this
meeting, does not indicate the nature of the home rule scheme
which Hartington was willing to discuss. liarcourt thought
well of it and believed that the majority of Liberals would
do the same. Presumably, it was a scheme f r a limited '
form of home rule. Harcourt assumed that Parnell would not
5
consent to it. Afterwards Gladstone, I lorley, and Harcourt
6
met and discussed Hartington*s remarks. "Ho violent objection
of principle arose", but Gladstone said that he could not
7
meet Hartington without Parnell*s consent. As a result it
was agreed that Korley should ask Parnell for an interview
o
in order to learn his views.
~ 7he Times. 6 June 1887, p. 10.
In his letter to Gladstone, 2 July 1887, Parcourt referred
to this event as "that; discussion which you had initiated".
(Add. Mas. khZOl, f. 132).








Harcourt believed that he knew what Parnell* s views
were certain to be and he abandoned his hope of a Gladstone -
1
Ilartington meeting. nevertheless, when day after day passed
2
with no reference to the interview with Parnell Harcourt
became more and more furious. At last he gave vent to his
views and feelings in a letter to Gladstone on 2 July.
Gladstone in his reply made no attempt to debate the issues
which Harcourt had raised. He confined himself to pointing
out that he had no faith in a scheme of limited home rule
su.ch as Harcourt had pressed for after his interview with
Ilartington. He remarked that through Par,.tell he had wished
to learn Ireland1s views on proposals which he disapproved,
but did not explain why the interview with Parnell had not
3
taken place.
The Irish Land bill had a slow passage through the
Lords and did not reach the House of Commons until b July.
The Government consented to certain alterations in the
bankruptcy clauses, but when the remodelled clauses were
denounced with an equal vigour, it restored them to
practically their original form. However, the Liberal
Unionists were determined that their objections should be
taken into account. To achieve this aim and to prevent
1 IUL&-
2 Ibid.
3 Gladstone to Harcourt (draft), 5 July 1837, Add. Mss.
MiF>1, f. 15+0.
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irate individual Liberal Unionists from malting damaging
attacks upon the Government the leaders decided to adopt the
course which they had taken with the Criminal Law Amendment
Bill. Eartington held a meeting of the Liberal Unionist
members at Devonshire House on 8 July and as before a
committee was appointed to draft amendments to be pressed
1
on the Government. According to the unauthorised press
reports, the meeting also passed a resolution assuring the
Government of Liberal Unionist support on at least the
second reading of the bill, and cane to a tacit understanding
that members who should disagree with the committee1s
amendments would confine their action to abstention from the
2
parliamentary division.
Salisbury admitted the necessity of the Irish Land Bill,
3
but confessed, that it was "pain and grief" to him. He
strongly opposed any further widening of its scope. The
Government adopted Salisbury's view and Balfour in moving
the second reading on 11 Ouly intimated, that no major
alteration of the bill would be accented. This information
precipitated a crisis the gravity of which was not realised
by the public at the time.
The committee consisted of Kartington, Chamberlain,
Sir II. James, It.E.tinlay, T.t.Russell, T.Lea, Viscount
Lymington, and J.U.Barclay. (The Times. 9 July 1887, p. 16).
2
©•£. The Times, 9 July IS87, p. 16.
•3
J Salisbury to Hicks-Beach, 3 July I087, quotation.
Cecil5 IV. 1U9.
**
Hansard, CCCXV11, cols. 372-89.
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The Liberal Unionists, while recognising that the bill
1
in many ways was an admirable one, strongly resented the
Government's decision to concede nothing to their views, A
deputation from a special Irish Land Bill sub-committee,
which had been set up by the Ulster Liberal tnionist
Association, was in I endon. pressing the demands of the Irish
2
unionist tenants. On the day following Balfour's
introduction of the measure T.h.Russell, the Liberal
Unionist representative for South Tyrone, warned that a
refusal to allow revision of Judicial rents end an insistence
upon the "bankruptcy" clauses vault., under-!line the unionism
3
of Ulster. In addition Chamberlain and. Churchill were
scheming together to replace Salisbury's Government by a
>f
Hartinf ton coalition containing themselves. They were so
hopeful of such an outcome that they agreed, it appears, that
neither would enter a cabinet which did not contain the
5
other. Chamberlain approached liar tington on the possibility
of a reconstruction of the Government, Hartington in his
reply did not express hostility to the idea but urged the
Chamberlain told the Commons, "It is generous to a
degree that no previous measure has been, and . . . goes
further in the concessions which it makes than any government
has ever gone, whether Tory or Liberal," (Hansard. CCCXVII.
col, *+25). His description of the bill as ''really generous"
in a letter to Rev, R.h.Pale (Garvin. II, 306) indicates that
his Commons description was an honest opinion.
^ Northern bhir. 9 July 1387, p, 5*
3 Hansard, CCCXVII, cols. 539-*+8.
l'r Garvin, II. *+33-*+; and Churchill, II. 3*1-j.
5 Churchill, II. 3^5.
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Inexpediency of an immediate one. He wrote:
As to a reconstruction of the Government, if it
should be suggested, I hope you will consider the
immense practical difficulties at this time, fhe
suspension of business at this period of the Session,
and a number of us sent down to our constituencies to
fight for our lives5 and the Conservatives puzzled
and perplexed at a crisis they don't in the least
anticipate or understand the necessity for; all this
is not a pleasant prospect, Surely it is bettor, if
it is at all possible, to keep the present Government
in this session, and let a reconstruction come, if it
is to come, with more deliberation and time to construct
a definite and popular policy.
Faced by the united front of the Liberal Unionists, the
outcry of the Irish unionist tenants,and the opposition of
Churchill the ministers drawn from the Commons declared
n
themselves beaten. Salisbury gave way to their views and
decided to concede all the main Liberal Unionist demands.
"It is the price which we have to pay for the Union and it
3
I., a heavy one," was his growling comment to his family.
He called the Conservative members and certain peers to a
meeting at the Carlton Club on the 19th and bluntly told them
h
of his decision. From the press reports it appears that
Salisbury said that the Government had been prepared to give
way on the less important aspects of the Irish Land Bill,
among which it included the bankruptcy clauses, but not on





Ihe press had to rely on second-hand accounts of the
speech as reporters were not admitted to the meeting, (fhe
, £0 July 1887, 9). Salisbury's biographer wrote
that they were admitted (Cecil, IV, 1>j), but she was
mistaken.
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the revision of judicial rents as Conservative principles
were opposed to the upsetting of contracts. He explained
that, nevertheless, the Government in order to avoid the
general election which must follow the -withdrawal of
Liberal Unionist support now proposed to concede the
revision of judicial rents also.
The committee appointed at the Devonshire House meeting
met later on the same day. It pronounced Salisbury's
concessions -co be satisfactory, and assured the Government
of Liberal Unionist co-operation in dealing with the remaining
1*2
business of the session, .As the committee contained
Hartington, Chamberlain, and James the Government was
thus assured that at least on the Irish Land Bill its
existence was no longer endangered.
The Conservatives on the whole accepted Salisbury's
logic and acquiesced in the surrender, although, of course,
not without many a surly complaint in private. The Standard
wrote that it would leave to metaphysicians to argue whether
the concessions were equivalent to a fresh valuation of
rents. It was enough, it maintained, for practical
1
Times. 20 July lub7, p. 7,
^ T.W.Russell (3,Tyrone) was satisfied with the Government's
concessions, but in the following month he withdrew from, the
Liberal Unionist party as a protest against its acquiescence
in the acceptance by the Government of two amendments to the
land bill. (X.W.Russell to the editor of The aiaes.. 20 Aug.
1887, The fines, 22 Aug. 1887, P. 8).
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politicians to know that the Government made their proposals
with the support of their followers, that the proposals met
the wishes of the Liberal Unionists, and that there was
every reason to believe that they would satisfy the Ulster
tenants and landlords. Hostages had been riven to the Irish
tenants, it argued, in the shape of previous legislation
and the path so taken would have to be followed until it
should emerge in single ownership. The Times thought that
the Government had probably been influenced to make the
concessions more by the wish to do nothing which would
weaken the position ol the Liberal Unionists, and with it
the valuo of their alliance, than by the fear that the
2
Liberal Unionists would desert them. The Daily Telegraph
wrote that the Liberal Unionists had loyally supported the
"coercion" bill - a most disagreeable necessity for most
of them - and that their demand, that the legislation of
the year should have a Liberal stamp was not asking too much
3
in return. The spectator declared that the only one who
had gained by the surrender was Parnell and blamed the
Government for not having made the concession at the time of
Parnell's Tenants Belief LI11, or when the Cowper Commission
had reported# It was no secret, it stated, that the prime
1
Standard, 20 July 1307, p. k.
2
The linos, 20 July lob7, p. 7.
Daily Telegraph. 2.0 July 1337, p. 5.
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mover In the Liberal Unionist pressure on the Government
had not been Hartington, and it doubted whether the
1
concessions wore in keeping with Hartington1s convictions.
The Uimingho- bally l ost drew the moral that the Government
would only go so far as it was firmly led by the Liberal
/*
Unionists. The .•ally hews commented that the Cabinet had
evidently decided that the retention of office was the
better Dart of valour, and that lord Hartington1s support
3
was worth more than ilr. Goschen's arguments.
.lot until the end of July could anyone be certain that
Salisbury's Irish Laid Bill surrender had saved the
Government. A wee!: after bis speech it again seemed on
the verge of collapse and even Hartington feared that no
ij.
propping could uphold It. However, disaster was once more
averted and by early August the Government was safe for at
least the immediate future.
Chamberlain had been elated at the prospect of an
5
immediate coalition and must have been keenly disappointed
when it receded into an inch finite future. lie had also to
give over his hope of a political partnership with Churchill,
■L Spectator. 23 July 1867, p. 980.
rlrridn-nn:: -ally Pi sty 2:1 July lo67, p.
3 Daily laws, 20 July 1837, p. b.
** Garvin, II. hBh.
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The expectation of a Government collapse had drawn then
closer together than ever before. It may also have made
then more aware of the obstacles of temperament and
personality which stood in the way of a partnership, both
men were too sell-willed to concede much to the views of the
other. Churchill was temperamental, his actions
unpredictable, and often ir. his speeches he seemed careless
of whether or not he damaged the unionist cause. As
Chamberlain noted a feu years later, "He was ready to
press the Government in a Liberal direction, but unfortunately
• . . he was willing to do this in a way and to an extent
1
which night seriously weaken them." - In the Commons on
1 August an amendment on the Irish Land Bill led to a clash
in which Churchill struck at Chamberlain with the phrase
"a characteristic sneer" and Chamberlain retaliated with
the remark that he was not one who spoke one way and voted
2
another. The quarrel was soon made up and within the week
they were dining and consulting together in what appeared to
3
be the same friendly way as before. but either the
reconciliation was incomplete or else the quarrel was a
symptom that they themselves sensed their political
incompatability. Soon afterwards Chamberlain and Churchill
had a frenk discussion during a walk in Hyde Pari and
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 279.
2 Hansard. CCCXVIII, cols. 820-9.
3 Churchill, II. 3ho.
ito7
"decided by mutual consent to work Independently and to
^
pursue the objects they sought in common by separate paths."
From that time onwards Churchill began to look more and
more to Hartington in political matters and to confide
2
less freely in Chamberlain.
Hartington believed that events were moving towards a
coalition and that Conservative and Liberal Unionist
3
opinion were now for the first time almost prepared for it.
He visualised a coalition which would be equally acceptable
to the majority of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, and
which i^ould be substantially agreed on non-Irish as well as
*f
on Irish policy. His views on coalition probably differed
from those of Chamberlain and Churchill. One suspects
that the latter wished for a coalition in which theirs
would be the predominant influence. Many right wing
Conservatives, and probably Salisbury, would have declined
to serve in such a ministry.
In a speech on 5 August Hartington said that a union of
Conservatives and Liberal Unionists itfould be the perfect
form of organisation, but that it would have to be preceded
by further experience of the willingness of both sides to
co-operate in Liberal legislation. He declared that he had
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Hartington to Coldwin Smith, 7 Aug. I087, Goldwin Smith1 s
correspondence (ed., A.Haultain), 202.
**
Har ting ton1 s speech, 3 Aug. 1887, The Times, 6 Aug, I887,
p. 10,
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no hope of an agreement between Liberal Unionists and
Gladstonians. An agreement, he said, would now have to be
an inter-party one and include the Conservatives - a suggestion
which he had made on several occasions in the preceding
weeks. The only statement of Gladstone which he could
consider a concession was the admission that a land bill
could be framed without imperial credit. lie explained that
to him the retention of the Irish members at Westminster
would be an aggravation and not an improvement in the
Government of Ireland Bill, and that separate treatment of
Ulster must involve a reconstruction of the whole scheme
.1
such as Gladstone did not appear to have recognised.
whatever prestige may have accrued to the Liberal
Unionists through having gained the alterations which they
had demanded in the Irish Land Bill was more than offset
by the success of the Gladstonians at the by-elections.
Between 1 July and 2 August six by-elections had been
fought in constituencies which had been contested in the
general election. The result had been that the Gladstonians
had captured two seats from the Conservatives, held two of
their own with increased majorities, and reduced the
2
Conservative majority in the remaining two. Although no
1
X&2. nnog., 6 Aug. 1387, P. 10.
2
The Uorthwieh (Cheshire) by-election (13 Aug.) is not
included because Chamberlain had made his approach to
Gladstone before the result of it was known. The Liberal
Unionists who had won Horthwich by *+5o votes in the general
election lost it by 1,129 votes. In both contests the Liberal
Unionist candidate was a moderate. In the General election
he was a local salt mining magnate and in the by-election
Lord Richard Grosvenor.
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Liberal Unionist stood in any of these contests, the
Gladstonian successes were more damaging to the Liberal
Unionists than to the Conservatives for it was widely
suspected that the explanation was that many Liberal Unionists,
and especially the radically Inclined, were returning to
1
Gladstone. The Liberal Unionists had to recognise that
there was some truth in this and that it angered ill for
the future of the party.
Apart from the by-elections early August was a
singularly gloomy time for Chamberlain. His hopes of an
immediate coalition and of a partnership with Churchill had
evaporated and, as was to be expected, he had no liking for
Hartington1s desire to close ranks with the Conservatives.
Such a course, he warned Bartington, was negative and
certain to lead in the long run to the extinction of
Another factor which told against the unionists in these
by-elections was the exceptional abilities of the Gladstonian
organisers, Francis Schna&horst and Francis Adams. On 2 Sept,
Arnold Morley warned Gladstone that the by-election victories
had been due in part to superior organisation, and that similar
success could not be expected in a general election. (Add.
Msa. LL-2535 f • 126). Both politicians and electors in the
latter nineteenth century attached a greater importance to
by-elections than th'ey do now. Prominent statesmen took part
in them to an extent unknown today, and unlike modern by-elections
the poll was invariably higher than in a general election.
Party organisation continued to increase in scale and efficiency
during the second half* of the eighties and by-elections were
fought with an increasing intensity. In the Exchange Div.,
Liverpool by-election of Jan. 1887 (in which Goschen was
defeated by 7 votes) some 700 voters who had taken up residence
elsewhere were brought back by the Gladstonians to vote. (Told
to Sir H. Temple by T.P.O'Connor, Sir E. Temple, Letters and
character sketches from the House of Commons. I99T.holess
than 260 members of Parliament, electioneering agents, and
others were brought into the constituency by the two parties
during the by-election for the Isle of Thanet in June I889.
(Speech by Wolmer, Liberal Unionist conference, Leeds, Nov,
1889, L^bppai, Ufljofttovi Gee. 1889, P. 92).
mo
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the Liberal Unionists as a party. Then in the second week
of August he learned that the Government had decided to
suppress the Irish National League by proclamation. He was
much disturbed. It was, he told Hartington, a suicidal
2
policy and one to which he could give no support. "Why
not", he asked, "trust rather to the beneficent operation
3
of the Land Bill?"
These embarrassments, and especially the decision to
suppress the National League, appear to have b en more than
Chamberlain could tolerate and, as was his instinct when
hard pressed, he sketched out a new offensive. His plan
was that the Liberal Unionist party should officially adopt
a substantial and distinct programme, including his own
"Canadian province" scheme of home rule, and, secondly,
that a renewed effort should be made to come to an
if
understanding x-Jifch Gladstone.
One is surprised by Chamberlain's advocacy of a new
approach to Gladstone. Was he appalled by the gloomy
outlook for the Radical Unionists and merely clutching at
the only straw within reach? Some men might have reacted
in that way, but one feels confident that Chamberlain was
1 Chamberlain to Ilartington, 16 Aug. 1887, Garvin, II.
315-16, and 22 Sept. 1887, Holland, II. 195-6.




Ilartington to Chamberlain, 15 Aug. I887, Holland, II.
193-ifj and Chamberlain to Hartington, 16 Aug. 1887.
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not such a person. He himself explains in his memoir that
Gladstone had in a speech indicated his willingness to make
1
concessions to the Liberal Unionists. This supposed
willingness appears to have been Chamberlains main
2
argument when pressing the proposal upon Hartington, But
in none of his speeches during the preceding weeks had
Gladstone made any concession of significance which he had
not already made prior to June and which consequently had
been denounced by Chamberlain as inadequate at the National
Radical Union conference. However, Gladstone had in one
or two speeches advocated home rule for Wales, and Scotland.
This fact and Gladstone's explicit statements that an Irish
or other legislature must be subject to the supremacy of
the Imperial Parliament, may have led Chamberlain to
wonder whether Gladstone could be induced to adopt a Canadian type
scheme for the whole of the British Isles - a plan which,
as has been seen, Chamberlain had long approved.
Whatever may have been his motives, Chamberlain acted
at once. In a conversation with Morley on the evening of
3
12 August he suggested "communications" In a further
b-
endeavour to discover a scheme of Liberal reunion. Morley
1
Chamberlain's memoir, Chamberlain, 271.
2
Hartington to Chamberlain, li> Aug, 1887.
3 Garvin, II, 310.
^
Morley to Gladstone, 21 Aug, I887, Add, Mss, bb-255, f• 217;
and Korley to Chamberlain, lb- Aug, 1887, Garvin, II, 311-12.
his
eagerly grasped at the suggest and next ^ travelled to
X
Hawarden Castle to discuss it with Gladstone. There he
found that Gladstone, although friendly to reconciliation,
2
doubted the expediency of immediate "communications".
Events, he suggested, should be allowed to ripen further
and added that the hostility to Chamberlain among the
Gladstonians meant that any move would have to be a
gradual one. He made clear that he was interested, not
in a reconciliation with Chamberlain alone, but in one
which would include the whole of the Liberal Unionist
party. . .he dreads any step", Morley reported, "which
might in some degree commit him to what might prove only
sectional accommodation."
Chamberlain replied to Morley on the 16th. By then ho
had learned from Hartington that it was futile to hope for
3
his co-operation in any immediate negotiations, and he must
have recognised from Morley's report that without Hartington's
co-operation any further approach to Gladstone would be worse
than useless. He informed Morley that he was quite ready to
accept the view that they should wait until events ripened or
at least until Morley should have returned from a holiday
in Switzerland in three or four weeks time.
1 Morley to Chamberlain, 12 Aug. 1667, Garvin, II. 311.
2 This description of the visit is based on Morley to
Chamberlain, 1m- Aug. 1887; and Morley to Gladstone, 21 Aug. 1837.
3 Hartington to Chamberlain, 15 Aug. 1387, Holland, II. 193-'}-.
h'
Chamberlain to Morley, 16 Aug# 1887, Garvin, II. 313.
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Meanwhile Chamberlain had urged his proposals on
Hartington. On the l*+th Hartington discussed them with
Churchill. Churchill told him that he believed the Conservative
party would not consider.any plan which went beyond an
extension of local government to the three kingdoms, and
that if the Liberal Unionists were to adopt a scheme for
Ireland modelled on the Canadian constitution the alliance
with the Conservatives and all hope of a coalition or of a
1
national party would be at an end. Next day Hartington
wrote reporting the conversation to Chamberlain. He added
that as Churchill was "at least as advanced as any of the
Conservatives" the probable result of an adoption of
Chamberlain's plan would be to break up the alliance with
the Conservatives; to make a reconstruction of the
Government impossible; and to place the Liberal Unionists
in a position where they would have the support of neither
2
Liberals nor Conservatives and so would disappear. And as
to Gladstone's supposed concessions - surely they could
criticise and examine them and draw him into more explicit
declarations before committing themselves further! However ;
If you still decide on treating Mr. Gladstone's
concessions as substantial and as providing a basis
for an understanding, I fear that it may be as you
have suggested, the commencement of a separation in
our lines of action. But I do not know that the risk
of this is greater than it was at the time of the round
table, and I doubt whether anything which I could
Hartington to Chamberlain, 15 Aug. I887.
2 Ibid.
dis¬
honestly say at this time would certainly avert it.
If I could promise a favourable consideration to some
plan which should be intended to satisfy my conditions,
it would not carry us much further, for I should do so
with the knowledge that the plan when produced would-}_
not differ very much from the one which I have seen,
to which I do not think that I could agree, and for
which I could not take any responsibility? and we
should before long find ourselves drifting apart.. • •
liar ting ton's arguments were reinforced by appeals to
2
Chamberlain from Sir Henry James and other Liberal Unionists.
Chamberlain yielded and consented to postpone public
3
advocacy of his proposed new departure.
The Irish national League was proclaimed in Clare, and
in parts of Galway, Kerry, Cork, and Waterford on 19
August. Next day Chamberlain announced that he would vote
against the^Government when the matter should come before
Parliament. Hartington thought the proclamation "open to
every sort of Parliamentary and political objection", but
confined himself to informing the Government of his opinion
as he assumed that it had taken the decision on better
5
information than he possessed. The Government had not
6
consulted him beforehand as they had done on other subjects.
Perhaps the Canadian province type scheme which Chamberlain
had shown Hartington in !4arch, (See above p. 369).
2
Garvin, II, 319'.
^ Chamberlain to Hartington, 16 Aug, 1837, Garvin, II,
319-16.
The Times. 22 Aug, 1887, p. 7.





It seems to have felt, he told Churchill, that it was a
measure of executive responsibility rather than of policy
and had abstained from asking him to share executive
1
responsibility. Churchill, too, was against the proclamation.
On the 22nd he wrote to Chamberlain that if the whole of
the Liberal Unionist party were to vote against it he would
go with them, but that otherwise he would give a silent vote
2
in its favour.
On the 25+th Gladstone brought forward a condemnatory
address. Hartington spoke in favour of the Government on
the last day of the debate (26 August). He contended that
the National League could not be judged entirely on its
professed aims and that account load to be taken of its
influence on peace and order in Ireland. He admitted that he
had pointed out to the Government objections to the
proclamation and had suggested the use, if possible, of
certain other provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
But the Government, he said, was bound to act on its own
judgment.
The Government had a majority of seventy-seven in the
division. Forty-seven Liberal Unionists, including Hartington
and Bright, voted with the Government, six against it, and
seventeen were absent impaired. The six consisted of
1 Ibid.
2
Churchill to Chamberlain, 22 Aug. 1887. q.w.o,, Garvin,
II. 31^15.
3 Hansard,. CCCXX, cols. 88-101.
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Chamberlain and his five staunehest followers - his brother
Richard, his brother-in-law William Ivonrick, Jesse Collings,
Power Williams, and Sir B# Hingley* The Conservatives
naturally were irritated by Chamberlain's action, but many of
them recognised that he was being consistent with his previous
attitude. W.H.Smith in reporting the debate to the Queen
wrote s
... Lord Hartington has acted throughout most
honourably in every sense of the word, and has given
evidence of his most earnest desire to do the best
in his power for the country irrespective of personal
interests; and Mr. Chamberlain also, as far as he
could,^has thrown aside all petty and party feeling
0 • •
Chamberlain's vote may have been decisive in a way in
which he could not have expected. On the same day as he
cast it the United kingdom, Canada, and the United States
agreed to attempt a settlement of the long standing fishing
rights dispute between Canada and the United States by means
of a joint commission. The Government was at once faced
with the problem of whom to place in charge of the British
side of the commission. Someone suggested Chamberlain and
2
immediately the idea was recognised as an excellent one.
He was a man of outstanding ability, his appointment would be
a mark of respect to the Liberal Unionists, and the removal
for some months of their militant and conditional ally would
"*• W.II.Smith to the Queen, 27 Aug. 1807, Letters of Queen
Victoria. 3rd Series, I. 3>+6-7. * ~
2 Garvin, II. 32b-.
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b© a relief to the Government# To Chamberlain, who just then
was at the nadir of his political weakness and isolation,
the prospect of leaving Britain my have come with even
1
greater satisfaction than it did to the Government. At
2
any rate he accepted their offer at once and the matter
was settled two days later (23th) by a telegram from the
3
Queen to Salisbury stating that she highly approved.
Behind the scenes Chamberlain continued to press hard
to have his now programme adopted by the party. It was a
single-handed struggle for on this question he lacked the
support of any important Liberal Unionist and had Churchill
against him# Towards the end of August Hartington informed
Goschen of Chamberlain's proposals and asked Goschen and
Salisbury to consider whether home rule could be resisted
permanently without the unionists offering an alternative
On 22 April i860 Chamberlain wrote to Miss Endicott,
"i pressed him QlartingtonJ to do something of this sort
(adopt a positive programmeJ before I left for America, and
if he had done so I should not have gone, but should have
remained to advocate it." (Garvin, II. 3)2).
2
Garvin, II. 32h-5,
3 The Queen to Salisbury (cypher telegram], 2o Aug. 1387,
Letters of Queen Victoria. 3rd Series, I. 3^7.
l(" On 22 Aug. Churchill wrote to Chamberlain t "The
conduct of the Government on the Land question and on the
League question is imbecile enough ... Every day that
they remain in office strengthens Mr, G.'s hands. But you
and I can do nothing by ^urselves. I think we must stick
to Lord II. coute que coute.. . • His position is most
difficult, but his shrewd caution and masterly inactivity
will probably carry him and his following through."
(Garvin, 11 • 315*- j>.
via
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scheme involving more than an extension of local government.
Eartington explained that his own belief was that Liberal
Unionists would be at a great disadvantage if it should
seem that their opposition was to the details of a particular
2
scheme and not to the broad principles of Gladstone's policy.
There is no record available of what Goschen or Salisbury
thought, but one can assume that they liked Chamberlain's
proposals no more than did Hartington.
During the greater part of September Chamberlain
continued to press for the adoption of his programme. At
last, either as a tactful gesture, or in order to prove to
Chamberlain how small a welcome his programme would have
from the party as a whole, Hartington asked Craig dollar
to obtain from a number of Liberal Unionists their opinions
"on what ought to be the policy of the jjiiberalj Unionist
party, and especially on the question of our proposing a
3
scheme of Home Rule or extensive Local Government." On 21
September Hartington forwarded Craig Sellar's replies (with
the exception of six which were still to come in) to
Chamberlain and pointed out that all were against any form
of Irish parliament, or large scheme of local government.
II© also gave his own opinion :
1 Elliot, II. 11U»15.
2 IMd.
3 Hartington to Chamberlain, 21 dept. I887, Holland, II.
... I feel more and more convinced that the production
of any alternative plan will break up the Liberal
Unionist party, or what remains of it, immediately.
There are, no doubt, a certain number whose objections
were to the details of the Gladstonian scheme. Mr#
Gladstone has probably indicated sufficient openness
of mind to conciliate them, and they would prefer such
a modification of his plan as he would himself propose,
to anything which we could offer as an alternative. But
the principle of the large majority of Liberal Unionists
is, I think, opposition to an Irish Parliament in any
shape and then we shall lose by any approach to Mr,
Gladstone.1
The answers to Craig Sellar1s enquiries seem to have
completed the task of convincing Chamberlain of the futility
of further pressing to have his views made those of the
party# He replied to liarting ton on the same day as he
received his letter. First he objected that the men
consulted by Craig Sellar were bad advisers for a popular
party and that even the Ulstermen, Lea and Russell, ignored
the English electorate. He then continued t
... However, I do not wi3h to press this now. I
decided after my last conversation with you not to put
any alternative scheme forward at the present time In
opposition to your "wish, and I certainly shall not say
anything in my coming speeches more definite than the
general allusions 1 have previously made.
At the same time it is right that I should privately
record my dissent from the policy which you have finally
adopted# It is a negative policy, and. while it may do
very well for the Conservatives, it will not retain any
considerable number of Liberal or Radical Unionists in
the country. Unless something turns up we are certain
to be extinguished at the next election, and it is
impossible to say how soon that election may come. If
you are ready to support the Government through thick and
thin, and whether they accept your advice or not, they
may retain office for a few years, but the smash will be
1 Ibid.
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all the worse when it does come.
Thus Ciiamberlain, in spite of his protests, conceded that for
"the present" Harbin?ton's ideas and not his own were to be
the ones followed by the party.
he also put aside his last real b/pe3 of reconciliation
with Gladstone. On 1 j September he wrote to i.orlep that the
situation seemed mors hopeless than ever and that Gladstone1s
most recent speeches and published letters seemed a
2
withdrawal fro:: rather than an advance towards conciliation.
Ilorley replied in a friendly letter holding open the door
for further developments. He remarked that he thought the
■3
J
difficulties wore, at bottom, mainly personal. Chamberlain
wrote back :
I do not think that the difficulties are personal.
If an agreement could be found that would settle the
question, I would undertake to go out of politics
altogether as ray part of the bargain. But 1 am bound
both by honour and duty to fight to the death against
proposals which in my judgment constitute the greatest L
national danger with which we have ever been threatened.
Kith this blunt note Chamberlain appears to have finally
turned his back on Liberal reunion.
The employment of the powers granted under the Criminal
Law Amendment act led to incidents which were as useful to
hone rulers as the "Parnellism and Crime" articles and the
Chamberlain to liar ting ton, 22 Sept. 16c7, Chats. 3^0.21*1-9
(Holland, il. 1%).
2 -
Chamberlain to Horlcy, 16 dept. .1667, Garvin, II. 316.
3 horlty to Chamberlain, 21 Sept. 1667 > ibid.
k
Chamberlain to barley, 22 Sept. 1667, ibid.. II. 3IS-26.
facsimile letter were to unionists. Many Irish nationalists
were convicted and Imprisoned for defying the Government
prohibitions, but the most dramatic incident occurred at
Mitchelstown, Co, Cork on 9 September during a large protest
meeting at which Dillon and a few radical Gladstonian
members of Parliament were the speakers. After a clash
with the police the mob drove them into their barracks from
which the police fired a volley that killed two people and
injured others.
Parliament did not rise until 16 September owing to the
amount of time which had been taken up by the two Irish
bills. The recess saw political campaigning of an unusual
intensity. Unionists were goaded on by the adverse bye-
elections of the previous months. A general election in
the near future was sufficiently probable to give an
additional stimulus to everyone. The Liberal Unionists
were especially active and the Annual heristsr speaks of
1
their "almost feverish energy", A fortnight before he left
for north America Chamberlain made a five day tour through
Ulster and met with an enthusiasm similar to that of
2
Churchill's visit in February 1686. On his return he
exclaimed to Hartington, "bo not forget Ulster - it is a
3
terrible nut for the G,G,M. to crack". Towards the end of
Annual Register. 168?, p. yftm
2
Northern Whir:. 12 - 1? Oct. 1887, passim.
3 Chamberlain to Eartington, 27 Oct. 1887, Chats, 3U0. 2152.
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November Hartington accompanied by Goschen addressed a
large gathering of Liberal Unionists in Dublin - a
gathering which impressed by the evidence it gave of the
strength of Liberal Unionism among the wealthier non-landlord
people of southern Ireland.
The annual conference of the National Liberal
Federation took place in Nottingham on 18, and 19 October.
Gladstone in his address on the 19th gave his consent to a
major step forward in the radiealization of the party
programme. He in effect sanctioned local government,
including county councils, the readjustment of rates so that
labour would have to pay no more than a fair share, local
option, abolition of landed entail ("free trade in land"),
disestablishment in Wales and Scotland, and abolition of
plural votes Cone man, one vote")• Disestablishment of
the Church of ?7.ngland he side-stepped with the claim that the
2
question was not yet ripe for decision.
Other factors were helping to solidify the Liberal
cleavage besides the increasing divergence in the party
programmes. One was the difficulty which Giadstonians and
Liberal Unionists had in tolerating one another when they
attempted to co-operate for a common end. In the early spring
of 1887 Chamberlain and a number of his supporters resigned
from the Liberation Society as a result of hostile statements
£he Times. 30 Nov., and 1 Dec. I887
2 Ibid.. 20 Oct. 1837.
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1
about Chamberlain and Bright at one of its meetings. The
Temperance Alliance meeting on 1 July hissed the Liberal
Unionists, IV. S.Caine and E.Russell, until both men were
2
forced to withdraw from the platform. Sir Wilfred Lawson,
the president of the Temperance Alliance, denounced such
3
conduct, and the Liberation Society in its winter programme
urged its members to exclude the Irish question from their
L-
proceedings. But events continued much as before. VJ.3.
Caine rejoined Gladstone in the summer of 18$)0 because he
careu more for temperance reform than for preventing home
rule and could not stand being howled and hooted every time
5
he addressed a temperance meeting.
The annual conference of the National Union of
Conservative and Constitutional Associations, which net in
Oxford on 22, and 23 November caused a flutter of consternation
among liberal Unionists by passing, with a large majority, a
Iritisii Weekly. 18 March lob?, p. 9.
2 Ibid.. 8 July 1887, p. 153.
3 IM&-
?!"
Ibid.. 30 Sept. 1887, p. If67.
^ W.S.Caine told James towards the end of I089 that he would
probably rejoin Gladstone and gave this as his reason.
(Jamas' memoir, Lord Askwith, Lord James of Hereford. 190).
The immediate cause of Caine's reversion was the Government's




resolution, approving the imposition of protective tariffs.
Salisbury, when later he addressed the conference,
endeavoured to allay apprehensions. The question, ho said,
was for the present of no more than academic interest. But
Liberal Unionists were not fully reassured. The ^Irmlrmhan
tail.: Post wrote that Salisbury would have to oppose
protection clearly and unreservedly. Gladstone's home rule,
it warned, would be infinitely less disastrous to the
national prosperity than protection. The ^eotsrtan drew
the mora.! that the Liberal Unionists rust keep up their own
party organisation as the Conservatives would be almost
certain in the course of time to adopt some policy opposed
•+
by the Liberal Unionists.
1 The Times. 23, and 2b Nov. 1087«
2 The Gladstonians, of course, were gratified by the Liberal
Unionist embarrassment. Harcourt wrote to Spencer, "The
declaration of the Tories at Oxford in favour of protection
is delightful and we ought to make a great handle out of it.
Fancy Goschen, bright and Chamberlain marching under the
Protectionist flag, headed by Howard Vincent!" (23 Nov. 138/,
Ilarcourt vol., Althorp).
3 himinch?^ uaily host, 2b Nov. 1887, p. b.
^ Scotsman. 2*+ Nov. 1887, p. b.
The parliamentary recess which occupied the later part
of 1837 can be considered the end of a phase in the history
of the Liberal Unionist party. For that reason it is chosen
as the terminating point of this thesis. Prior to the
recess there was still a possibility, even if only a very
slight one, that a section of Lib-oral Unionists might yet
return to Gladstone, From the recess onwards such a
possibility was very remote indeed. The failure of the
Round 1 able Conference and the other attempted rapprochements
the liberalism of the Government policy? the Increasing
radicalism of the Gladstonian; and the fact that the
Liberal Unionists had not only supported the Government
.for a year and a half, but had supported them in passing
the Irish Criminal Law Amendment Act all contributed
towards the new situation. On his return from North
America (9 Larch 1888) Chamberlain was to create a Liberal
Unionist party machine in Birmingham to. replace "The Two
Thousand" (which the Gladstonians Raptured during his
absence) and to use if shortly afterwards to support the'
1
Conservative candidate in a municipal by-election.
1
Garvin, II, chap, XXXVII, passim
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APPENDIX I
FREE CHURCH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, <5HJffi 1886
The following lists of Free Church M.P.s were gleaned from
the religious press. It has not been possible to compile a
list of Congregational M.P.s because the Nonconformist and
Independent was not interested in discovering which of the
M.P.s were of its denomination. The number of Unitarians and
Quakers in Parliament was many times larger than the size of
their denominations would lead one to expect. (£•£• li" M.P.s
had been returned according to the ntmerict.il strengths of the
denominations, Methodist K.P.e would have outnumbered Unitarian
by more than twenty-five to one). The comparatively large
number of Unitarian and Quaker M.P.s was probably largely
because these two denominations contained exceptionally high
proportions of the upper middle class. Nineteenth century-
census returns did not include figures for religious dexiominationsy
but the Christian Life believed that Methodists had 693*374 full
church members in England and Wales; '-ongregationalists, 418,100;
1
Baptists, 310,818; and Quakers, 15,219. The Christian Life
did not include a figure for Unitarians. Unitarians, including
four congregations in Scotland, today number 26,000 full church
members.^
1 Christian Life, 3 July 1886, p.321.
2
World Christian Handbook, 1952, p.129. This source is used
and not the census returns as the census figure includes more




Ashton (T.Gair) Hyde Div., Cheshire
Brooklehurst (W.C.) Macclesfield Div., Cheshire.
Brunner (J.T.) Northwleh Biv., Cheshire.
Carbutt (E.II.) Monmouth Dist.
Cobb (H.P.) S.E.Warwickshire or Rugby Div.
Cosham (Handel) E. Div., Bristol.
Cowan (Joseph) Newcastle-on-Tyne.
urompton (C.) Leek Div., Staffordshire*
Hunter (W.A.) IT.Div., Aberdeen.
Jacoby (J.A.) Mid. Div., Derbyshire.
James (C.H.) Merthyr-Iydvil,
Kenny (Courtney Stanhope) Barnsley Biv., Yorkshire.
Paget (T.T.) Harborough, Leicestershire.
Peacock (Richard) S.E.^orton, Lancashire.
Potter (T.B.) Rochdale.
Rathbone (William) Carnarvonshire.
Roscoe (Sir H.E.) S. Biv., Manchester.
Samuelson (Sir Bernard) Banbury Div., Oxfordshire.
Btansfeld (James) Halifax.
Williams (Arthur John) S. Glamorganshire.
Wright (Caleb) Leigh Div., Lancashire.
Channing (F*A.) E» Biv., Northamptonshire was the son
of a Unitarian minister, but he withdrew from that
denomination and joined the Anglican.
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Liberal Unionist (Total 4)
Chamberlain (Joseph) W. Div., Birmingham.
Chamberlain (Richard) W. Div., Islington.
Kenrick (Alderman W.) N. Div*, Birmingham.






Bennett (J.)(Wesleyan) Gainsborough, Lincolnshire.
Broadhurst (H.)(Wesleyan) Bordesley Div. Birmingham.
Cohens-Hardy (H.H,) (Free Methodist) N. Norfolk.
Crawford (W.) (Primitive) Mid Durham.
Fenwick (C.)(Primitive) Wansbeck, Northumberland.
Fowler (E,H.)(Wesleyan) E. Wolverhampton.
Holden (A.)(Wesleyan) E. Bradford.
Holden (I.)(Wesleyan) N. Keighley, Yorkshire.
Hoyle (I.)(Wesleyan) Heywood, Lancashire.
Jenkins (D.J.)(Wesleyan) Penrith and Falmouth.
McArthur (A.)(Wesleyan) Leicester.
Moulton (J.F.)(Wesleyan) Clapham.
Robson (W.S.)(Wesleyan) Bow and Bromley.
Watson (T.)(Free Methodist) Ilkeston, Derbyshire.
Wilson (J.)(Primitive) Houghton-le~Spring, Durham.
429
Burt (T.) Morpeth, was the son of a Methodist preacher,
but he withdrew from that denomination and was
for a time associated with the Unitarians. In
1386 he appears to have been attached to no
denomination.
Liberal Unionist (total 2)
Allen (W.8.)(Wesleyan) Newcastle-under-Lyme.
Bickford-Smith (W.)(Wesleyan) Truro, Cornwall.
Non-Committed Liberal (Total 1)
Blades (J.W.) (Wesleyan) W. Brorawich (walked out before the
division on the home rule bill and did not re-stand
for Parliament.)
Conservative (Total 2)
De Cobain (E.S.W.MPrimitive) E. Be1 fast.
Hughes (E.)(Wesleyan) Woolwich.
Nationalist (Total 1)
Jordan (J.)(Wesleyan) W. Clare.
BAPTIST
Gladstonian (Total 6)
Blake (T.) Forest of Dean, Gloucestershire.
Coleraan (J.J.) Norwich.
Coote (T.) S. Huntingtonshire.
Davies (W.) Pembrokeshire.
Everett (R.L.) Woodbridge, Suffolk.
Illingworth (A.) W. Bradford.
V3 o
Liberal Unionist (Total 1)







Pease (Sir Joseph W.) Barnard Castle, Durham.
Liberal Unionist (Total 3)
Bright (John) Central Birmingham.







A, Collections of private papers.
B, Autobiographies, diaries, printed correspondence and
collected speeches.
C, Biographies and character studies.
D, Contemporary newspapers and periodicals,
E, Contemporary polemical publications.
F, General histories,
G, Other works.
H, Works of reference.
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A. COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE PAPERS
John Bright papers, British Museum.
Sir Henry Camphell-Bannerman papers, British Museum.
Fourth Earl Carnarvon papers, Public Record Office.
Leonard and Kate Courtney (first Baron and Lady Courtney of
Penwith) papers, London School of Economics.
Eighth Duke of Devonshire papers, Chatsworth House,
Derbyshire.
Sir Charles Dilke papers, British Museum.
Mrs. Mary Drew (daughter of Gladstone) papers, British Museum,
Herbert Gladstone (first Viscount Gladstone of Hawarden)
papers, British Museum.
William Swart Gladstone papers, British Museum,
Second Earl Granville papers, Public Record Office.
First Earl Iddesleigh papers, temporarily deposited in the
Public Record Office for the convenience of the Historical
Manuscripts Commission.
Sir Henry Ponsonby papers, British Museum.
first Marquess of Ripon papers, British Museum.
Fifth Earl Spencer papers, Althorp, Northamptonshire.
Sir Richard Temple (Conservative M.P,) papers, British Museum,
IM £2U2Hi&£ yj^rq pgfl^ted Ml UUiU 2B
Jtil§ PfesQUf sdiesis
H.H.Asquith (first Earl of Oxford and Asquith) papers, Bodleian
Library, Oxford.
Henry Broadhurst papers, London School of Economics,
II. de F. Montgomery (Ulster Liberal Unionist landlord) papers,
Public Record Office, Northern Ireland.
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B. APIOBIOGRAPHIE3. DIARIES. PRINTED
CORRESPONDENCE,. Alii CQL. LCl'frp SPEECHES.
Aberdeen and Teraair, Marchioness of (Ishbel Maria). The
musings a LZMXm.- 1936.
Aberdeen and Temair, 1st Marquess and Marchioness of (John
C. Gordon and Ishbel Maria). "We twa"• reminiscences
°£ and Lady AberdeenT vol. I. 192!?.
[Lord-lieutenant of Ireland during Gladstone's third
admini3 tra tion].
Acton, 1st Baron (J.E.E.Dalberg-Acton). Letters of Lord Acton
12 LPreuJ, fla.ufihtefl of r£. lm. W.E.Glaqgtpnq.
Edited by H.Paul. 2nd edition. 1913.
— 3qleptloas ££m lh§ 20ryt?9P9ndqflce of jfte lirgt
Lord Acton. Edited by J.J.Figgis and R.V.Laurence,
vol. I. 1917.
Agg-Gardner (Sir James). ftQffle parliamentary rocQljegtions.
0-927]. [Conservative M.P.],
Anderson (Sir Robert). Tjie lighter side o£ olOjqjal life.
191°. [Home Office post administering secret service
investigations into the activities of Irish extremists,
I867-I088. Wrote a number of the "Parnellism and crime"
articles for The Times].
Arch (Joseph). l&g story of Ms. life £oM Jby Ma££l£. Edited
by the Countess of Warwick. I898. [Founder of the National
Agricultural Labourers' Union. President of the Birmingham
Radical Union, I883. Returned for N.W.Norfolk, Nov. 1885.
Gladstonlan],
Argyll, 8th Duke of (George Douglass Campbell). The Duke of
toxills angiography QQWSPQndqftqe. Edited by
The Dowager Duchess of Argyll, vol. II. I896.
Arnold (Matthew). Letters. 18L8 - 1888. Collected and
arranged by G.W.E.Russell. 2nd edition, vol. i. 1901.
Atherley-Jones (L.A.). Looking back,. 1925. [Gladstonlan
and radical M.P. for N.W.Durhairy.
Balfour, 1st Earl of (Arthur James Balfour). Chanters of
autobiography. Edited by Mrs. Edgar Dugdale [niecej. 1938.
Balfour, Lady Frances, ifg obllviscaris, vol, II. I93O .
LDaughter of Duke of Argyll and sister-in-law to Arthur
BalfourJ.
Bax (Ernest Belfort). Reminiscences and reflections, of &
mid and late Victorian. 1918. [Socialist and member of
the Social Democratic Federation].
Besant (Annie). An autobiorranhv. 2nd edition. I89E.
Birrell (Augustine). Ihinns est redress. 1937.
Bodkin (M.M.). Recollections of an Irish judge. 191'+.
[Nationalist M.P.J,
Bridges (John. A.), Reminiscences of a country politician.
1906. [Active in local politics of Worcestershire.
Conservative],
Bright (John). The diaries of .John Bright. Edited by Philip
Bright. 193°.
— Letters on Home Rule. Birmingham, 1892.
— The -public letters of the rt. hon. J. Bright.
Collected and edited by II.J.Leech. 2nd edition. 1895*
Broadhurst (Henry). Henrv I roadhurst. M.P. told bv himself.
1901. [Working men's representative. Under-Sec. of
State in Home Dept., Jan. - July, 1886],
Burt (Thorns). Thorns Burt : an autobiography. Supplementary
chapters by Aaron Watson. 192*+. [pladstonian and
radical M.F, for Morpeth. Prominent in miners' trade
union movement].
Carpenter (Edward). My. days and dreams. 1916.
Chamberlain (Joseph). The Radical platform. {Chamberlain's
election campaign spee ches, 1885J7 Edinburgh, 1885.
——— Ssagskaa o£ JtllL £&• hm* Chamberlain.
Edited by II.W.Lucy. 1885.
— Horae Rule and the Irish question. Printed by
Rational Radical Union, Birmingham. 1887. {A
Collection of speeches I88I-87J.
Pheg the Irish CWgUflfl. [1887-90] •
Birmingham, 1l>9°.
—-— lk« Chamberlain's speeches. Edited by Charles W.
Boyd, vol, I.191U.
A Political memoir, 1880-92. Edited by C.H.D.
Howard. 1953.
Cbanning (F.A.). memories o£ Midland politics. 188j - 1910.
1918. [Gladstonian radical K.P. for E.horthamptonshireJ.
Churchill (Lady Randolph). The reminiscences of Lady Randolph
Churchill. I9O8.
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Churcb.il! (Lord Randolph). Grcrch. s or Lore. Randolph
Churchill, 1ooC-1Gu3. Edited by J,Jennings. 2 vols.
I009.
Clarke <Sir E.). liu. dor., of ; „ IIa, IS lb. 0»ollci tor-
General, 1336-92. Counsel for Capt. C'Jhoa in divorce
case].
Clynes (J.R.,). Memoirs. 1369-192*+. Vol. I. 1937.
Coates (Thorns F.G.), Lord Kosebery : his lite and speeches,
vol. II. 19C' .
Collings MessO and John L. Green. life of the rt. hon.
Jesse Colliers. [Part I by boilings and Part II by Green}.
1923. [Radical and a champion of the far.: workers.
Liberal Unionist 3.P. and close supporter of Char.iberlain].
Cooke (C.W.R.). lour years In Parliament ut n. hard labour.
1391. [Conservative M.P., <ujqv.) ifd5-92j.
Cooper (Charles A.). editor8 a retrospect. 1396.
[Editor of the leots".an? 1366-97].
Cranbrook, 1st Earl of (Gathorne Hardy), ill one ciu'y :
ii mmlL £ith as&ftlQ&a fror. his. corros; ondence.
vol. II. Edited by A. .Gathorne liardy. 1910.
Daunt (W.J. 8 <eill). £ life srent for Is land. 1396.
[Irish nationalist of the school of Isaac butt. Thought
that under Parnell the home rule movement had become an
agrarian and class war] •
Derby. 15th Earl of (Idward H. Stanley), ■> uocltos and
addressesf Id A- - 1391. vol. II." Edited by 3iFT.II.
Sanderson and I.S.Hoscoe. 139*+.
Devoy (John), [clan na Gael organiser], Devoy's noat I -s r. ,
vol. II. Edited by William G'Lrien and Desmond Ryan.
Dublin. 1953•
Drew (Mrs. '-Sary). Mary Olaustano (brs. Dree] s her diaries
end letters. Edited by Lucy Kasternan. 1930.
— —— cocu downrdo.-.i letters, 1873 - 1911: writtea to
Era. Drew ( is,- ary Gladstone). Edited by Lisle
March-Ehillips and Eertrm Christian, 1917.
Dunlop (Andrew), .lift- years of Iff si .journalism. Dublin.
1911. LPnionistJ.
Dunraven, Earl of (W.T.Wyndham-Cjvin). East tiros opt; mstiros.
2 vols. 1922. [Admirer of Churchill. Under-Gee.,
Colonial Office, 1335 aaG 1336 ~ Dec. 1337. Resigned
because of the "reactionary tendency" of Gov. and because
he disapproved of their Newfoundland policy}.
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Edwards (George). Froip qroy-s,qa£ia& j& Westminster; &n
autobiography. 1922. (Farm workers' championJ.
Escott (T.H.S.). Great 3pL£k2£la£a 5 memories a^d
aaiaoaalifciea. i9ioT^
— EgliUsa ana 1386.
Esher, 2nd Viscount (Reginald Baliol Brett). Journals ant)
AQlit.Qr.g g£ Sa&iaalg Viggpmt Mfcer* ikZ2 - 1232 : edited
by Maurice V, Brett, vol. I. 193^+. L-Private sec. to
Hartlngton. 1878-85. M.P. 1880-85 s defeated, general
election 1385].
Farquharson (Robert). In. and out of Parliament. 1911.
[Gladstonian M.P.].
Fawcett (Mrs. M.G.). What 1 remember. 192b, [Active in the
founding and running of the Women's Liberal Unionist
Association],
Gladstone, 1st Viscount (Herbert Gladstone), After thirty
years. 3rd edition. 1929.
Gladstone (William Ewart). Gladstone's speeches. Edited by
A.T.Bassett. 1916.
Gj&flatoaa to M& wi£g {letters]. Edited by
A.T.Bassett, 193o.
Goschen, 1st Viscount (George J.Goschen). Political speeches
fleliVOTfl tiWAm 1G& general election. 1885. Edinburgh,
1886.
Lord Goschen and his friends. Edited by Percy
Colson. l_19l+6J. [Mainly letters of whicli most of the
more important had already been published].
Griffith-Boscawen (Sir Arthur). Memories. 1925.
Haldane (Elizabeth Sanderson). From one century to another.
1937. (lister of Vise. Haldane].
Haldane, Viscount, of Cloan (Richard Burdon Haldane). An
autdbioEfap'qy. 1929.
Hamilton (Lord Ernest). Forty years on. 1922. [Conservative
M.P. for N. Tyrone, 1885-lo86].
Hamilton (Lord G.). PgjdJL&Sga&glX reifaMWflPgg &nd refleqtiqm,
1868-1906. 2 vols.1917.Hirst Lord of the Admiralty,
1885-18H6 and 1886-1892].
Hafiqqrfl' g Parljan^ayy Debates.
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Harris (Frank). Frank Harris s an autobiograpiy. Edited by
Grant Richards. 19}+7. [Editor Evening Lews (Cons.),
1883-87 and 1 ortnirht v Review, 1883-9;;].
Harrison (Frederick). An tob iog.raid ileal memoirs. 2 vols.
1911. [Lawyer, historian, etc. Liberal. Unsuccessful
candidate, July 1886J.
Healy (Timothy Michael). Letters and leaders of my day.
2 vols. 1928. Ui.P. and a leader in the nationalist
party. Irish bar].
K&Y Ireland XSL SQt a syrycy q£ two, ity yefirs
Dublin. I890.
Hlgginbottorn (F.J.). The vivid. life s a .journalist* s ca^ogr.
193b. [Wide experience of parliamentary journalism and
of Ireland],
Hyndman H-I.M.). hurther reminiscences. 1912. [Founder of
Social Democratic Federation],
Jeans (William) • Parliamentary reminiscences.. 1912.
[Press gallery journalist],
Kilbracken, 1st Baron, (Arthur JSodley). Reminiscences of
Lord ivllbrackeii. 1931- [Private secretary to Gladstone
I872-71'- and 1880-82. Permanent under secretary of
state for India I883-I9G9J.
Kirk (R.S.). "Recollections of Chamberlain and his times",
The Searchlight, Birmingham, 13 Uov. 1913-
Lansbury (George). My Life. 1928. [Radical and trade
unionist],
— L,ooiq,ag pacljwar^s. - and forwards. 193b'-
Leveson Gower (8ir George). Years of content. 1910.
[^ss. private secretary to Gladstone, 1880-85. Elected
to Pari. Dec. 1885 and appointed Junior Lord of the
Treasury, Feb. 1686. Defeated July I806. Gladstonian],
~ The. years o£ endeavour, 1886 - 1202. 19b2.
Long _(Walter), Viscount of Wraxall. Memories. 1923.
[Pari, sec. to the Local Gov. Board, 1886-1892].
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Nevill. Edited by her son Ralph Nevill, I9O6.
—— Under five reigns. 1910.
*69
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Rpsefrftpy'i? ap,eggh9fl (!&&-,3.69$). I896.
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Sexton (Sir James). Agitator. 1936. [irish nationalist
and Liverpool dockers' trade union organiser].
Sidgwick (Henry). Henrv Sldgvlok s a. memoir by Arthur and
Eleanor Sidgwick. I906,[included here because it
consists largely of extracts from Sldgwick's letters,
autobiographies and diaries. He was an active Liberal
UnionistJ.
Smillie (Robert), ly 14£e £or l§k2B£. 192lf.
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Armour (W.S.). ir. 'onr of 1 t llv.o-icy. 193*+. [Irish
Presbyterian clergyman. Liberal Unionist, but became
Hot© Ruler in IS92].
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1910. ytep-son of w.E.Forster and grandson of Dr.
Arnold of Rugby, Liberal Unionist].
A skyith, 1st Faron (G.R.Asltwith). X-ord Janes of ■ -rofurd. 193°.
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A.A.Bautiann edited by I . Wolfe. 1936.
Birrell (Augustine). Air 1 ran!;. . oclcwrou. 2nd edition. 1698.
[Gladstoninn i • 1 .].
Birrell (Frances). Gladstone. 1933.
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Briggs-Davldson (John). Ceorrv JynLhrn. 1951. [Private Sec.
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Cecil (Lady cwendolsn) [daughter!. Life pf Robert. Marouess
of Jalisburv. vols, ill and IV. 1931-32.
Childers (Lieut.-Col. Spencer) [son], Life and correspondence
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I8g^3£gy» 1939. (^Contains a history of the Fortnightly
Review].
Creswicke (Louis). Life of Joseph Chamberlain. vol. II. 190^.
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July 18863.
Du Parcq (Berbert) • ui..o 01; i-ov. -■ blovu Cco.t.V'.m, vol. I, 1912.
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Pureell (I'dunnd Sheridan) , Life of Cardinal < . caning.
Archbishop of Westminster. vol.* II. 2nd edition. IS96.
Haihes (Ilenry St. J .). 2;o life am. letters of : oni';/ Cecil
HaIke5. I898. [Conservative i .1 Cambridge I'niversity.
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I artist [Radical Unionist, Wuekly],
1 irnlnrban Dal.lv o.,t [kadical UhionistJ,
1 lackwooda HamSte.
J'fflW* £*g££ggls I&3&S3 fee Church. Unionist I iberal.Discontinued April I806],
British weekly [Free Church weekly. Independent, Radical,
Tirst issued Kov. 1886J,
ehrlstlnn | lie [Unitarian weekly. Liberal Unionist],
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'
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Daily Hews (Gladstonian].
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..ionconfornist and Independent Congregational weekly.
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North American Review.
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Westminster Review.
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The Truth about the Irish election of 138 p bv the defeated
51kZZl^r7l"rl"T.7TPu33r^ot "llFtedTT ""&"lso^sneeches
feprjat? ££c^ ifj¥spnper§ a^c periodicals &££ t&t listed.
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±6 £Lol°ZZ lQ£ j&£ 3A£fe °£ .U;.. ilk. lm. E.k.Claptons5 2£,
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Baker (T.B.L.), To neighbour, the new f^ectorg.!
Gloucester, 1685.
Baker (W.). T££ PfaTffft j&e Xig&2£&. di2 appqaj. j& facta.
1386.
Bartlett (Sir I. Ashraead). Union or separation . . . also,
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